Judgment :- Thomas, J. Both parties won as well as lost in Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority. When the landlord won the case in regard to the ground. under S.11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the act), he lost to the tenant in regard to the ground under S.11(3). Both sides went in appeal and the Appellate Authority dismissed both appeals. Hence both parties have filed these separate revisions. 2. Regarding the ground under S.11(3) of the Act, the factual position as found by the two lower authorities is this: This building belonged to the father of the present landlord. He died in 1982. Another building which belonged to him was in the possession of some other person and that became vacant. The present landlord, who is one of the co-owners of that building, did not occupy it for any business use even though it became vacant in 1982 itself. In 1985 he and the other co-owners executed a partition deed as per which the petition schedule building was allotted to the share of the landlord. Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority found concurrently that the claim of the landlord was not bona tide mainly due to the fact that he did not choose to occupy the other vacant building for starting the business which he proposes to do in the petition schedule building. 3. After admit ting the fact that till the partition of 1985 the other building (which fell vacant) was not used by the landlord, his learned counsel contended that ownership of a fractional right in another building is not enough to use the ban contained in the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act to resist the claim of the landlord. In other words, according to the learned counsel, unless the landlord is the full and absolute owner of the other building, he is not liable to be deprived of the benefit of eviction order on the ground under S.11(3), if he is otherwise entitled to it. In support of the above contention, learned counsel invited our attention to two decisions of this court (vide Rainakrishnan v. Gopalan Moolhcin,1971 KLT427 Tlwnias liuby v. CheriaiiThressiainma,1973 KLT 1043). In support of the above contention, learned counsel invited our attention to two decisions of this court (vide Rainakrishnan v. Gopalan Moolhcin,1971 KLT427 Tlwnias liuby v. CheriaiiThressiainma,1973 KLT 1043). In the former, a learned single judge (Sadasivan, J.) has held that for the operation of the bar contained in the pro viso, petitioner/ landlord should have owned and possessed another building exclusively for himself. Learned Judge observed further that "in my view, a mere right of residence or some interest in the family house will not, by itself, debar him from claiming possession of the rented building". In the latter decision, Bhaskaran, J. (as His Lordship then was) was considering the claim of a widow who in her seventies expressed a desire to live separate from her children with whom she was residing in a house which jointly belonged to them all. Learned Judge held that Rent Controller was wrong in using the ban contained in the first proviso to deny her of the right to evict, the tenant by observing that "the ownership contemplated in the first proviso to sub-section (3) of S.11, in my opinion, is to the absolute ownership, not to a fractional interest which does not entitle such person to have exclusive occupation of the building or any particular portion thereof which could be conveniently used as a separate place of residence. 4. Learned counsel for the tenant argued that the premise adopted in the aforesaid two decisions is no longer good law in the light of some subsequent decisions rendered by Supreme Court declaring that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner is (vide Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jaganna (AIR 1976 SC 2335), Kanta Gael v. B.P. Palhak (AIR 1977 SC 1599) and Anupama Sen Gupta v. Deb Kumar Sen Sarma (AIR 1982 SC 25). Those decisions were followed by one of us (Thomas, J.) in Krishnan Nair v. Lekshmi Amrna (1986 KLT 558) for holding that a co-owner of the building is also a landlord as defined in S.2(3) of the Act. 5. For appreciating the rival contentions a closer reading of the first proviso to S.11(3) is useful. Those decisions were followed by one of us (Thomas, J.) in Krishnan Nair v. Lekshmi Amrna (1986 KLT 558) for holding that a co-owner of the building is also a landlord as defined in S.2(3) of the Act. 5. For appreciating the rival contentions a closer reading of the first proviso to S.11(3) is useful. It is extracted below: " Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so." 6. Learned counsel for the landlord made an endeavour to distinguish the decisions of the Supreme Court (cited supra) by giving emphasis to the words "his own in his possession" appearing in the first proviso to S.11(3). According to the counsel the aforesaid words would sufficiently indicate that ownership contemplated in the first proviso is exclusive ownership and not any fractional ownership. In the context we may point out that we have held in Kariyalh Raghavan v. Akkanisseri Govindan Nambiar (CRP.No. 2517/94) that the principle embodied in the first proviso has in fact been traceable as embedded in the main body of Section 11(3) itself and that it was separately recast in the form of a proviso only for setting the burden of proof in proceedings for eviction under the Act. 7. When a co-owner can be the landlord for the purpose of S.11(3), is it necessary, for the application of the first proviso, that the other building should belong to him exclusively? Would it mailer so much if his ownership is as dial of a co-owner? When we understood the scope of the first proviso in the manner indicated in our judgment in Kariyalh Ragluivan's case, we arc of the further opinion dial even if the landlord is only a co-owner in respect of the other building in his possession, the burden is on such landlord to satisfy the Rent Control Court that inspite of his having possession of another building there are special reasons by which the order of eviction can still be granted under S.11(3). This means the mere fad I hat ownership of the landlord over the other building is that of a co-owner is no reason to keep the first proviso at bay when the landlord seeks for eviction under S.11(3). The words "has another building of his own in his possession" in the first proviso can be understood to mean that the landlord has another building over which he has ownership and possession. The mere fact dial such ownership is only a part ownership does not mailer much if he has possession of that building. We therefore agree with the contentions of Sri.MR. Parameswaran, learned counsel for the tenant that exclusive ownership of the landlord over the other building is not sine, quo nun for invoking the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. 8. As such, no interference is called for with the findings of the two authorities in regard to the bona fides of the landlord's claim under S.11(3) of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the tenant assailed the other finding against him that he ceased to occupy the petition schedule bailding. We do not see any valid ground to disturb such finding. Landlord has averred in the original petition that the> tenant-firm stopped its business on 31-3-1979 and the telephone connection in the building was snapped on 23-6-1979 and the electric power supply was also disconnected from the building. Though in the objections tenant had denied those averments, those facts were substantiated in evidence. In fact Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority founded their conclusion on those facts. As a revisional court, we are unable to interfere with such fact finding. In the result we dismiss both the revisions. However, as the learned counsel for the tenant pleaded for some more time to make alternative arrangements, we allow him to remain in the premises for three monodies from today for the said purpose on the following condition. The tenant shall give an unconditional undertaking before the execution court within ten days from today that he would surrender vacant possession to the landlord on or before the expiry of three months from today. If any such undertaking is given the execution court shall allow the tenant to remain in the premises for that much period. If he fails to give the undertaking in the manner indicated above, he will not be entitled to this benefit.