JUDGMENT : 1. It appears that on 29th July, 1995 the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Manipur passed an order bearing No. 1/4(1)/ 95-SP(LA) whereby he gave reasons for exercising powers conferred upon him under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India to disqualify any member of the Legislative Assembly with immediate effect for having given up the membership of a political party to which he belonged. In consequence of the reasons given by that order on the very same day the Deputy Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, Manipur converted the disqualification by an order informing the file M.L.As of that disqualification. This order which was printed in the Manipur Legislative Assembly Secretariat Bulletin Pat II was questioned by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Gauhati High Court and it came up for hearing before the Imphal Bench presided over by P.K. Ghosh, J. It appears that in the meantime some matter appeared in the local newspaper "Freedom" dated 31st July, 1995 which led Ghosh, J. to decline to hear the matter. His colleague H.K. Sema, J. had also declined to take up Civil Rules Nis. 460/ 95, 469/95 and 470/95 between the same parties and hence, Ghosh, J. assed an order declining to take up Civil Rule No. 490/ 95. He passed an order that the case be laid before the Chief Justice for disposal by himself or by any other learned single Judge to whom it was assigned. It appears that after the above order was made the matter came up before M. Sharma, J. who took up the matter for hearing. At that time, counsel for the petitioner filed an application seeking permission to withdraw Civil Rule No. 3284/95 (Gau) Civil Rule No. 490/95 (Imphal) with liberty Judge after hearing Rule, if so advised. The learned Judge after hearing learned counsel for both the sides allowed the withdrawal of the Civil Rule but refused to grant the permission reserving liberty to file a fresh petition, if so advised. Accordingly, Civil rule No. 3284/95 (Gau) Civil Rule No. 490/95 (Imphal) came to be dismissed as withdrawn. The miscellaneous petition which was filed in the said Rule was also disposed of as such. Against this order of the learned Judge, no further proceedings have been taken. 2. Accordingly, Civil rule No. 3284/95 (Gau) Civil Rule No. 490/95 (Imphal) came to be dismissed as withdrawn. The miscellaneous petition which was filed in the said Rule was also disposed of as such. Against this order of the learned Judge, no further proceedings have been taken. 2. It appears that thereafter the present special leave petition came to be filed from the reasoned order of the Speaker bearing No. 1/4(1)/95-SP(LA) dated 29th July, 1995. The contention of the petitioner that in the present proceeding since he is not questioning the order of the Legislative Assembly, which appeared in Bulletin Part II, which was the subject matter of challenge in the earlier Civil Rule, he was not debarred from challenging the aforementioned order as an order of the Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution. A preliminary objection has been raised that the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is not maintainable in view of the withdrawal of Civil Rule referred to earlier on 11th August, 1995, by which date the petitioner, in any case, was aware of the order impugned in this petition. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that since M. Sharma, J. passed order dismissing the Civil Rule No. 3284/ 95 (Gau) Civil Rule No. 490/95 (Imphal), the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution questioning the very same order of disqualification was not maintainable. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport, Appellate Tribunal 1987 (1) SCR 200 . The facts of that case were that the petitioner had withdrawn the earlier petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution without permission of the court to file a fresh petition. Later, he filed another petition against the very same order and the High Court summarily dismissed it taking the view that no second writ petition lies against the same order since the earlier petition was withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition having been obtained. In appeal preferred under Article 136 this Court held that the High Court was right in holding that a fresh petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. In appeal preferred under Article 136 this Court held that the High Court was right in holding that a fresh petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. Reliance was placed on the principle underlying Order 23 Rule I of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter again after abandoning the earlier suit by withdrawing the same without obtaining the Court's permission to file a fresh suit., This Court held that the said principle should, in the interest of justice and not he ground of public policy, be extended to withdrawal of writ petitions also. Therefore, where a petitioner withdraws a writ petition without permission to institute a fresh writ petition in relation to the same subject matter he must be deemed to have abandoned the remedy in respect of that cause of action and must be debarred from filing a fresh petition. That is because the principle embodied in the aforesaid Rule of the Code is founded on sound public policy so that a party is not vexed over again in respect of the same subject matter. That would prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. At the same time, this Court noted that such withdrawal would not debar other remedies like a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court in a case involving the question of enforcement of fundamental rights because the withdrawal would not operate as res judicata, there being no decision on merits of the High Court. 3. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court based on the principle of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, which in turn is based on the public policy that a litigant will not be vexed twice. we find that this petition brought under Article 136 of the Constitution is unsustainable. 3. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court based on the principle of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, which in turn is based on the public policy that a litigant will not be vexed twice. we find that this petition brought under Article 136 of the Constitution is unsustainable. However, counsel for the petitioner submitted that while in the earlier petition filed in the Gauhati High Court, the challenge was restricted to the order appearing in Bulletin Part II of the Manipur Legislative Assembly Secretariat, the challenge in the present petition is to the Speaker's order, of course, of even date. It must, however, be realised that the order appearing in the Bulletin Part II was in consequence of the order passed by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. In any case, by the date the writ petition was withdrawn, the petitioner was aware of the order impugned in this petition and therefore, this distinction which is sought to be drawn is meaningless because the petitioner knew that the order which he had challenged in the writ petition before the High Court was in consequence of the order passed by the Speaker which is the subject matter of challenge in the present proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution. The proper course in that case was to amend the writ petition rather than to withdraw it. It was for the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner to decide whether he should withdraw the writ petition when the learned Single Judge was disc lined to reserve onto the petitioner the liberty to file a fresh writ petition if so advised. Not only that, even thereafter, the petitioner has acquired that order and has not made it the subject matter of any further proceedings by way of review or an appeal under Article 2136 of the Constitution to this Court. That is the reason why relying on the principle underlying Orders XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Court observed that it tantamount-ed to abandonment of proceedings. That being so, we do not entertain this petition. The special leave petition is dismissed. SLP (C) Nos. 19365, 19380, 19383/95 4. For the reasons recorded in SLP(C) No. 19126/95, these petitions are also dismissed.