By order dated 23.6.95 all writ applications were rejected and reasoned order I am delivering today i.e. 29.6.95. 2. These Civil Rules have been filed by the petitioners with the prayers to direct the respondents to include the petitioners in the scheme for regularisation formulated on 14.2.91 vide Annexure B to the writ application i.e. Civil Rule No.3860 of 1993 as being done in case of other similarly situated work contract labourers and with a further direction to the respondents to fix the equal rate of wages with regard to the petitioners for the same and equal job as being paid to other work contract labourers who have been included in the scheme for regularisation. 3. The admitted position is that by Annexure B to the writ application on 14.2.91, the management agreed to regularise selected 456 numbers of work charged labourers in phased manner after the existing casual contract labourers regularisation is over, as per the Memorandum of Settlement dated 11.9.1989, and it was further agreed that this regularisation will be in continuation of the last phase of casual contract labourers regularisation. It was further agreed that pending regularisation of listed work charged labourers they will be paid same and similar wages payable to casual contract labourers with effect from 1.4.91 and these 456 labourers will be called work charged labourer(R). Annexure B to the writ application i.e. Civil Rule No.3860 of 1993 is quoted below: "Memorandum of settlement signed between the Management of Oil India Ltd, Duliajan and the workman represented through Asom Tells Thikadari Shramik Santha, Duliajan (ATTSS) Regd. No.D/23/87 arrived at on 14.2.91 in presence of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and Conciliation Officer, Guwahati. Following parties were present Representatting employer: 1. Col. P. Baruah, CI, RM, 2. Shri A. Anand, Manager (IR). 3. Shri HC Talukdar, IRO. 4. Shri DD Khaund, Asstt IRM. 5. Shri BN Doley, Senior IRO. 6. Shri AK Khotoniar, Sr Engineer Representing workman : 1. Shri Lika Dhodumia, President. 2. Shri Khira Phukan, Secretary. 3. Shri Binud Chetia, Member. 4. Shri Rajen Sarma, Member. 5. Shri Aboni Gogoi, Member. 6. Shri A. Anand, Manager (IR). 3. Shri HC Talukdar, IRO. 4. Shri DD Khaund, Asstt IRM. 5. Shri BN Doley, Senior IRO. 6. Shri AK Khotoniar, Sr Engineer Representing workman : 1. Shri Lika Dhodumia, President. 2. Shri Khira Phukan, Secretary. 3. Shri Binud Chetia, Member. 4. Shri Rajen Sarma, Member. 5. Shri Aboni Gogoi, Member. 6. Shri Nandeswar Khaund, Member Short Recital of the case The demand of regularisation of WCLs working against permanent/perennial nature of job in Oil India Ltd. was raised by the Assam Tilla Thikadari Shramik Santha, along with their demand of regularisation of CCLs, several rounds discussion at bi-partite as well as tripartite level were held and a detailed enquiry for identification of WCLs working against perennial jobs was also made jointly by the Management, Union and the Regional Labour Commissioner, Guwahati. After considering all the aspects of the problem the parties resolved the dispute amicably on 14.2.91 on the following terms and conditions : TERMS AND SETTLEMENT 1 .The Management agreed to regularise selected456 member of WCLs in phased manner after the existing CCLs regularisation is over, as per the Memorandum of Settlement dated 11.9.1989. This regularisation will be in continuation of the last phase of CCLs regularisation. 2. Pending regularisation of listed WCLs they will be paid same and similar wages payable to CCLs wef 1.4.91 and hereinafter they will be called WCL (R). They will be given key number accordingly identifying them as WCL (R). 3. Both the parties agreed that the finalised list of WCLs shall be divided into groups viz local WCLs (R) (from the State of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh) and non local WCLs (R) (from other States) and the regularisation will be made in the ratio of 5.1. 4. The age limit for regularisation of each WCL(R) shall be 45 years as on 1.3.91. 5. Other conditions of regularisation shall remain the same as have been agreed upon vide Memorandum of Settlement dated 11..9.89 with regard to CCLs. The Union agreed not to raise any demand whatsoever in connection with the WCLs pending completion of regularisation of the WCL(R). Management representatives Union representatives 1.Sd/- 2. Sd/- 1.Sd/- 2. Sd/- 3. Sd/- 4. Sd/- 3.Sd/- 4. Sd/- 5. Sd/- 6. Sd/- 5. Sd- 6. Sd/-" 4. The bone of contention is that whether this is a policy decision of the management and/or is a settlement under Industrial Disputes Act. Management representatives Union representatives 1.Sd/- 2. Sd/- 1.Sd/- 2. Sd/- 3. Sd/- 4. Sd/- 3.Sd/- 4. Sd/- 5. Sd/- 6. Sd/- 5. Sd- 6. Sd/-" 4. The bone of contention is that whether this is a policy decision of the management and/or is a settlement under Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioners claim that this is a policy decision and as such they have a right to the same benefits. In paragraph 6 and 7 of the writ application i.e. Civil Rule No.3860 of 1993 it is stated as follows : " Para 6: That the petitioner beg to state that their cause for regularisation were raised by two different Unions namely Asom Toila Shramik Santha and Oil India Workers Association. At the instance of these Unions a scheme of regularisation of casual contract labours engaged in perennial nature of job was formulated on 11.9.89. It was inter alia stipulated that 300 casual contract labours would be regularised in the financial year 1989-90. Remaining casual contract labours would be regularised in phased manner. The entire process of regularisation would be finalised within a period of eight years. The term perennial was also defined as perennial means those who have put 240 days work on a job in any of the year since 1982. Para 7 : That the aforesaid scheme for regularisation was with respect to the casual contract labour (WCL). Work contract labours (WCL) were not included in the scheme. The work contract labours are performing identifical or similar nature of job. They are also entitled to be regularised. Their cause of regularisation was exposed by the existing Union and ultimately a scheme for regularisation of the work contract labours was formulated at the intervention of the Labour Commissioner, the respondent No.3 on 14.2.92. It has been inter alia stipulated that the work contract labours (WCL) working against permanent perennial nature of job shall be regularised in a phased manner after regularisation of aforesaid casual contract labours. The existing benefit conferred upon these concerned work contract labours (WCL) are that they would get the same rate of wages as being paid to the casual contract labours which is equal to the rate of wages paid to the regular employee employed by the principal employee. There are numbers work contract labours out of which 456 labours have been included in the scheme. There are numbers work contract labours out of which 456 labours have been included in the scheme. Remaining work contract labours have been left out from this scheme." 5. The further admitted position is that the petitioners along with others raised the disputes regarding none regularisation of their services with the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), respondent No.3 and the respondent No.3 after protracted conciliation has submitted his failure report which has been received by the appropriate Govt. and the appropriate Govt. refused to refer the matter as claimed and as against that a writ application is pending before this Court. The other admitted position is that these petitioners are the contract labourers under the Contract Labour (Regularisation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and not the workman of Oil India Limited, the respondent No.2 in this writ application. 6.1 have heard Shri A.Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Shri JP Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the respondent No.2 in all the Civil Rules. Shri Bhattacharjee raises an objection that these writ applications are not maintainable in view of the fact that these writ petitioners have an alternative adequate efficacious remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act and that remedy is being pursued by these petitioners and they cannot take resort to this application under Article 226 of the Constitution. He further submits that even on merit under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not competent to issue any Mandamus as prayed for by the petitioners. On the other hand, Shri Dasgupta submits that the petitioners can pursue remedy and have a relief as claimed by them in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 7. Let us first take up the question that whether Annexure A and B to the writ application i.e. two documents dated 11.9.89 and 14.2.91 respectively are the settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act or is a policy decision of the Management. A bare perusal of these two documents will show that this is a settlement as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act define settlement. A bare perusal of these two documents will show that this is a settlement as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act define settlement. That is quoted below : "Section 2 (p) : 'Settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workman arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer." 8. An analysis of decision of settlement would show that it contemplates only two kinds of settlements : (i) A settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings under the Act i.e. which is arrived at with the assistance and concurrence of the Conciliation Officer and (ii) a written agreement between the employer and the workman arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. But written agreement of the latter kind in order to fall within the definition must satisfy two more conditions, namely: (a) it must have been signed by the parties thereto in the prescribed manner, and (b) a copy thereof must have been sent to the authorities indicated in section 2 (P). 9. The consequences of the aforesaid two agreements of settlement which are quite distinct are set out in section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The effect of settlement of the first kind is indicated in sub-section (3) and that of the second in sub- section (1) of section 18 of the Act. It is clear from a persual of section 18 that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding is binding not only in the actual parties to the industrial dispute but also on the heirs, successors of assignees of the employers on one hand and all the workman in the establishment present or future, on the other. In extending operation of such settlement beyond parties thereto sub-section (3) of the section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. It is clear beyond doubt that a settlement which is made binding under section 18 is a settlement arrived at with the assistance and concurrence of the Conciliation Officer. In extending operation of such settlement beyond parties thereto sub-section (3) of the section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. It is clear beyond doubt that a settlement which is made binding under section 18 is a settlement arrived at with the assistance and concurrence of the Conciliation Officer. The provisions of section 18 (3) of the Act is not controlled by any Order or Act or the appropriate Government, as is evident from the provision of the section 12 (3) of the Act. Accordingly, absence of a report under section 12 (3) would not vitiate the settlement between the parties to it. It can stand by itself an J bind the parties and other persons as provided in section 18 (3) of the Art) The matter is further settled that in order that a settlement reached in the course of conciliation proceedings should be valid and binding on all employees, it is not necessary that if there are several unions, all those unions should be represented. It is enough if the settlement reached is one which concern all the employees of the employer or a dispute common to all the employees of the employer. The fact that the other union was not a party to the conciliation proceedings does not take away the binding effect of a settlement of a dispute which concerns all the employees. If the settlement is a fair and bonafide one and that it is entered by majority of the workers it will bind all irrespective of the fact that some of the workmen were parties to the settlement and were opposed to it. Section 19 (2) of the Act provides the priod regarding binding nature of the agreement. Where a period is agreed upon by the parties to the settlement for its operation then the expiry of that period, the settlement continues to bind the parties until notice in writing is given of an intention to terminate the settlement and two months thereafter for expiry. Where a period is agreed upon by the parties to the settlement for its operation then the expiry of that period, the settlement continues to bind the parties until notice in writing is given of an intention to terminate the settlement and two months thereafter for expiry. ^Where the parties have not provided the period during which the settlement should be in operation, section 19 (2) of the Act creats statutory period of six month during which that settlement will be in operation and directs that the period during which the settlement shall be in operation shall not expire but shall continue to be in operation and to bind the parties until the expiry of two months of the notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party to the settlement. That has not been done in this case. Accordingly, I find that the Annexure B to the writ application i.e. Civil Rule No.3860 of 1993 on the basis of which relief is claimed by the petitioners is a settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act and 1 further hold that the same is binding on all the petitioners. 10. The next question is whether I can issue a Mandamus as prayed for by the petitioners. In this connection it is to be noted that the admitted position is that the petitioners are contract labourers and are covered by the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called the Act) and the question is that whether the Court is competent to issue a Mandamus as prayed for by the petitioners. All the provisions of this Act except section 10 are regulatory in nature. Only section 10 provides for prohibition of employment of contract labour. Section 10 is quoted below : "10. Prohibition of employment of contract labour - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Prohibition of employment of contract labour - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. (2) Before issuing any notification under sub-section (1) in relation to an establishment, the appropriate Government shall have regard to the condition of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in that establishment and other relevant factors, such as - (a) where the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment; (b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is so of sufficient duration having regard to the nature of industry, trade, business, manufacture or Occupation carried on in that establishment; (c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workman in that establishment or an establishment similar thereto; (d) whether it is sufficient to employee considerable number of whole time workmen." 11. So, it will be seen from this section that it is the power of the appropriate Government to prohibit the employment of contract labour. The Court cannot exercise that power. 12. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance was placed on the following decisions : (i)1985 Lab 1C 1733( HD Singh vs. Reserve Bank of India & others) wherein reliance is placed in paragraph 8, that was case where the appellant was a Tikka Mazdoor with the Reserve Bank of India. The Tikka Mazdoor is a person who helps the Examiners of coins/notes. He was so selected by the Reserve Bank of India and a letter of appointment was issued to him. The admitted position is that he worked for 240 days in the year, and latter on he was thrown out from service and that was challenged by raising an industrial disputes and the matter ultimetly came up before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in that connection pointed out that the burden was on the Bank to establish by producing necessary records to show that he did not work for 240 days as claimed. I do not understand how this case can help the petitioners because the admitted position in this case is that the petitioners are not the employee of the Oil India Limited and that was also agreed to in the settlement mentioned above. (ii) The next case relied on is (1994) 5 SCC 304 (RK Panda & others vs. Steel Authority of India & others). There it was a case of labourers employed through contractors at Rourkela Plant of the Steel Authority of India who claimed parity in pay with regular employees and also regularisation in the employment of the said authority. It was claimed by them that they were continuously working for the period from i 0 to 20 years and were being treated as contract labourers only for defeating their claims. It was further claimed that the contractors used to be changed but the new contracts were brought and under the terms of agreement these new contractors were bound to retain the workers of the predecessor contractors. Out of 246 jobs in the Steel Plant, the State Government of Orissa identified 106 jobs for abolishing contract labour and the remaining 142 jobs is contract labour continued. The Supreme Court in that judgment relied on its earlier decision reported in (1991) 2 SCC 176 (Mathura Refinery Mazdoor Sangh vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd) and (1992) 1 SCC 695 (Dena Nath vs. National Fertilisers Ltd) and pointed out that the Court cannot direct the Management to absorb the labourers without having found that these labourers have direct connection with the Management. In paragraph 7, the law has been laid down as follows :- " It is true that with the passage of time and purely with a view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal employers while renewing the contracts have been insisting that the contractor or the new contractor retains the old employees. In fact such a condition is incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularisation in the employment of the principal employer. In fact such a condition is incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularisation in the employment of the principal employer. Whether the contract labourers have become the employees of the principal employer in the course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, as has been urged in this case, is a question of fact and has to be established by the contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High Court or this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. It need to be pointed out that in all such cases, the labourers are initially employed and engaged by the contractors. As such at what point of time a direct link is established between the IA contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene is a matter which has to be established on material produced before the Court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent forum to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them." (iii) Next case is AIR 1990 SC 532 (Sankar Mukharjee & others vs. Union of India & others) wherein reliance is placed in paragraph 6 of the judgment which is quoted below : " It is surprising that more than forty years after the independence the practice of employing labour through contractors by big companies including public sector companies is still being accepted as a normal feature of labour-employment. There is no security of service to the workman and their wages-are far below than that of the regular workman of the company. This Court in Standard Vaccum Refining Co. of India Ltd. vs. Its workman, (1960) 3 SCR 466 : AIR 1960 SC 948 and Catering Cleaners of Southern Railway vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 700 : AIR 1987 SC 777 has disapproved the system of contract labour holding it to be 'archaic', 'primitive' and of 'baneful nature'. This Court in Standard Vaccum Refining Co. of India Ltd. vs. Its workman, (1960) 3 SCR 466 : AIR 1960 SC 948 and Catering Cleaners of Southern Railway vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 700 : AIR 1987 SC 777 has disapproved the system of contract labour holding it to be 'archaic', 'primitive' and of 'baneful nature'. The system which is nothing but an improved version of bounded-labour, is sought to be abolished by the Act. The Act is an important piece of social legislation for the welfare of labourers and has to be liberally construed." That judgment in no way helps the petitioners in deciding the present controversy. The power to abolish the system is with an appropriate Government and the Court is not competent to exercise that power. (iv) The next case is 1995 (3) SCALE 499 (Gujrat Electricity Board, Thermal Power Station, Ukal, Gujarat vs. Hind Mazdoor Sabha & others) wherein the law was laid down as follows by the Supreme Court :- "(a) It cannot be disputed that the direct workmen of the principal employer can espouse an industrial dispute for absorption of the contractor's workmen and the industrial adjudicator will have jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and grant the necessary relief. (b) If the workmen of the so-called contractor allege that in fact the contract is sham and they are in fact the workmen of the principal employer, they may raise the dispute themselves not for abolition of the contract labour system, but for making available to them the appropriate service conditions. (c) If, however, the contract is genuine, the direct workmen of the principal employers may espouse the industrial dispute for abolition of the contract labour system and for absorption of the contractor's workmen as the direct workmen of the principal employer, (para 51). (d) If the labour contract is genuine a composite industrial dispute can still be raised for abolition of the contract labour and their absorption. (e) When such dispute is raised by the direct workmen of the principal employer, the industrial adjudicator can entertain the reference; but in view of the provisions of section 10 of the Act, he will have first to direct the workmen to approach the appropriate Government for considering the question as to whether the contract labour in question should or should not be abolished under the said provisions. If, on such reference being made by the workmen, the appropriate Government does not abolish the contract labour, the industrial adjudicator has to reject the reference since the jurisdiction to abolish the contract is exclusively vested hi the appropriate Government and he has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. (f) If the appropriate Government abolishes the contract labour, the industrial adjudicator can proceed to decide (i) as to whether the erstwhile contract labour should be absorbed in the principal establishment; (ii) if so, to what extent and (iii) on what terms. (g) However, it is not correct to say that the reference for the abolition of the contract, itself stands barred. It is the terms of the reference which will determine the jurisdiction of the industrial adjudicator to entertain and decide the reference. (h) It is not correct to say that the Contract Labour Act is a complete Code by itself and, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to give a direction to the principal employer to absorb the workmen in question. (i) There is nothing in the Act which can be construed to have desprived the industrial adjudicator of the jurisdiction to determine the same. So long as, therefore, the said jurisdiction has not been taken away from the industrial adjudicator by any express provision of the Act or of any other statute, it will have to be held that the said jurisdiction which, as pointed out. above, has been recognised even by the decision in Dimakuchi and Standard Vacum cases (supra) continues to exist. (j) The industrial adjudicator can certainly make a contract between the workmen of the ex-contractor and the principal employer and direct the principal employer to absorb such of them and on such terms as the adjudicator may determine in the facts of each case." 13. This case also in spite of helping the petitioners helps the respondents inasmuch as it specifically points out that the forum is the Industrial Tribunal and it is the Industrial Tribunal which have some power in the matter and the writ Court cannot exercise that power. 14. This case also in spite of helping the petitioners helps the respondents inasmuch as it specifically points out that the forum is the Industrial Tribunal and it is the Industrial Tribunal which have some power in the matter and the writ Court cannot exercise that power. 14. Shri Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents No.2 in all the Civil Rules regarding prayer for equal wage claimed by the petitioners relies on AIR 1985 SC 409 (BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar & others vs. Union of India & others) and points out that this Court has no jurisdiction to determine that matter. The jurisdiction is of different authority. In this case, the law has been laid down as follows :- " Similarly the question whether the work done by contract labour is the same or similar work as that done by the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of any establishment is a matter to be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner under the proviso to Rule 25(ii) (v) (a)." 15. This being the position, there is no merit in these writ applications and accordingly, the same are rejected. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.