LAKSHMAMMA, ALIAS LAKAMMA v. SOMBEGOWDA S/O KODIGOWDA
1995-03-07
G.C.BHARUKA
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred by defendant No. 3. The plaintiff had brought the present suit for declaration of his title over the suit lands and grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the same. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff had purchased the suit property under a registered sale deed dated 17-5-1977 (Ex. P-1) executed by defendants 7 and 8. Defendant No. 7 has two wives viz. , defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 8. He had only two daughters from the first wife defendant No. 3 who have been married to first and sixth defendants. The other defendants are their relations. According to the plaintiff, the necessity for filing the suit arose because defendants 1 to 6 were trying to disturb his possession over the suit properties. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT No. 3, the first wife of defendant No. 7 by relying on the document Ex. D-2 dated 15-5-1970, described as a family arrangement, sought to resist the claim of the plaintiff by pleading that under the said document Ex. D-2 she has acquired a right of maintenance and therefore she cannot be dispossessed and thereby deprived of her right of maintenance. The lower Appellate Court by reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has held that plaintiff has acquired good title under the sale deed, Ex. P-1, and he is in possession of the suit property. It has further been held that the alleged deed of family arrangement Ex. D-2, which is an unregistered document cannot be looked into as an evidence for determining the respective rights of the parties. ( 4 ) KEEPING in view the facts as found by the lower Appellate Court and its findings, the following substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission for consideration :-"l) Exhibit D-2 although unregistered document, can it not serve to convey title to suit properties in favour of the third defendant to whom it is addressed? 2) If so, conveying suit properties by the 7th defendant to others subsequent to the execution of Ex. D-2, is it effective in law?" mr. Visweswara, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the document Ex.
2) If so, conveying suit properties by the 7th defendant to others subsequent to the execution of Ex. D-2, is it effective in law?" mr. Visweswara, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the document Ex. D-2 was executed by defendant No. 7 for making, provisions of maintenance for her first wife defendant No. 3-appellant as his obligation under the Customary Hindu Law and therefore it did not require any registration under S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the case of Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation reported in AIR 1976 SC 807 and in the case of Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi reported in AIR 1966 SC 323 . ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Smt. Surya Prabha, appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that Ex. D-2 on its plain reading; speaks of creating a right of maintenance in the property, and therefore it is compulsorily registrable. In support of this part of submission she has relied on the decisions of Supreme Court in the case of Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar reported in AIR 1952 SC 153 and in the case of Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v. Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo reported in AIR 1981 SC 1937 . ( 6 ) EX. D-2 ex facie provides that defendant No. 7 has put his first wife defendant No. 3 in possession of the property with her right to maintain herself out of the property and to meet the expenses of marriage of the unmarried daughter. It has further been stipulated that if necessary defendant No. 7 will execute a registered document to the said effect in future. Therefore this document either creates right of maintenance in the property or it is still in realm of a promise to be fulfilled at a later date by execution of a registered document. If it creates right in the property then unless it is registered it cannot be taken into evidence. On the other hand, if it has been made in the nature of a promise to be fulfilled in future, it creates no right in the property and is inconsequential for determining the title of the plaintiff, which he has acquired under a registered sale deed Ex. P-1, from the rightful owner of the suit property.
On the other hand, if it has been made in the nature of a promise to be fulfilled in future, it creates no right in the property and is inconsequential for determining the title of the plaintiff, which he has acquired under a registered sale deed Ex. P-1, from the rightful owner of the suit property. ( 7 ) IN Kashinath's case (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the document itself creates an interest in immoveable property, the fact that it contemplates execution of another document will not exempt it from the registration under Section 17 (2) (v) of the Registration Act. ( 8 ) AGAIN in Bhaiya Ramanuj's case in paragraph 22 it has been held as follows :-"22. As regards the second reasons, the argument is based on Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Registration Act. Section 17 of the Registration Act enumerates the documents requiring registration. Section 49 of the Registration Act provides that no document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 to be registered shall (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, (b ). . . . . . . . . . (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered, Khorposh (maintenance) deed is a document which requires registration within the meaning of Section 17 of the Registration Act and as the document was not registered it cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. " ( 9 ) SO far as two decisions cited by Mr. Visweswara are concerned, in my opinion those have no relevance to the facts and the question involved in this case. Those were the cases pertaining to partition and family settlement of joint Hindu family properties. Moreover, in the case of Kale and others (supra) it has been set out that if a document evidencing family partition itself creates or extinguishes rights in the properties, is it compulsorily registrable. It has further been held that the memorandum of partition does not require compulsorily registration because it merely records the oral partition already effected and does not by itself create or extinguish any right in the property. Keeping in view the ratio of this decision as well, Ex. D-2 was required to be compulsorily registered.
It has further been held that the memorandum of partition does not require compulsorily registration because it merely records the oral partition already effected and does not by itself create or extinguish any right in the property. Keeping in view the ratio of this decision as well, Ex. D-2 was required to be compulsorily registered. In view of the law, as discussed above, since Ex. D-2 is an unregistered document the same cannot be taken into evidence for deciding the competing rights of the parties. For this reason the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court needs no interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear thier own costs. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .