Judgment : D. K. Seth, J. 1. The order dated 13-10-1993 passed by Sri Krishna Kumar District Judge, Haridwar in Civil Revision No. 11 of 1993 reversing the order dated 2-2-1993 passed by Sri Ram Ashrey Singh, Munsif Magistrate, Roorkee in Misc. Case No. 9 of 1987, is under challenge by means of this writ petition. 2. THE petitioner's case, inter alia, was that the respondents No. 3 and 4 herein as plaintiffs instituted a case being S. C. C. Case No. 5 of 1984 before the learned Munsif Magistrate, Roorkee for eviction of the petitioner as defendants. THE said suit was decreed on 2-12-1986, which became final. Accordingly, execution was levied by the plaintiffs decree-holder, in which the petitioner-defendant judgment-debor had filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein it was alleged that subsequent to the decree there was a compromise between the parties by virtue whereof the property was let out to the petitioner judgment-debt or. THE learned Munsif Magistrate by an order dated 2-2- 1993 allowed the said objection in the resultant Misc. Case No. 9 of 1987. Against which a Revision preferred by the decree-holder, being Civil Revision No. 11 of 1993, which was allowed by order dated 13-10-1993 passed by the District Judge, Haridwar. It is this order, which is impugned in the present writ petition. Sri S. K. Singh, learned counsel appearing with Sri V. K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of subsequent agreement under the con tract or compromise the decree passed in SCC Case No. 5 of 1984 was no more executable and, as such, should be struck off. He contends that since it was an act of the party through which fresh contract has been entered into the same, cannot be interfered with by the executing Court in the execution of the said decree. 3. SRI H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand con tends that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the compromise having not been certified, the same cannot be looked into and as such objection under Section 47 should be rejected and the decree should be executed. 4. 4. ADMITTEDLY, the alleged compromise dated 22-2-1987 does not have the seal of the court and was alleged to have been arrived at out of court. The decree holder, however, questioned the genuineness of the compromise. The case made out in the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that there was subsequent agreement which is evident by the said compromise or agreement, by reason whereof the decree stands satisfied and, as such, was no more executable. It is no compromise within the meaning of Order XXIII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, having the seal of the court which could have entered into prior to the decree either in the trial Court or even in the appellate Court. The present com promise alleged to have been entered into after the decree and levy of execution, the same at best can be termed as an adjustment within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that such adjustment are to be certified by the court. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner had applied for treating the application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as an application under Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the same was rejected. Therefore, there was no such adjustment certified by the court. Therefore, the alleged adjustment can not have any bearing on the execution proceeding. 5. EVEN on merit as has been held by the learned District Judge the said agreement and compromise has not been accepted as an adjustment though its genuineness was also questioned. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out anything by which it can be said that the said agreement was accepted by the revisional Court as to have been certified or by the trial Court. These are by no stretch of imagination Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be attracted. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out anything by which it can be said that the said agreement was accepted by the revisional Court as to have been certified or by the trial Court. These are by no stretch of imagination Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be attracted. I am supported in respect of my above observation by the decision in the case of Rajeev Khandelwal v. Arun Pannalal, AIR 1987 MP 262 , where in it has been held: "the objection to the execution of the deuce for eviction taken by the judgment-debtor that the judgment-debtor as per agreement between himself and the decree-holder, had delivered possession of the suit premises to the decree-holder and the decree-holder has again put him in possession of the suit premises on enhanced rent and since his possession over the accommodation is in pursuance of fresh agreement of tenancy the decree had become inexecutable, comes within the purview of the term "adjustment". Since the said agreement had not been got recorded as certified under Order XXI, Rule 2 the objection could not be recognised by the Court executing the decree". * * * * "it is a salutary rule of interpretation that two statutory provisions should not be so construed as to render one of them otiose. It is again a salutary rule of interpretation that statutory provision should not be so construed as to encourage frivolous litigation. Consequently Section 47, C. P. C. does hot deserve to be so construed as to render Order XXI, Rules 2 and 3 otiose. Likewise Section 47 should also not be so construed as to encourage frivolous litigation by providing a judgment-debtor who having lost in the suit is trying to avoid the execution of the decree as far as possible with a second innings to delay the execution proceedings and to enjoy the boon of delay at the cost of the decree-holder. Rules 2 and 3 of Order XXI were really intended to curb this tendency. The purpose of Rules 2 and 3 of Order XXI obviously is that whenever such an agreement is set up by the judgment-debtor which has the effect of adjustment of the decree either in whole or in part the same has to be got recorded as certified. " 6. SIMILAR view was also expressed in the case of Km. The purpose of Rules 2 and 3 of Order XXI obviously is that whenever such an agreement is set up by the judgment-debtor which has the effect of adjustment of the decree either in whole or in part the same has to be got recorded as certified. " 6. SIMILAR view was also expressed in the case of Km. Raj Kumar v. VI Additional District Judge, Lucknow, 1986 AWC 71 wherein the compromise at the stage of execution whereby the judgment-debtor claimed that the decree is to be adjusted and, therefore, not executable, falls within the ambit of Order XXI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and unless certified, can not prevent execution. In the present case the alleged compromise or agreement having not been certified or recorded the same can not come in aid of the petitioner. I am therefore, unable to find out any illegal exercise of jurisdiction or illegal assumption of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction by the District Judge in his judgment in the revisional application. 7. MORE so in the case of Ganga Saran v. District Judge, Hapur, AIR 1991 All 114 , it was held that writ jurisdiction can be invoked only when there has been violation of fundamental principles of law. Here I do not find that any such principle is violated. Therefore, the present writ petition cannot be entertained. 8. FOR all these reasons the writ petition cannot be sustained and is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.