ORDER : 1. While we do not propose to interfere with the order of the Administrative Tribunal because it concerns an individual, there is an aspect of general importance which we propose to dwell on. This aspect can be better appreciated in the background of the fact of this case itself. 2. The respondent entered service when he gave his birth date to be 1.7.1932. Thereafter, he claimed that his actual birth date was 1.7.1934. By an interim order made by the Tribunal he was allowed to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years on the basis of the two years itself in the year of birth. He would otherwise have retired on 30.6.1992. Thus, by virtue of the interim order he got an extended tenure in service of two years. Thereafter, the Tribunal disposed of the petition stating that since the petitioner has retired on attaining the age of 60 years on 30.6.1994, that date may be taken as the correct date of superannuation for working out the retrial benefits. The Tribunal:, did not decide the question whether the age of retirement was 58 or that he was permitted to continue by virtue of the difference in the year of birth:0 This shows how the process can be abused by obtaining an interim order and thereafter allowing the petition to lapse after the purpose is served. Even before us in response to the notice the respondent has not chosen to appear because he has reaped the benefit of the interim order. We had an occasion in Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Shri Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr., JT 1995 (4) SC 23 to make a detailed order in such cases. It is necessary to emphasise that in such cases irreparable damage is caused to the institution which cannot be put back even if the employee is wrong in his contention. If the employee is allowed to reap the benefit through an interim order without a final adjudication by the Tribunal or High Court, as the case may be, it would tantamount to permitting the employee to abuse the process of the Tribunal/Court. If the employee is allowed to reap the benefit through an interim order without a final adjudication by the Tribunal or High Court, as the case may be, it would tantamount to permitting the employee to abuse the process of the Tribunal/Court. That is the reason why in the afore-mentioned judgment we had emphasised that the Tribunal/Court should be slow in granting interim injunction in such cases because it would not cause any hardship to the -employee even if he is allowed to retire on the original birth date for the obvious reason that if he succeeds he can always get the monetary benefits to which he would have been entitled, had he not been retired earlier in point of time. In the decision mentioned above, this Court had observed that it would be imprudent on the part of the High Courts to allow interim relief to such an employee for continuance in service. The same principle would apply where the Tribunal is exercising jurisdiction. We would once again draw the attention of the Tribunals/High Courts in this behalf. We direct that a copy of this order along with a copy of the judgment in Burn Standard Co. case be circulated to the High Courts as well as the Tribunals. 3. As stated earlier, we do not interfere with the impugned order insofar as the respondent is concerned since it is an individual's case, but we would like to clarify that the respondent would be entitled to pension as per rules only. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.