This writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India relates to sale of an old jeep bearing No. TRA 484 on auction by respondent No.2 viz. Executive Officer, Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. 2. The case of the petitioner is that in response to the notice inviting tender dated 6th July, 1994 (Annexure 1) issued by the respondent No.2, the petitioner, who is a married woman submitted quotation for purchasing the aforesaid jeep for a sum of Rs.7,041/-. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 by his Memo dated 15.7.94 contained in Annexure 2 directed the petitioner to deposit the entire quoted amount in cash by 27th July, 1994 and remove the jeep on or before 29th July, 1994 at her own cost. 3. On receipt of this Memo the petitioner went to the office of the respondent No.2 to deposit the sum of Rs.7,041/- in cash, but she was refused to deposit the same. So, she approached the respondent No.2 on 27.7.94 for a direction where and to whom she should deposit the amount. But the prayer of the petitioner dated 27.7.94 (Annexure 3) was again verbally rejected. The petitioner, therefore, sent a demand notice to the respondent, but she got no favourable response. It was further alleged that the petitioner was refused to deposit the amount due to the fact that respondent No.2 wanted to favour one of his relations by disposing of the jeep in his favour. Hence, this writ petition for issuance of a direction to the respondents to accept the quoted amount of the petitioner so that she might purchase the aforesaid jeep. 4. Respondent No. 1, namely, the State of Tripura resisted this writ petition by filing a counter-affidavit in which it was contended, inter alia, that no rate quotation from the petitioner Smti Amrita Laskar, wife of Sri Swapan Laskar was received by the Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. But one Amrita Laskar, C/o Sri Swapan Laskar submitted a rate quotation quoting the rate of Rs.7,041/-which was below the reserved value against the purchase of the aforesaid condemned jeep No. TRA 484. It was further averred that due to some clerical mistake the rate quotation given by Amrita Laskar C/o Sri Swapan Laskar was accepted but when the mistake was detected it was cancelled on 2.8.7.94 along with others. It was further averred that due to some clerical mistake the rate quotation given by Amrita Laskar C/o Sri Swapan Laskar was accepted but when the mistake was detected it was cancelled on 2.8.7.94 along with others. It has been further contended that the petitioner never came to the office of the Tripura State Co-operative Union for depositing the quoted money and as such the question of refusal to accept the quoted amount did not arise at all. It was however admitted that one unknown boy submitted an application of Smti Amrita Laskar in the office of the respondent No.2 on 27.7.94. The allegation that respondent No.2 wanted to favour one of his relations by disposing of the aforesaid jeep in his favour was denied. It was further averred that one Raji Ghosh was the highest bidder and second highest bidder was one Matilal Ghosh. 5. Similarly, respondent No.2 also resisted the writ petition contending, inter alia, that due to some clerical mistake the Memo contained in Annexure 2 was issued to Smti Amrita Laskar, C/o Swapan Laskar at Abhoynagar, but subsequently it was cancelled. The respondent No.2 denied all the material allegations and also denied having received the prayer dated 27.7.94 contained in Annexure 3 from the petitioner. The respondent also denied that he refused to accept the quotation money from the petitioner to show favour to his relations. 6. Although it has not been specifically contended in the affidavit-in-opposition that the petition was not maintainable by reason of the fact that the Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. is not a 'State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, Mr. P.Deb Roy, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. UB Saha, the learned Government Advocate took a preliminary objection in respect of the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground that Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. is not a 'State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It will therefore be convenient to answer this question before adverting to the factual controversy involved between the parties. 7. Mr. Deb Roy has contended that this writ petition is not maintainable because Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. of which respondent No.2 is an officer is neither an instrumentality of the State nor it falls within the expression 'all local or other authorities'. In support of his contention Mr. 7. Mr. Deb Roy has contended that this writ petition is not maintainable because Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. of which respondent No.2 is an officer is neither an instrumentality of the State nor it falls within the expression 'all local or other authorities'. In support of his contention Mr. Deb Roy has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Education Research and Training & others reported in (1991) 4 SCC 578 . The question which came up before their Lordships in the aforesaid case was that whether the National Council of Educational Research and Training (for short NCERT) is' State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In answering this question their Lordships held that: “There are only general principles but no exhaustive tests to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Even in general principles, there is no cut and dried formula which would provide correct division of bodies into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government and those which are not. The powers, functions, finances and control of the Government are some of the indicating factors to answer the question whether a body is 'State' or not. Each case should be handled with care and caution. Where the financial assistance from the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the institution, or the share capital of the corporation is completely held by the Government, it would afford some indication of the body being impregnated with Governmental character. It may be a relevant factor if the institution or the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication. If the functions of the institution are of public importance and related to Governmental functions, it would also be a relevant factor. There are merely indicative indicia and are by no means conclusive or clinching in any case. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is' State'. There are merely indicative indicia and are by no means conclusive or clinching in any case. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is' State'. If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out Governmental activity and Governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as 'State' within the meaning of Article 12.” 8. It would, therefore, be apparent from the above quoted passage that each case has to be handled with care and caution and that there are only general principles which are not exhaustive tests to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. In dealing with the aforesaid case their Lordships went through the Memorandum of Association which governed the NCERT and on analysing the relevant clauses it was found that the object of the council was to assist and advise the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in the implementation of its policies and major programmes in the field of education particularly school education. As per the Memorandum of Association the Council was not only independent to undertake several kinds of programme and activities to fulfil the objectives but the Council was also free to apply the income and property towards its objectives in such a manner as it may think fit. So, on analysis of the various clauses their Lordships held, that the object of NCERT was to assist and advise the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in the implementation of the Governmental policies and major programmes in the field of education particularly the school education. The Government control was confined only to the proper utilisation of the grant and as such it was found that the NCERT is largely an autonomous body. 9. In view of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Association in that case, Mr. The Government control was confined only to the proper utilisation of the grant and as such it was found that the NCERT is largely an autonomous body. 9. In view of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Association in that case, Mr. CS Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has sought to distinguish the aforesaid case from the present one on making a submission that in the present case it is an admitted fact that major share is borne by the Government and apart from that a perusal of the Co-operative Societies Act, Rules and Bye-laws will show that it is the Government which is controlling all affairs of the society from behind the screen. 10. It has already been stated above that neither the respondent No.l nor respondent No.2 made any specific statement that the Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. was not a 'State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. On perusal of the affidavit-in-opposition I also do not find that the respondents have stated anywhere what percentage of share is borne by the State. It however appeared from their arguments that Registrar who is controlling all and each affair of the society is appointed by the State Government and his pay and allowances are also paid by the State Government. It is also revealed that the staffs who are working on deputation in the Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. are also getting their pay and .allowances from the Government. The respondents did not make any averments in respect of this fact. That the post of Registrar, is a cadre post of administrative service has nowhere been denied. 11. In spite of these facts, it has been quite strenuously argued by Mr.Deb Roy that the decision he has referred to NCERT (supra) squarely covers this case. The respondents did not make any averments in respect of this fact. That the post of Registrar, is a cadre post of administrative service has nowhere been denied. 11. In spite of these facts, it has been quite strenuously argued by Mr.Deb Roy that the decision he has referred to NCERT (supra) squarely covers this case. I am however unable to pursuade myself to agree with the submission of Mr.Deb Roy as a perusal of that judgment will show that NCERT is governed by Memorandum of Association and the clauses contained in that Memorandum of Association would show that the main object of the Council was to assist the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in the implementation of these policies and major programmes in the field of education and the Council was free to apply the income and property towards its objectives in such a manner as it may think. 12. In the instant case section 3 of the Tripura Co-operative Societies Act, 1974 (abbreviated as the Act) shows that it is the Government who appoints the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies of the State of Tripura. It is an admitted fact that Tripura State Co-operative Union Ltd. is registered under the Act. According to Rule 4 (1) of the Tripura Co-operative Societies Rules, 1976 (abbreviated as the Rules) every application for registration of society has to be submitted in the prescribed form and manner and on receipt of such application the Registrar as per Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules forwards such application with a report to the State Government under sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act in the Form D. Form D of the Rules shows that Registrar would make a request to the Government to allow him to register the society. It means that without the approval of the Government a society cannot be registered in case such society is not registered within the prescribed time. 13. It means that without the approval of the Government a society cannot be registered in case such society is not registered within the prescribed time. 13. Section 7 of the Act reads : “Notwithstanding any thing contained in this Act, the Government may, by special order in each case, examine subject to such conditions (if any) as it may, impose, any society from any of the requirement of this Act as to registration.” 14.1 have mentioned these provisions only to show that so far as registration of a society is concerned the Government exercises its control over it and it is the Government which also can exempt any of the conditions. It will also appear from the Bye-laws that for holding the election of the Board of Directors an Election Officer is required to be appointed by the Registrar. But the Registrar may refuse to appoint Election Officer unless and until he is satisfied in respect of the formalities to be observed. Rule 40 of the Bye-laws further envisages that the Union may wind up with the approval of the Registrar. These are some of the instances which show how Government is exercising control over the society through the Registrar. 15. Apart from what is stated above it will appear from the Bye-laws that the object to be performed by the Union are for the benefit of the public. The Supreme Court in Tekraj vs. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 469 ) observed that there cannot be a straight jacket formula for determination as to when a corporation or society can be said to be an instrumental or agency of the Government. It was observed further that it was not necessary that all the tests should be satisfied for reaching the conclusion either for or against holding an institution to be 'State'. In a given case some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. 16. It has already been stated that in the present case the respondents nowhere stated how much financial assistance is given by the Government. It is however, admitted that Government is giving considerable financial assistance to the Union. That apart, the objects to be performed by the Union as mentioned in the Bye-laws will clearly indicate that functions of the Union are of public importance and closely related to the Governmental function. 17. It is however, admitted that Government is giving considerable financial assistance to the Union. That apart, the objects to be performed by the Union as mentioned in the Bye-laws will clearly indicate that functions of the Union are of public importance and closely related to the Governmental function. 17. Hence, in the back-ground of all these facts it must be held that there is existence of deep and pervasive State control over the respondents. The decision “of Kerala High Court in the case of P.Bhaskaran & others vs. Additional Secretary, Agricultural (Co-operation) Department, Tribandram & others reported in AIR 1988 Kerala 75 is not applicable to the present case as it would appear from the paras 29 and 30 of the judgment that the co-operative societies are not created by the Co-operative Societies Act and they are not statutory bodies. They are only function in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Those institutions would have legal existence even if the Co-operative Societies Act was not in force. Moreover, the Government have no shares in the co­operative societies. 18. I, therefore, hold that the respondent Union is a instrumentality of the Government and thus constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 19. Coining now to the facts of the present case, it would be found from the affidavit-in-opposition that the respondents admitted having informed the petitioner to deposit the money for purchasing the jeep in question. Learned Government Advocate at once stage submitted that petitioner was not entitled to get any sort of relief as it was not clear that the petitioner was a woman as the petitioner neither wrote Smti nor wrote Mrs before her name. But on examination of the relevant files which has been produced before me I find from the Memo at page 59 of the file that although word Shri was typed before the name of the petitioner it was subsequently corrected by scoring out the letter' r' to make it't'. This contention, in my opinion, has no force at all. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner's quotation was accepted and she was also directed by Memo dated 15.7.94 for depositing the quoted amount of Rs.7,0417- on or before 27th July, 1994. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that it was issued out of clerical mistake. This contention, in my opinion, has no force at all. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner's quotation was accepted and she was also directed by Memo dated 15.7.94 for depositing the quoted amount of Rs.7,0417- on or before 27th July, 1994. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that it was issued out of clerical mistake. What sort of clerical mistake was there is not explained but the aforesaid Memo shows that it was signed by the Executive Officer, viz. SB Deb Barma. It has been argued that some other persons were the highest bidders. But on examination of the record I find that the quotation of Matilal Ghosh was cancelled by order dated 2.8.1994 (F 4-50/TSCU/92/1264). The Memo dated 2.8.94 vide No. F 4-58/TSCU/92/1265 further shows that quotation of Raji Ghosh was also cancelled. 20. So, in the back ground of these facts I see no reason why the petitioner's quotation should not be accepted. 21. The result is that the petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to receive the quotation money viz. Rs.7,041/- from the petitioner and thereafter sell the vehicle bearing No. TRA 484 Geep by issuing necessary cash memo. The petitioner is directed to deposit the amount of Rs.7,041/- with the respondents within a period of 7 days from today. 22. This writ petition is disposed of with the above order and direction but under the circumstances there would be no order as to costs.