S. S. SODHI, CJ. When a Government employee seeks premature retire ment under the relevant Rules and gives the requisite three months notice, is acceptance of such request a necessary precondition for his retirement or is he be taken to have retired from service on the expiry of the period of the notice? Herein lies the controversy raised. 2. In February 1989, the appellant Surendra Narain Singh, a Sub-Inspector in the U. P. Nirikshak Police, sought premature retirement under the relevant Police Rules and gave the requisite three months notice for this purpose. Ill health being the reason put forth by him for seeking such premature retirement. 3. It appears that after seeking premature retirement the appellant aosented himself from duty without leave. The police authorities, however, passed no order within three months notice period either with regard to the premature retirement sought by the appellant or for his being absent from duty without leave. It was almost about a year and half later that on August 10, 1990, an order was passed suspending him from service. 4. The appellant filed a writ petition seeking to challenge the order of suspension passed against him. By its order of October 25, 1990, this Court stayed the impugned order suspension of August 10, 1990. 5. During the pendency of the writ proceedings an order was passed on November 14, 199l, dismissing the appellant from service. A challenge was then made to this order too, by an amendment in the writ petition. 6. It is in this background that the issue that arises for consideration is with regard to the effect of the inaction on the part of the police authorities on the appellants prayer of premature retirement or for that matter with regard to his absence from duty without leave. 7. In string of judicial precedents it has been held that a request for premature retirement does not require a specific order accepting it by the concerned authority before an employee can be deemed to have retired from service. In other words, unless a particular rule says otherwise, on the expiry pf the period of the notice for premature retirement, the employee seeking it shall be deemed to have retired, unless, in the meanwhile, specific order has been passed, to the contrary, whether on account of contemplated disciplinary proceedings or otherwise. In other words, unless a particular rule says otherwise, on the expiry pf the period of the notice for premature retirement, the employee seeking it shall be deemed to have retired, unless, in the meanwhile, specific order has been passed, to the contrary, whether on account of contemplated disciplinary proceedings or otherwise. 8- In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Syed Muzaffar Mir, (1995) 1 UPLBEC 146, held, while interpreting Rule 56 (c) of the Fundamental Rules, that where the Government servant seeks premature retirement, the same does not require any acceptance and comes into effect on the completion of the notice period. A similar view was expressed in two earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangama v. State of Assam, AIR 1978 SC 17 and B. J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 2 SCC 202 . 9. Applying the rationale as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the judicial precedents referred to, it cannot but follow that the request of the appellant for premature retirement must be deemed to have stood accepted on the expiry of the three months period of notice from the date thereof, that is, February, 1989, This being so, the subsequent orders of suspension and of dismissal passed against the appellant have inevitably to be held to be void. 10. In the result, the appellant shall be taken to have retired from service on the expiry of the period of three months from the date he sought premature retirement which was in February, 1989. It follows that he is entitled to his pensionary and other retirement benefits, as would be admissible to him under the relevant Rules, Keeping in view the unwarranted delay in the payment of these benefits, the appellant shall be entitled to them along with compound interest, with yearly rests ; with effect from the date when they became due till the date of payment thereof. 11. This Special Appeal is consequently hereby accepted in these terms with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 1,000. Appeal allowed. .