BINOD KUMAR ROY, J. The Petitioner prays to quash the order, dated 12-10-1970 of the Consolidation Officer, Samaria, district Jaunpur (Respondent No. 3) passed in case Nos. 8356 to 8361, -the Appellate Order, dated 23-12-1971 of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Jaunpur Respondent No. 2. in Appeal Nos. 409, 318, 319 and 324 and the Revisional Order, dated 15-10-1972 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur (Respondent No. 1) dismissing his Revision Nos. 439, 441, 440 and 442. The Facts : 2. The relevant facts are as under. : There appears to be a dispute concerning right, title, and interest in regard to the lands bearing Khata Nos: ,26, 60, 61 and 66 of village Jaisingpur. The basic year consolidation entry of Khata No. 26 is in the name of Respondent Nos. 5 to- 8 Deo Raj, Munni Lal, Sita Ram and Jai Ram, sons of Bharos, of Khata Nos. 60 and 66 in the name of the Petitioner and Smt. Moghani and of Khata No. 66 in the name of the petitioner, Smt. Moghani and Respondent Nos. 5 to 8. Suit No. 132 under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was filed by the Petitioner along with Smt. Moghani for a declaration that they are the sale bhumidars of the 13 plots detailed at the foot of the plaint, which apart in to khata Nos. 26 and 66 aforementioned and that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 (Devraj, Munni Lal, Sita Ram and Jai Ram sons of Bharos) and defendant No. 5 had no interest in those lands. Their case was that Hardayal was the common ancestor; that Jhulai was one of the four sons of Katwaru who was one of the, several grandson of Hardayal and that they are successor in interest of Jhulai. It appears that they claimed that Katwaru and Ghura are one and the same person. Defendant No. 1 Devraj contested the suit pleading that the plaintiffs do not belong to the family of Hardayal ; that Jhulai; through whom the plaintiffs claim relationship with Hardayal, was not his great grandson as alleged rather Hulai was son of Ghura and Katwaru are not the name of same person. The suit was dismissed holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Jhulai was son of Katwaru, who was grandson of Hardayal. The plaintiffs went up in Appeal. The suit was dismissed holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Jhulai was son of Katwaru, who was grandson of Hardayal. The plaintiffs went up in Appeal. By his judgment and decree, dated 29-8-1964, the Additional Collector (Judicial), Varanasi, dismissed their appeal No. 295/7/907 of 1963-64 of Jaunpur holding that the finding of the trial court is perfectly correct. The plaintiffs went up in Second Appeal before the Board of Revenue. By his order, dated 6-11-1969 the Judicial Member, Board of Revenue, passed an order of abatement of the suit along with the Appeal under Section 5 (b) of the U. P. "consolidation of Holdings Act. In the meantime the basic year consolidation record was prepared in regard to lands of Khata No. 26 in the name of Respondent Nos. 5 to 8 sons of Bharos, of Khata Nos. 60 and 61 in the name of the Petitioner and Smt. Moghani ; of Khata No 66 in the name of the Petitioner, Smt. Moghani and Respondent Nos. 5 to 8. The Petitioner filed an objection under Section 9 (A) (2) of the Act before the Assistant Consolidation Officer irapleadihg co-plaintiff Mst. Moghani as Opposite Party No. 1, Sheo Dhari, son of Ram Nandan (another heir of the common ancestor Hardayal) as Opposite Party No. 2, Respondent Nos. 5 to 8 as opposite party Nos. 3 by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein. These to 6, apart from some other persons. Objection was also filed objections were registered as Case Nos. 8356 to 8361. An objection was also filed by respondent No. 4 Sheo Dhari for recording his name as co-tenant along with Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 5 to 8 which was registered as Case No. 8368. The parties reiterated their case and lead evidence-Oral and documentary. By order,- dated 12-10-1970, the Consolidation Officer, Samaria (Respondent No. 3) to whom the objections were forwarded, was pleased to reject the objection of the Petitioner and allowed that of Respondent No. 4. The Petitioner went up in appeals. His Appeal Nos. 409, 318, 319 and 324 were dismissed but Appeal No. 326 was allowed by a common order, dated 23-12-1971. Against the appellate order, Revision Nos. 439, 441, 440 and 442 were preferred by the Petitioner, Revision No. 601 was preferred by Baijnath and Rivision No. 571 was preferred by Dev Raj (Respondent no. 5 ). His Appeal Nos. 409, 318, 319 and 324 were dismissed but Appeal No. 326 was allowed by a common order, dated 23-12-1971. Against the appellate order, Revision Nos. 439, 441, 440 and 442 were preferred by the Petitioner, Revision No. 601 was preferred by Baijnath and Rivision No. 571 was preferred by Dev Raj (Respondent no. 5 ). All revisions were dismissed by a common order, dated 15-10-1972. The Submissions : 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted as follows : (i) The Revisional Authority has committed an apparent error qf law in rejecting the claim of the Petitioner by relying upon the findings recorded in the suit filed under Section 229-B of the DY P. Z. A. and L. R, Act and the Appeal which abated under Section 5 (b) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, vide order, dated 6-11-1967 passed in 2nd Appeal No. 208 (z) of 1964-65 which in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Satyanarain Prasad San and others v. State of Bihar and others, A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 2051 and Mst. Bibi Rdhmani Khatoon and others v. Harkoo Gope and others, AIR 1981 S. C. 1450 had, become naught and could not be relied upon for rejecting the claim of the Petitioner on merits. (ii) Even though Respondent no. 4 has No interest longer in the lands of Khata No. which will be apparent from the production of original sale deed dated 26-10-1920 executed by grand father of Respondent No. 4 in favour of Nepal but this deed has not been considered erroneously observing that no document has been filed to show that Respondent No. 4 has no interest in the lands of that Khata. 4. Mr. Sankatha Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 5 to 8, submitted as follows : (i) No error of law was committed by the Revisional authority in relying upon the findings recorded in the judgments of the Suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Z. A and L. R. Act and the Appeal in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Prasad (Dead) by LRs and Others. v. The Asstt. Director of Consolidation and others Judgment. Today 1994 (3) S. C. 519! v. The Asstt. Director of Consolidation and others Judgment. Today 1994 (3) S. C. 519! (ii) The Consolidation authorities have also considered the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties and correctly recorded a positive finding that the Petitioner has not proved that he belonged to the family of Hardayal. The Revisional authority also expressly observed that the petitioner had not adduced any evidence to show that Katwaru and- Ghura are one person rather the documents filed by them show that Katwaru and Ghura were two. persons. Since the Petitioner has not adduced any satisfactory evidence In terms of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove :the genealogical table set up by him, this court need not exercise its discretion in favour of the Petitioner, (iii) In regard to, the second submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Rai submitted that, even though he is not holding brief for Respondent No. 4 and the said point has nothing to do with Respondent Nos. 5 to 8, the petitioner cannot be said to be prejudiced on account of mentioning of the name of Sheo Dhari (Respondent No. 4) as a co-tenant as, his right, title and interest have already been protected by the Consolidation authorities and thus there is no merit in the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the writ application is liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, apart from reiterating his submissions, emphasised that the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in preference to the latest decision in Ram Prasad relied upon by Mr. Rai are binding on this Court. 6. When I put a specific question to the learned counsel for the Petitioner whether any evidence in terms of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act was adduced to prove the genealogical table set forth by the Petitioner he answered in negative though emphasised that the Petitioner had adduced his own evidence to support his case. To the question whether the Petitioner adduced any documentary evidence to show expressly that Katwaru and Ghura are one person as claimed by the Petitioner, the learned counsel for the Petitioner again answered in the negative but he tried to emphasise that a deed of martgage was filed to show that the properties of family which were mortgaged by Mst. To the question whether the Petitioner adduced any documentary evidence to show expressly that Katwaru and Ghura are one person as claimed by the Petitioner, the learned counsel for the Petitioner again answered in the negative but he tried to emphasise that a deed of martgage was filed to show that the properties of family which were mortgaged by Mst. Mughani, widow of great grandson of Hardayal, was redeemed by Jainarain the uncle of the Petitioner. My Findings : 7. Section 5 (2) of the UP. Consolidation of Holdings Act runs as follows: " (2) Upon the said publication of the" notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4. The following further consequence, shall ensure in the area to which the Notification relates namely : (a) every proceeding for the correction of record and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any Court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated : Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard : Provided further that on the-issue of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part, as the case may be, shall stand vacated ; (b) such abatement shall be without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate the right Or interest in dispute in Jhe said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. " 8. Relevant part of section 4 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, which is in pari materia of our Act, runs as follows :- "4. " 8. Relevant part of section 4 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, which is in pari materia of our Act, runs as follows :- "4. Effect of notification under S. 3 (1) of the Act-Upon the publication" of the notification under sub- section (1) of Section 3 in the official Gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operations ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely :- ** ** ** (c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in, any land lying in the area of for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court or authority before whom such suit or proceedings is pending, stand abated. " ** ** ** "provided further that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said , suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. " 9. Provision of Section 5 of our U. P. Act and Section 4 of the Bihar Act have been subject matter of repeated interpretations by the Supreme Court right from Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and others, A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 714. Even the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question of vires of the Bihar Act in Satyanarain ,prasad Sah and others v. State of Bihar and another, A. I. R. 1980 SC 2051 and after repelling the arguments that Section 4 (c) of the Bihar Act is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, observed thus: "the Petitioner is right in saying that the High Court should not have nullified the decree of the trial court but should have-merely declared" that the proceeding stood abated, which of course, means that the Civil proceeding comes to nought. " In Mst. " In Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others v. Harkoo Gope and Others, A. I. R. 1981 SC 1450, after considering Satyanarain Prasad Sah (Supra) and many other decisions. When a question arose as to what are the necessary consequences of the order of abatement under section 4 (c) of the Bihar Act, the Supreme Court held as follows : "9. When a scheme of Consolidation is undertaken, the Act provides for adjudication of various claims to land involved in consolidation by the authorities set up under the Act. In order to permit the authorities to pursue adjudication of rival claims to land unhampered by any proceedings in civil courts, a wholesome provision was made that the pending proceedings involving claims to land in the hierarchy of civil courts, may be in the trial court, appeal or revision, should abate. This provision was made with a view to ensuring unhampered adjudication of claims to land before the authorities under the Consolidation Act without being obstructed by proceedings in civil courts or without being hampered or impeded by decisions of the civil courts in the course of consolidation of holdings. In order to avoid conflict consequent upon rival jurisdictions and legislature provided that the proceedings involving the claims to land put in consolidation should be exclusively examined by the authorities under the Consolidation Act and all rival jurisdiction would be closed. Simultaneously it was necessary to deal with the pending proceedings and that is why the provision for abatement of such proceedings. ** ** ** "10. The concept of abatement is known to civil law. If a party to a proceeding either in the trial court or any appeal or revision dies and the right to sue survives or a claim has to be answered, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party would have to be substituted and failure to do so would result in abatement of proceedings. Now, if the party to a suit dies and the abatement takes place, the suit would abate. If a party to an appeal or revision abates, it will have no impact on the judgment, decree or order against which the appeal or revision is preferred. In fact, such judgment, decree or order under appeal or revision would become final. Such is not the scheme of abatement as conceived by Section 4 of the Act. If a party to an appeal or revision abates, it will have no impact on the judgment, decree or order against which the appeal or revision is preferred. In fact, such judgment, decree or order under appeal or revision would become final. Such is not the scheme of abatement as conceived by Section 4 of the Act. Here, if the abatement as is conceptually understood in the Code of Civil Procedure is imported, it will do irreparable harm. To illustrate, if an appeal abates rendering either the trial court judgment or the judgment in first appeal final and binding, the consolidation authorities would also be bound by it and the party whose appeal or revision abated would lose its chance of persuading the appellate or revisional authority to accept its case which may result in interfering with or setting aside the judgment, order or decree in appeal. Such was not and could not toe the intention of Section 4. This becomes manifestly "clear from the proviso to clause (c) of Section 4 extracted hereinabove which shows that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the person affected to agitate the rights or interest in dispute in the suit or proceeding before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. No one would, therefore, stand to suffer on account of the abatement because there is a special forum carved out for adjudication of the rights which were involved in proceedings which would abate as a consequence of the notification under Section 3. If the construction as canvassed for were to be adopted it would result in irreparable harm and would be counter productive. The consolidation work would be wholly hampered and a party whose appeal is pending would lose the chance of convincing the appellate court which, if successful, would turn the tables against the other party in whose favour the judgment, decree or order would become final on abatement of the appeal. Therefore, the legislature intended that not only the appeal or revision would abate but the judgment, order or decree against which the appeal is pending would also become no est as they would also abate and this would leave consolidation authority free to adjudicate the claims of title or other rights or interest in land involved in consolidation. Therefore, the legislature intended that not only the appeal or revision would abate but the judgment, order or decree against which the appeal is pending would also become no est as they would also abate and this would leave consolidation authority free to adjudicate the claims of title or other rights or interest in land involved in consolidation. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in not only holding that the second appeal pending before it abated but also the judgment and decree of the trial court and first appellate court would stand abated along with those proceedings. We reach this conclusion on the language of Section 3 and 4 and the scheme of the Act but the view which we are taking is also borne out by some decisions though in none of them this position was directly canvassed. " ** ** ** "i1 In Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1968 SC 714 ), this Court examined the effect of a provision in pari materia in a parallel statute, namely, Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (u. P. Act for short ). Section 5 provided for the consequences of a declaration of intention to prepare a scheme for consolidation of holdings made under Section 4. As the section stood, prior to its amendment in 1966, it did not provide for abatement of proceedings pending in civil courts at the commencement of consolidation proceedings. By the Amending Act 21 of 1966, Section 5 was amended introducing sub-section (2) (a) to provide for abatement of pending proceedings. This section is in pan materia with Section 4 (c) of Act. At the timer of the issue of the notification an appeal by special leave was pending in this Court and a notice of motion was taken out requesting the court to pass an order abating the appeal after taking note of sub-section (2) (a) introduced by the Amending Act of 1966. After negativing the contention challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act, this Court held that the suit out of which the appeal came to the Court would stand abated in view of sub- section (2) (a) introduced in Section 5. The emphasis is that not only would the appeal pending in this Court abate but the suit as a whole, abated. The emphasis is that not only would the appeal pending in this Court abate but the suit as a whole, abated. True it is that no contention was taken whether only the appeal would abate keeping the judgment under appeal intact or the suit as a whole would abate, but the observation of this Court will clearly indicate that in the opinion of this Court the suit as such would abate rendering the appeal pending before this Court infructuous. This decision in Ram Adhar Singhs case, AIR 1968 SC 714 was in terms followed in Chatter Singh. v. Thahir Prasad Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1499 . The appeal in Chattar Singhs case related to a suit which had a reference to claim to the land in respect of which a notification was issued under the U. P. Act as amended by Act 21 of 1966. The notification was issued when the appeal was pending before this Court. The appellants moved for passing an order of abatement, granting the motion, this Court held that the suit and the appeals stood abated, leaving it open to the parties to work out the rights before the appropriate authorities under the U. P. Act. Both the aforementioned decisions were noticed in Satyanarayan Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 SC 2051 . In that case upon the issue of a notification under Section 3 of the Act at a time when the matter was pending in the High Court an order was- made under Section 4 (C) abating the proceeding arose. Writ Petitions were filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Act as being violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. After repelling the challenge to the vires of Section 4, this Court affirming the decisions in Ram Adhar Singh and Chattar Singhs cases held that may be that the High Court should not have nullified the decree of the trial court but should have merely declared that the proceeding stood abated which this Court understood to mean that the civil proceeding comes to a naught. In other words, the proceedings from its commencement abate and no decision in the proceeding at any stage would have any impact on the adjudication of claims by the parties under the Act. " ** ** ** "12. In other words, the proceedings from its commencement abate and no decision in the proceeding at any stage would have any impact on the adjudication of claims by the parties under the Act. " ** ** ** "12. Accordingly both on principle and precedent it is crystal clear that where a notification is issued bringing the. land involved in a dispute in the civil proceeding under a scheme of consolidation, the proceedings pending the civil court either in the trial court, appeal or revision, shall abate as a consequence ensuing upon the issue of a notification and the effect of abatement would be that the civil proceeding as a whole would come to a naught. . . . . . ". 10. Relevant part of the judgment in Ram Prasad (supra) strongly relied upon by Mr. Rai runs as follows : "7. The question- then is whether the suit of the appellants was not maintainable, as contended by Shri Satish Chandra. No doubt S. 242 prohibits the jurisdiction of the civil courts only in respect of the rights given and claims arising under Tenancy Act. But the relief claimed in the suit was one for a declaration that the decree granted under Section 59 was vitiated by fraud. and collusion. Admittedly, such a relief, when cannot be given by revenue courts, the suit undoubtedly becomes maintainable under Section 9 of C. P. C. In the suit, the findings recorded by the Civil Courts are that the respondent was not resident of Salarpur. He was already having his wife and he was not cultivating the lands along with Smt. Jivani. It was also found that the plea of joint cultivation was not raised in the joint written statement of him and Smt. Jivani filed in the first instance. It was only averred in the additional written statement after her demise. The original plea was of sharing the crop between him and Smt. Jivani which, by operation of proviso to Section 33 (2), does not create a right to joint tenancy. Accordingly the declaration given in the civil suit for the reasons stated by the trial court that the decree obtained in the suit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . under Section 59 was a collusive decree is perfectly legal. That was confirmed by an elaborate reasoning in the Judgment rendered by the 3rd Addl. istt. Judge on April 1, 1965. Pending the second appeal notification under Section 5 of the Consolidation Act came to be published. . . . . . . . " ** ** ** "8. Undoubtedly no fresh evidence was adduced in the proceedings before Consolidation Officer except the judgments and decree of the Civil Court and the appellate court. The authorities under* the Act held that though the civil suit stood abated the evidence considered by the civil court and the findings recorded therein would be available for consideration and can be relied upon. We find that the view taken by the authorities is well justified. Though the suit stood abated, yet the evidence recorded in the suit or appeal and the findings recorded by civil courts do not get wiped, out, are entitled to be considered and that, therefore, it being the relevant evidence the authorities. under the Consolidation Act, unless contrary evidence is established, could go into the evidence and were entitled to rely upon the findings recorded by the civil courts in support of its conclusions. / Undoubtedly, the tribunals, below had gone into the question and held that the decree obtained by the respondent was collusive and fraudulent decree and that, therefore, it does not bind the appellants. " 11. There appears to be a Conflict between the decision in Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and Ram Prasad. Mst. / Undoubtedly, the tribunals, below had gone into the question and held that the decree obtained by the respondent was collusive and fraudulent decree and that, therefore, it does not bind the appellants. " 11. There appears to be a Conflict between the decision in Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and Ram Prasad. Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon explains at length the effect of ah order of abatement on a suit and appeal that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made ther eunder and that this provision was made with a view to ensuing unhampered adjudication of aims to land before the authorities under the Consolidation Act without being obstructed by proceedings in civil courts or without being hampered or impeded by decisions of the civil courts in the course of consolidation of holdings. 12. In this context it is useful to refer Section 5 (l) (b) (ii) of the Act which runs as follows : "the findings of consolidation authority in proceedings under this Act in respect of such right or interest in the land (shall be accepted by) the authority or Court before whom, the proceeding or suit was pending which may, on communication thereof by the parties concerned, proceed with the proceeding or suit, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed. " The aforementioned provisions emphasises that the findings recorded by the. consolidation authorities has to be accepted by the authorities or courts by whom the proceeding was held to have abated and not vice versa. 13. It has been held in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak by the Supreme Court that per incurium are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority -binding on the court concerned or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found on that amount, to be demonstratively wrong. If the decision has been per incuriam the court ignores it (vide paragraphs of 42, 47 and 112 ). 14. With greatest respect, thus, I am constrained to follow the decision in Mst. If the decision has been per incuriam the court ignores it (vide paragraphs of 42, 47 and 112 ). 14. With greatest respect, thus, I am constrained to follow the decision in Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and accordingly hold that after passing of the order of abatement of a proceeding before the Civil Court or the Consolidation authorities cannot rely upon the findings recorded in Civil Suits or in the suit instituted under 2. 29-B of the U. P. ZL A. and L. R. Act and/or Appeal which had abated. 15. I, find substance in the second submission of Mr. Rai. Learned counsel for the Petitioner could not show adducing of any evidence in terms of Section 50 of the Evidence Act to prove the genealogize tree set forth by him. The observation made by the consolidation authorities in this regard are correct. A mortgage can be redeemed not only by the mortgagor or his heirs but even by a person who may had purchased the equity of redemption. I thus do not find sufficient reasons to interfere with the impugned orders. 16. Re-submission No. (ii) of the learned counsel for the Petitioner.-In paragraph 11 of the writ petition it has been stated that even though the sale-deeds were on the record the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has wrongly observed that there was nothing to prove that the ancestor of Sheo Dhari had sold their share. Respondent No. 4 Sheo Dhari has not entered appearance to contest the assertions made, by the Petitioner. Even the basic consolidation year entry was not in favour of Sheo Dhari in regard to Khata No. 61. Though the Petitioner claims to have filed a number of sale deeds he actually refer to only one original deed, dated 26-10-1920 executed by Deo Narain in favour of Nepal. This observation of the Revisional authority is erroneous. In my view thus there would be failure of justice if I refuse to exercise my discretion in favour of the Petitioner in relation to the lands of Khata no. 61 and Revision Nos. 439 requires reconsideration. 17. In the result, this writ application is dismissed in regard to the Revisional Order passed in Revision Nos. 440, 441 and 442. In my view thus there would be failure of justice if I refuse to exercise my discretion in favour of the Petitioner in relation to the lands of Khata no. 61 and Revision Nos. 439 requires reconsideration. 17. In the result, this writ application is dismissed in regard to the Revisional Order passed in Revision Nos. 440, 441 and 442. However, this writ petition is allowed in part, the impugned order in regard to Khata No. 61 and Revision No. 439 is set aside and Revision No. 439 s remitted back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur. 18. In the peculiar facts and circumstances I make no order as to cost. 19. Let a writ of certiorari issue Re-Revision No. 439 only. Petition dismissed .