Mr. Arun Kumar, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a review application under Section 114 read withorder IXVII, Rule 1 and Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure. The applicationseeks review of the judgment dated 10/03/1993 delivered by Hon ble Ms. Justice Santosh Duggal. The application was filed on 17/04/1993, i. e. after theretirement of the learned Single Judge who had passed the judgment. ( 2 ). An objection has been raised on behalf of the appellant/non-applicant thatthe application is an abuse of the process of the Court and has been filed knowingfully well that the Hon ble Judge who decided the matter had retired. Thejudgment was dictated in open Court and if the applicant/respondent had anygrievance the same could have been pointed out to the Court then and there ratherthan moving the present application after the learned Judge had retired on20. 3. 1993. ( 3 ). In reply to this objection it has been submitted on behalf of the applicant thatthe applicant tried to obtain copy of the order after the same had been dictated inopen Court by way of inspection of the Court file. However, the file was not madeavailable till the date of the retirement of the learned Judge. Therefore, the application could not be filed earlier. Regarding failure to point out the points whichaccording to the applicant remained unnoticed while the judgment was beingdictated in open Court the reply is that the main Counsel who had argued thematter was not available and the junior Counsel who was present in Court whenthe judgment was being dictated did not consider it proper to disturb the learnedjudge during dictation. It may be possible that the Court file was not madeavailable to the applicant for inspection as stated by the applicant in the rejoinder3 filed to the reply of the non-applicant but the explanation for not pointing out tothe Court the points which remained to be noticed in the judgment according to thepetitioner is not sufficient enough. Immediately after the dictation was over suchpoints could have been brought to the notice of the Court. The learned Judgeretired on 20/03/1993 i. e. ten days after the dictation of the judgment in opencourt and as per the case of the applicant the file remained in Court all throughout. Immediately after the dictation was over suchpoints could have been brought to the notice of the Court. The learned Judgeretired on 20/03/1993 i. e. ten days after the dictation of the judgment in opencourt and as per the case of the applicant the file remained in Court all throughout. The Counsel for the applicant could always mention the matter in Court and pointout the points which according to the applicant remained unnoticed or called forreview of the said judgment. I do not want to go further into this controversy sincei have proceeded to consider the points raised on behalf of applicant in the presentapplication on merits. ( 4 ). I do not consider it necessary to refer to or dilate upon the arguments onbehalf of the applicant regarding nature and scope of the power of review underorder 47 Civil Procedure Code I may only note ththe submission on behalf of the learned Counselfor the applicant that at this stage I have only to consider whether to allow reviewof the judgment or not and if I allow review I will have to enter the third stage ofhearing of the review application on merits to the extent review of the judgmentdated 10/03/1993 is allowed. However, during the course of hearing thelearned Counsel for the applicant conceded that it is not necessary to have a gapbetween allowing review and embarking upon the third stage of considering thereview on merits. He agreed that the two stages can be combined together forpurpose of disposal of a review application. ( 5 ). In order to appreciate the points involved in the present petition it isnecessary to give certain basic facts. The appellants in the appeal are the owners/landlords of property No. 12, Friends Colony (West), New Delhi. The premiseswas let out to M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited for aperiod of five years four months by means of an application filed before the Rentcontroller under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control act (for short the Act) on16. 8. 1977. The application came up before the Additional Rent Controller on17. 8. 1977 when statements of the parties were recorded and by an order passed onthe said date necessary permission was granted. The lease deed was executedbetween the parties on 18. 8. 1977 and was registered on 29. 8. 1977. Mr. 8. 1977. The application came up before the Additional Rent Controller on17. 8. 1977 when statements of the parties were recorded and by an order passed onthe said date necessary permission was granted. The lease deed was executedbetween the parties on 18. 8. 1977 and was registered on 29. 8. 1977. Mr. Namonarain, Company Secretary had been authorised by the Company to appear onbehalf of the Company in these proceedings to make the necessary statements andsign the requisite papers. The possession of the tenancy premises was not handedover to the owners/landlords after the expire of period of limited tenancy whichled the owners/landlords to move a second application, i. e. execution applicationseeking possession of the premises in terms of the order under Section 21 of the Act. The application was moved on 11/05/1983. The respondent-Company insteadof vacating the premises filed objections to the execution through its Managingdirector Mr. Yogendra K. Modi on 4/05/1984. The objections found favour withthe Additional Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal. Therefore, thepresent second appeal was filed by the owners/landlords. The appeal Was allowedby the learned Single Judge of this Court on 10/03/1993. The respondent hassought review of the said judgment through the present application. ( 6 ). As per the averments in the application the review of judgment dated 10thmarch, 1993 is sought on the following grounds:- (A) (per paras 4 and 5 of review application) x xx till the date of expiry of theperiod of limited tenancy and in fact for a period of four and half yearsand thereafter, there was no order granting permission to createtenancy fora limited period against therespondent, the respondenthad no occasion whatsoever to come to the Hon ble Court and fileobjections. "the respondent here means M/s Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Company ). The arguments is that in the ordergranting permission under Section 21, the person named as tenant was Namonarain and therefore the Company was not the judgment debtor. The Companycould not file objections. Further the grievance of the applicant in this behalf is:-"the Hon ble Judge has construed the said argument of the Counsel for therespondent and not dealt with the same in the correct perspective. " (b) (per para 6 of review application)"that similarly another important argument on law raised by the Counsel forthe respondent had been totally ignored. Further the grievance of the applicant in this behalf is:-"the Hon ble Judge has construed the said argument of the Counsel for therespondent and not dealt with the same in the correct perspective. " (b) (per para 6 of review application)"that similarly another important argument on law raised by the Counsel forthe respondent had been totally ignored. The submission of the Coancel forthe respondent before this Hon ble Court was that even the Supreme Courtof India has, as late in Shrist Dhawan s case reported in JT 1991 (5) SC. 378, inthe last line of para 17 of the judgment held that since the law as to the filingof the objections under Section 21 of the Act was not so clear earlier, objectionsshould be considered on merits x xxx the request of the Counsel, therefore,to go into the merits of the objections was declined and it was observed by thehon ble Judge that she would not like to go into merits of the case. However,it has nowhere recorded in the judgment and order dated 10/03/1993that the findings of fact were not gone into at all. " ( 7 ). 1 have heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the aforesaid points. Sofar as the first point is concerned it has been elaborately-dealt with in the judgmentsought to be reviewed. In view of the settled law that if the objections againstsection 21 permission are filed after the expiry of the period of lease, the samecannot be entertained, this argument has been devised on behalf of the applicant/respondent. The object behind the argument is to overcome the difficulty faced onaccount of the fact that the objections in the present case were filed after the expiryof the period of lease. It is submitted that the objector/respondent was not thejudgment debtor at the relevant time and, therefore, the question of filing of theobjections within the subsistence of the period Of lease did not arise. To support theargument it is said that in the order granting permission the name of Namo Narainwas mentioned and, therefore, the Company was not named as the tenant andcould not be the judgment debtor who had to deliver possession. The Companybecame judgment debtor only after the correction was allowed in the said order inaugust 1987 on an application moved on behalf of the appellant landlord in thetrial Court. The Companybecame judgment debtor only after the correction was allowed in the said order inaugust 1987 on an application moved on behalf of the appellant landlord in thetrial Court. Thus it is said that at best the Company be said to be getting a chanceto file objections only thereafter. The question will arise: is this argument open tothe Company when it filed the objection in 1984, i. e. much before the amendmentwas allowed in 1987? ( 8 ). The judgment sought to be reviewed contains various details which clearlydemonstrate that the said objection is wholly misconceived and is without anymerit or substance. The same has been discussed at length and rejected. Thequestion of review on this point, therefore, does not arise. The judgment notes thatnamo Narain was the Company Secretary of the Company at the relevant time. Heappeared and accepted the terms set out in the application under Section 21 of theact as correct. The application was signed by him on behalf of the Company ascompany Secretary and he further stated that he had been authorised to makestatement on behalf of thecompany by means of a letter of authority which is Ex. R-1. Permission was granted by the learned Additional Rent Controller on 17. 8. 1977on the basis of the application made before him and the statements recorded byhim. The lease deed executed on 18. 8,1977 is on the same terms as set out in thedraft lease deed filed alongwith application under Section 21. The lease deed wasduly registered on 29. 8. 77. The lease deed was signed on behalf of the Companyby Namo Narain as Company Secretary. Preamble of the lease deed expresslystated that it was executed between the owners and landlord on the one hand andthe Company as a lessee through Namo Narain on the other hand. The lease alsocontains a reference that the tenancy was pursuant to the order under Section 21 ofthe Act. That is not the end of the matter. Before expiry of the period of lease thecompany had been called upon to hand over vacant possession of the premises bythe landlords. On behalf of the Company a reply dated 6. 12. 1982 was sent throughm/s Khaitan and Partners, Advocates by registered post, which is Ex. DHW I /1. Thereply specifically mentions that it was being sent on behalf of the Company. On behalf of the Company a reply dated 6. 12. 1982 was sent throughm/s Khaitan and Partners, Advocates by registered post, which is Ex. DHW I /1. Thereply specifically mentions that it was being sent on behalf of the Company. Thereply admits that the letting was on the basis of permission under Section 21 of theact for a period of 5 years and 4 months. If the Company was clear and honest aboutthis stand, why did it file the objections in response to the execution application?the objections were filed in the executing Court through Mr. Yogendra K. Modi asmanaging Director of the Company. Mr. Modi has been in occupation of thepremises. The letter of authority authorising Mr. Namo Narain to make statementon behalf of the Company is given by him on behalf of the Company. The learnedsingle Judge held that it was not a case where Modi was not in the picture at the timeof the letting under Section 21 of the Act. In the background of the facts it was held: "it, therefore, does not now lie in the mouth of Mr. Modi who, for all purposes,is the objector in the case, being presently in occupation, and also beingmanaging director of the respondent-company, who was shown as theproposed tenant, in the application and the draft lease deed, to now urge thatthe tenancy was in the name of Mr. Namo Narain x xx x"further it has been observed: "x x x there is thus no merit or substance in the contention as strenuouslyurged by Mr. Tandon that Mr. Namo Narain was the real tenant, and till theamendment of the order under Section 21 had taken place, executionapplication itself was not maintainable against the company, as the Additional Rent Controller had rightly held that the real tenant, from the inception,was the Company and that was the real intention of the parties and that it wasonly a case of accidental slip that name of Mr. Namo Narain was mentionedin the order. To that extent, I do not find any error committed by theauthorities below, in accepting the plea of the appellants that the respondent-company was the real tenant, and dismissing the preliminary objection of therespondent that the execution application was not maintainable against thecompany, as name of Mr. Namo Narain was mentionedin the order. To that extent, I do not find any error committed by theauthorities below, in accepting the plea of the appellants that the respondent-company was the real tenant, and dismissing the preliminary objection of therespondent that the execution application was not maintainable against thecompany, as name of Mr. Namo Narain, in the order has been rightly held tobe a result of incidental slip, and what was required was only a clarificationof the actual position, particularly when Mr. Namo Narain throughoutrepresented himself to be the Secretary of the Company, and letting wasintended to be in favour of the Company, and he gave statement in Court onbehalf of the Company, under letter of authority of very same Mr. Yogendrak. Modi, who filed objections. " ( 9 ). This point has been fully dealt with in the judgment sought to be reviewedand I do not consider that the first point enumerated above calls for review of thejudgment dated 10. 3. 1993. ( 10 ). Strictly the way this point has been taken in the review application (para5 as already quoted above) the only objection is that the point has not been dealtwith in the correct perspective. Firstly I do not agree that the point has not beendealt with in the correct perspective. Secondly, even if that were so this is noground for review of the judgment so long as the point is dealt with and answered. ( 11 ). The second point on which review sought is based on the following linesoccurring at the end of para 17 of the judgment in Shrisht Dhawan s case reportedin JT 1991 (5) S. C. 378 "but since law was not so clear when the objection wasdecided by the Controller it is appropriate to examine if the finding on merits issustainable" ( 12 ). On the basis of these lines it is urged that inspite of holding that theobjections filed for the first time at the time of execution based on fraud or collusionunless the tenant is able to establish that it was not known to him and he came toknow of it for the first time only at the time of execution, cannot be entertained, thesupreme Court went on to examine the objections on merits in view of the fact thatlaw was not so clear when the objections were decided by the Controller. It issubmitted that in all cases of the relevant time the objections should be examinedon merits ignoring the settled law that they cannot be examined on merits if theyare filed after the expiry of period of lease. For purpose of review it is submitted thatthis point taken in this manner has neither been noticed nor examined by thelearned Single Judge in the judgment sought to be reviewed and, therefore, thereview must be allowed. This argument gives rise to some questions: (I) Can on the basis of the said observation in Shrisht Dhawan s case it besaid as a matter of law that in all cases belonging to the relevant periodobjections even if filed after the expiry of period of lease should beconsidered on merits? (ii) If this point has been otherwise dealt with in the judgment though notin so many words as suggested by the applicant, must review be allowed? (iii) Assuming that there is an exception to the rule that objections if filedafter the expiry of period of lease cannot be entertained, this will beonly when the objector is able to show that the fraud or collusion wasnot known to him earlier and he came to know of it subsequently. Canthe applicant objector without claiming to be covered on facts underthe exception, seek to take the benefit of the afore-quoted lines occurring in Shrisht Dhawan s case? ( 13 ). Having given my careful consideration to all these aspects I am of the viewthat the applicant objector must fail on each ground and review must be rejected. ( 14 ). Taking the last point first it is to be noted that the crucial lines relied upon by the applicant in Shrisht Dhawan are preceded by the following passage :- "in any case in absence of any averment in the application that he was notaware of various allegations made against the landlady in the applicationseeking invalidity of the permission granted by the Controller the applicationwas liable to be dismissed. No exceptional circumstances so as to bring itwithin the principle laid down in Yamuna Maloo s (supra) case could bedeciphered either from the application or from the statement of the tenant. Neither the Controller nor the Appellate Authority found any exceptionalcircumstances which could justify the tenant to resist the execution afterexpiry of the period. No exceptional circumstances so as to bring itwithin the principle laid down in Yamuna Maloo s (supra) case could bedeciphered either from the application or from the statement of the tenant. Neither the Controller nor the Appellate Authority found any exceptionalcircumstances which could justify the tenant to resist the execution afterexpiry of the period. Therefore, the Controller was not justified in entertaining his objection and entering upon an enquiry which was roving in natureand wholly uncalled for". ( 15 ). In the present case the learned Single Judge found that the reply dated 6/12/1982 (Ex. DHW1/l)was sent on behalf of the Objector/company to thelandlord in which the contention advanced was that the real intention was that thetenancy would be a general tenancy and not circumscribed by any limit of periodfor which it was to subsist, and that it was only because of the facts and circumstances of the appellants that letting would be by means of an application undersection 21, and on the assurance that this was by way of formality, and that in caserent was paid regularly, and there was no other cause for complaint, then the leasewould continue. The plea of landlord that the premises was required by them fortheir own use and occupation was also repudiated in details set out in the reply. Thesingle Judge further found that the objections on merits were in substance reiteration of the same stand. Further nothing is said in the objections about any particularfacts having been discovered subsequently, therefore, in the facts of the presentcase it is not even open to the applicant/objector to urge that its case can be coveredunder the exception to the rule, if there is any. ( 16 ). The reply was given during the subsistence of the leaser What is said in theobjections is substantially the same as was said in reply dated 6/12/1982. Therefore, the objector cannot be heard to say that some facts showing fraud orcollusion came to its knowledge subsequently. The objector is thus debarred fromany benefit on the basis of the observations in Shrisht Dhawan s case relied uponby it. ( 17 ). Now coming to the main point about the effect of the aforesaid observations at the end of para 17 of Shrisht Dhawan s case certain background has to benoticed. The objector is thus debarred fromany benefit on the basis of the observations in Shrisht Dhawan s case relied uponby it. ( 17 ). Now coming to the main point about the effect of the aforesaid observations at the end of para 17 of Shrisht Dhawan s case certain background has to benoticed. It is the applicant s own case that the law regarding how the objections areto be dealt with is Judge made law. Nowhere it is statutorily prescribed that theobjections regarding creation of tenancy under Section 21 and permission grantedby the Controller under the said provisions are to be filed within a specified time. The judgment in S. B. Noronah v. Premkumari Khanna, 1979 (2) RCR 455 is generally taken as the starting point for discussion on this subject. The said judgmentfollowed by V. S. Rahi v. Smt. Rani Chambeli, AIR 1984 SC 595 contained the bestthat could be said for the tenants. Then came J. R. Vohra v. M/s. India Export Housepvt. Ltd. 1985 (1) Rent Control Reporter 368 which held that the contention thatpermission under Section 21 of the Act was obtained by fraud cannot be raised atthe end of the tenancy. The issuance of warrant of possession by the Rent Controllerwithout notice to the tenant after the expiry of period of tenancy was upheld. It washeld that no prior notice is necessary to a tenant for putting landlord in possessionof premises at the expiry of limited period tenancy. This was the other view whichwas most favourable for the landlord. All these judgments came up for consideration in Yamuna Maloo v. Anand Swamp, AIR 1990 SC 1725 . Starting with Naronah s case the entire law on the subject upto Vohra s case and also some subsequentjudgments of the Supreme Court were considered. The conclusions are containedin para 21 of the report which is reproduced as under:- "both in Vohra s case and in Shiv Chanderkapoor s case though not arisingfor determination in either, it has been stated while laying down the rule thatproceeding to challenge limited tenancy has to be taken during the currencyof the tenancy, an objection filed by the tenant could be looked into is indeedan obiter. We would like to make it clear that the rule having been stated tothe contrary in Vohra s case there was indeed no warrant to indicate thecontra situations. We would like to make it clear that the rule having been stated tothe contrary in Vohra s case there was indeed no warrant to indicate thecontra situations. Perhaps to meet the eventuality which might arise in aparticular case neither of the two Benches of this Court wanted to close theavenue of the enquiry totally, and that is why in both the cases decided bycoordinate Benches, the exception has also been indicated. It mustbeunderstood on the authority of the said two decisions and our judgment nowthat if the tenant has objection to raise to the validity of the limited tenancy ithas to be done prior to the lapse of the lease and not as a defence to thelandlord s application for being put into possession. We would like toreiterate that even if such an exercise is available that must be taken to be verylimited and made applicable in exceptional situations. Unless the tenant isable to satisfy the Controller that he had no opportunity at all to know the factsearlier and had come to be aware of them only then, should such an objectionbe entertained. " ( 18 ). In fact in Yamuna Maloo s case while discussing the earlier decisions of thesupreme Court in Vohra s case, it has been observed that question which had reallycome up for consideration before the Bench in Vohra s case was whether notice wasnecessary when the landlord applied to be put in possession after the terminationof the tenancy? Objections on the ground of fraud and collusion were raised afterthe claim by the landlord for being put in possession but were rejected as belated. In that context it was found that the observations that tenant s objections could beenquired into if the tenant aliunde came to know of landlord s move and objectivewas not relevant for the decision. Further the above quotation from Yamunamaloo s case makes it clear that the observations in some of the judgments that theobjections filed by the tenant could be looked into are indeed obiter. This leaves outno scope for any exception to the rule that any objections by the tenant which canbe entertained must be filed during the subsistence of the lease. ( 19 ). After Yamuna Maloo s case came Pankaj Bhargava and Am. v. Mohindernath and Anr. , AIR 1991 SC 1233 . Again the entire law on the subject was discussed. This leaves outno scope for any exception to the rule that any objections by the tenant which canbe entertained must be filed during the subsistence of the lease. ( 19 ). After Yamuna Maloo s case came Pankaj Bhargava and Am. v. Mohindernath and Anr. , AIR 1991 SC 1233 . Again the entire law on the subject was discussed. This judgment further takes note of a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court insubhash Kumar Lata v. R. C. Chhiba, AIR 1989 SC 458 . On the basis of thisjudgment the High Court had chosen to go into the merits of the objections filed bythe tenant after the expiry of the period of lease in response to the notice ofexecution application filed by the landlord. The Additional Rent Controller as well asthe Rent Control Tribunal had by concurrent findings of fact rejected the objectionsof the tenant on merits. However, the High Court had set aside the judgments ofthe authorities below and upheld the objections of the tenant on merits mainlybasing itself on Lata s case (supra) so far as the question of entertaining theobjections on merits was concerned. The Supreme Court after a careful consideration of all the relevant judgments on the point again reiterated that the objectionseven on the ground of fraud which were filed after the expiry of the period oflimited tenancy could not be entertained and the appeal was allowed setting asidethe judgment of the High Court. It is to be noted that the judgment of the Highcourt on merits of the objections was upheld. Still it was set aside on the point oflaw that the objections could not have been entertained on merits because theywere filed beyond the period of lease. ( 20 ). Certain observations of the Supreme Court in this judgment are worth noticing: "it is true that in Naronah s case a challenge to the validity of the limitedtenancy was permitted even after the period of limited lease but later caseshave substantially denuded this position. ( 20 ). Certain observations of the Supreme Court in this judgment are worth noticing: "it is true that in Naronah s case a challenge to the validity of the limitedtenancy was permitted even after the period of limited lease but later caseshave substantially denuded this position. In Vohra s case ( AIR 1985 SC 475 ),this Court laid down that a tenant who assails the permission under Section21 on the ground that it was procured by fraud - a. ground not dis-similar tothe one urged in the present case -must approach the Rent Controller duringthe currency of the limited tenancy for an adjudication of his pleas as soon ashe discovers facts and circumstances which, according to him, vitiate thepermission, x x x The reason why this requirement was built in the workingrights and obligations under Section 21 was the need to reconcile andharmonise certain competing claims that arise in administering the scheme ofsection 21. " "the manner in which the Court harmonised and re-conciled these competing and conflicting claims and interests was byinsisting upon by the tenant toapproach the Rent Controller for adjudication of his pleas as soon as hediscovered that the initial grant of permission stood vitiated. This wasevolved as a part of policy of law for reconciliation of divergent andcompeting claims. "with reference to Lota s case (supra) it was observed:- "it is difficult to reconcile the observations in Subhash Kumar Lata s case ( AIR 1989 SC 458 ) with the pronouncements in other and later cases. In viewof the pronouncements of this Court as to the limitations on the permissiblechallenge to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 21, any appeal to theremedy based on concept of nullity and collateral attack is inappropriate. " ( 21 ). Apart from the question of conflicting claims on the basis whereof theaforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court I feel that to judge the bona fidesof the stand of the tenant also it is important that the attack should have been madeat the earliest. If the facts on the basis of which the challenge is laid were in existenceat the time of grant of permission why should the tenant not have them testedbefore the authorities immediately? If the facts on the basis of which the challenge is laid were in existenceat the time of grant of permission why should the tenant not have them testedbefore the authorities immediately? The mere fact that the challenge is made afterthe expiry of the period of lease shows that it is by way of an after thought and togain time as far as possible in order to stick to the possession of the premises. Generally the facts on which the challenges are laid by the tenants in such casesbelong to the stage of grant of permission under Section 21 which are known to theparties. When the necessary facts are available there is no reason why the tenantshould not approach the authorities immediately if his challenge is bona fide,genuine and if he is serious about it. Just like the principle that fraud vitiateseverything, it is equally important that fraud should be brought to light andappropriate remedies sought qua it at the earliest. Waiting to raise these questionstill the landlord applies for execution of the order leads to only one conclusion andit is that it is an after thought and is intended to gain further time. For instance takethe present case itself. The period of limited tenancy expired in December 1982 andwe are in the year 1995. The landlord is yet to be put in possession of his property. ( 22 ). The decision in Pankaj Bhargava s case (supra) leaves no scope for theproposition that the objections filed after the expiry of the period of limited tenancycan be entertained by the authorities under the Act. ( 23 ) THE last judgment in the series and which is the sheet anchor of theargument of the learned Counsel for the applicant/objector is Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, JT 1991 (5)S. C. 378. In my view the said judgment in no waydisturbs the settled legal position as per the judgments in Yamuna Maloo and Pankajbhargava (supra ). In fact in para 16 after noting certain observations in Pankajbhargava s case it was observed: "thus a tenant cannot wait for the entire periodof lease and then raise objection to execution on fraud or collusion unless he is ableto establish that it was not known to him and he came to know of it for the first timeonly at the time of execution. In other words the Controller shall not be justified inentertaining an objection in execution unless the tenant establishes, affirmatively,that he was not aware of fraud before expiry of the period of lease. To the followingextent, therefore, the law on procedural aspect should be taken as settled: " (1) Any objection to the validity of sanction should be raised prior toexpiry of the lease. (2) The objection should be made immediately on becoming aware offraud, collusion etc. (3) A tenant may be permitted to raise objection after expiry of lease inexceptional circumstances only. (4) Burden to prove fraud or collusion is on the person alleging it. "as already noticed this is not the case of the tenant/objector that itcame to know of the alleged fraud or collusion for the first time only atthe time of execution. ( 24 ) THE learned Single Judge has REFERRED TO to all the aforesaid judgments of thesupreme Court and on the basis thereof held that objections of the tenant/objectorcannot be gone into on merits. Therefore, the objector/respondent was not allowedto go into merits of the objections. When the Court has discussed all the relevantjudgments including the judgment in Shrisht Dhawalt s case on which reliance hasbeen placed by the learned Counsel for the applicant/respondent and from the saidjudgments has culled out the proposition that the objections filed after the expiryof the period of lease cannot be entertained, it is not open to the applicant to say thatthis point has not been noticed or discussed in the judgment sought to be reviewed. It is not mandatory that the Judge while pronouncing a judgment must use thesame language in which the argument has been advanced. What is to be seen is thesubstance and the findings and conclusions contained in the judgment. The ratio ofthe judgment sought to be reviewed clearly shows that the challenge based onmerits of the objections was not permissible as per facts on record and as per thelaw. That is why after discussing the relevant judgments the prayer for going intomerits of the objections was turned down. ( 25 ) IT will be seen that in Yamuna Maloo s case the period of limited tenancyexpired on 30/09/1978. In Pankaj Bhargava the period of limited tenancyexpired on 5/04/1983 while in the present case the period of limited tenancyexpired in December, 1982. ( 25 ) IT will be seen that in Yamuna Maloo s case the period of limited tenancyexpired on 30/09/1978. In Pankaj Bhargava the period of limited tenancyexpired on 5/04/1983 while in the present case the period of limited tenancyexpired in December, 1982. Therefore, all the cases are of almost same period so faras the question of legal position prevailing at the relevant time is concerned. It willbe recalled that in Pankaj Bhargava even though objections had been dismissed onmerits by both the Courts below the High Court had allowed the objections onmerits. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside judgment of the Highcourt in so far as it entertained the objections on merits. The prayer of the landlordfor being put back in possession was granted. ( 26 ) THIS also answers the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant/respondent that his argument based on last three lines of para 17 in Shrishtdhawan s case has not been noticed as such, much less discussed. The overalleffect of the judgment in Shrisht Dhawan has been considered and, therefore, thereis no scope for seeking review of the judgment on this specious plea. ( 27 ) SUMMING up the legal position on the second point urged on behalf of therespondent/applicant for seeking review of the judgment dated 10/03/1993,it can be stated that the judgment in Yamuna Maloo s case cleared all the webs bylaying down that objections if filed after the expiry of the period of limited tenancycannot be entertained. Any observations in any other judgment to the contrary areto be treated as obiter. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chanderlata s case remained unnoticed in Yamuna Maloo s case. Lata s case had castsome cloud on the proposition of law laid down in Yamuna Maloo s case. Thecloud cast by Lata s case led this Court to uphold the objections of the tenant onmerits, though they were filed after the expiry of the period of lease, in Pankajbhargava s case. The landlords in Pankaj Bhargava s case went to the Supremecourt against the judgment of this Court. As laid down in Yamuna Maloo s casethe Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal position on the point, i. e. the objectionsfiled after the expiry of period of limited tenancy could not be entertained. Shrishtdhawan s case does not change the said legal position. The landlords in Pankaj Bhargava s case went to the Supremecourt against the judgment of this Court. As laid down in Yamuna Maloo s casethe Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal position on the point, i. e. the objectionsfiled after the expiry of period of limited tenancy could not be entertained. Shrishtdhawan s case does not change the said legal position. The learned Counsel for theappellant on the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court in Shrishtdhawan s case contained in last three lines of para 17 wants to again cloud the wellestablished legal position. I do not think that on the basis of these lines in Shrishtdhawan s case it can be said as a matter of law that objections must be entertainedthough filed after the expiry of the period of lease in all cases of the relevant period. This cannot be so for various reasons:- (1) Yamuna Maloo and Pankaj Bhargava are also the cases of almost thesame period as already noted herein-before. The objections were notallowed to be entertained on merits in these cases. (2) Shrisht Dhawan s case does not over-rule the decisions in Vohra, Shivchander Kapur, Yamuna Maloo and Pankaj Bhargava. If these casescontaining the same consistent approach were to be over-ruled, thiswould have been done in a dear cut and specific manner rather than inan indirect manner as sought to be suggested by the learned Counselfor the applicants. (3) The fact that the Court chose to go into the objections on merits inshrisht Dhawan s case cannot be said to be an authority for theproposition that as a matter of law in all cases of the relevant timeobjections must be gone into on merits by the executing Court. As heldin Yamuna Maloo s case while interpreting similar observations in J. R. Vohra s case the observations maybe treated as an order in the facts ofthe particular case. ( 28 ) THE learned Single Judge refused to go into the objections of the tenant onmerits. She has noticed all the aforesaid judgments including the judgment inshrisht Dhawan s case before coming to the conclusion that the objections cannotbe entertained on merits. Law does not permit inquiry into objections filed afterexpiry of the period of lease. ( 28 ) THE learned Single Judge refused to go into the objections of the tenant onmerits. She has noticed all the aforesaid judgments including the judgment inshrisht Dhawan s case before coming to the conclusion that the objections cannotbe entertained on merits. Law does not permit inquiry into objections filed afterexpiry of the period of lease. The learned Single Judge further noted that she hadtaken the same view on law in a couple of her earlier decisions on the same pointand the Special Leave Petitions against those judgments were dismissed by thesupreme Court. In this background I am of the view that it does not lie in the mouthof the applicant to say that the submissions in this behalf had not been noticedmuch less discussed in the judgment sought to be reviewed. True that thejudgment does not use the same language as used by the learned Counsel for theapplicant before me. It is not necessary that in a judgment arguments be reproduced in as manywords as advanced by a Counsel. We have to see the substance. Even if the argument was noted in the manner it has been phrased by the learnedcounsel for the applicant in the present application, on merits it would not havemade any difference in view of the reasoning of the learned Single Judge on thepoint in issue and the ratio of her decision. The ratio is clear and unambiguous. Thearguments of the objector in this behalf already stands rejected in the judgmentsought to be reviewed and there is no occasion for reconsideration of the samethrough the present review application. ( 29 ) THE application is thus totally devoid of any merit. The points on whichreview of the judgment dated 10/03/1993 is sought, stand fully answered inthe judgment. The sole object behind the present review application appears to beto gain time in order to continue with the illegal occupation of the premises. Theapplicant has gained two years time on the basis of the review application. Theperiod of limited tenancy expired in December 1982. The tenant has alreadysuccessfully stalled the process of putting the landlords in possession of thepremises for over 12 years. The review application is mala fide and is in abuse ofthe process of the Court. The same is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000. 00.