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1995 DIGILAW 1439 (SC)

ST. Stephen's College v. Amit Gordon

1995-12-04

A.M.AHMADI, S.C.SEN

body1995
JUDGMENT : 1. Special leave granted. 2. Heard counsel for both the sides. 3. The facts in brief are that the respondent Amit Gordon failed to secure admission in St. Stephen's College, Delhi, whereupon he questioned the decision of the management refusing him admission on the ground that he satisfied the eligibility criterion and yet another student by the name Nasima Lala Roo Tahera who had secured only 57% marks as against his 59.5%, had been admitted to the B.A. 1st Year (Pass) Course in the Persian/Urdu Stream. It is important to notice the fact that out of 45 seats, according to the management, 5 seats were reserved for Persian/Urdu students, 10 seats for snorts students and the remaining 30 seats were available to other student with a reservation upto 50 per cent thereof for Christian students. It was, therefore, the case of the management that the aforesaid student Nasima was given admission in Persian/Urdu stream on the reserved 5 seats, whereas the respondent Amit Gordon was refused admission as in his stream he did not have sufficient percentage of marks to qualify for admission. According to the management the minimum percentage of marks was fixed at 60.5 percent and since the respondent had only 59.5 per cent marks he was eliminated at the threshold and was, therefore, not entitled to be called for interview at all. The respondent questions this decision of the management on the ground that the management had given admission to Nasima who had only 57% marks. The other contention put forth by the respondent was that in the admission prospectus as well as in the advertisement there was no mention of 5 reserved seats for Persian/Urdu students nor was there any mention about reservation of 10 seats for sports students. The management contends that it was not necessary to mention the same in the advertisement as it was a practice which was known to all and followed by the management over a number of years. The High Court has come to the conclusion that even though the Institution is a minority institution it. was required to follow certain norms in the matter of admission and since the advertisement did not specify the reservation of seats and since the student Nasima was given admission even though she has only 57 per cent marks of the total aggregate, the management had wrongly refused interview to the respondent. was required to follow certain norms in the matter of admission and since the advertisement did not specify the reservation of seats and since the student Nasima was given admission even though she has only 57 per cent marks of the total aggregate, the management had wrongly refused interview to the respondent. It is necessary to point out that Nasima had more than 60.5 per cent marks so far as Persian/Urdu subjects were concerned, but we proceed on the assumption that her aggregate was 57 per cent. If the respondent is right, Nasima was not entitled to be considered for admission because her aggregate was below 60.5 per cent. That, however, does not mean that the respondent was entitled to be considered for admission because if Nasima was wrongly considered for admission, that by itself would not make the respondent entitled to admission on the strength of Article 14 because two wrongs cannot make a right. Therefore, the High Court proceeded on the wrong premise in reviewing the matter from this aspect. If that logic is accepted it would tantamount to saying that the wrong should be perpetuated because the management had erred in the case of Nasima. We often have had occasions to say that this approach in invoking Article 14 of the Constitution is not correct. If the respondent did not have the requisite percentage of cut off marks, namely, 60.5 per cent, he was not eligible to be called to interview. Merely because someone else pith lessor percentage of marks has been submitted does not entitle him to claim admission. In that case the correct thing to do would be to cancel the admission of the student who was wrongly admitted (but not to admit another student wrongly by invoking Article 14). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in the view that it took in this behalf. This is not to say that we are of the view that Nasima was wrongly admitted. 4. I t may further be pointed out that according to the management if admission was not granted by reserving 5 seats to students belonging to the Urdu/Persian stream, the department would have to close down because sufficient number of students would not be available on the criterion relied on. 4. I t may further be pointed out that according to the management if admission was not granted by reserving 5 seats to students belonging to the Urdu/Persian stream, the department would have to close down because sufficient number of students would not be available on the criterion relied on. We need not go into this question because the High Court has in the ultimate permitted the continuance of Nasima who had opted for the Urdu/Persian strain. 5. For the above reasons we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and allow this appeal with no order as to costs.