ORDER 1. On the basis of the F.I.R., a charge-sheet was submitted on 31.12.90 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewa for committing an offence punishable u/s. 420/109 IPC against Suresh Kumar Singh, Shanker Singh, Udairaj Singh and Sagar Singh. A case was registered as Case No. 324/90 (State v. Suresh Kumar Singh and 3 others). On 12.4.91, the learned Magistrate passed an order refusing to grant the custody of the jeep No. MIA 132 in favour of Shamsher Singh, Udairaj Singh and Sagar Singh vide order dated 12.4.91. Aggrieved from this order, a revision (Cr. Rev. No. 61/91) was preferred and the same was decided by learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge Rewa vide his order dated 14.3.92 wherein he, while allowing the revision, passed an order for giving the custody of the jeep No. MIA 132 in favour of Udayraj Singh on his furnishing a security to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/-. Before this order could be implemented, Smt. Rambai (respondent herein) who had lodged the FIR on the basis whereof, the criminal proceedings in Cr. Case No. 324/91 were set in motion, filed a civil suit being C.S. No. 2-A/92. She also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC which was disposed of by District Judge Rewa vide his order dated 23.4.92 whereby the appellants were restraining from receiving the custody of the jeep from the concerned Court. Besides, the learned District Judge also directed for giving the custody of the jeep on Supurdgi from the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class Rewa and the amount for the Supurdgama was to be fixed by the Court of JMFC Rewa. The present appeal is directed against the aforesaid order dated 23.4.92. 2. The cause list is revised. The counsel for the appellants is present. Counsel for the respondent is not present. On the last occasion also, the counsel for the respondent was not present and since the controversy involved was important one, this Court on 24.1.95 passed the following order, pointing out to the learned Dy. Advocate General Shri R.K. Thakur to assist the Court as amicus curiae. The case is taken up today but none from the respondent's side has appeared. "24.1.95. At the request of Shri C.L. Kotecha, learned counsel for the appellants, let the appeal be listed on 27.1.1995. Learned Govt. Advocate General Shri R.K. Thakur to assist the Court as amicus curiae. The case is taken up today but none from the respondent's side has appeared. "24.1.95. At the request of Shri C.L. Kotecha, learned counsel for the appellants, let the appeal be listed on 27.1.1995. Learned Govt. Advocate is requested to address the Court as amicus curiae on the question and learned counsel for the appellants has entrusted his file to him as well." The case is taken up today but none from the respondent's side has appeared. 3. The short question involved in the case is whether the civil Court by way of a civil suit can set at naught an earlier order passed in a criminal case regarding the custody of the jeep. 4. The facts in the present case have only a peripheral relevance. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the criminal Court in which it has independent jurisdiction under the Cr.P.C. and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is under other enactment except the Criminal Procedure Code. The Code of Criminal Procedure has only authorised the civil Court in relation to the procedure u/s. 145 Cr.P.C. and that too under the circumstances specified thereunder. There is no general power conferred on the civil Court for interfering with the order passed by the criminal Court. Thus, the civil Court has no supervisory power and according to him, the order passed by the civil Court restraining the appellants from taking the custody of the jeep had in effect nullified the order of the criminal Court. The learned counsel submitted that so long as the injunction is in operation, the criminal Court's order shall remain ineffective. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the order of Supradnama passed u/s. 451 Cr.P.C. was not an order revisible u/s. 397/401 Cr.P.C. Here it is not necessary to decide the forum. The remedy even if found not available u/s. 397/401 Cr.P.C., then, it could be under section 482 Cr.P.C. in that event this power can be invoked, whereunder the Court has got wider powers. 7. The remedy even if found not available u/s. 397/401 Cr.P.C., then, it could be under section 482 Cr.P.C. in that event this power can be invoked, whereunder the Court has got wider powers. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that apart from the parties approaching the Court, the Court is possessed of the suo-motu power, if the order is illegal, arbitrary or the criminal liability is being used as an intrument to wreck vengeance or for the purpose of summoning and delaying the process of justice. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on three decisions: (i) The first relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant was Kali Prasad Das and another v. Gadhadhar Sahu, AIR 1978 Orissa 8. In this connection, he referred to Paras 6 to 9 of the Report. The case relied on was a case under the proceedings u/s. 145 Cr.P.C. and the order granting temporary injunction was not sustainable. To grant injunction in the matter would amount to refraining the respondents (the appellants in the present case) from prosecuting the proceedings in the criminal Court which is not subordinate to the learned Subordinate Judge, because, admittedly, the learned Magistrate is not a Court subordinate to the learned Subordinate Judge. The said case is relating to a different proposition i.e. u/s. 145 Cr.P.C. wherein the possession alone is to be decided. U/s. 145 Cr.P.C. a Magistrate is authorised to issue an order declaring a party to be entitled to possession of a land until evicted therefrom in due course of law. The Magistrate does not purport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the land but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course of law. The foundation of the jurisdiction is on apprehension of the Breach of the peace, and with that object, he makes a temporary order irrespective of the rights of the parties, which will have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided by law. The life of the said order is coterminous with the passing of a decree by a civil Court and the moment a civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the criminal Court...". The life of the said order is coterminous with the passing of a decree by a civil Court and the moment a civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the criminal Court...". As the life of the final order in the proceeding u/s. 145 Cr.P.C. being coterminous with the passing of a decree, until the decree is obtained, the order of the learned Magistrate must operate. In this case, a reference is made to the Supreme Court case of Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 . That case was also u/s. 145 Cr.P.C. In para 16 of the said case, the Court observed:- "The Magistrate does not purport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the land but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course of law. The foundation of his jurisdiction is on apprehension of the breach of the peace, and with that object, he makes a temporary order irrespective of the rights of the parties, which will have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided by law. The life of the said order is conterminous with the passing of a decree by a civil Court and the moment a civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the criminal Court. The Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdharani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdharani (1901) 29 Ind. App. 24, 33 tersely states the effect of orders under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus- "These orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace. The Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdharani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdharani (1901) 29 Ind. App. 24, 33 tersely states the effect of orders under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus- "These orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace. They decide no question of title......" In para 7, a reliance has been placed on a decision in the case of Barket-Un-Nissa v. Abdul Aziz (1990) ILR 22 All 214 on the basis of which the Court observed that- "I am inclined to hold that in suitable cases, the civil Court would have jurisdiction to make appropriate arrangements for preserving the property." This is not attracted in the present case as the power of giving property in supurdgi of a particular party is to preserve the property and when an order is passed by the criminal Court, there is no question of passing of any order by the civil Court and apart from this, it is not from the order appealed against and the order which has been passed, operates for preserving the property. (ii) The next case relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is State of Gujarat v. Mangal Traders, Jamnagar, AIR 1987 Gujarat 234. This case is on a different background, relating to anticipatory injunction and that has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. The learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that the jurisdiction of the civil Court and criminal Court has got a demarcation. According to him, the civil Court may exercise jurisdiction in such matters where the provisions of Cr.P.C. are not attracted. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, an order passed by a criminal Court is appealable or revisible and if neither of the remedies is available, section 482 Cr.P.C. provides an inherent power to entertain such matter or such order which is neither appealable nor revisionable. Apart from this, under the revisional jurisdiction, the Court also possesses suo moto power. Thus, the appropriate forum for the plaintiff-respondent was to proceed under the Code of Criminal Procedure whereunder the power to preserve the property was available under the Code itself. It was a case where the civil Court should not have interfered with; and according to him, it is a settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. It was a case where the civil Court should not have interfered with; and according to him, it is a settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. Of course, the civil Court has not stayed the order of Supurdgi passed in criminal case, but has restrained the supurdgi, which could not have been ordered by him/it directly. He relied on the decision of the Patna High Court in Kedarnath Thakur v. Mahmood Ali Khan, AIR 1921 Patna 92. It was a case under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC. In that case the subordinate Judge of Darbhanga passed an order on 7.6.1920 in Execution Case No. 180 of 1919 directing the appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the mortgaged properties and to deposit the income of the same in Court after meeting expenses under the directions of the Court. Later on an application in Suit No. 32 of 1919 supported by an affidavit was made with a prayer for a temporary injunction "restraining the Receiver from taking possession of the property till the decision of the case. The petition was disposed of on the 13th of August, 1920 after the hearing of the parties concerned. In the meantime, on the 20th of July, 1920, a Receiver was appointed in the Execution Case in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga and he took charge on 24th July, 1920. The appellate Court observed thus- "The Receiver was appointed by the Darbhanga Court after the sale of the property pending the disposal of the objections of the judgment-debtor and the confirmation of the sale. The Receiver thus became an officer of the Court and the possession taken by him was on behalf of the Court and will be deemed to be that of the Court. One subordinate Court has no right to restrain the action of the other co-ordinate subordinate Court by any order or rubkar such as that passed in the present case by the Subordinate Judge of Patna." Thus, this case, to a great extent, deals with the matter that one subordinate Court has no right to restrain the action of the other co-ordinate subordinate Court by passing any order. The objective of this ratio is to promote judicial discipline. 10. The second case relied on on is ILR Vol. 30 page 400 1907 Madras Series. The objective of this ratio is to promote judicial discipline. 10. The second case relied on on is ILR Vol. 30 page 400 1907 Madras Series. In this case the Court observed that no suit will lie in an injunction, to restrain the proceedings or an order made by the Magistrate u/s. 451 Cr.P.C. The order of the Criminal Court, whether interim or final cannot be interfered with by the civil Court as the criminal proceedings and the civil proceedings are independently controlled by the presiding officers and one has no judicial interference or control over the other, as it will lead to disastrous situation, if such interference is permitted and the matter would remain pending for much longer period. It will give a handle to the contesting parties interested in delaying the litigation and consequently, it will affect the cause of justice and Court's discipline. One order of the Court is not allowed to be violated by another Court by passing another order, as it will affect the judicial discipline and will also cause delay in the matter. The Parliament, while enacting law, made two separate laws viz. Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure as it was aware that the Courts functioning under these two Codes should function independently without any interference of one over the other. 11. The third case relied on is Fakira Mahadaji Marathe v. Mt. Rumsukhibai, AIR 1946 Nagpur 428. This case relates to the proceedings under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and deals with different aspect of the matter. The underlying principle on which the Court should act whether under Order 39 Rule 1 or under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC is the same. It is fundamental in all these cases that the Court should not step in temporarily except to prevent a party from being permanently deprived of a relief which he seeks in the suit. On the other hand, if there is likelihood of permanent injury or loss, the Court should step in, provided the party applying has been diligent and so forth and do that which is fairest all round during the pendency of the suit. Unless this is done, litigation would become meaningless and a mockery in many cases. On the other hand, if there is likelihood of permanent injury or loss, the Court should step in, provided the party applying has been diligent and so forth and do that which is fairest all round during the pendency of the suit. Unless this is done, litigation would become meaningless and a mockery in many cases. But unless something approaching irreparable loss is shown to be likely, the rule is that the Courts should not interfere and should allow the law to take its course. 12. Before concluding the matter, I wish to bring on record the appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Deputy Advocate General Shri R.K. Thakur in the matter especially when the contesting respondents were not available. 13. In view of the above, I find that the order of injunction passed by the civil Court is unwarranted and deserves to be set aside. 14. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 23.4.92 passed in civil suit No. 2-A/92 by the District Judge Rewa is set aside. Parties to bear their own costs.