A.K. Patnaik, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment dated 18.3.93 of the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.94(K)/91, quashing the report dated 23.4.90 of the Enquiry Committee, order of suspension dated 30.6.90 and the memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 against the respondent. 2. The facts briefly are that the respondent was serving as Superintending Engineer in the establishment of Development Authority, Nagaland. In respect of some irregularities in additional works in Nagaland House, Calcutta, an Enquiry Committee was constituted which submitted its report on 23.4.90. In the said report, the Enquiry Committee found that in awarding the contract, signing of the work order and making payment, there were gross irregularities on the part of the respondent. The said Enquiry Committee also recommended that the respondent be immediately dismissed and a criminal case be filed against him. After receipt of the said report of the Enquiry Committee, the respondent was placed under suspension by order dated 30.6.90 in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings and thereafter, on 11.9.91, a memorandum of charges was served on the respondent. Aggrieved by the aforesaid actions of the appellants, the respondent filed Civil Rule No.94(K)/91 before the Kohima Bench of this Court and by the impugned judgment dated 18.9.93, the learned Single Judge quashed the report of the Enquiry Committee, order of suspension and the memorandum of charges. 3. Mr. DK Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants, took us through para 6 of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge to show that the report of the Enquiry Committee as well as order of suspension dated 30.6.90 was quashed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that reasonable opportunity had not been given to the respondent as required by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution before the findings in the report of the Enquiry Commitee were recorded and the order of suspension was passed, against the respondent. Mr. Mishra submitted that the Enquiry Committee conducted only a preliminary enquiry and the inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings were to take place pursuant to memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 served on the respondent. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge was not correct in taking a view that the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution had not been followed. According to Mr. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge was not correct in taking a view that the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution had not been followed. According to Mr. Mishra, reasonable opportunity as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution would have been given to the respondent in the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 served on the respondent. 4. Mr. A. Roy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that a reading of the report dated 23.4.90 of the Enquiry Committee would show that the Enquiry Committee had already recommended dismissal of the respondent and since the recommendation of punishment had been made without any opportunity to the respondent of being heard as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge was right in taking the view that the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution had not been followed in the enquiry. According to Mr. Roy, therefore, there is no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 5. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submissions of Mr.Roy, learned counsel for the respondent. The provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are quoted herein below: “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State - (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed : Provided further that this clause shall not apply- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry; (3) if in respect of any such person as aforesaid a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.” A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution would show that a reasonable opportunity has to be given to a person holding a civil post under the State Government before the order of punishment is imposed on him for removal or dismissal or reduction in rank. By the report of the Enquiry Committee, although a recommendation for punishment was made, no order had been passed by the appropriate authority dismissing the respondent from the service. It appears that the learned Single Judge treated the preliminary enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Committee as an enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings itself and on the basis of this erroneous view quashed the report of the Enquiry Committee being violative of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It appears that the learned Single Judge treated the preliminary enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Committee as an enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings itself and on the basis of this erroneous view quashed the report of the Enquiry Committee being violative of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. A bare look of the report of the Enquiry Committee dated 23.4.90 would show that the same is only a preliminary report. It is now settled by Courts that such preliminary reports can constitute basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding so long as the Government servant is given an opportunity as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution to refute the charges framed against him on the basis of the findings in such preliminary report. In the present case, since the report of the Enquiry Committee has been treated only as a report in a preliminary enquiry and on the basis of findings in the said report the respondent has not been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and only charges have been framed against the respondent and the respondent will be afforded the reasonable opportunity of refuting these charges and of being heard in the enquiry in course of the disciplinary proceedings, in our opinion, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the provisions under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution were not followed is erroneous. Accordingly, the report of the Enquiry Committee could not have been quashed for violation of provisions under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 6. Regarding order of suspension dated 30.6.90, sub-rule (1) of the Rule 6 of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967, which empowers the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant is quoted herein below: “6. Suspension : (1) The Appointing Authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. A standard Form of order of suspension is specified in Schedule II: (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial:” 7. It is not disputed that the aforesaid Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967, (for short the Rules) are applicable to the respondent. It is not disputed that the aforesaid Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967, (for short the Rules) are applicable to the respondent. This being so, the appointing authority was empowered under the Rules to suspend the respondent where a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against him. Since the disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent pursuant to the report dated 23.4.90 of the Enquiry Committee, the suspension of the respondent on 3 0.6.90 was in contemplation of such disciplinary proceedings. The order of suspension dated 30.6.90, therefore, was fully within the jurisdiction of the appointing authority under the Rules. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge, in so far as he quashed the order of suspension dated 30.6.90 passed against the respondent was not correct in law. 8. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that on a reading of para 7 of the impugned judgment would show that the memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 were quashed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the said memorandum of charges had been issued not by the Chairman, Development Authority, Nagaland but by the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland while under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules it is only the disciplinary authority who was empowered to frame charges against the respondent. Mr. Mishra brought to our notice para 6 of the memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 which would show that the memorandum of charges had been served on the respondent by the order and in the name of the Chairman of the Development Authority, Nagaland, Dimapur. In our opinion, Mr. Mishra is right in his submission that the memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 was served on the respondent by order of the Chairman of the Development Authority, Nagaland who was admittedly the disciplinary authority and the Secretary of the Development Authority, Nagaland, merely communicated the said order of the Chairman. Therefore, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the memorandum of charges had been framed by the Secretary Development Authority, Nagaland, is not correct on the facts. 9. Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the respondent, however, forcefully submitted that a reading of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules would show that the charges can be framed by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the allegations on which “enquiry proposed to be held”. 9. Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the respondent, however, forcefully submitted that a reading of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules would show that the charges can be framed by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the allegations on which “enquiry proposed to be held”. He also took us through Standard Forms specified in the Schedules IV and V of the Rules to show that while framing the charges, the disciplinary authority has to indicate in the memorandum of charges that an enquiry was proposed to be held. But in the impugned memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91, the disciplinary authority has not indicated as to whether an enquiry is proposed to be held as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules. Mr. Roy developed his argument further by stating that it would be clear from para 1 of the aforesaid memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 that actions were proposed to be taken against the respondent for misconduct and misbehaviour on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Committee which prima facie shows that no further enquiry was proposed under the said sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules. Mr. Roy also submitted that the Standard Form of memorandum of charges as specified in the Schedules IV and V of the Rules clearly provided that list of documents on which the Articles of charges were proposed to be sustained and a list of witnesses on whom the Articles of charges were proposed to be sustained are to be provided along with the statement of allegations. Since these requirements under sub-rule (2) of the Rule 9 and the Standard Form in Schedules IV and V to the said Rules had not been followed, the impugned memorandum of charges dated 11.9.91 initiating disciplinary proceedings was without jurisdiction. 10. We are not in a position to accept the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Roy. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules is quoted herein below : “9. Procedure for imposing penalties : (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. 10. We are not in a position to accept the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Roy. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules is quoted herein below : “9. Procedure for imposing penalties : (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant, and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority, a written statement of his defence to be heard in person. Standard From of Memorandum of Charge-sheet and Memorandum are specified in Schedule - IV and V.” A bare reading of the aforesaid sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules would show that all that is required by the aforesaid Rule is that the Disciplinary Authority will frame definite charges on the basis of allegations on which the enquiry was proposed to be held. The aforesaid sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 is required that definite charges have to be framed but does not require that the charges have to be mandatory in the Standard From as specified in Schedules IV and V of the Rules. On the contrary, the mere fact that the from of charges has been described as Standard From in the aforesaid sub-rule suggests that the form may or may not be adopted by the disciplinary authority. In the present case, we find on a reading of the memorandum dated 11.9.91 that definite charges have been framed by the disciplinary authority and communicated to the respondent and the respondent has been asked to submit his defence which indicates that an enquiry is proposed against the respondent in respect of the charges. In case, the statement of allegations on the basis of which the aforesaid charges have been framed and the list of witnesses and list of documents have not been forwarded along with the memorandum of charges, the disciplinary authority will have to furnish the same to the respondent in accordance with the Rules, but such acts of omission, in our opinion, did not make the initiation of disciplinary proceedings under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 against the respondent as one without jurisdiction altogether. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Roy further submitted that one of the contentions that was raised before the learned Single Judge was that initiation of disciplinary proceedings was vitiated by malafides inasmuch as the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland, had influenced such initiation of the said disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Mr. Roy also took us through paragraph 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the impunged judgment of the learned Single Judge to show that on the basis of the adverse ACRs of the respondent for the period ending 31st December, 1988 communicated by the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland to the respondent, the learned Single Judge had arrived at a finding that the said Secretary was highly motivated against the respondent, and on the said findings, the learned Single Judge had directed that in the event afresh enquiry was ordered by the authorities, the Secretary, Development Authority shall not in any way involve himself in conducting the enquiry. Mr. Roy, therefore, submitted that the entire disciplinary proceedings was one which was vitiated by malafides. 12. We are not in a position to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Roy. We find from the records produced before us that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the respondent on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Committee dated 23.4.90 and from a perusal of the said enquiry report, we also find that besides the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland, the Chairman and the Financial Commissioner of the said Development Authority, were members of the Enquiry Committee and had signed the said report dated 23.4.90. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent had been initiated at the instance of the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland and thus vitiated by malafides. But we would like to observe that this finding of ours that the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding was not vitiated by malafides would not in any way affect the directions of the learned Single Judge that the Secretary, Development Authority, Nagaland, shall not in any way involve himself in the inquiry against the respondent. 13. Subject to our aforesaid observations, this writ appeal is allowed and the impunged judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.8.93 in Civil Rule No.94 (K)/91 is set aside. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that parties shall bear their own costs.