JUDGMENT A. K. Ganguly J. - The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is an order dated 22nd December, 1993 passed by the State Manager-cum Joint Secretary, Bihar State Housing Board, Patna (hereinafter referred to as the said Board) whereby the allotment of a Medium Income Group House No. 161 to the petitioner was cancelled . 2. The said order which has been impugned in this writ petition has been passed, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) as he had sublet the said alloted flat to the respondent no. 5 who was living in the said flat since May, 1985 on a monthly rental of Rs. 625/-per month. The case of the petitioner is that the said flat was alloted to him in the year 1981 vide letter dated 11th September, 1981. It was a M.I.G. Flat No. 161 situated at Hanuman Nagar, Kankarbagh, Patna-20 (hereinafter referred to as the said flat). The further case of the petitioner is that pursuant to the said allotment, hire-purchase agreement was entered between him and the said Board on 16th September, 1981 after making part payment of the agreed sum which was fixed as the price of the said flat. The petitioner further asserts that as electric and water connection and door fittings were not complete in the said flat the possession of the flat was not handed over to him. In the counter-affidavit filed by the said Board it appears that after registration of the agreement the petitioner did not take over intentionally the physical possession of the said house from the Board, but he started occupying the said flat on his own after registration of the agreement. 3. Averments which have been made in para-6 of the writ petition about several allotments being challenged before this Hon'ble High Court and of the petitioner being informed from the office of the Housing Board that the allotment given to him has become subjudice and so on, are totally vague and this Court cannot take any judicial notice of those vague assertions. The further case made out by the petitioner is that because of his ailment he went out of India for treatment in Canada and thereafter on his return to India, he found a showcause notice dated 3rd February, 1993 asking him to show cause why his allotment should not be cancelled as he had inducted respondent no. 5 by subletting the said flat in question. The petitioner has annexed the said notice dated 3.2.1993 as Annexure-2 to this petition. The petitioner further states that he also received a show-cause notice dated 16.5.1990 containing the aforesaid allegation about the subletting of the said flat to respondent no. 5 and as such, the petitioner was asked to show-cause why the allotment in his favour should not be cancelled. It appears that certain documents were also annexed with the show-cause notice, but those documents have not been disclosed in the writ petition. However, the petitioner had given a reply to the said show-cause notice on 29th March, 1993. Thereafter, the respondents passed the impugned order dated 22nd December, 1993 for cancellation of allotment in respect of the said flat. 4. By an interim order passed by a Division Bench of this Court operation of the said impugned order dated 22nd December, 1993 has been stayed. 5. In the reply given to the said show cause by the petitioner he has raised various factual disputes including the allegation that the documents and the receipts containing his forged signatures have been filed before the Housing Board. The Housing Board Authorities have, of course, passed the final order without hearing the petitioner in person. This position is not disputed by anybody. 6. It is common ground that the said impugned order has been passed under Section 59 of the said Act which provides for summary procedure for eviction and recovery of rents under the said Act. The Housing Board Authorities have, of course, passed the final order without hearing the petitioner in person. This position is not disputed by anybody. 6. It is common ground that the said impugned order has been passed under Section 59 of the said Act which provides for summary procedure for eviction and recovery of rents under the said Act. In this connection sub-see (5) of Section 59 of the said Act is set out below :- "If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of the notice under sub-section (1) and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the competent authority is satisfied that any of the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (1) exists, or existed on the date of the issue of the notice, it may on a date to be fixed for the purpose make an order stating reasons therein directing that the Board premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof and may further order that any person shall pay such amount of arrears of rent or damages as may be specified in the order." On perusal of the said sub-section (5) of Section .59 of the said Act it is clear that the person proceeded against has a right to adduce evidence in support of his stand and the person concerned shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 7. This Court is of the view that the reasonable opportunity of being heard would include the reasonable opportunity of oral hearing and not mere opportunity of filing written representation. In coming to the said conclusion the Court has also considered the provisions of sub-section (7) of Section 59 of the said Act. Sub-sec. 7. This Court is of the view that the reasonable opportunity of being heard would include the reasonable opportunity of oral hearing and not mere opportunity of filing written representation. In coming to the said conclusion the Court has also considered the provisions of sub-section (7) of Section 59 of the said Act. Sub-sec. (7) of Section 59 of the said Act is set out below: "The competent authority shall for the purpose of holding any inquiry under this Chapter, have, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matter, namely :- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) Requiring the discovery and production of documents; and (c) any other matter which may be prescribed, be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974), and any proceeding in such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860)." It is clear that the competent p8rson holding inquiry under Section 59 of the said Act shall have certain powers as vested in a Civil Court. The proceeding by such authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the competent authority holding inquiry will be deemed to be a Civil Court under Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. On a combined reading of sub-section (5) and sub-section (7) of Section 59 of the said Act, this Court is of the view that while holding enquiry under Section 59 (5) of the said Act, the competent authority does not exercise power merely as a quasi-judicial authority but also functions as an authority with the trappings of a Court. In this connection the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Virindra Kumar vs. The State of Panjab (A. I. R. 1956 Supreme Court page-153) is very pertinent. In this connection the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Virindra Kumar vs. The State of Panjab (A. I. R. 1956 Supreme Court page-153) is very pertinent. The observations of Venkatrama Ayer, J. at page 156 of the report are set out below :- "It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust to them work of a judicial character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey L.C. in 'Shell, Co. of Australia v. Federal Commr. of Taxation, 1931 AC 275 at p. 296 (A), some of the trappings of a court. The distinction between courts and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions is well established, though whether an authority constituted by a particular enactment, falls within one category or the other may, on the provisions of that enactment, be open to argument. (6) There has been considerable discussion in the Courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a Court as distinguished from a tribunal exercising quasijudicial functions. Vide 1931 AC 275 (A)-R. V. London Council, 1931-2 KB 215 (B)-Cooper v. Wilson, 1037-2 KB 309 (C)-Huddart Parkar and Co. v. Moorehead, (1909) 8 CLR 330 (D); and Rola Co. v. The Commonwealth, (1994) 69 CLR 185 (E). In this Court, the question was considered in some fullness in 'Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188 (F). It is unnecessary to traverse the same ground once again. It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question wherefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court." 9. It goes without saying that cancellation of the allotment order prejudicially affects the petitioner and imposes civil consequences upon the petitioner. As such the impugned order for cancellation of allotment can be passed only after the concerned allottee has been heard and given an opportunity to lead evidence. In this connection the Court follows the judgment of Full Bench of Patna High Court where the same principles in a different context were followed. (Vide judgment of Full Bench Patna High Court in the case of Commissioner, Wealth Tax vs. Jagdish Prasad Chaudhary, reported in 211 (1995) I.T.R. page-472 : 1995 (1) PLJR 519 (F.B.)). 10. Learned counsel for respondent no. 5 has placed reliance on several judgments for the purpose of contending that where only one view is possible even after observance of principle of natural justice, no hearing need be given. He has further contended that where the petitioner obtained some advantage in his favour by practising fraud, he is not entitled to get an opportunity of personal hearing. 11. This Court, with great, respect, is unable to follow the relevance of the afforesaid principle on the facts of the present case especially in the context of statutory provisions of Section 59. The Court does not think that in the facts and circumstances of the case only one conclusion is possible. The Court also cannot hold that any fraud has been committed by the petitioner when the entire allegations against him rest on some disputed questions of facts arrived at in an enquiry conducted by the said Board without the participation of the petitioner. 12. In that view of the matter, this Court holds that the enquiry which the authorities of the Board are to hold under Section 59 of the said Act must include oral hearing in which the person proceeded against should have the opportunity to lead evidence. That has not admittedly be done in the instant case. 12. In that view of the matter, this Court holds that the enquiry which the authorities of the Board are to hold under Section 59 of the said Act must include oral hearing in which the person proceeded against should have the opportunity to lead evidence. That has not admittedly be done in the instant case. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. I therefore, set aside the impugned order dated 22nd December, 1993 and direct the authorities of the Board to hold an enquiry on the basis of the show-cause proceeding before cancellation of the allotment of said flat to the petition8r and to give the petitioner an opportunity of oral hearing and an opportunity to lead evidence in the said enquiry. 13. It is made clear that in the said enquiry the authorities of the Board shall also hear respondent no. 5 and give him an equal opportunity of adducing evidence. It is further made clear that the said enquiry must be concluded within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of this order and the date of such hearing will be fixed within a month from today after giving notice to both the writ petitioner and respondent no. 5. This Court further makes it clear that it has not made any findings on the factual assertions and counter assertions made by the parties in this writ petition. It is open to respondent no. 5 to urge his case before the authorities of the Board in connection with the aforesaid enquiry by producing documents which are in his possession. It is further made clear that nothing said in this judgment will be construed as an expression of any opinion by this Court about the merits of the case of either party. With the above observation, this writ petition, at the admission stage, is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to cost.