JUDGMENT Ajay Nath Ray, J. : This is an application for summary revocation of the caveat filed by Garodia in the matter of the last Will of Hari Prasad Lohia by which his brother's son Nikunj has been appointed both executor and residuary and principal legatee. 2. Hari Prasad Lohia had a brother and two sisters. One of the sisters Durga Devi lodged a caveat. Then she expressed her intention to withdraw the same and after a contested hearing I permitted such withdrawal. The other sister Pushpa Debi Modi who predeceased Hari Prasad never came into the picture through her heirs, if any. 3. Hari Prasad himself died without any children. He was a divorcee and he never married a second time. 4. It has been alleged, though not as the first point, that the caveat is maintained merely for this purpose that Nikunj does not get the 2,44,000 shares owned by the deceased in the East India Syntex Company. Both Garodia and Nikunj are directors of that company. It is alleged that Garodia's interest would be much served and his control over the company would be much strengthened if the 2,44,000 shares of Hari Prasad and the voting rights thereon remained always in suspense. 5. The Probate Court being a court of equity. I permitted these matters to be brought on record. Motive, though not always, might sometimes prove to be a relevant and tilting factor in an equity court. 6. On the same basis i.e. this Court is an equity Court, facts were brought to my notice from the side of Garodia, regarding the actions of Nikunj, which, according to Garodia, disentitle Nikunj from obtaining a discretionary relief from this Court. 7. It was said that Nikunj first tried to obtain a probate by suppressing citations and making a written erroneous statement upon oath that there are none others interested in the probate of the Will of the deceased than he and his sister. Only upon an order being passed by Hazari, J. did citation issue to the deceased's sister Durga Debi Goenka. At that stage Durga Debi's son Lokenath apparently used an affidavit denying the genuineness of Hari Prasad's Will. Only upon an order being passed by Hazari, J. did citation issue to the deceased's sister Durga Debi Goenka. At that stage Durga Debi's son Lokenath apparently used an affidavit denying the genuineness of Hari Prasad's Will. I have not seen the affidavit itself but a copy of it is annexed to the affidavit of Kejriwal who has affirmed an affidavit on behalf of Garodia in the next application of Nikunj, where he prays for limited rights of administration pendente lite relating to the voting powers of the said 2,44,000 shares. 8. It is also alleged by Garodia that two dividend warrants for two successive years after the death of Hari Prasad in October 1992, were encashed at the instance of Nikunj by making entries on the line "payee's signature". Once Nikunj signed as H.P. Lohia and in another instance he signed in some illegible manner seeking to make it appear as H. P. Lohia's signature. It is alleged that they were Nikunj's forgeries. 9. Nikunj has denied these allegations. He has said that only H.P. Lohia's name was written. He has said that the bank allowed the warrants to be encashed. It appears to me that in the second of the dividend warrants H. P. Lohia's name was not written but that a signature was attempted by somebody to be put in there. Why and how the bank encashed the warrants in the account of H. P. Lohia even after his death are things which I have not been able to understand. 10. The above matters might have been relevant ones since an equitable matter is in issue, but in my opinion, where summary revocation of probate is called for, the issue is one and one only. The issue is, has the person who has lodged the caveat a sufficient interest in the estate of the deceased so as to have the locus standi for such lodgement? 11. The motive for such lodgement is in my opinion irrelevant in a summary revocation application, although I have formed this opinion only after hearing all the facts in full, If Garodia has a sufficient interest in the estate of Hari Prasad Lohia, deceased, then it does not matter in the least whether he wishes to lodge and press his caveat for maintaining the control of the East India Syntex Co. of for some other purpose. of for some other purpose. Similarly, an heir as on intestacy would be entitled to maintain a caveat even if his motive is, say, the dishonourable one of putting spokes in the wheels if other co-sharers, who might be much needy than the caveator, and much deserving or meritorious, in the ordinary non-legal use of those words. 12. Similarly the actions of Nikunj Lohia, in initially suppressing citation, if he did so suppress it initially, and in obtaining encashment of the dividend warrants improperly if improper conduct it was on his part, are equally irrelevant. If the Will of H. P. Lohia is genuine and if Nikunj is the executor he is entitled to obtain probate and in the matter of such obtaining of probate he is entitled to have cleared out of his way the opposition of all those who, in the eye of law, are mere busybodies or mere nobodies. 13. Is Garodia therefore a mere busybody or a mere nobody? If he is not, he can go on with his caveat. If he has no locus standi, there is no •reason why his caveat should not be summarily rejected. 14. Garodia is a nobody to the Lohia family. There is no question of Garodia being an heir as on intestacy of H. P. Lohia. His interest, if interest it is, in the estate of the deceased is only this, that he has a two year old order of attachment before judgment in regard to H. P. Lohia's estate and some property contained therein, the said interlocutory order being at Garodia's instance and in aid of his suit. 15. The exact nature of the suit it is not necessary to mention in any great detail. Garodia filed a suit as a person entitled to an indemnity. This is an indemnity for all claims and liabilities (the indemnity being acquired on the basis of an award which has become a decree) to be made good to him, because he, along with other defendants have been impleaded by banks in several suits, where liquidation of the debts of various companies have been claimed by the banks, and in respect of all those companies Garodia is an indemnity holder. Even if Garodia is not yet out of pocket, he can claim on the indemnity merely upon a claim being made upon him this is Garodia's case on the law, and one which is probably not foundationless in law. 16. The attachment before judgment is therefore the only thing on the ground of which the caveat of Garodia, if at all, can be maintained. 17. Mr. Tibrewal has cited a large number of authorities to show in what circumstances the Courts have held certain persons to have an interest in the estate of the deceased and therefore entitled to lodge a caveat, and where the Courts in other circumstances have held otherwise. In those other circumstances the persons were held not to be entitled to have an interest in the estate of the deceased and therefore not entitled to lodge a caveat. 18. A Division Bench authority was relied upon by Mr. Tibrewal being the case of Southern Bank Ltd. vs. Kesardeo Ganeriwalla, reported in 62 CWN p. 444 and he has drawn my attention to the observation made at page 451 which is as follows: "I am unable to agree that a person who has a right to seize a property in execution of a decree for money which he holds has therefore an interest in it." 19. A mere creditor of the estate of a mere decree-holder against the deceased therefore, would not have a sufficient legal interest to lodge a caveat. 20. On the other hand, it was submitted from Garodia's side that a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has said in the case of : In the goods of Mrs. Elsie Augusta Black (AIR 1941 Pat p. 151) as follows: "A creditor who has attached a portion of the estate might possibly be a person who had an interest in the estate but a mere creditor without even a decree can hardly be said to have an interest in the estate." 21. The Calcutta dictum says in no uncertain terms that a mere creditor of the estate has no locus standi. It does not mention its view about a creditor who has levied an attachment, because the problem did not exactly arise for consideration by their Lordships. 22. The Calcutta dictum says in no uncertain terms that a mere creditor of the estate has no locus standi. It does not mention its view about a creditor who has levied an attachment, because the problem did not exactly arise for consideration by their Lordships. 22. Again in the Patna case the obiter by way of doubt indicates, no doubt, that an attaching creditor of a portion of the estate might have a locus standi but does not encompass necessarily within it also the case of the attaching plaintiff who has not yet reached the more solid stage of a creditor, by obtaining a decree. 23. The above point of distinction between attachment levied before judgment and an attachment levied thereafter in execution is also brought out in the case cited by Mr. Tebriwal being Bhagwan Das Pribhdas & Ors. vs. Santokh Singh Saran Singh reported in AI R 1968 Punj 461. 24. There is no exact authority which goes even so far as to say, not by way of an obiter dictum but by way of its ratio decidendi, that a creditor who has levied attachment after obtaining a decree has a sufficient interest in the estate of the deceased so as to be entitled to lodge a caveat. 25. The position of a decree-holder creditor levying attachment after judgment need not be pronounced upon in this case. We are concerned with a lesser situation, Garodia is not yet a creditor and he is only in the position as yet of a hopeful plaintiff. The attachment, which he has levied, is by way of an interlocutory order and will not necessarily survive the disposal of the suit. If Garodia were to be granted a locus standi today on the basis of the attachment before judgment obtained by him, and he were to lose his suit the next day, what will happen to his locus standi? Will the Probate Court be put on constant enquiry whether an attachment before judgment obtained by Garodia is subsisting every minute it goes on with the probate case? Will such enquiries be made during cross-examination and examination-in-chief? If the locus standi ceases in the midst of cross-examination, will the cross-examination counsel be stopped from further continuing his cross-examination? 26. In my opinion, locus standi for challenging a Will cannot be founded upon such shifting sands. Will such enquiries be made during cross-examination and examination-in-chief? If the locus standi ceases in the midst of cross-examination, will the cross-examination counsel be stopped from further continuing his cross-examination? 26. In my opinion, locus standi for challenging a Will cannot be founded upon such shifting sands. Interest in the estate of the deceased must be shown to be present within the bundle of rights already available to the lodger of the caveat in such a manner as is not defeasible in all ordinary and normal circumstances. Such an interest in the estate of Lohia, I do not find in the bundle of rights presented by Garodia to Court to-day. 27. The attachment order might be vacated even by a subsequent interlocutory order in the suit. Mr. Tibrewal offered security of Rs. 5 lac or 10 lac or 15 lac but in these application there is no scope for taking security. If these offers are made again before the interlocutory Court, who knows what will happen to the attachment order? 28. I have seen the Will of H. P. Lohia which was given production of Lohia's address is mentioned as at a house in Hindustan Park, Calcutta. He died at 3 Maharani Bag, New Delhi, For a person leaving an estate of Rs. 30 crore or so, the unregistered will on a single type-written sheet does appear to be a little too informal to me, but these are matters of conjecture into which a Court should not enter. 29. The Probate Court being a Court of conscience, I would be happier if somebody were left to assist the Court in analysing the Will for a little longer time than is likely to be occupied by an ordinary un contentious Will case which comes before a Probate Court. But my greater happiness is no reason why I should make a Will case which deserves to be uncontentious, a contentious one by permitting a mere nobody in the eye of law to remain on the scene as a cross-examiner for the Court. 30. Under these circumstances, prayer(a) in the Master's Summons of 11th of August 1993 is allowed. The Will of Hari Prasad Lohia will hereafter be probated as an un-contentions case since no further caveat remains on record. Prayer(b) of the Master's Summons is not pronounced upon now. 30. Under these circumstances, prayer(a) in the Master's Summons of 11th of August 1993 is allowed. The Will of Hari Prasad Lohia will hereafter be probated as an un-contentions case since no further caveat remains on record. Prayer(b) of the Master's Summons is not pronounced upon now. The probate, in my opinion, should be granted in the open Court after the Will has been proved before the Hon'ble Judge taking Will cases. 31. One and the same order should, in my opinion, also dispose of the notice of motion wherein a limited administration pendente lite has been prayed for by Nikunj. This is the prayer for voting rights in respect of the 2,44,000 shares of East India Syntex. 32. Nikunj appears now to be totally unobstructed in the matter of his obtaining administration and control of the estate of Hari Prasad Lohia. Nobody in the family has appeared as an objector on the scene. Only the outsider Garodia has been objecting. The sister of the deceased also withdrew her caveat as I have mentioned above. Under these circumstances I do not see why I should keep the voting rights of the Lohia shares in abeyance. I also do not see why during the time probate is not granted, Nikunj Lohia, who has annexed to his petition for probate the Will of Hari Prasad Lohia, which he claims to be genuine, should not have pendente lite administration for the limited purpose prayed for herein. Pending grant of probate, if any, there will thus be an order in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion dated 28th of July 1994. 33. All parties, the department and all others concerned to act on a signed copy of this dictated order upon the usual undertakings. Application allowed.