N. J. PANDYA J. ( 1 ) THERE is no question of extending time for submitting undertaking granted as per order dated 12th September 1994 passed by my learned colleague S. D. Shah. J. in Civil Revision Application No. 943 of 1994. ( 2 ) MY learned Brother S. D. Shah J. had an occasion to pass the said order in the above Civil Revision Application when he felt that there is no substance in it. Therefore he dismissed the same by giving detailed reasons in the first five paragraphs of his order. The learned Judge finally had declared that the Revision Application is summarily rejected. ( 3 ) AT that stage as recorded in paragraph 6 of the Order the learned advocate Shri J. N. Jadeja appearing for the petitioner-tenant requested that some reasonable time should be granted to the petitioner-tenant to vacate the suit premises. ( 4 ) MY learned colleague S. D. Shah J. was pleased therefore to grant time upto 31st December 1995 subject to certain conditions and stipulations as enumerated therein; but making it a condition precedent that an undertaking in usual terms shall be filed in this Court within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. The said three weeks thus would work out upto 4. 10. 1994. ( 5 ) THE learned advocate so far as he is concerned has informed his client had drafted out an undertaking and accordingly to Shri Jadeja learned advocate appearing for the tenant in the said Revision Application who also appearing in this Misc. Civil Application. The tenant has also sworn in the undertaking within time. However the clerk who was handed over the undertaking in a form of affidavit failed to produce the same in the Court within time prescribed. ( 6 ) BY that time what transpired before the trial court was that the execution application no. 10/94 pending there was sought to be revived and finally on 6. 10. 1994 possession warrant under Order 21 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code came to be issued. ( 7 ) ON the next day a report came to be submitted that the premises was under lock and key. Therefore necessary permission for breaking open the lock was granted and that was done on the same day. 10. 1994 possession warrant under Order 21 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code came to be issued. ( 7 ) ON the next day a report came to be submitted that the premises was under lock and key. Therefore necessary permission for breaking open the lock was granted and that was done on the same day. Thereafter the warrant came to be executed on that very day and necessary report came to be made to the executing court in that regard. These details are to be found from the papers annexed to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent no. 2. ( 8 ) THE net result therefore is that the tenant was to give an undertaking within the time stipulated. On failure of the tenant to give such an undertaking he was put in the same position as he would have been on account of dismissal and rejection of the Civil Revision Application with regard to the decree sought to be executed as if he has not been granted any time. Therefore if the situation is visualised that when my learned colleague S. D. Shah J. dismissed the Civil Revision Application and if no time was granted the decree would have become executable immediately. The failure on the part of the tenant to submit the undertaking within the time prescribed brought about the same situation as if no time has been granted to the tenant to vacate the premises. ( 9 ) THE premises have already been taken possession of by virtue of an order of executing court. Hence the attempt on the part of the tenant to get the time extended for filing undertaking for which purpose this Application is filed would not serve any purpose. No doubt the real purpose of filing the Application is to get the order of restitution or restoration as per prayer B of paragraph 5 of this Application. The concept of restitution or restoration known under the Civil Procedure Code is covered by sec. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. No doubt the provisions are rot exhaustive and therefore there are powers under sec. 151 of the C. P. C. which may have to be invoked. ( 10 ) HOWEVER this not one such case where sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code will have to be invoked. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. No doubt the provisions are rot exhaustive and therefore there are powers under sec. 151 of the C. P. C. which may have to be invoked. ( 10 ) HOWEVER this not one such case where sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code will have to be invoked. Otherwise also there is no question of the decree having been varied altered or set aside. On the contrary the order of my learned colleague S. D. Shah J. clearly indicates that the decree passed by the courts below requiring the tenant to vacate the premises is not required to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court even under. the Bombay Rent Act. So far as section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned it would not apply. ( 11 ) UNDER the aforesaid background now that the possession is taken over by execution of decree by the original landlord there is no question of invoking powers under section 151 of the C. P. C. either. ( 12 ) LEARNED advocate Shri Jadeja relied upon the decision reported in A. I. R. 1976 Calcutta 371 with regard to invoking powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. In view of the aforesaid details this decision does not help the applicant. ( 13 ) SHRI Jadeja learned advocate also relied upon the decision rendered in Dr. Martand Ramchandra Potdar vs. Dr. Dattatraya Ramchandra Potdar A. I. R. 1975 Bombay 237 wherein the trial court allowed the plaintiff to retain an amount but the appellate court by varying the decree allowed the defendant to take back the amount from the plaintiff. This was considered to be a variation under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence the restitution held to be permissible. Obviously this is not the situation here. The decision rendered in AIR 1982 N. O. C. 173 Madras relates to a case where restitution might be treated as review. Obviously there is hardly any scope for review in the instant case because neither the order of my learned colleague S. D. Shah J. is in question nor is there any action of the trial court brought before this Court questioning the legality and validity. What is sought by way of this Application is only extention of time for filing of undertaking which has been expired. What is sought by way of this Application is only extention of time for filing of undertaking which has been expired. The authorities cited above are not applicable to the instant case. Therefore the Application is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to cost. Application Dismissed. .