ORDER : G.N. Ray, J. - Leave granted. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal is directed against judgment dated April 29, 1992 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Civil Revision Case No. 66/89. The Single Bench of the High Court allowed the said revision case filed under Section 21(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) against the order passed on March 30, 1989 by the Appellate Authority (II) Solan, dismissing the appeal of the appellant and confirming an order of eviction passed on April 19, 1986 by the Rent Controller, Solan. 3. The appellant-landlord made an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent-tenant from the suit premises being a shop room in Solan on the ground of sub-letting and also on the other grounds. The case of the landlord was that by registered lease dated October 21, 1972 the said shop premises was let out to one Som Nath respondent No. 1 at a monthly rental of Rs. 400/-. In March 1973 by a rent note, the said tenant Som Nath sublet the suit premises in favour of respondent No. 2 Ashwani Kumar and the said Ashwani Kumar later on sublet the same to his wife the respondent No. 3, Kamala. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed written statement inter alia contending that the respondent No. 3 was never a sub-tenant but she was inducted as a tenant directly by the landlord from 1971 onwards and in her capacity as a direct tenant she had been possessing the suit property by paying rents. It may be stated here that the respondent No. 3 did not give any evidence by coming to the witness-box but the respondent No. 2 Ashwani Kumar had deposed in this case. 4. The learned Rent Controller, however, did not accept the other grounds for eviction of the tenant but having accepted the case of the landlord that the original tenant Som Nath had sublet the suit premises in favour of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 without the written consent of the landlord, the said respondents were liable to be evicted from the suit premises, passed the order of eviction against the respondents. On an appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 without the written consent of the landlord, the said respondents were liable to be evicted from the suit premises, passed the order of eviction against the respondents. On an appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the Appellate Authority also upheld the decision of the Rent Controller by dismissing the appeal. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 thereafter made the said revision application under Section 21(5) of the Rent Act before the High Court. The High Court allowed the said revision case. The High Court held that from the counterfoils of the cheque books of respondent No. 3 it appeared that payment of rent in respect of the premises was made by respondent and such payment had been accepted by the agent of the landlord. The landlord was not a resident of Solan but had been staying at Chandigarh for the last twenty-five years. The High Court indicated that the said important evidence namely payment of rent by cheque by respondent No. 3 to the agent of the landlord had not been taken into consideration and as such the concurrent finding of fact by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was not justified. The High Court inter alia held that respondent No. 3 having paid rent to the agent of the landlord who had accepted the same with knowledge and consent that respondent No. 3 should be treated as a tenant, the eviction proceeding must fail. Accordingly the orders of Rent Controller and appellate authority were set aside and the eviction case was dismissed by the High Court. 5. Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel being ably assisted by Mr. Mehta has contended that the High Court has failed to appreciate the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 21(5) of the Rent Act. It has been contended by the learned counsel that although scope and ambit of Section 21(5) may be little wider than revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure , but the revisional power under Section 21(5) is not akin to the power to be exercised by an appellate authority. In the instant case, the High Court has, in fact, decided the case afresh by re- appreciating the evidence in the purported exercise of power of revision. In the instant case, the High Court has, in fact, decided the case afresh by re- appreciating the evidence in the purported exercise of power of revision. On reassessment of materials on record and evidence adduced in the case, the High Court came to a different finding by reversing concurrent finding of fact by the tribunals, although such an exercise is not permissible under Section 21(5) of the Act. In support of such contention, reference has been made to a decision of this Court in Smt. Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s S. Chokesiri and Co., 1988(2) RCR 328(SC) : 1989(1) SCC 19 . In the said case, East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was taken into consideration and it has been indicated that the scope of revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute conferring the revisional jurisdiction. This Court has indicated that the language of Section 15(5) of the said Rent Act did not confer a power to the High Court to reappreciate evidence and interfere with the findings of facts by the tribunals below. 6. Mr. Sanghi has submitted that the provisions of Section 21(5) is also similar and the revisional power under Section 21(5) does not empower the High Court to sit as a court of appeal and reappreciate the evidence and by such appreciation to come to a different finding by overruling concurrent finding by the tribunals below. 7. The learned counsel has also submitted that even on merits, the High Court has come to an erroneous finding. It has been submitted that the case of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as evident from written statement is that respondent No. 3 was a direct tenant under the landlord ever since 1971. No evidence whatsoever has been led in support of such induction of tenancy in 1971. No rent receipt of such tenancy in 1971 or 1972 has been produced. Only reliance has been made on the payment by cheque by respondent No. 3 towards the rent of disputed premises to the agent of the landlord from a period after 1973 when the sub-tenancy in favour of the respondent No. 2 the husband of respondent No. 3 was created and from then onward, the payment was made to the agent of the landlord towards the rent of the said showroom by cheque. But simply on the basis of such payment of rent of the said shop room by respondent No. 2 or respondent No. 3, no tenancy in their favour will be created. In support of such contention reliance has been made on the decision of this Court in Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhary, 1988(1) RCR 240(SC) : 1988(2) SCC 172 . In the said case, agreed rent of Rs. 600/- was paid by two separate cheques, one for Rs. 250/- and the other for Rs. 350/-. One of such cheques was issued by admitted tenant under the landlord and the other was issued by the party who claimed tenancy right. This Court has held that such payment cannot lead to any irresistible conclusion that the tenancy was created also in favour of the person who had paid rent. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the written statement, no case has been made out by the respondents No. 2 and 3 that the original tenant Som Nath, in whose favour of the registered lease deed was executed on October 21, 1972, has surrendered the said tenancy and thereafter the landlord having accepted such surrender had also received rent for the said premises from the respondent Nos. 2 or 3 accepting either of them to be a tenant and in view of such fact and by payment of such rent by the tenant namely respondent No.3 and acceptance of such rent in recognition of tenancy a new tenancy was created. The case of the defendants 2 and 3 is completely different and they having claimed direct tenancy in favour of respondent No. 3 ever since 1971, should not be permitted to rely on the payment made by any of them to the agent of the landlord towards the rental of suit premises after 1972 and contend that subsequently a direct tenancy in favour of respondent Nos. 2 or 3 by payment and acceptance of rent between the parties had been created. The learned counsel has therefore submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court has resulted in a total miscarriage of justice and the same is liable to be set aside. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 or 3 by payment and acceptance of rent between the parties had been created. The learned counsel has therefore submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court has resulted in a total miscarriage of justice and the same is liable to be set aside. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has, however, submitted that the landlord is admittedly an absentee landlord in this case and the uncle of the landlord was an agent of the landlord who had been receiving rent from respondent No. 3 by cheques issued by the said respondent. No cogent explanation has been given as to why the said agent had allowed the respondent No. 3 to make payment by the cheques in respect of the said shop. Such payment of rent by the respondent No. 3 for the shop room coupled with exclusive possession of the said shop room by her and acceptance of such rent from her over the years only indicate that the landlord through his agent was fully aware that the said respondent No. 3 had been exercising her right as a tenant and in that capacity had been making payment of the rent for the said shop room. Even then, the landlord accepted such payment of rent from respondent No. 3. The landlord, therefore, cannot be permitted to contend that there had been any sub-tenancy without the knowledge and consent of the landlord in favour of the respondent No. 3 by the original tenant Som Nath or by respondent No. 2 Ashwani Kumar. The learned counsel has submitted that at least from 1973 onwards, the exercise of such right by the respondent No. 3 qua tenant has been established beyond any shadow of doubt and the implication of such payment and acceptance of rent not having been properly considered by the courts below, the High Court was justified, in exercise of its revisional power under Section 21(5) of the Rent Act, to interfere with erroneous finding of fact arrived by non-consideration of relevant material. He has submitted that in any event, in view of long possession of respondent No. 3 qua tenant with full knowledge of the landlord by accepting payment of rent from her by cheques having been established convincingly, no interference need be made by this Court in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution because exercise of such jurisdiction will be against the equity in this case. This appeal, therefore, should be dismissed. 10. After giving our anxious consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that in the facts of the case, the High Court had quite improperly exercised its jurisdiction for revision under Section 21(5) of the Rent Act. It appears to us that the trial court had considered the case of payment of rent by the respondent No. 3 by cheques but such payment has not been accepted by the trial court as constituting creation of new tenancy in favour of respondent No. 3. The court of appeal has not made any specific discussion of such payment. As the judgment of the appellate authority is a judgment of affirmance, we do not think that any elaborate discussion on the said aspect was required. It appears to us that the High Court being oblivious of the limited scope and ambit of Section 21(5) of the Rent Act, has exercised the power of a court of appeal and having reappreciated the entire evidence come to a contrary finding. Such exercise as a court of appeal should not have been done by the High Court in the facts of the case. 11. We have, however, considered the merits of the case. In our view, even on merits, the finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 did not come out with any case whatsoever that the original tenant Som Nath and surrendered the tenancy and thereafter the authorised agent of the landlord had accepted the respondent No. 3 as a direct tenant and on such acceptance received payment of rent from the respondent No. 3 by cheques. We have indicated that in written statement filed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 a completely different case namely a direct tenancy in favour of respondent No. 3 from 1971 onward was made out. We have indicated that in written statement filed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 a completely different case namely a direct tenancy in favour of respondent No. 3 from 1971 onward was made out. The case that respondent No. 3, later on became tenant because of payment of rent by her by cheques and acceptance of such payment by the agent of the landlord being completely inconsistent with pleadings of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, should not be countenanced by Court and the said defendant should not be permitted to introduce any different case which is essentially incompatible with case pleaded by them. In our view, the learned counsel for the appellant is justified in contending that simply by accepting payment of rent in respect of disputed premises from the respondent No. 3, no irreistible conclusion can be drawn that such payment had been received from respondent No. 3 by accepting her as a tenant of the said shop room in place of respondent No. 1 in whose favour tenancy was created in 1972 by executing registered deed of lease. There is no material to show that such respondent No. 1 had surrendered the tenancy at any point of time. The respondent No. 3 has failed to produce any evidence showing tenancy in her favour in 1971. No rent receipt for such tenancy has been produced. The payment towards the rent of disputed premises, appears to have been made from 1973. Such payment, without more, only ensures discharge of rent obligation of the original tenant namely defendant No. 1. It may be stated here that the defendant No. 3 also did not depose in this case in support of her case of direct tenancy ever since 1971. We, therefore, have no hesitation to set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and affirm the order of eviction. 12. A prayer has been made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the disputed premises is being used as shop-cum-residence by respondent No. 3 and she was in possession of the same for a very long time. Hence, the decree of eviction should not be executed immediately and some time should be given to her to make alternative arrangement of residence and business otherwise great hardship would be caused. Hence, the decree of eviction should not be executed immediately and some time should be given to her to make alternative arrangement of residence and business otherwise great hardship would be caused. It appears to us that the suit is pending for more than 13 years and it will not be proper to grant longer time to the respondents. However, considering the aforesaid submissions, we grant time to the respondents to vacate the disputed premises by April 20, 1996 on furnishing the usual undertaking before this Court within four weeks from today. Such undertaking should be given by both the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. In default of execution of undertaking as directed, the decree would be executable at once. The appeal is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs. Appeal allowed.