Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil — 1995 DIGILAW 1496 (SC)

ORDER J. S. Verma, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short "the R. P. Act") against the judgment dated 26-4-1993 by S.N.Variava, J. of the Bombay High Court in Election Petition No. 24 of 1990 whereby the election of the appellant Manohar Joshi to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from 32, Dadar Constituency of Greater Bombay held on 27-2-1990 has been declared to be void on the ground under Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act. 2. Manohar Joshi was the candidate of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance at that election while the original election petitioner Bhaurao Patil (now dead), was the candidate of the Congress (1) Party. Manohar Joshi secured the highest number of votes i.e. 47,737, while Bhaurao Patil secured 24,354 votes. Accordingly, Manohar Joshi was declared duly elected on 1-3-1990. 3. Admittedly, the last date for filing the election petition according to the limitation prescribed in sub-section (1)of Section 81 of the R. P. Act was 14-4-1990 but the election petition was actually presented in the Bombay High Court on 16-4-1990. It is also admitted that 14-4-1990 was a Saturday on which date the High Court as well as its office was closed on account of a public holiday and 15-4-1990 was a Sunday on which date also the High Court as well as its office was closed and, therefore, the election petition could not have been presented on either of these two dates. The first question which arises, relates to compliance of Section 81 of the R. P. Act, the non-compliance of which renders the election petition liable for dismissal under Section 86 of the R. P. Act. 4. The election petition alleged the commission of corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) and (3 A) of Section 123 of the R. P. Act and sought declaration of the election of Manohar Joshi to be void on the ground under Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act.The corrupt practices alleged were, in substance, speeches on 24-2-1990 at Shivaji Park by the returned candidate Manohar Joshi and leaders of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance, namely, Bal Thackeray, Chhagan Bhujbal and Pramod Nawalkar; and some audio and video cassettes played during the election campaign alleged to contain material constituting these corrupt practices. Any further reference to the audio cassettes is unnecessary since none was either produced or relied on at the trial. The petition was supported only on the ground of the said speeches and video cassettes. Further details of the same would be given later at the appropriate stage. 5. The High Court rejected the contention that the election petition was time barred and, therefore, liable to be dismissed under Section 86 of the R. P. Act. The High Court has held that the corrupt practices alleged have been proved. Consequently, the election petition has been allowed and the election of the returned candidate Manohar Joshi has been declared to be void on the ground under Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act. Hence this appeal. 6. It would be appropriate to first deal with the contention of Shri Ram Jethmalani relating to non-compliance of Section 81 of the R. P. Act which, if correct, renders the election petition liable to be dismissed under Section 86 thereof. The arguments of Shri Jclhmalani in this respect have to be considered with reference to Sections 81, 83 and 86(1) which are asunder :-- "81. Presentation of petitions.-- (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in (sub-section (1)) of Section 100 and Section 101 to the (High Court) by any candidate at such election or any elector (within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the dale of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.) Explanation.-- In this sub-section, "elector" means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not. #|xx xx xx] ##[(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition ### and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of Ihe petition.] "83. #|xx xx xx] ##[(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition ### and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of Ihe petition.] "83. Contents of petition.-- (1) An election petition -- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition." "86. Trial of election petitions.-- (1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. Explanation.-- An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of Section 98. xx xx xx" 7. Shri Jethmalani contended that the election petition should have been dismissed by the High Court in accordance with Section 86(1) of the R. P. Act for non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 because it was not presented within the prescribed limitation: and it ought to have been dismissed thereunder, also for non-compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 81. For the second part of the submission, Shri Jethmalani contended that subsection (3) of Section 81 must be read along with Section 83 and, therefore, the copy of the election petition must be the copy of a Petition satisfying the requirement of Section 83(1) of the R. P. Act. These are the two parts of the argument for invoking Section 86 for dismissal of the election petition at the threshold. These are the two parts of the argument for invoking Section 86 for dismissal of the election petition at the threshold. The question, therefore, is: Whether there has been non-compliance of any part of Section 81 to attract Section 86 of the R. P. Act? We will consider this argument at the outset. NON-COMPLIANCE OF SUB-SECTION (1) AND/OR SUB-SECTION(3)OF SECTION 81 OF THE R. P. ACT. Re : Sub-section (1) of Section 81 8. In substance, the point for decision is whether the election peiition filed on 16-4-1990 was presented within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate as required by sub-section (1) of Section 81, since the last day of limitation, so reckoned, fell on 14-4-1990. Admittedly, the High Court and its office was closed on 14-4-1990 as well as 15-4-1990 on account of which the election petition could not have been presented in the High Court on any of these two days. Incidentally, even 13-4-1990 was a holiday when the High Court and its office was closed, but that is not of any significance since the last day of limitation was 14-4-1990. There is no controversy that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the election petitions required to be presented under the R. P. Act and. therefore, Section 4 of the Limitation Act is of no avail. The only question is whether Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applied to an election petition to permit filing of the election petitionon the date when the High Court opened alter the holidays. If Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is appli-eable then the election petition presented on 16-4-1990 was within the nine prescribed by subsection (1) of Section 81 and there would be no non-compliance of that provision to attract Section 86(1) of the R. P. Act requiting dismissl of the election petition as lime barred. 9. The submission of Shri Jethmalani is that the R. P. Act is a self-contained Code and, therefore, no provision outside the Act can be imported for the purpose of computing the limitation for presentation of an election petition. On this basis. he submitted that Section 10 of Ihe General Clauses Act has no application. In reply. Shri Ashok Desai. 9. The submission of Shri Jethmalani is that the R. P. Act is a self-contained Code and, therefore, no provision outside the Act can be imported for the purpose of computing the limitation for presentation of an election petition. On this basis. he submitted that Section 10 of Ihe General Clauses Act has no application. In reply. Shri Ashok Desai. learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the scheme of the R. P. Act and the legislative history of the limitation prescribed by the Act for presentation of an election petition clearly show that Section 10 of the Genera! Clauses Act applies for computing limitation for presentation of an election petition. Shri Desai also relied on the legal maxim -- fexnonkojit and impossibillia --which means the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. Shri Desai submitted that the election petitioner was entitled as of right to present the election petition on the last day of limitation which Cell on 14-4-1990. but that day and the next day being holidays when the High Court and its office was closed, the election petition presented on 16-4-1990, the first day on which Ihe Court and its office opened after the holidays, was presented within the prescribed period of limitation. On this basis. Shri Desai submitted, there was no non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R. P. Act. 10. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is as under:-- "10. Computation of time.-- (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act. any act or proceeding is directed or allowed 10 be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due lime if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open; Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act. 1877. applies. (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, I887." 11. 1877. applies. (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, I887." 11. A brief reference to the legislative history of the limitation prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 81 is relevant. The limiiation of 45 days from the dale of election of the returned candidate for the presentation of an election petition, has been prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 81 itself by an amendment by substitution of certain words by Act 27 of 1956. Prior to it. the period of limitation was required 10 he prescribed by the Rules framed under the R. P. Act according to the words then used in subsection (1) of Section XI. Rule 119 of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951 (for short "1951 Rules"). prescribed that period. The 1951 Rules also contained Rule 2(6) which expressly provided for Ihe application of the General Clauses Act to the provisions in the Rules. 12. A similar question relating to applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act arose when the limitation was prescribed by the Rules as required by the then existing sub-section (1) of Section 81 in. H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh. It was held by this Court that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to the presentation of election petitions. Thereafter, the same view has been taken in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra : Hari Shankar Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh: and Simhadri Satya Narayana Rao v. M. Budda Prasad, 1994 Suppl (1) SCC 449 : 1991 (1) SCJ 281. The later decisions were in relation 10 election petitions filed after amendment of Section 81 (1) by Act 27 of 1956 prescribing the limitation in this section itself. Shri Jethmalani tried to distinguish those decisions on the ground that the earlier decision in H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh was followed without noticing the legislative change by amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 81. In view of the fact that this point was not raised in the manner it has been done by Shri Jethmalani before us, it is appropriate that we consider the merit of this submission. 13, It is settled by the decision of this Court in Ramlal. In view of the fact that this point was not raised in the manner it has been done by Shri Jethmalani before us, it is appropriate that we consider the merit of this submission. 13, It is settled by the decision of this Court in Ramlal. Motilal and Chholelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. that the litigant has a right to avail limitation up to the last day and his only obligation is to explain his inability to present the suit/petition on the last day of limitation and each clay thereafter till it is actually presented. This being the basic premise, it cannot be doubted that the election petitioner in the present case was entitled to avail the entire limitation of 45 days up to the last clay, i. e., 14-4-1990 and he was required to explain the inability of not filing it only on 14-4-1990 and 15-4-1990 since the petition was actually presented in the High Court on 16-4-1990. If Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies, the explanation is obvious and the election petition must be treated to have been presented within time. 14. The question now is : Whether the applica-bility of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act to the presentation of election petitions under the R.P. Act is excluded? No doubt the R. P. Act is a self-contained Codeeven for the purpose of the limitation prescribed therein. This, however, does not answer the question. It has to he seen whether the context excludes the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which is in the part therein relating to the General Rules of Construction of all Central Acts. The legislative history of prescribing limita-tion of presentation of election petitions in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 81 is also significant for a proper appreciation of the context. Admittedly. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applied when by virtue of the requirement in the then exist ing subsection (1) of Section 81. The period of limitation was prescribed by Rules framed under the R. P. Act, in Rule 119 of the 1951 Rules. This was expressly provided by Rule 2(6) of the 1951 Rules. Admittedly. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applied when by virtue of the requirement in the then exist ing subsection (1) of Section 81. The period of limitation was prescribed by Rules framed under the R. P. Act, in Rule 119 of the 1951 Rules. This was expressly provided by Rule 2(6) of the 1951 Rules. There is nothing to indicate that providing the period of limitation in sub-section (1) of Section 81 itself by substitution of certain words by Act 27 of 1956 instead of prescribing the limitation by Rules, was with a view to exclude the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. The change appears to have been made to provide for a fixed period in the Act itself instead of leaving that exercise to be performed by the rule making authority. An express provision in Rule 2(6)of the 1951 Rule was required since the General Clauses Act ipso facto would not apply to Rules framed under the Central Act, even though it would to the Act itself. The context supports the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act instead of indicating its exclusion for the purpose of compuling the limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 81 for presentation of election petitions. 15. In view of the basic premise that the election petitioner is entilled to avail the entire limitation of 45 days for presentation of the cleciion petition as indicated by Ramlal, (supra), if the contrary view is taken, it would require the election petitioner to perform an impossible task in acase like the present to present theelection petition on the last day of limitation on which date the High Courf as well as its office is closed. It is the underlying principle of this legal maxim which suggests the informed decision on this point, leading to only conclusion that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies in the computation of the limitation prescribed by sub-section (1) of Seciion 81 of the R, P. Act for preseniation of an election petition. So computed, there is no dispute that the election petition presented in the present case on 16-4-1990 was within limitation and there was no non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R. P. Act. 16. So computed, there is no dispute that the election petition presented in the present case on 16-4-1990 was within limitation and there was no non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R. P. Act. 16. We have reached the above conclusion independent of the above decisions of this Court rendered on petitions presented subsequent to the amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 81. If may straightway be said that in all these cases applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act was either not doubted or was taken for granted. This is how the position has been understood for all these years and no case taking the contrary view has been cited all the Bar. This settled position is in conformity with the view we have taken on this point. There is no basis in law to take a different view, Re : Sub-section (3) of Section 81 17. Sub-section (3) of Section 81 requires every election petition to be accompanied by as many copy thereof as there are respondents, obviously for the purpose of a copy of the election petition being served upon each respondent along with the notice of the election petition. The submission of Shri Jethmalani is that the election petition and, there-fore, its accompanying copy in accordance with Section 81(3) should satisfy the requirement of subsection (1) of Section 83 as to the contents of the petition. He argues that if the contents of the election petition which has been filed and the copy accompanying it do not satisfy the requirement of Section 83(1), there is non-compliance of Section 83(3) attracting Section 86 for dismissal of the election petition. The argument is that the defect in such a case is in the accompanying copy of the election petition which is deficient in its contents as required by Section 83(1). For this reason, he submits, if results in non-compliance of Section 81(3) which attracts Section 86 of the R. P. Act. 18. The argument is that the defect in such a case is in the accompanying copy of the election petition which is deficient in its contents as required by Section 83(1). For this reason, he submits, if results in non-compliance of Section 81(3) which attracts Section 86 of the R. P. Act. 18. In the present case, there is reference in paras 32 and 33 of the election petition 10 certain video cassettes, the contents of which are deemed to be incorporated by reference in the election petition, and since the video cassettes or a transcript of its contents was not filed along with the election petition and was not supplied with the copy of the election petition to the respondent (returned candidate), it is argued, that it has resulted in non-compliance of Section 81(3) which aitracts Section 86. No further reference to the audio cas-settes is necessary since the audio cassettes were not produced even at the trial and were not relied on by the election petitioner for proof of the corrupt practice. These video cassettes were later produced at the trial but the subsequent production of the video cassettes at the trial, it is urged, does not cure the defect of non-compliance of Section 81 (3). In reply, Shri Ashok Desai submitted that the video cassettes did not form part of the election petition as the contents thereof are not incorporated by reference in the election petition and, therefore, a non-production of the video cassettes or their iranscript with the election petition and failure to annex the same to the copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate did not amount to non-compliance of Section 81(3). Shri Desai submitted that Section 81(3) merely requires the copy to conform with the eleclion petition as presented in the Court and not an election petition as required to be drafted according to Section 83(1) of the R. P. Act. Shri Desai submitted that Section 81(3) merely requires the copy to conform with the eleclion petition as presented in the Court and not an election petition as required to be drafted according to Section 83(1) of the R. P. Act. He further submitted that any defect or deficiency in the contents of the election petition found with reference to Section 83(1) of the R. P. Act may have any other consequence requiring the Court to act under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. or Order 6 Rule 16, C.P.C, but there is no non-compliance of Section 81(3) if the copy accompanying the election petition which is served on the respondent is identical with the election petition as it is actually presented in the Court. In short. Shri Desai submitted that non-compliance of Section 83(1) of the R. P. Act is not visited with the consequence of dismissal of the election petition at the threshold under Section 86 and, therefore, the non-compliance of Section 81 which attracts Section 86 has to be seen without reference to Section 83 of the R. P. Act. Both sides have placed reliance on the same set of decisions to support the rival contentions. 19. There is no dispute that the election petition as presented in the Court, was accompanied by as many copies thereof its there were respondents in the election petition; and the copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate with the notice of the election petition was identical with the election petition as it was presented in the Court. The requirement of the plain language of Section 81(3) was. therefore. fully met. The object of the provision is clearly to ensure that each respondent to the election petition gets an identical copy of the election petition as presented in the Court to acquaint the respondent with the actual and full contents of the election petition as it is presented in the Court. On the basis of the identical copy the respondent can prepare his defence and also take the plea of deficiency, if any, in the contents of the election petition with reference to Section 83 of the R. P. Act, in order to apply in the Court for action being taken under Order 7 Rule 11 or Order 6 Rule 16, C. P. C, as the case may be. These provisions are attracted only after the election petition survives the liability for dismissal at the threshold under Section 86 of the R. P. Act, 20. Section 86 empowers the High Court to dismiss an election petition at the threshold if it does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 on Section 82 or Section 117of the Act, all of which are patent defects evident on a bare examination of the election petition as presented. Sub-section (1) of Section 81 requires the checking of limitation with reference to the admitted facts and sub-section (3) thereof requires only a comparison of the copy accompanying the election petition with the election, petition itself, as presented. Section 82 requires verification of the required parties to the petition with reference to the relief claimed in the election petition. Section 117 requires verification of the deposit of security in the High Court in accordance with Rules of the High Court. Thus, the compliance of Sections 81, 82 and 117 is to be seen with reference to the evident facts found in the election petition and the documents filed along with it at the lime of its presentation. This is a ministerial act. There is no scope for any further inquiry for the purpose of Section 86 to accertain the deficiency, if. any, in the election petition found with reference to the requirements of Section 83 of the R. P. Act which is a judicial function. For this reason, the non-compliance of Section 83, is not specified as a ground for dismissal of the election petition under Section 86. 21. Acceptance of the argument of Shri Jethmalani would amount to reading into Seclion 86 an additional ground for dismissal of the election petilion under Section 86 for non-compliance of Section 83. There is no occasion to do so, particularly when Section 86 being in the nature of a penal provision, has to be construed strictly confined ID iis plain language. 22. We may now refer to the decisions of this Court on which reliance is placed by both sides to support the rival contention on this point. In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar a translation in English of the pamphlet annexed to the election petition was incorporated in the body of the election petition and it was stated in the petition that it formed part of the petition. In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar a translation in English of the pamphlet annexed to the election petition was incorporated in the body of the election petition and it was stated in the petition that it formed part of the petition. Along with the copy of the election petition which contained the entire transcript in English of the pamphlet, a copy of the pamphlet had not been annexed. The respondent raised the objection that the copy of the election petition served on him was not a copy of the election petition presented in the High Court and. therefore, the efection petition was liable to be dismissed under Section 86 of the R. P. Act. lt was held by this Court that the pamphlet which was filed as an annexure to the election petition must be treated as a document filed with the election petition and not apart of the election petition in so far as the averments are concerned. Obviously, this view was taken because the contents of the pamphlet were incorporated in the body of the election petition of which a copy was duly served on the respondent. Accordingly, it was held that there was no non-compliance of Section 81 (3) and the petition was not liable to be dismissed under Section 85 of the R. P. Act. In A. Mathin Mohan v. Kalavakuma Chandrasekhra, the earlier decision in Sahodrabai Rai. (supra) was followed. It was held that failure to furnish copy of schedules and documents which did not form an integral parl of the election petition was not fatal to the petition and it was not liable to be dismissed under Section 86 of the R. P. Act. An earlier decision in M. Karunanidhi v. Dr. H. V. Handa was distinguished and il was pointed out that M. Karunanidhi (supra) did not depart from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai Rai (supra). Para 15 of the decision in A. Madan Mohan. is as under :-- "This decision in no way departs from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai Rai case.. The aforesaid case, however, rested on the ground that the document (pamphlet) was expressly referral to in the election petition and thus became an integral parl of the same and ought to have been served on the respondent. is as under :-- "This decision in no way departs from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai Rai case.. The aforesaid case, however, rested on the ground that the document (pamphlet) was expressly referral to in the election petition and thus became an integral parl of the same and ought to have been served on the respondent. It i.s. therefore, manifest that the facts of the case cited above arc clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Furthermore, the decision in M. Karunanidhi case. has noticed the previous decision and has fully endorsed the same." (at page 292) (of SCC.) This decision by a 3-Judge 35. It was argued by Shri Ashok Desai that in ease of the provocative and incendiary speeches given by acknowledged leaders of the political party the consent of the candidate set up by their party has to be assumed being impliet from the relationship of the candidate with the speaker through the medium of the party. On this basis, it was urged that a party candidate must be held to have consented to such speeches made by the leaders of that party and, therefore, if the speech of the leader satisfies the other requirements of the corrupt practice, the eon-sent of the candidate which too is a constituent part of the corrupt practice, must be assumed to make out the ground under Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act for declaring his election to be void. Shri Desai made a fervent emotive appeal that unless the law is so construed, a candidate of the party will get the benefit of appeal for votes on the ground of his religion on the basis that his consent has not been pieaded and proved, thereby frustrating the object of the enactment and adversely affecting the purity of elections which is of essence in a democracy. It was argued that leaders of the party must be assumed to be agents of the candidates of that party for the purpose of the ground of corrupt practice. 36. In our opinion, the fallacy in the argument is that it overlooks certain other provisions of the R. P. Act. Section 100 of the R. P. Act is as under:-- "100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. 36. In our opinion, the fallacy in the argument is that it overlooks certain other provisions of the R. P. Act. Section 100 of the R. P. Act is as under:-- "100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. --(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion -- (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected -- (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. (2) If in the opinion of the High Court, a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the High Court is satisfied -- (a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and evey such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders, and without the consent, of the candidale or his election agent; (b) Omitted. (c) that the candidate and his election agemt took alt reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election; and (d) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practiceon Ihe part of the candidate or any of his agents, then the High Court may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void." 37. The distinction between Clause (b) of subsection (1) and sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) therein is significant. The ground in clause (b) provides that the commission of any corrupt practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent by itself is sufficient to declare the election to be void. On the other hand, the commission of any corrupt practice in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent (without the further requirement of the ingredient of consent of a returned candidate or his election agent) is a ground for declaring the election to be void only when it is further pleaded and proved that the result of Ihe election in so far as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected. This ground is further subject to sub-section (2) of Section 100 of which the onus is on the returned candidate. 38. It is, therefore, clear that if Ihe corrupt practice is committed in the interests of the returned candidate by any other person, even if he be an agent other than his election agent, without the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent, the law provides of the election to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(ii) provided it is also pleaded and proved that the result of the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected thereby. The apprehension expressed by Shrj Ashok Desai is, therefore, ill founded since the law clearly provides that the returned candidate would not get the benefit of a corrupt practice committed in his interests by anyone if the result of the election is shown to be materially affected thereby. 39. Apart from this aspect, it has also to be remembered that provision is made in the R. P. Act as well as in the genial law to punish the makers of such incendiary speeches for the offences committed by them in Ihe form of electoral offences e. g. under Section 125 of the R. P. An and Sections 153A. 153B and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. 153B and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Thus even if the acknowledged lenders of a parly have committed any corrupt practice which results in benefit to the returned candidate then on proof of the benefit having materially affected the election result in favour of the candidate, his election would he set aside on the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(ii) of the R. P. Act. There is thus no occasion to read into the ground in Section 100(1)(b) or the definition of "corrupt practice" the implied consent of the candidate for any act done by a leader of that puny to dispense with a clear pleading and proof of the candidate's or his election agent's consent as a constituted pan of the corrupt practice for the ground under Section 100(1)(b) of the R, P. Act. 40. It may also he mentioned that the proposition suggested in the argument of Shri Desai docs not appear to be correct. Whenever the requirement is of consent, it must be free consent given by the giver of the consent, of his own volition. Ordinarily, it also implies a subservient role of the person to whom consent i.s given and the authority of the giver of the consent to control the actions of the agent. It is difficult to ascribe to an acknowledged leader of the pany a role subservient to the candidate set up by that party inasmuch as the candidate is ordinarily in no position to control the actions of his leader. However, if even without giving his consent, the candidate has received benefit from the leader's act in a manner which materially affects his election favourably, on pleading and proof of such material effect on the election, the candidate's election is liable to he set aside on the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(ii) unless, as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 100 he further discharges the onus placed upon him that in spite of his opposition and taking due precautions that act had been committed for which he cannot be responsible. 41. Reliance in the election petition on the allegations of corrupt practices was for the ground under Section 100(1)(b) and not Section 100(1)(d)(ii) : and it is under Section 100(1)(b) that the election has been declared to be void by the High Coun. 41. Reliance in the election petition on the allegations of corrupt practices was for the ground under Section 100(1)(b) and not Section 100(1)(d)(ii) : and it is under Section 100(1)(b) that the election has been declared to be void by the High Coun. There was no attempt to plead and prove that the result of the election of the appellant was materially affected for these reasons to make out a ground under Section 100(1)(d)(ii) for declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void. It is in this manner the present case has to be viewed. 42. The pleading in paras 2,5(o). 7 and 8 of the election petition is general relating to the pany of which the appellant was a candidate, and the plunk of Hindutva which in the election petition is equated wiith Hindu religion. We have already indicated in the connected matters -- Civil Appeal No. 2835 of 1989 - Bal Thakre v. Prabhakar K. Kunte, (with Civil Appeal No. 2836 of 1989).decided today, that the word 'Hindutva' by itself docs not invariably mean Hindu religion und it is the context and the manner of its use which is material for deciding the mean ing of the word 'Hindutva' in a particular text. It cannot be held that in the abstract the mere word 'Hindutva' by itself invariably must mean Hindu religion. The so-called plank of the political pany may at best be relevant only for appreciation of the context in which a speech was made by a leader of the political party during the election compaign, but no more for the purpose of pleading corrupt practice in the election petition against a particular candidate. 43. In para 16 of the election petition apan from some generaI pleading, there is reference to a speech at Shivaji Park. Dadar on 24-2-1990 by Bal Thaker and some other leaders who have not been named therein except for the appellant (respondent in the election petition). In para 17. the alleged offending portions of the speeches of those leaders of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance have been enumerated. These portions are from speeches alleged to have been made by Bal Thakre of the Shiv Scna and Pramod Mahajan of the B.J.P. Thus para 17 contains allegation of specific ponions of speeches by Bal Thakre and Pramod Muhajan for the purpose of pleading the corrupt practice. These portions are from speeches alleged to have been made by Bal Thakre of the Shiv Scna and Pramod Mahajan of the B.J.P. Thus para 17 contains allegation of specific ponions of speeches by Bal Thakre and Pramod Muhajan for the purpose of pleading the corrupt practice. Further reference to it would be made later. Para 18 merely says that the proceedings of the meeting were tapereeorded and taken down in shorthand by police authorities on which the petitioner would rely. Obviously this relates only to evidence of what is pleaded and does not amount to incorporation by reference of the contents of the alleged tapes and there is no enumeration of its contents in the election petition. Para 30 refers to the speech by the appellant himself und names some other speakers at different meeting. Further reference to para 30 would he made later. Pant 31 is a general statement referring to speakers in general without naming any one of them and mentions the existence of certain audio and video cassettes of the speeches. Paras 32 and 33 then refer to certain video cassettes und audi cassettes giving merely the title of the video cassettes and generally their purport and say that the video cassettes were displayed in the constituncncy partcularly at Shaka offices, street corners after 6.30 p.m. and were regularly exhibiterd at or near the places of residence of some of the active workers of the said alliance in the said constituency. It is significant that neither these video cassettes and audio cassettes nor the transcript of their texts was reproduced in the election petition or annexed to the election petition so that the contenis thereof were not pleaded in either of the required modes. That apart, there is nothing in the pleading to indicate the names of the persons who are alleged to have displayed the same or the dates on which they were displayed or in other words any other fact which would make the allegation clear and specific. The further requirement of consent of the returned candidate for those acts is not pleaded as required for the ground under Section 100 (1)(b) of the R. P. Act and in the definition of the corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123. The further requirement of consent of the returned candidate for those acts is not pleaded as required for the ground under Section 100 (1)(b) of the R. P. Act and in the definition of the corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123. Para 35 is the only other para in the election petition which is relied on by Shri Desai in this context and it merely says that the 'aforesaid facts clearly prove that the respondent (appellant in this appeal) and his agents with his consent have indulged into corrupt practice under Section 123 of the said Act." This is a mere repetition of the statutory provision and not a pleading of any material fact. 44. We have no doubt that the requisite consent of the returned candidate or his election agent which is a constituent part of the corrupt practices under sub-section (3) and (3A) of Section 123, and an ingredient of the ground under Section 100(1)(b) has nowhere been pleaded in the election petition either in connection with the allegations based on the speeches by Bal Thakre. Pramod Mahajan and any other leader or the display of video and audio cassettes in the constituency, when this is an essential requirement for raising a triable issue of corrupt practice to bind the appellant with the consequence of such a corrupt practice and to invalidate his election. In our opinion, this alone is sufficient to ignore the entire pleading in the election petition relating, to speechesby Bal Thakre. Pramod Mahajan and any other leader as well as the display of video and audio cassettes since none of those acts is attributed to the appellant or his election agent. For this reason, it is also not necessary to consider the specific portions alleged to form parts of speeches of Bal Thakre and Pramod Mahajan mentioned in paras 16 and 17 of the election petition. Same is the result of pleadings in paras 32 and 33 relating to the video and audio cassettes. In para 31 there is a general averment that the speakers went on to say that on the respondent (appellant in this appeal) being elected and Ihe said alliance establishing a Hindu Government jobs would be given to all Hindus. Same is the result of pleadings in paras 32 and 33 relating to the video and audio cassettes. In para 31 there is a general averment that the speakers went on to say that on the respondent (appellant in this appeal) being elected and Ihe said alliance establishing a Hindu Government jobs would be given to all Hindus. No speaker is specifically named and what is alleged to have been said by the appellant in his speech in the meeting held on 24-2-1990 is contained only in para 30 of the election petition. Since the contents of para 31 cannot be related to the speech alleged to have been made by the appellant in that meeting, that too must be left out of consider-ation. 45. The only surviving allegation requiring consideration is in para 30 relating to the allegation made with reference to the speech made by the appellant himself. The portion in para 30 relating to the appellant (respondent in the election petition) which has to be considered is as under:-- "The petitioner stales that the respondent himself in his capacity as a candidate from the said constitueney as well as a leader of the said alliance made appeals which offends the provisions of the said Act. For e.g. in the meeting held on 24-2-1990 at Shivaji Park, the respondent stated the first Hindu State will be established in Muhaiashtra. Similarly in various other public meetings, the respondent herein made objectionable appeals. Some of the meetings were reported in newspapers. The petitioner states that such meetings were held at Khaddke Building. Dadar on 21-2-1990. Prabhadevi. on 16-2-1990. at Kumbharwada on 18-2-1990 and Khed Galli on 19-2-1990. ....." 46. The High Court failed to appreciate that the only allegation of corrupt practice in this election petition which raised a triable issue is as. indicated above and rest of the general averments deficient in requisite pleadings of all the consiitutent parts of the corrupt practice did not constitute a pleading of the full cause of action and. therefore, had to be ignored and struck out in accordance wilh Order 6. Rule 16. C. P. C. However, there being a specific allegation in para 30 of the election petition relating to the returned candidate himself based on his speech made on 24-2-1990. to that extent a triable issue had been raised and had to be decided. 47. therefore, had to be ignored and struck out in accordance wilh Order 6. Rule 16. C. P. C. However, there being a specific allegation in para 30 of the election petition relating to the returned candidate himself based on his speech made on 24-2-1990. to that extent a triable issue had been raised and had to be decided. 47. It is this failure in the High Court which has led to an unnecessary protracted trial and reception of considerable irrelevant evidence which in turn has led to the errors found in the judgment. The reason for this error appears particularly from para 32 of the judgment in which the High Court has indicated its perception of the nature of trial of the election petition as under :-- "It must be noted that this Election Petition is not based upon individual acts of Respondent or his Election Agent or any other person with his consent. This petition is based upon the above mentioned plank and/or policy decision of the Shiv Scna and B. J. P. and the campaiging by the parly end the Respondent on the basis of'that plank. .............,........" 48. In our opinion, it is this erroneous impression of the High Court which has led to the serious errors committed during the trial for which the parties are equally to blame inasmuch as both sides contributed to the expansion of the legitmate scope of the trial by introducing matters which have no relevance, for the pleading and proof of the corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 for ihe purpose of the ground under Seciion 100(1)(b) to invalidate the election, which is the true scope of this election petition. 49. Before we take up for consideration the corrupt practice attributed to the appellant himself in para 30 of the election pelition based on his own speech on 24-2-1990. it would be appropriate at this stage to refer to the argument based on Section 99 of the R. P. Act. Non-compliance of Seciion 99 of the R. P. Act. 50. 49. Before we take up for consideration the corrupt practice attributed to the appellant himself in para 30 of the election pelition based on his own speech on 24-2-1990. it would be appropriate at this stage to refer to the argument based on Section 99 of the R. P. Act. Non-compliance of Seciion 99 of the R. P. Act. 50. Admittedly, no notice was given to Bal Thakre, Pramod Mahajan or any other person against whom allegation was made of commission of corrupt practice in the election petition, even though the High Court has held those corrupt practices to be proved for the purpose of declaring the appellant's election to be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act. We would now indicate the effect of the combined reading of Sec-lions 98 and 99 of the R. P. Act and the requirement of notice under Section 99 to all such persons before decision of the election petition by making an order under Section 98 of the R. P. Act. 51. The combined effect of Sections 98 and 99 of the R. P. Act may now be seen. These provisions are as under :-- "98. Decision of the High Court.-- At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the High Court shall make an order - (a) dismissing [he election pelition ; or (b) dcctarinng the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or (c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. 99. Olher orders to be made by the High Court. 99. Olher orders to be made by the High Court. -- (1) At the time of making an order under Section 98 the High Court shall also make an order - (a) where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the eleclion, recording -- (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been commilted at ihe election, and the nature of that corrupt practice; and (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice; and (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable and specifying the persons by and to whom costs shall be paid : Provided that a person who is not a parly to the petition shall not be named in the order under sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) unless -- (a) he has been given notice to appear before the High Court and to show cause why he should not be so named; and (b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by the High Court and has given evidence against him, of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard. (2) In this section and in Section 100, the expression "agent" has the same meaning as in Seciion 123." 52. The opening words in Section 98 are 'At the conclusion of the trial of an election pelition the High Court shall make an order". There can be no doubt that Seciion 98 contemplates the making of an order thereunder in the decision of the High Court rendered 'at the conclusion of the trial of an eleclion petition'. Declaration of the election of any returned candidate to be void in accordance with Clause (b) is clearly to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition and not at an intermediate stage. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) in Section 98 contemplate the different kinds of orders which can be made by the High Court in its decision at the conclusion of the trial which has the effect of disposing of the election petition in the High Court. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) in Section 98 contemplate the different kinds of orders which can be made by the High Court in its decision at the conclusion of the trial which has the effect of disposing of the election petition in the High Court. There is nothing in Seciion 98 to permit the High Court to decide the election petition piecemeal and to declare the election of any returned candidate to be void at an intermediate stage of the irial when any part of the trial remains to be concluded. 53. Sub-section (1) of Section 99 begins with the words 'At the time of making an order under Section 98 the High Court shall also make an order" of the kind mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) therein. It is amply clear that the order which can be made under Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 is required to be made 'at the time of making an order under Section 98'. As earlier indicated, an order under Section 98 can be made only at the conclusion of the trial. There can be no doubt that the order which can be made under sub-section (1) of Section 99 has, therefore, to be made only at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition in the decision of the High Court, made by an order disposing of the election petition in one of the modes prescribed in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 98. This alone is sufficient to indicate that the requirement of Section 99 is to be completed during the trial of the election petition and the final order under Section 99 has to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered under Section 98 at the conclusion of the-trial of the election petition, 54. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 provides for the situation "where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election". In that case, it requires that at the time of making an order under Section 98, the High Court shall also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice : and the names of all persons, if any. In that case, it requires that at the time of making an order under Section 98, the High Court shall also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice : and the names of all persons, if any. who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that corrupt practice. Clause (b) further requires the fixing of the total amount of costs payable and specifying the person by and !o whom costs shall be paid. The net result is that where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, the High Court shall "at the time of making an order under Section 98' also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice; and where the charge of corrupt practice has been found proved, it must also record the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. Thus the trial is only one at the end of which the order made by the High Court must record the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of the corrupt practce and the nature of that practice. 55. It follows that the High Court cannot make an order under Section 98 recording a finding of proof of corrupt practice against the returned candidate alone and on that basis declare the election of the returned candidate to be void and then proceed to comply with the requirement of Section 99 in the manner Mated therein with a view to decide at a later stage whether any other person also is guilty of that corrupt practice for the purpose of naming him then under Section 99 of the R. P. Act. It is equally clear that the High Court has no option in the matter to decide whether it will proceed under Section 99 against the other persons alleged to be guilty of that corrupt practice along with the returned candidate inasmuch as the requirement of Section 99 is mandatory since the finding recorded by the High Court requires it to name all persons proved at the trial to have been guilty of the corrupt practice. The expression 'the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice' in sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 99 clearly provides for such proof being required 'at the trial' which means 'the trial of an election petition' mentioned in Section 98, at the conclusion of which alone the order contemplated under Section 98 can be made. There is no. room for taking the view that the trial of the election petition for dcclaring the election of the returned candidate to be void under Section 98 can be concluded first and then the proceedings under Section 99 commenced for the purpose of deciding whether any other person is also to be named as being guilty of the corrupt practice of which the returned candidate has earlier been held guilty leading to his election being declared void. 56. The rationale is obvious. Where the returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of a corrupt practice in the commission of which any other person has participated with him or the candidate is to be held vicariously liable for a corrupt practice committed by any other person with his consent, a final verdict on that question can be rendered only at the end of the trial, at one time, after the inquiry contemplated under Section 99 against the other person, after notice to him, has also been concluded. Particularly, in a case where liability is fastened on the candidate vicariously for the act of another person, unless that act is found proved against the doer of that act, the question of recording a finding on that basis against the returned candidate cannot arise. Particularly, in a case where liability is fastened on the candidate vicariously for the act of another person, unless that act is found proved against the doer of that act, the question of recording a finding on that basis against the returned candidate cannot arise. Viewed differently, if the final verdict has already been rendered agains the returned candidate in such a case, the opportunity contemplated by Section 99 by any inquiry after notice to the other person is futile since the verdict has already been given. On the other hand, if the question is treated as open, a conflicting verdict after inquiry under Section 99 in favour of the noticee would lead to an absurdity which could not be attributed to the legislature. 57. The plain language of Sections 98 and 99 of the R.P. Act indicates the construction thereof made by us and this is also supported by the likely outcome of a different construction which is an absurd result and must, therefore, be rejected. The High Court has overlooked the obvious position in law in taking a dil'lercni view. No notice under Section 99 was given by the High Court before making the final order under Section 9-H of the R P, Act declaring the election to he void. This is fatal defect. 58. This alone is sufficient to indicate that apart from the reasons given earlier, the election of the appellant in the present case could not be declared void by making an order under Section 98 on the ground contained in Section 100(1)(b) of the R.P. Act without prior compliance of Section 99. Absence of notice under Section 99 of the R. P. Act vitiates the final order made under Section 98 by the High Court declaring the election to be void. 59. However, in the present case, the remaining pleadings being ignored for the reasons already given, no further question arises of the effect of non-compliance of Section 99 in respect of these other persons because the finding of corrupt practices against the appellant based on the speeches of these other persons and the video and audio cassettes has to be set aside for the reason already given. This is yet another instance of a serious defect in the trial of this election petition by the High Court. Speech of appellant. 60. This is yet another instance of a serious defect in the trial of this election petition by the High Court. Speech of appellant. 60. We would now consider the only surviving question based on the pleading in para 30 of the election petition. The specific allegation in para 30 against the appellant is that in the meeting held on 24-2-1990 at Shivaji Park. Dadar. he had stated that 'the first Hindu Slate will be established in Maharashtra'. It is further pleaded therin that such meetings were held at Khaddke Building, Dadar on 21-2-1990. Prabhadevi on 16-2-1990. at Kumbharwada on 18-2-1990, and Khed Galli in 19-2-1990. These further facts are unnecessary in the context because the maximum impact thereof is to plead that the same statement was made by the appellant in the other meetings as well, even though such an inference does not arise by necessary implication. In our opinion, a mere statement that the first Hindu Slate will he established in Maharashtra is by ilself not an appeal for votes on the ground of his religion but the expression, at best, of such a hope. However, despicable be such a statement, it cannot he said to amount to an appeal for Mites on the ground of his religion. Assuming that the making of such a statement in the speech of the appellant at that meeting is proved, we cannot hold that it constitutes the corrupt practice either under sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of Section 123. even though we would express our disdain at the entertaining of such a thought or such a stance in a political leader of any shade in the country. The question is whether the corrupt practice as defined in the Act to permit negation of the electoral verdict has been made out. To this our answer is clearly in the negative. 61. As indicated by us, the only triable issue raised in the election peiition i.s limited to this extent, which did not require the consumption of the considerable tune, energy and expense involved in the trial of the election petition and the hearing of this appeal in this Court. To this our answer is clearly in the negative. 61. As indicated by us, the only triable issue raised in the election peiition i.s limited to this extent, which did not require the consumption of the considerable tune, energy and expense involved in the trial of the election petition and the hearing of this appeal in this Court. However, the lack of proper perception of the limited scope of the trial and the election petition being filed and contested in the manner in which unfortunately the elections are being fought, contributed to the trial being converted into an electoral battle which misled even the High Court to commit several errors in conducting the trial. The erroneous perception of the position in law and the scope of the election petition also cotributed to this end. Obviously, it was much ado about nothing when viewed in proper perspective after ignoring from consideration the copious unnecessary, frivolous or vexatious pleading in the election petition and consequentIy in the written statement which was liable to be struck out under Order 6. Rule 16. C. P. C. 62. We may refer to the decision in Jamaat-e-Islami Hind v. Union of India. wherein the requirement of valid adjudication by the Tribunal wider Section 4 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was indicated tor the purpose of confirming the declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3 that Jamaat-e-Islami Hind is an unlawful association as defined in the said Act, The Tribunal's order confirming the declaration made by the Central Government was quashed on the ground that the entire material on which the declaration was based, was inadequate for the purpose, even though the Tribunal is not required to confine ilself only strict legal evidence admissible under the Evidence Act. 63. A 3-Judge Bench, speaking through one of us (J. S, Venna. J.). held as under :-- "..... The only material produced by the Central Government to support the notification issued by it under Section 3(1) of the Act. apart from a re' sume' based on certain intelligence reports, are the statements of Shri T. N. Srivuslava, Joint Secretary. Ministry of Home Affiars and Shri N. C. Padhi. Joint Director. 1B, Neither Shri Srivaslava nor Shri Padhi has deposed to any fact on the basis of personal knowledge. Their entire version is based on official record. apart from a re' sume' based on certain intelligence reports, are the statements of Shri T. N. Srivuslava, Joint Secretary. Ministry of Home Affiars and Shri N. C. Padhi. Joint Director. 1B, Neither Shri Srivaslava nor Shri Padhi has deposed to any fact on the basis of personal knowledge. Their entire version is based on official record. The resume is based on intelligence reports submitted by persons whose names have not been disclosed on the ground or cofidentialily. In other words, no person has deposed from personal knowledge whose veracity could be tested by cross-examination....." (at page 450) (of SCC.) 64. It is significant that the mere production of the official record including the literature of Jamaat-e-lslami Hind depicting its philosophy and aims, inul the intelligence reports without examining any witness who couId depose from personal knowledge to the alleged unlawful activities of the Association was held to be inadequate to support the declaration that Jamaat-e-Islami Hind is an unlawful association as defined in Ihe said Act. It need hardly be mentioned that the requirement of proof of a corrupt practice at the trial of an election petition is higher and confined to strict legal evidence, in comparison to the material on which Ihe Tribunal can rely for its decision under Section 4 of the Unlawful Activilies (Prevention) Act. 1967 to confirm the declaration by the Central Government of an association as unlawful. 65. The High Court midsdrrecled itself by starting on a wrong premise in frying an allegation not in the pleading and then in admitting and relying on material which is not legal evidence for the proof of a corrupt practice. The error was aggravated by an incorrect appreciation of the legal principles and overlooking the meaning of certain terms explained in earlier decisions. The significance of the trial of a corrupt practice and the consequence of the finding thereon, appears to have been missed in the High Court. 66. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the finding recorded by the High Court against the appellant that charge of corrupt practices under subsections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act has been proved to declare his election to be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1)(b) of the R. P. Act, is contrary to law and is. therefore, set aside. therefore, set aside. The result is that no ground is made out for declaring the appellant's election to be void. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed with costs resulting in dismissal of the election petition. 67. Appeal allowed.