S. Barman Roy, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.1.1989 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kamalpur, North Tripura in Sessions Trial No.20 (WTK) 87 convicting the appellants, namely, Shri Indrajit Deb and Shri Nikhil Das under section 302/34IPC and the appellant Sankar Deb under section 302 IPC and sentencing them thereunder to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The case in short is that on 5.7.1984 at about 3.30 AM, PW 1 Shri Pintu Kumar Das lodged an FIR at Kamalpur Police Station alleging, inter alia, that at about 11.00PM on 4.7.1984 said informant along with some others were returning home after seeing cinema at Kamalpur town. While so returning, when they reached southern end of the house of Mahesh Das, they noticed some white substance lying by the road side. It further seemed to them that a person was lying by the road side. Then they requested PW 6 Gouranga Das, whose house was situated nearby, to bring a lamp and then PW 6 Gouranga Das brought a lamp and saw that Jogesh Deb (since deceased) was lying dead. They further saw blood. At that time, one Brajendra Das also came there with a torch light in his hand and with the help of that torch light they noticed the dead body thoroughly and found bleeding injury on the rear portion of the neck of the deceased which appeared to them to have been caused by a sharp cutting weapon. Subsequently, many people assembled there. Afterwards PW 1 went to the house of PW 14 Shri Swaraj Kairi (Pradhan). After that they came to the police station and lodged the said information. Action upon the said information, police registered an FIR under section 302 IPC. 3. Police after usual investigation submitted charge-sheet against the 3 appellants under section 302, 109 IPC. In due course of time, the case was committed to the Court of the learned trial Court, Learned trial Court upon perusal of the materials on record, framed a charge under section 302 IPC against the appellant No.2 Sankar Deb. Learned trial Court further framed a charge under section 302/109 IPC against the appellant Nos. 1 and 3vHe also framed a charge under section 302/34 IPC against all the appellants. All the appellants pleaded not guilty to the said charges. In course of the trial prosecution examined as many as 19 PWs. Learned trial Court further framed a charge under section 302/109 IPC against the appellant Nos. 1 and 3vHe also framed a charge under section 302/34 IPC against all the appellants. All the appellants pleaded not guilty to the said charges. In course of the trial prosecution examined as many as 19 PWs. Defence examined none. Defence of the appellants was that of complete denial of the prosecution case. 4. The prosecution case is based on a confession made by the appellant No. 1 Shri Indrajit Deb and recorded by PW 18 Shri N.Chakraborty, Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate. It is also based on some extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant No.1 to the Officer-in-charge of the police station in presence of some of the witnesses. Corroboration in support of the prosecution version is also sought from the alleged recovery of a dao from the house of the appellant (No.2. It is also sought to be corroborated by recovery of some documents which are said to have been recovered by the police being led by the appellant No. 1. The whole case rests on the confession and the aforesaid materials on record. 5. So far as evidence of PW 1 is concerned, no further discussion is considered necessary inasmuch as he has reiterated the same story before the learned trial Court which he narrated in the FIR. FIR does not disclose as to who committed the murder. However, it needs to be mentioned here that the appellant No.1 happens to be the son of the deceased. 6. The prosecution story, as alleged, is that the deceased refused to maintain his son appellant No. 1, his wife his mother and other brothers. Deceased wanted to dispose of his properties depriving his son appellant No.1 and other family members of the deceased. Further prosecution case is that deceased maintained a concubine and under her evil influence deceased was trying to dispose of all his properties. But prosecution could not adduce any evidence to prove this part of the prosecution case. In these circumstances, the appellant No.1 requested the appellant Nos.2 and 3 to kill the deceased and for that reason they would be given some money. 7. Evidence of PW 2 certainly needs some discussion. But prosecution could not adduce any evidence to prove this part of the prosecution case. In these circumstances, the appellant No.1 requested the appellant Nos.2 and 3 to kill the deceased and for that reason they would be given some money. 7. Evidence of PW 2 certainly needs some discussion. PW 2 Shri Ramesh Chandr^i Das Choudhury stated in his evidence that on the date of occurrence at or about 9/9.30 PM one Amrita Das informed him that somebody had murdered deceased Jogesh Deb. Soonafter that PW 2 requested Amrita Das to inform the son of the deceased. After that the appellant No. 1 being the son of the deceased was brought to the house of PW 2 and both of them went to the spot together. It was stated to be around 11.00 PM when they reached the spot. On reaching the spot they found the dead body of the deceased was lying on the eastern side of the road. They also noticed an injury which appeared to them to have been caused by dao on the neck. Villagers also assembled there before PW 2 could reach the spot. He was also informed that some people had already left for Kamalpur Police Station. At that stage, noticing that the appellant No. 1 was not shedding tears, PW 2 asked him as to why he was not crying though his father was murdered. Despite this enquiry, appellant No.1 kept mum. PW 2 left the dead body under guard of the appellant No.1. He went to his house as no police till then reached the spot. After the sunrise, police reached the spot and learning about arrival of police PW 2 went to the spot. On being asked by the Police Officer, appellant No.1 allegedly divulged that he got his father murdered with the help of other two appellants. Appellant No.1 further stated that while his father was being murdered by the other appellant Sankar Deb, he and appellant No.3 Nikhil Das were standing a little distance away from that place. Murder was committed with a dao. There the appellant No.1 allegedly divulged that his father was disposing of all his properties and he was not looking after his wife and driven out the wife and the sons and for this reason he decided to kill his father so that his mother and younger brother could maintain themselves. Murder was committed with a dao. There the appellant No.1 allegedly divulged that his father was disposing of all his properties and he was not looking after his wife and driven out the wife and the sons and for this reason he decided to kill his father so that his mother and younger brother could maintain themselves. Indrajit further, stated to the Police Officer that for this act of murder, killers would be paid Rs.1,000/- and such payment was due. The Police Officer thereafter asked the appellant No.1 to show him the path by which they left the place after commission of murder. So, the appellant No. 1 led the Police Officer to show him the path by which they left place of occurrence. Appellant No.1 further stated that they took out some papers etc. from the pocket of the deceased after killing him and they threw away these papers on the way. After sometime, the Police Officer brought some papers including a record of right, prescription, rent receipt, a two rupee note etc. along with the appellant No. 1. Appellant No. 1 also stated that the appellant N.o.3 Nikhil Das was to be paid Rs.200/- for this act. Appellant No.1 allegedly narrated the same story before the Police Officer which was already told by the appellant No.1 Indrajit Deb. This is the gist of the evidence given by PW 2 before the trial Court. Admittedly the entire story of confession said to have been made by the appellant No.1 and 3 to the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station or any Police Officer as claimed by PW 2 is clearly inadmissible in evidence, same having been made to a Police Officer. No further elaboration of law in this regard is at all necessary. It further appears that PW 2 never stated this story to the Police Officer in his statement recorded during investigation that the appellant led the Police Officer through certain path and came back with papers after collecting the same. He also did not divulge in the statement before the police in course of investigation that the appellant No.1 and 3 ever made any confession in presence of the police officer. It further appears that this witness specifically stated to the police in his statement recorded in course of investigation that the appellant No.1 was sitting near the dead body of his father and was weeping. It further appears that this witness specifically stated to the police in his statement recorded in course of investigation that the appellant No.1 was sitting near the dead body of his father and was weeping. Therefore, the entire evidence of PW 2 is most untrustworthy. His entire evidence that deals with confession said to have been made by the appellant No.1 to the Investigating Officer is inadmissible. Other parts of his evidence were not stated to the IO in course of the investigation of the case and these were stated by PW 2 for the first time before the learned trial Court and, therefore no conviction can be founded on such evidence. 8. PW 3, Nikhil Namasudra was also declared hostile by the prosecution. His evidence does not support prosecution version. 9. PW 4, Shri Chitta Das .also did not state anything material. PW 5; Shri Keshab Maiakar was declared hostile and his evidence also does not disclose anything material. PW 6 Gorunga Das merely stated in his evidence that on that day at 11.00 PM Chitta asked him for a lamp from his house. Accordingly, he came out of his house with a Samp and saw the dead body of the deceased Jogesh Deb was lying by the road side near his house. Thereafter, with the help of torch light he could see the injury on the neck of the deceased which appeared to have been caused by a dao. Except this, he stated nothing more in his evidence. Like wise PW 7 was also declared hostile by the prosecution and he declined to support any part of the prosecution story. Prosecution cross-examined him before declaring him hostile and before obtaining leave from the trial Court. The statement of this . witness recorded by the police during investigation was brought on record and admitted in evidence before obtaining any permission to cross-examine and this novel method, unknown to law, was adopted by the trial Court as well as by the prosecution. We do not think any further comment in this regard is at all necessary except that the evidence of this witness also does not support prosecution version in any manner. 10. PW 8, Ganga Charan Deb Barma is material as regards the seizure of the dao. He clearly stated in his evidence that dao was seized being produced by the father of the appellant No.2. 10. PW 8, Ganga Charan Deb Barma is material as regards the seizure of the dao. He clearly stated in his evidence that dao was seized being produced by the father of the appellant No.2. He also did not state as to whether said dao had any blood mark on it. Such dao is a common instrument found in every house in villages. Seizure of a mere dao from a house without anything else does not connect the appellant No.1 with the crime. That apart, this witness stated in his evidence that the dao which was produced before the learned trial Court is not the dao which was seized by the IO. This witness was also declared hostile for not supporting the prosecution case. PW 9 is witness of seizure of wearing apparels of the dead body of the deceased. His evidence is also net very material for our present purpose. PW 10, witnessed the seizure of the dao. He also did not support prosecution. It is strange that the prosecution cross-examined'this witness with reference to his previous statement recorded under section 161 CrPC without obtaining leave from the Court. 11. PW 11 was tendered by the prosecution without examining him. Defence also declined to cross-examine him. PW 12 is Dr. MN Debnath who held autopsy over the dead body in question. But in view of our decision which we are going to take, we do not think any further discussion of the evidence of PW 12 is at all necessary. PW 13 is a Police Constable who took the dead body with the dead body challan to the morgue and he identified the dead body in the morgue. Save this, his evidence does not disclose any further material. PW 14 is the Gao Pradhan. He has not been declared hostile by the prosecution. His evidence in fact substantially or atleast indirectly belies the prosecution. He clearly stated that the appellant No. 1 was weeping. According to this witness he accompanied the informant to the police station for lodging FIR. From the police station he along with the Officer-in-charge of the Kamalpur Police Station came to the place of occurrence early in the morning at about 5.30 AM. At the spot inquest report was prepared and he put his signature thereto. At the spot he also saw the appellant No.1 weeping. From the police station he along with the Officer-in-charge of the Kamalpur Police Station came to the place of occurrence early in the morning at about 5.30 AM. At the spot inquest report was prepared and he put his signature thereto. At the spot he also saw the appellant No.1 weeping. He further stated that at the instance of few children Daroga Babu came to know that some papers were lying somewhere near by and accordingly, Dardga Babu left the spot being led by the said children and this witnes and others and as pointed out by the children he seized certain papers. This again belies the version given by PW 2 that these papers namely record of right, rent receipt, prescription etc. were seized by the police being pointed out by the appellant No.1 .This witness also did not state that at the spot appellant No.1 and 3 confessed to the IO that the appellant No.1 got his father killed by other appellants. PW 15 is an inquest witness. PW 16 was also tendered. PW 17 is not at all important. PW 18 is the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate who recorded the confession. 12. In the confession, appellant No.1 virtually gave the whole prosecution story. Prosecution story is also available only form this confession. There is no further evidence on ecord to lend corroboration to the confession. Can conviction be founded solely on the basis of uncorroborated confession ? Is confession evidence in the strict sense of the term ? 13. Therefore, important question is whether confession is evidence within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 observed in paragraph 8 as follows : "Garubachan's confession has played an important part in implicating the appellant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way the confession of an accused person can be used against a co-accused ? It is evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu vs. The King, 76 Ind. App. 147 at p. 155. It does not indeed come within the definition of 'evidence' contained in section 3, Evidence Act. It is evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu vs. The King, 76 Ind. App. 147 at p. 155. It does not indeed come within the definition of 'evidence' contained in section 3, Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, not in the presence of the accused and it cannot be tested by cross-examination." Their Lordships also point out that it is "obviously evidence of a very weak type...... it is much weaker type of evidence then the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of those infirmities." They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made foundation of a conviction and can only be used in "support of other evidence". In view of these remarks, it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of other evidence ? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps ? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to believe him except in so far as he is corroborated ?" In paragraph 9, the Supreme Court further observed in the aforesaid case that: " 9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor vs. Lalitmohan 38 Cal. 459 at p. 588 where he said that such a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused" or to put it in another way as Relilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan, 54 Mad. 75 at p. 77". "The provisions goes no further than this where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in S.30 may thrown be into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence."' 14. After taking aforesaid case laws into consideration, Supreme Court farther observed in paragraph 10 as follows : "10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. After taking aforesaid case laws into consideration, Supreme Court farther observed in paragraph 10 as follows : "10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first to rnarshall the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is. believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept." In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence on record to even faintly suggest that appellants were concerned with' the crime in question. If we exclude the confession from our consideration, we are actually left with no evidence to marshall the same against the appellants. 15. Again the Supreme Court in Chakrrakanta Chimanlal Dessai vs. State of Gujrat, (1992) 1 SCC 473 held in paragraph 5 and 6 as follows: "5. The confession of accused I was retracted at the time when the accused was questioned under section 313. In considering the reliability of the confessional statement the High Court had not kept in view the observations of this Court in Kashira Singh vs. State of MR In this decision the Supreme Court had observed (AIR p. 159). "The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in section 3. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is first to marshall the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is J capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession, in aid. The proper way is first to marshall the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is J capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession, in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept." 6. The High Court has on the otherhand made this confessional statement as the basis and has been gone in search for corroboration. It concluded that the confessional statement is corroborated in material particulars by prosecution witnesses without first considering and marshalling the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration. As held in the decision cited above only if on such consideration on the evidence available, other than the confession a conviction can safely be based then only the confession could be used to support that belief or conclusion. The trial Court has given pogent reasons for not accepting the evidence of PWs 7,8 and 11 and rightly so. The High Court has not given any convincing reasons as to why PWs 7,8 and 11 who were discarded by the trial Court should be relied oih-The only evidence which calls for comment is that of PW 6, Noorbibi, who is said to have seen accused 1 with the child around 7 PM. On this aspect the trial Court pointed out that in spite of the fact that the missing of the child was widely talked about in the village and she was also stated to be aware of it she had not informed the police regarding this incident and ..that in fact neither she nor her husband to whom she had told the fact had informed the incident 10 anybody in the village. Further her husband has not been examined as a witness. Further her husband has not been examined as a witness. The trial Court also pointed out that this witness even after dead body of Tinu was found out had not told anybody regarding the above incident. For this and other reasons the trial Court had disbelieved PW 6 and the High Court had not traversed this aspect. On the other hand the High Court observed that she had disclosed this fact to the parents of the deceased next morning, a statement which is far from accurate if we examine her evidence carefully. The trial Court had rightly brushed it aside but the-High Court did not analyse .this part of the prosecution evidence. The trial Court has also analysed the evidence of PWs 7,8 and 11 and had discarded their evidence on number of grounds. In fact, the High Court has also not relied on the evidence of PWs 7,8 arid 11. The whole approach of the High Court was to make confessional statement the basis and then find out if the facts stated therein were corroborated in material particulars by other evidence, instead of analysing the evidence first and trying to find out whether, the evidence is reliable and the facts established are consistent with the guilt of the accused. With respect, the High Court failed to realise that there were statements in the confessional statement which provided intrinsic evidence of police interference for otherwise how could accused 1 have mentioned about having seen Noorbibi when he must have seen several others also. The trial Court had critically examined the recording of the confessional statement and held that the Magistrate had not taken sufficient precautions before recording the evidence in order to ensure that the statement was voluntary. In fact the trial Court was of the view that the confessional statement was in the hands of the police even before the same was recorded by the Magistrate. Even the Investigating Officer's evidence was not relied on by the trial Court and the High Court had not said any thing, on that aspect. We also have gone into the evidence carefully and we cannot say that the Magistrate was far wrong in discarding the confessional statement. Even the Investigating Officer's evidence was not relied on by the trial Court and the High Court had not said any thing, on that aspect. We also have gone into the evidence carefully and we cannot say that the Magistrate was far wrong in discarding the confessional statement. The reliance by the High Court on the evidence available that on August, 27, 1977 around 8.30 PM both the accused are seen together, that both of them knew each other, that late in the night on the day of occurrence accused 2 was seen in the temple of Kalka Devi situated at Prantij along with a sadhu who was not traced are all minor and flimsy circumstances which do not go to establish a chain of events pointing to the guilt of the accused. PW 17's evidence that on the night when he saw accused 2 in the temple he appeared to be little frightened was not accepted by the trial Court on the ground that there was enmity between accused 2 and the witness. There was no reason why the Hioh Court should have discarded this reason and accented the evidence of PW 17 in this regard. Besides such evidence is neither here nor there. The recoveries relating to grain of rice at the place of occurrence same type of rice at the house of accused 2 do not show any involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime. The rice is not as such a distinguishable article being one commonly found in houses and that could not be treated as any incriminating circumstances. The trial Court had carefully considered the recovery of the rice as. also the alleged recoveries of anklet and half pant worn by the accused on the information given by accused 1. Since we are agreeing with the trial Court reasoning in preference to that of High Court we do not consider it necessary to catalogue all the reasons given by the trial Court. We think the consideration by the trial Court was more reasonable and conclusion more acceptable. We agree with the trial Court that the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt about the involvement in the crime or commission of offence by the accused appellants." 16. We think the consideration by the trial Court was more reasonable and conclusion more acceptable. We agree with the trial Court that the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt about the involvement in the crime or commission of offence by the accused appellants." 16. Again in Union of India vs. JS Brar (1993) 1 SCC 176 , Supreme Court held in paragraph 7 that as regards the objection concerning the retracted confession attributed to the fourth accused, Pradhan, it may be stated that the confession as such is of no value, particularly because it is retracted except as a reassurance when reliable evidence has already been adduced on behalf of the prosecution. In this regard Supreme Court relied upon as many as 10 previous Supreme Court decisions in Harish Uppal vs. Union of India, (1973) 3 SCC 319 ; Ram Narain vs. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 3 SCC 805 ; Chonampara Chellappan vs. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 312 ; Bhubon Sahu vs. The King, AIR 1949 PC 257; Shrishail Nageshi Para vs. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCC 341 ; Brij Bhushan Singh vs. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 38; Abdul Sattar vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1985) Supp SCC 599; Md. Husain Umar Kochara etc. vs. KS Dalipsinghji, (1969) 3 SCC 429 ; SN Mukharjee vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 and Ram Sarup vs. Union of India, e (1964) 5 SCR 931 . 17. Of course in some other decisions of the Supreme Court, it was held that confession can be acted upon if corroborated by independent evidence in material particulars. In the instant case as we have observed there is absolutely not even iota of evidence to lend any corroboration/assurance to the confession except the evidence furnished by the injury on the neck of the dead body of the deceased / save that there is nothing. Dead body of the deceased had only one injury caused by a sharp cutting weapon. In the confession it was stated that two blows of a dao were inflicted upon the deceased. Therefore, to that extent also medical evidence contradicts the contents of the confession. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in (1983) 2 SCC 251 where it has been observed that retracted confession made before the Magistrate, even if voluntarily, requires corroboration. Therefore, to that extent also medical evidence contradicts the contents of the confession. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in (1983) 2 SCC 251 where it has been observed that retracted confession made before the Magistrate, even if voluntarily, requires corroboration. In the instant case also the confession was retracted by the appellant No.1. There is also no further material to lend corroboration to the contents of the confession. 18. We have discussed the entire evidence on record. It is clear, therefore, that apart from retracted confession of the appellant No.1, there is not even an iota of evidence on record to even remotely suggest that the appellants, had any link or connection with the murder. In a large number of cases Supreme Court held that confession is not even evidence in the strict sense of the term within the meaning of section 3 of Evidence Act and, therefore, no conviction can be founded merely on confession. Supreme Court further held that if conviction can be based on other evidence on record, then of course confessional statement can be used to lend corroboration/assurance to such evidence on record. As already observed, we have thoroughly scanned the evidence. But we could not find even a shred of evidence to even remotely suggest that the appellants had any hand in the murder. Therefore, there is absolutely no evidence on record for which corroboration can be sought from retracted confession of the appellant No.1. For the aforesaid reasons, we are left with no option but to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. Appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith, if they are still in custody.