R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner challenges the order of the Collector Ahmedabad passed on 9-6-1994 by which the Resolution No. 47 of the respondent Municipality made in 15-4-1994 was set aside. ( 2 ) ). Under the Resolution of the respondent-Municipality dated 15-4-1994 certain construction made by the petitioner was regularised and the portion was resolved to be given on lease for six years on rent of Rs. 20. 00 per sq. yard per year in favour of the petitioner. The Municipality had made this Resolution on the basis of No. 16 on 4-1-1994 passed by the Executive Committee of the Municipality. ( 3 ) ). The only contention which was canvassed at the hearing of this petition was that though the Resolution of the Municipality which was passed in favour of the petitioner was set aside the petitioner was not heard by the Collector in the matter. ( 4 ) ). Under Section 2587 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 the Collector is empowered to suspend execution of any order or resolution of a Municipality the circumstances mentioned ill the provision warrenting the exercise of such power. The Resolution of the Municipality purported to regularise certain construction made by the petitioner and to grant lease for six years of the area mentioned in the Resolution in favour of the petitioner. Therefore the petitioner was vitally concerned and ought to have been heard before making an order suspending such resolution. ( 5 ) ). A Division Bench of this Court while construing the provision of Section 258 (1) of the said Act in the case of H. H. Parmar v. Collector Rajkot and Anr. reported in XX (2) G. L. R. p. 97 was confronted with the question as to whether a third party who had received some benefit under the resolution of a Municipality was not entitled to be heard before the benefit which had accrued to him was withdrawn by the Collector making an order under Section 258 (1) of the said Act. The Division Bench held that if the Resolution affects the Municipality alone the question of hearing a third party would not arise but if a right has accrued in favour of a person under the Resolution then the question whether that right had lawfully accrued or not cannot he decided against such a person unless he has been heard. The Division Bench held that if the Resolution affects the Municipality alone the question of hearing a third party would not arise but if a right has accrued in favour of a person under the Resolution then the question whether that right had lawfully accrued or not cannot he decided against such a person unless he has been heard. On the facts and circumstances of the case it was held that if an order of appointment was issued and the appointee had taken charge of his office under the Resolution a right accrues to the appointee to hold that office and therefore it was necessary for the Collector to issue a notice to such a person before making any order under Section 258 of the said Act. The Division Bench held that it was absolutely necessary for the Collector to give a resonable opportunity to the concerned employee who had benefited under the resolution or being heard. Attention of this Court was drawn by the learned A. C. P. Mr. Raval to the decision of this Court in the case of Pratapsing Motising Parmar v. A. A. Rath Collector Jamnagar and Anr. reported in IX G. L. T. 186 (Note 131 ). The oriental judgment has been called for from the office and it was noticed that by the decision dated 4- 4-1972 rendered by the Honble Mr. Justice B. J. Diwan (as he then was) in Special Civil Application No. 548 of 1972 the learned Single Judge while construing the question as to whether hearing was required to be given under Section 258 of the said Act to a beneficiary of the Resolution held as under: Under the scheme of S. 258 the only party which the Collector is bound to hear is the Municipality. . . . Looking to the scheme of See. 258 what the Collector has to consider is in the light of the facts of the case whether the Resolution under consideration was lawful or not and for that purpose the only party entitled to be heard was the Municipality. The petitioner who was the beneficiary under this Resolution had no right of audience before the Collector and therefore in my opinion there was no breach of principles of nature justice when the Collector passed-the impugned order after hearing the Municipality only. The petitioner who was the beneficiary under this Resolution had no right of audience before the Collector and therefore in my opinion there was no breach of principles of nature justice when the Collector passed-the impugned order after hearing the Municipality only. 5a The aforesaid ratio of the decision of the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 548 of 1972 is clearly in conflict with the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench rendered in the case of H. H. Parmar (supra) which lays down that in the case where benefit is given to a third party under the Resolution of the Municipality it was incumbent on the part of the authority to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to such a beneficiary. In this view of the matter the decision of the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 548 of 1972 in the case of Pratapsing (supra) is no longer a good law. ( 6 ) ). As the petitioner was entitled to he heard before the Collector could make all order under Section 258 (1) of the said Act suspending the Resolution under which the petitioner was a beneficiary the impugned order of the Collector having been passed without hearing the petitioner cannot be sustained. The impugned order is therefore set aside and the Collector is directed to decide the matter a fresh in accordance with law under Section 258 (1) of the said Act after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Collector shall take a decision as expeditiously as possible. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .