P. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THE present second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff against a judgment and decree by which the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit for eviction. ( 2 ) SOME material and important facts are stated below: (a) The defendant-respondent obtained the disputed lease on the basis of a registered deed of lease executed on August 30, 1973. The lease was for a period of 4 years from September 1, 1973 at a monthly rent of Rs. 70/- payable according to English Calendar month. It was clearly stipulated in the said deed of lease that in default of regular payment of rent the lessor might re-enter on the land upon determination of the lease by giving 15 days' notice terminating within a month. The lease was obtained in connection with the running of a saw mill which was set up on the adjacent land to the north of the suit land. The plaintiff has alleged that after the expiry of the lease at the request of the defendant, he allowed him to continue as a tenant-at-will for some time to enable him to make alternative arrangement, but as the defendant showed his reluctance to vacate voluntarily, the lease was terminated by giving 15 days' notice as required under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff has also alleged that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent. (b) The defendant contested the suit. The defendant took the plea that he was continuing upon exercise of option to renew and was paying the rent regularly month by month. He has alleged that the plaintiff accepted rent up to the month of May, 1988 and thereafter stopped accepting rent in spite of regular tender of rent. (c) It is significant to note that in the written statement the defendant has not alleged that the notice of termination of tenancy/lease was insufficient or invalid. He admitted that he received the said notice of termination. (d) As no question about the validity or sufficiency of the notice was raised by the defendant, no specific issue on the question of notice was also raised. But, it appears from the judgments of both the courts below that the question of sufficiency of notice was considered at length. He admitted that he received the said notice of termination. (d) As no question about the validity or sufficiency of the notice was raised by the defendant, no specific issue on the question of notice was also raised. But, it appears from the judgments of both the courts below that the question of sufficiency of notice was considered at length. (e) The trial court recorded findings that after the expiry of the period of lease, the tenancy was renewed from month to month by payment and acceptance of rent, that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose, and that six months' notice was required. It, however, held upon an unacceptable reasoning that six months' notice was in fact given. Upon such view that the lease was lawfully terminated the trial Court decreed the suit. (f) The defendant-respondent filed an appeal. The First Appellate Court upheld the view that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose and that six months' notice was required under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). The First Appellate Court, however, reversed the finding that six months' notice was given and dismissed the suit on the ground of insufficiency of notice of termination of lease. ( 3 ) TWO questions arise for consideration in the present appeal, viz. , whether the disputed tenancy was for manufacturing purpose and whether the tenancy was from year to year or from month to month. Under S. 106 of the Act six months' notice is required when a lease is for manufacturing or agricultural purpose and the same is from year to year. Lease for a 'manufacturing purpose' is not necessarily a lease from year to year, but it can be a monthly or periodic lease in accordance with the terms of the contract and in such case six months' notice is not required. ( 4 ) IN the present case the lease was created by a registered instrument. It was stated in the said instrument that the lease was for the purpose of timber business of the lessee. Admittedly the defendant was running a saw mill on the land adjoining to the suit land and the suit land was taken on lease for timber business in connection with the said saw mill. The defendant in his written statement has stated that the suit land was a vacant land for stacking timbers. Admittedly the defendant was running a saw mill on the land adjoining to the suit land and the suit land was taken on lease for timber business in connection with the said saw mill. The defendant in his written statement has stated that the suit land was a vacant land for stacking timbers. In his deposition the defendant has stated candidly that the saw mill and its office are situated on 17 decimals of land which was taken on lease from Debendranath Panda and Marmathnath Panda and he uses the suit land to stack the timber. In his written statement the defendant has not claimed that the lease was taken for manufacturing purpose. It has not been claimed that six months' notice was necessary or that the notice of termination of lease was insufficient or invalid. However, the plaintiff has stated that the lease was taken in connection with the running of a saw mill. But there is no evidence about the activities in the said saw mill. ( 5 ) ALTHOUGH there is no evidence about the activities carried on in the saw mill in question, usually in a saw mill logs of wood are cut into various sizes to be sold to different buyers for the purpose of preparing various wooden articles, and the First Appellate Court has also proceeded upon the said view. Assuming that such kind of work was also done in this saw mill, whether such activity involves any such manufacturing process as will make the lease a lease for 'manufacturing purpose' within the meaning of S. 106 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE expression "manufacturing purpose" has not been defined in the Act, but the Supreme Court has considered the question and has laid down the principles and tests for determination of what can be said to be "manufacturing purpose" within the meaning of the Act. ( 7 ) IN the case of P. C. Cheriyan v. Mst. Barfi Devi reported in AIR 1980 SC 86 , the Supreme Court has held that (at p. 89):"the broad test for determining whether a process is a manufacturing process, is whether it brings out a complete transformation for the old components so as to produce a commercially different article or commodity. Barfi Devi reported in AIR 1980 SC 86 , the Supreme Court has held that (at p. 89):"the broad test for determining whether a process is a manufacturing process, is whether it brings out a complete transformation for the old components so as to produce a commercially different article or commodity. "in the said case it has been held that retreading of old tyres does not involve manufacturing process inasmuch as it does not bring into being a commercially distinct or different entity and the old tyres retained their original character or identity as a tyre. In the said decision the Supreme Court also sounded a note of caution that (at p. 89):"the definitions of "manufacture" given in other enactments, such as, in the Factories Act or the Excise Act should not be blindly applied while interpreting the expression "manufacturing purpose" in S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. " ( 8 ) IN the case of Idandas v. Anant Ramchandra Phadke reported in AIR 1982 SC 127 , the Supreme Court has laid down the following tests for determining whether a lease is for purpose of "manufacturing process" within the meaning of S. 106 of the Act. The tests are (at p. 129):" (I) That it must be proved that a certain commodity was produced; (ii) That the process of production must involve either labour or machinery; (iii) That the end product which comes into existence after the manufacturing process is complete, should have a different name and should be put to a different use. In other words, the commodity should be so transformed as to lose its original character. " ( 9 ) RELYING upon the aforesaid decisions Mr. P. Mishra, learned Advocate for the appellant has argued that the activities in a saw mill do not satisfy the tests laid down by the Supreme Court. He has also submitted that cutting of wood into varied sizes to enable logs of wood to be used for preparing door framed or other articles cannot be said to be manufacturing process. P. Mishra, learned Advocate for the appellant has argued that the activities in a saw mill do not satisfy the tests laid down by the Supreme Court. He has also submitted that cutting of wood into varied sizes to enable logs of wood to be used for preparing door framed or other articles cannot be said to be manufacturing process. ( 10 ) LEARNED Advocate for the defendant-respondent has referred to a number of decisions of different High Courts, i. e. , (1955) 6 STC 30 (Madh Pra) (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo), (1963) 14 STC 1067 (Bachha Tewari v. Divisional Forest Officer, West Midnapore Division), (1957) 8 STC 294 : (AIR 1957 Madh Pra 47) (G. R. Kulkarni v. State of Madhya Pradesh), 1992 Lab IC 1513 (Ori) (M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Orissa), AIR 1993 Raj 117 (Ravi Shankar Sharma v. State of Rajasthan) and AIR 1986 SC 662 (Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India) in which the word "manufacture" has been considered in the light of provisions of other statutes. Mr. Das has submitted that in AIR 1980 SC 86 (supra) the Supreme Court has not ruled out the application of definition of other enactments but merely cautioned against blind adoption of such definition. He has also referred to the meaning of "manufacture" given in different dictionaries. ( 11 ) AS already stated in the case of Idandas ( AIR 1982 SC 127 ) (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the tests to be applied for determining the question of 'manufacturing purpose' in the context of S. 106 of the Act and in view of the said decision it is not at all necessary to refer to the decisions on the question of 'manufacturing process' under other statutes. ( 12 ) THUS, even if log of timber is sawn and made into different sizes of wood for sale on the suit land, it cannot be said that there has been such a transformation that the original character of the raw material is lost. It is not possible to hold that the kind of operation mentioned in the judgment of the First Appellate Court is a manufacturing process for the purpose of S. 106 of the Act. It is not possible to hold that the kind of operation mentioned in the judgment of the First Appellate Court is a manufacturing process for the purpose of S. 106 of the Act. In a decision reported in (1980) 1 Andh LT 166 (Konda Venkateswarlu v. Venkadari Venkata Subba Rao) Andhra Pradesh High Court has also taken similar view. ( 13 ) THE First Appellate Court has in its judgment referred to a decision reported in AIR 1971 Mys 365 (John Augustine Peter Mirande v. N. Datha Naik) in support of its decision. In the said decision there was no determination whether the activities conducted within a saw mill would be manufacturing purpose within the meaning of the Act. In the said case it was admitted that the lease was for manufacturing purpose and accordingly no determination of fact was made. Moreover, that decision was rendered long before the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore. Accordingly, the said decision of the Mysore High Court cannot be relied upon for the purpose of holding that the running of the saw mill will obviously be a manufacturing purpose. ( 14 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the disputed lease was a lease from year to year. In the present case the lease was created by a registered deed of lease. It was for a fixed period of four years. The rate of rent was fixed monthly and payable month by month according to English Calendar. There was clear and express stipulation that in default of regular payment of rent, the lessor might determine the lease and re-enter by giving 15 days' notice. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the lease was from year to year. ( 15 ) IT is the case of the defendant-respondent that after the expiry of the period of lease, he was holding over by paying monthly rent to the landlord. In view of the finding that the lease was not for manufacturing purpose and no manufacturing process in the context of S. 106 of the Act was being carried on the lease could not become a lease from year to year due to such holdingover. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the lease was neither for manufacturing purpose nor from year to year. Accordingly, six months' notice was not required. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the lease was neither for manufacturing purpose nor from year to year. Accordingly, six months' notice was not required. ( 16 ) IT is necessary to mention that reason given by the Trial Court for upholding the sufficiency and validity of the notice was wholly misconceived and erroneous. ( 17 ) THERE is no dispute that 15 days' notice was duly sent to and received by the defendant-tenant. Accordingly, the tenancy of the defendant-respondent was duly terminated. The First Appellate Court committed error in dismissing the suit. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are set aside. The decree of the Trial Court is affirmed for the reasons mentioned in this judgment. There is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. .