M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in each of these three matters is the navsarjan Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd It had purchased lands in question in a public auction held by Special Recovery Officer under three different sales certificates and, therefore, three Special Civil Applications have been filed. These three Speciel Civil Applications are based on common facts giving rise to common questions of law and, therefore, all these three matter are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE land in question is situated in village Anjana Taluka Choryari the details of which have been set out in para 4 2 of the Special Civil application No 85 of 1993 and for the sake of brevitv, reference is made to the pleadings in Special Civil Application No 85 of 1993 only. The sale certificates, in pursuance of the auction sale, were issued on 28-5-81 and on that basis the name of the petitioner-Society was entered in the record of rights as per the document Annexure "a" enclosed with the Special Civil application No. 85 of 1993 The respondent No 3 had stood a guarantee for one Kalyanbhai Govindbhai, against whom the Co-operative Society, namely Shree Ambheta Vibhag Seva Sahakari Mandali had a claim determined under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act and to satisfy that claim the auction sale was held, in which the land in question belonging to respondent No 3 is alleged to have been put to auction. The petitioner society has placed the order of Special Recovery Officer. Surat passed on 28-5-82 as Annexure "d" on record, which shows that an amount of Rs. 400/-was to be recovered by Shree Ambheta Vibhag Seva Sahakari Mandli from respondent No 3 as guarantor with interest of Rs 385. 75 Ps and the administrative cost of Rs 210. 25 Ps. , i e. in all a sum of Rs 1096/- and this order Annexure "d" dated 28-5-81 placed on record by the petitioner- society shows that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner- society in this auction for sum of Rs. 14 lacs. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 is the original declarant with regard to this land for the purpose of Urban Land (Ceilling and Regulation) Act, 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Act.) and the total holding declared by responpent no. 14 lacs. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 is the original declarant with regard to this land for the purpose of Urban Land (Ceilling and Regulation) Act, 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Act.) and the total holding declared by responpent no. 3 was 23064 Hectare 35 Acre 81 sq mts. and the Competent Authority while deciding the proceedings under Section 6 of the Act held 21564 65 81 sq mts of and to be excess land for the purpose of Special Civil Application no, 85 of 1993. In the Special Civil Applications Nos 80 and 87 of 1993, there are different figures with regard to the excess land. The Competent authority passed orders on 30-12-88 with regard to the land in dispute in all the three matters. The petitioner-Society had not raised any objection before the Competent Authority, but it preferred the Appeals against the aforesaid order dated 30-12-88 passed by the Competent Authority before the Urban land Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act Appeals Nos. 47 and 48 of 1990, but of which Special Civil Applications Nos. 85 and 87 of 1993 arise, were decided by a common order dated 11-5 92 and Appeal No. 49 of 1990, which gave rise to Special Civil Application No. 86 of 1993, was decided by a sepa rate order dated 31-1-92. Thus, these three Special Civil Application are land Tribunal at Ahmedabad where by the Apeals Nos. 47, 48 and 49 of 1990, preferred by the petitioner-society, were dismissed. ( 4 ) MR. Sanjanwala appearing for the petition-Society has raised following contenation. 1. The Tribunal has wrongly held that the petitioner-Society had no locus standi, to prefer the Appeal under section 33 of the Act against the order passed by the Competent Authority on 30-12-88 because the petition-Society eas not the original declarant and it had purchased ihe property in the auction sale on 28-5-81 whereas the proceedings under Section 6 and the question as to whether any excess land beyond ceilling limit was there or not on 17-2-76,i. e, the date of the commencemment of the Act and the petitioin-Socirty had no interest as on 17-2-762. The Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act could not have decided the validity of the sale deed on the basis of which the petitioner-Society had purchased the land in question and there- fore, the finding with regard to the sale beiog wthout jurisdiction. when the question about the validity of the sale had not been dealt with by the Competent Authority, and, therefore, it could not have been considered by the appellate authority for the first time. That the petitioner-Societys application seeking exemption under section 20 was pending and that during the pendency of this application, notification under Section 10 could not have been issued. ( 5 ) THE affidavit-in-reply dated 24-1-95 has been filed on hehalf of respondents Nos, land 2 by Shn B S Dave, Competent Authority and deputy Collector, Surat and the affidavit-in-reply dated 29-1-95 has been fielld by Shri Babubhai Nathubhai Dhanawala, i. e, responded No 3. Affidavit dated 31-1-95 was hied in rejoinder and yet another affidavit dated 9-2-95 alongwith certain document, was also filed in rejoinder and on behalf of respondents Nos 1 and 2 another affidavit was filed on 10-2-95 by Shri H a Patel Deputy Secretary to Governnient. Revenue Department alongwith document dated 3-8-93 and the affidavit-rejoinder dated 15-2-95 was again fied by the petitioner-Society and taus, the Special Civil Application and the affidayits-in-reply and rejoinders as aforesaid alongwith documents, from the pleadings for the purpose of the decision of all these three matters. ( 6 ) THE respondents through affidavits-in-reply has traversed the petitioner-society a claim. It was submitted by Mr, Oza. learned Counsel and mr Sompura, learned A. G. P. that the petitioner-Society had no locus standi whatsoever to file and maintain the Appeal under Section 33 of the Act and once it is upheld that the petitioner has no locus standi, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone and there is no need to consider other contentions raised bv the petitioner-Society in case it is held that the petitioner Society had no locus standi to file and maintain the Appeal In the alternative, Mr. Sompura learned A. G. P. and Mr Oza, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3. have also made submissions factual as well legal against the other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner- society. ( 7 ) IN the facts of this case. Sompura learned A. G. P. and Mr Oza, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3. have also made submissions factual as well legal against the other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner- society. ( 7 ) IN the facts of this case. I may first is of all consider the first contention raised on hehalf of the petitioner-Society on the question of petitioner-Societys locus standi to prefer the appeal against the order of the competent Authority before the Urban Land Tribunal under Section 33. It is to be considered and decided as to what interest the petitioner-Society could have at the time of the commencement of the Act, i. e, on 17-2-76 because it is the petitioners own case that the land is purchased in the auction sale by the petitioner on 28-5-81 Thus, according to the petitioners own averment, it connot be said that the petitioner had any interest in the land in question as on the date of the commencement of the Act However, Mr. Sanjanwala has referred to various provisions under the scheme of the Act, particularly Sections 10, 21, 26 and 27 and has submitted that according to the scheme of the Act, the subsequent events are also to be taken care of and, therefore, even if the petitioner-Society had purchased the land in the year 1981, the Appeal coutd not be rejected on the basis of the quetion of locus standi and the view taken by the Tribural that the petitioner-Society had no interest is wrong Mr Sanjanwala also argued that the case of suryapur Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State, reported in XXX (1) glr- 674 ; (1989) IGLR 64) decided by a Single Bench is not applicable to the facts of the present case and he relied upon the case of Gigabhai Mavji v. Jagjivan Kanji, reported in XX GLR 256. The submission of Mr. Sanjanwala that the law laid down in the aforesaid case of Sutyapur Co operative Housing Society Ltd (supra), decided by the single Bench cannot be made use of against the petitioner-Society because it has been held in the case of Gigabhai Mavji (supra) that specified kinds of transfer are of voluntary transfer and do not indicate or include compulrory transfer or forced transfer. The submission of Mr Sanjanwala is that in the instant case it was a case not of voluntary transfer but forced transfer, section 27 of the Act of course requires that no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years or otherwise, but, it could not enlarge the meaning of word transfer" as the said word occurs in continuation of 4 other words, which are "sale", "mortgage", "gilt", or "lease", which are essentialls volition or voluntary acts and, therefore, the word "tran" must take its colour from the aforesaid from words in association with which it is used Mr Sanjanwala invoked the principle of ejusdem generis and submitted that according to Gigabhai Mavjis case (supra) what is prohibited under Section 27 is a transfer by a person. On the authority of the aforesaid case. Mr. Sanjanwala argued that in the case at hand, it is clear that neither it was a purchase from a person it was a sale by a person, It was a sale and purchase by way of public auction and, therefore, it should not be treated as a case of transfer of any vacant land with reference to Section 5 or any other provisions under the Act. It was also submitted that since the provisions of the Act take care of the subsequent events, even if the petitioner-Society has acquired the interest in the year 1981 in the land in question, the Appeal could not be rejected on the ground of lows standi and he further referred to the provisions of Rule 5 contained in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Kegulation) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules,") and submitted that the order passed by the competent authority shows that it had the knowledge about the petitioners interest in the land, in question and according to Rule 5 (2) (a) (ii), the draft statement had to be served together with the notice referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8 on all other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or are likely to have, and claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession or both, in respect of the vacant lands. Mr. Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that these Rules are mandatory and since the Competent Authority did rot give any notice under the sub-section (3) of Section 8 to the petitioner-Society, the proceedings taken by the Competent authority were invalid and since the petitioner had interest and yet was not given the notice, as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 8, the tribunal could not hold that the- petitioner had no locus standi. It has been submitted by Mr. Sanjanwala that in the order passed by the Competent authority, reference has been made to the revenue records pertaining to the land in quesetion and the petitioners name has been duly entered in the records of rights as per the Jocument Annexure "a". The Competent authority could have well known and in fact knew about the interest of the petitioner in the ownership, ( 8 ) AS aganst this the argument of Mr. Sompura. learned A G. P. and mr Oza, learned Counsel for respondent No 3 is that the entry with regard to the petitioner-Society in the revenue records was admittedly made on or after 28-5-81 and according tohe petitioner-Societys own showing, it had neither any interest nor possession on 17-2-76 and. therefore, there is no question on giving notice und ;r Rule 5 to the petitioner-Society and the petitioner bad no lucus standi. l. trong reliance was placed on the decision of the Single Bench of this Court reported in XXX 1 G. L, R 6/4 (supra ). ( 9 ) RULE 5 of the Rules is reproduced as under :"5. Particulars to be contained in draft statement as regards vacant lands and manner of service of the same- (l) Every draft statement prepared under sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall contain the particulars specified in from III. (2) (a) The draft statement shall be served, together with the notice referred to in sub-sec ion (3) of Section 8, on (i) the holder of the vacant lands, and (ii) al! other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or likely to have, any claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession, or both, of the vacant lands. other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or likely to have, any claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession, or both, of the vacant lands. by sending the same by registered post addressed to the person concerned : (i) in the case of the holders of the vacant lands, to his address as given in the statement filed in pursuance of sub-section (1) of Section 6, and (ii) in the ease of other persons at their last known address. (b) Where the draft statement and the notice are returned as refused by the addressee, the name shall be deemed to have been duly served on such person (c) Where the effects to serve the draft statement and the notice, on the holder of the vacant lands or, as the may be, any other person referred to in Clause (a), in the manner specified in that clause is not successful for reasons other than the reason referred to in Clause (b ). the draft statement aad notice shall be served by affixing copies of the same in a conspicuous place in the office of the competent authority and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) iu which the holder of the vacant lands or, as the case may be, the other person is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. " ( 10 ) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides It is the petitioners own case that it bad purchased the land in question in the public auction in the year 1981 and, therefore, obviously the petitioner could not have had any interest on 1 7-2-76 at the time of the commencement of the Act or any date, thereaftertill 28-5-81. No doubt, there are provisions, which fefer to taking care of the subsequent events in certain cases, as pointed out bv Mr, Sanjanwala but this is a case in which the posiiion is to be seen an on 17-2-76 and under Rule 5 also the notices are required to be givee only to those persons; who could have held any interest in the property in question as on 17-2-76 or when it could be ascertained wih reference to the records as available at the time of commencement of the act that any person is likely to have any interest with regard to ownership or possession in future. In no case, no evidence or document, which was not at all in existence at the time of the commencement of the Act. could be taken into consideration foi the purpose of giving notice under Section 8 (3), as has been argued by Mr. banjanwala and, therefore, even if Rule 5 is mandatory, it cannot l~e held on the basis of the correct interpretation of rule 5 that the petitioner Society had any interest in the land in question at the relevsnt time and, therefore, the argument of Mr. Sanjanwala that since the petitioner-Society was a party which could be known to have interest and, therefore, entitled to the notice under Rule 5 is hereby rejected ( 11 ) IN the order of the Competent Authority passed on 30-12-88 reference to the revenue record is for (he years 1979-80 to 1982-83 and it is with reference to the revenue records ot" these years that the name of the petitioner-Society has been mentioned and, therefore, the authority could not take the petitioner-Society as a party likely to have any interest with reference to the possession as obtaining in the year 1976. There could not be any reference to the interest of the petitioner-Society in any manner in the from No. I under Section 6 which was filed by the original declarant, i. e,. There could not be any reference to the interest of the petitioner-Society in any manner in the from No. I under Section 6 which was filed by the original declarant, i. e,. respondent No 3 nor there arc any contemporarteous documents, on the basis of which the petitioner-Society could be taken to be a party likely to have any interest in the land in question and merely because the Competent authority has passed order on 30-12-81 and in the meantime, the land in question was purchased ry the petitioner-Society under a registered sale deed it cannot confer any interest in the petitioner-Society for the purpose of notice under Section 8 (3) or otherwise to have any grievance against the land determined to be in excess of the ceiling limits by the Competent authority and in the eye of law, the petitioner-Society cannot be taken as an aggrieved party against the order passed by the Competent Authority on 30-12-88, so as to entitle it to file an Appeal. It has been clearly observed in para 6 of Suryapur Co-operative Housing society Ltds case tsupra) that in view of provisions of Section 5 of the Act read with Section 42 of the Act. anv transfer of vacant land within the urban agglomeration area concerned would be deemed to be null and void if the same is not effected in accordance witn the provisions of the Act and it has also been categorically held that any party having no interest whatsoever on the date of the commencement of the Act, i. e, 17-2-76 can be said to have acquired interest in the land on the basis of the auction held by the special Recovery Officer subsequently. In (he case of Suryapur Co-operative housing Ltd, (supra) the suction was held by the Special Recovery Officer on 7-4-81 whereas in the ccse at hand the dated is 28-5-81 and the reading of para 3 of the judgment ia Suryapur Co-operativs Housing Society Ltd, would show that except the difference of the dates, the facts of this case are exactly idential and on the date of tfc commencement of the Act ,i. e. on 17-2-76. the petitioner-Society wa neither in possession of (he land n^r it bad any interest whatsoever in the land and, therefore, there is no question of any locus Mandii or any caus of action to the pf titioner-Society nor the petitioner-Society can be taken o be an aggrieved party for the purpose of filing Appeal under Section 33 of fhe Act ( 12 ) SO far as the decision n Gigabhai Mavijs case (supra) is concerned, it may be straightway observed that there cannot be any quarrel with the preposition of law as has been la; J down in this case, but it will be pertiment to point out that so far as the purchaser is concerned he was under no compulsion to purchase and if at all such an objection is (aken. such an objection can be taken by the seler and not bv the purchaser. It is unbelievable that the petitioner-Societv while investing a sum of Rs, 14 lacs to purchase this property had no knwledge that the land, which it was going to purchase, was under ceiling proceedings and the fact cannot be lost sight of that the land was put to public auction by Special Recovery Officer for the satisfaction of a petty claim of Rs 400/- + interest + administrative (sic) cost, in all to the extent of Rs 1096/-and (he land put to auction for satisfacfion of such a petty claim was purchased by the petiiioner- society for a sum of Rs 14 lacs a; alleged by ths petition-Society itself. The petitioner should have, therefore, been alert before heading for the purchase of such a lend a fid this fact also cannont be lost sight of that the petit inner-Society never can d to approach the Competent Authority and though it hid purchased the land in the year 1981 and the Competent authority decided (he procfedings as late as in i9s8 and in such a long span of seven yf-ars, the petitioner-Sock ty hever cared to raise anv objection before the fompeferu Authority and it woke up a from a long slumber only after the parsing of the order by the Competent Authority. The inference is irresistible that (he petitioner-Society was watching the proceedings sitting on the fence, allowed the proceedings under Section 6 of the Act to be completed as if it was to step in the proceedings only for the purpose of filing the Appeal against ths order of the Competent Authority. It wns submitted by Mr Sompura to the beginning that it appears that at that very point of time, i e. when the proceedings were pending before the Compeient Authority and at the time when the order was passed, the petitioner as well as the respondent NO 3 were in collusion and it is at a latter stage that they had fallen ou. Besides this, certain other controversies with regard to the receipt of the amount of auction purchase, etc. have also been sought to be raised and claim; and counter claims have beeb included in the affidavits fikd by the parlies, ie the petitioner and the respondent no, 3, but u is n. jt at all necessary for this Court to enter into those contro versies, specilly when it was informed at the Bar that the matter is being separately litigated in the ivil Court thus, I have no hesitation in holding from the facts and circumstances of this case that the conclusion is irresistible : tible that the petitioner cannot have any locus standl, it was not at all entitled to and notice under Rule 5. by no norms it can be said to be an aggrieved party against the order passed by the Competent Authority so as to claim an entitlement to file the Appeal under Section 33 before the Urban Land tribunal and in my considered opinion, the Urban Land Tribunal has rightly rejeced the Appeal of the petitioner-Society under Section 33 of the Act on the ground of locus sfandi ( 13 ) THE learned A. G. P. on the interpretation of Rule 5 has drawn my stientiuu to a decision of the Single tsench of this Court rendered in new Jalaram Park Co-operative Housing Society v. Ramchandta, reported in xxix (1) G. L. R. 82 (1988 (1) G. L. R. 82) in which it had been held that the petitioner-Society was not put in possession of the land on the appointed date, Rule 5 has to be read together with (he provisions of the Act and other provisions of the Rule, it connot be read so as to frustrate the provisions of the Act and it has got to be interpreted that the claim or interest in the ownership of possession of the property should exist on the appointed date and if such a claim or interest either in the ownership or possession of the property comes into exi fence after the appointe date the same cannot be taken into consideration as far as Rule 5 is concerned. ( 14 ) SO far as the question of pendency of the application for exemption is concerned, document daied 3-8-93 filed as Annexure-I with the affidavit dated 10-2-95 (Jed by Shri H. V Patel Deputy Secretary makes it clear that the application seeking exemption was made as late as on 10-4-91, which had already been consigned to record and it was no more pending and this Order also shows that the notification under Section 10 (5) had also been issued This leter dated 3-8-93 shows that it was addressed to one Thakore- bhai Manchhabhai Patel, C/o. Navsarjan Industrial Co-operative Society ltd , through whom the present petition has been filed and a copy thereof had already been separately sent to the petitioner-Society. This letter dated 3-8 93 also shows that it had been sent by Registered Post A D. as is mentioned on Use top of it and although receipt of this copy has been denied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Society during the course of arguments. there is no reason to disbelieve that it was sent by Registered Post A. D and in normal course it must have been received and, therefore, the argument of the pendency of the application foi exemption under Section 20, as moved by the petitioner-Society, does not survive, although it may also be observed thai the petitioner-Society is not even have a locus standi for the purpose of moving application see king exemption under Section 20 because such an application could be moved only by the original declarant and not by a party like the petitioner-Society, who purchased the land in question in the year 1981 the contents of this letter also shows that the Department has taken note of the fact that as on. 17-2-76 the Petitioner-Society had no interest and it may also be mentioned that the petiiioner-Society, which had purchased the land in the yeat 1981, moved the application seeking exemption as late as in April 1991, when the proceedings under Section 6 bad already been finalised by the Competent Authority way back in December 1988 and by this time. i. e. in April 1991, the petitioner Society had already preferred the Appeals NOS. 4/ and 48 of the year 1980. It is, therefore, transparently clear that the petitioner Society went on watching the proceedings under the Act as was going on tiie basts of the declaration filed by respondent No. 3, but stepped in these proceedings only after the decision of the Competent autboiity in the year 1988 and moved the application seeking exemption under Section 20 after preferring the Appeals before the Urban Land Tribunal and the application under Section 20 had been filed during the pendency of the Appeals Nos. 4/ and 48 which were registered in the year 1990. ( 15 ) ONCE it held that the petitioner-Society had no locus standi in the matter, it is cot necessary for this Court to go into the other contentions raised by the petitioner-Society, to which reference has already been made in the earlier part of the judgment. ( 16 ) IN the end Mr. ( 15 ) ONCE it held that the petitioner-Society had no locus standi in the matter, it is cot necessary for this Court to go into the other contentions raised by the petitioner-Society, to which reference has already been made in the earlier part of the judgment. ( 16 ) IN the end Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that against the decision of the single Bench of this Court, i. e Suryapur Co-operative Housing society Ltd case (supra), a Letters Patent Appeal is pending before the division Bench and. therefore, this matterr should also be referred to the division Bench In my opinion it is not at all necessary for this Court to refer the mater to the Division Bench merely because Letters Patent Appeal is pending against the decisioo in Survapur Co-operative Housing Society ltd. s case rendered by the single Bench I have referred to and dealt with the decision rendered single Bench in Sutyapur Co-operative Housing Society ltd *s case only becanse it was cied at the Bar. Independent of this decision also. I am of the considered opinion that the facts relating to the conduct of Ihe petitioner in the Csc at hand stand a foot higher than the facts, which are available in Suryayur Co-operative Hosing Sacictv Ltds case and the petioner-Society, which had entered into purchase of this lan^ fora sum of Rs. 14 lacs against the satisfaction of a petty claim of Rs 10^6 - as srated hereinabave ought to have known aud it is unbelievable that it did not know about (he pending proceedings under the Urban i-and Ceiling Act in the year 1*8 and yet it did not talo- care to raise any onjection of its own before the Competent Authority and, therefore, the petitioner had no locus standi whatsoever to claim notice under Rule 5 or to claim as an "ggrieved party and hence independent of the decision rendered in Survapur Co-opera- tive Hoesing Society Ltd , I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner- society had no locus standi whatsover and the Urban Land Tribunal has rightly rejected the Appeals preferred by the petitioner-Society. ( 17 ) THE result of the adjudication as aforesaid is that these three petitions have no force and the same, therefore, fail All the three Special civil Application are accordingly dismissed Rule is hereby discharged in all these three petitions Interim orders stand automatically vacated in all these petitions. No order as to costs. .