PRADIPTA RAY, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the registered agreement to sell Ac. 1. 99 dec. of agricultural lands executed by the defendant-appellant on 18/02/1975. The defendant appellant contested the suit alleging that an understanding was reached between him and the plaintiff that the plaintiff would advance a loan of Rs. 3,000/- and he would mortgage 99 decimals of land. According to him, it was agreed that the mortgage would be usufructuary in nature. The further case of the defendant-appellant is that he executed the document in good faith upon the impression that it was a deed of mortgage. The defendant has alleged that the said agreement was obtained by practising fraud and deception. ( 2 ) THE trial Court granted decree for specific performance which has been affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The defendant-appellant has preferred the present second appeal against the said judgments and decrees. ( 3 ) MISS Panda, learned Advocate for the appellant has drawn the attention of this Court to the evidence of the plaintiff himself and has urged that the said evidence has clearly established that the intention and the arrangement was to create a unsufructuary mortgage, but a different kind of document was obtained from the defendant by deception. Miss Panda has further argued that none of the courts below was able to appreciate the legal effect of the said admission and committed error in passing a decree for specific performance ignoring the express provisions of the Specific Relief Act. ( 4 ) MR. U. K. Samal, learned Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent has contended that both the courts below having concurrently held that the agreement to sell was consciously executed by the defendant, the said concurrent finding cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. He has further submitted that both the courts below have considered the plaintiffs statements and discussed the same at length and it cannot be said that the effect of the said statement was not considered. He has also argued that the plaintiffs oral deposition cannot have the effect of overriding the express contents and nature of a registered document. He has referred to the statements made by the defendant in his deposition and urged that the materials on record do not establish the defence case of mortgage. He has also argued that the plaintiffs oral deposition cannot have the effect of overriding the express contents and nature of a registered document. He has referred to the statements made by the defendant in his deposition and urged that the materials on record do not establish the defence case of mortgage. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff in his deposition has stated:";i was possessing the land 2/3 years prior (to) the execution of the agreement to sell. By now I have appreciated 3/4 crops which, however, cannot be expressed in terms of money. In the document, however, the fact of possession was not mentioned. The condition was that if the defendant returned the money I would give up possession. This condition was mentioned in the deed. . . . . . . . . I did not offer Rs. 1000/- then and there because there was the chance of returning the advance. Regarding payment of interest there was no condition. "; ( 6 ) THE plaintiff's witness No. 2 stated in his deposition that - ";the plaintiff is in cultivating possession of the land since 7/8 years. "; That witness was deposing on 11/08/1980. The aforementioned statements support the defence case of an intention of creating a usufructuary mortgage. It appears that the plaintiff was allowed to be in possession of the lands and to enjoy the usufructs thereof in lieu of interest. The courts below failed to appreciate the full legal implications of the statements of the plaintiff himself. ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that an admission is not conclusive, but the same is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon. The Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Baladiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi reported in AIR 1960 SC 100 has laid down-";an admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. ";in the present case the plaintiff deposed and made the statements quoted above on 31/07/1980. Thereafter, he was recalled again on 11/08/1980 when further deposition was recorded. In his deposition given on 11/08/1980 the plaintiff did not make any attempt to explain the statements made by him earlier. He did not even claim that the said statements were mistaken. ";in the present case the plaintiff deposed and made the statements quoted above on 31/07/1980. Thereafter, he was recalled again on 11/08/1980 when further deposition was recorded. In his deposition given on 11/08/1980 the plaintiff did not make any attempt to explain the statements made by him earlier. He did not even claim that the said statements were mistaken. Thus, the statements as quoted above, bind the plaintiff and disentitle his claim that there was no intention to create mortgage. ( 8 ) THE contentions of the learned Advocate for the respondent that there being a registered document, no reliance can be placed on the oral evidence of the plaintiff is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The plaintiff, who claims his right on the basis of the document in question, himself has clearly stated that the understanding was that he would give up possession if the defendant returned the money. The said statements lend support to the defence case that a mortgage deed was intended to be executed, but another kind of document was prepared to deceive him. In the present case the plaintiff's own oral statement is being relied upon not to contradict the contents of the concerned document, but to establish the defence case of invalidity of the document. Such use of oral evidence particularly of the person who claims on the strength of the disputed document is permissible. The decisions reported in AIR 1962 Mys 44 (Doddamallaapa Channabasappa Kari v. Gangappa Shiddappa Gulgand) ant AIR 1921 Nagpur 166 (Vyankatesh v. Ganesh) do not apply to the facts of the present case. Even if it is assumed that the agreement for sale was consciously executed by the defendant, the materials on record indicate that such a document was obtained as a kind of security for the money advanced by the plaintiff and that money advanced by the plaintiff was a loan. ( 9 ) SECTION 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. ( 9 ) SECTION 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Thus, assuming that an agreement for sale was executed by the defendant, in view of the plaintiffs own clear statement as quoted hereinbefore, enforcement of specific performance gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage and is inequitable The courts below committed error in exercising discretionary jurisdiction to grant a decree for specific performance. ( 10 ) MR. Samal, learned Advocate has cited decisions reported in c, N. A. C. Gunuour) and AIR 1959 SC 1509 (Maniar Ismail Sab v. Maniar Fakruddin) and has contended that this Court while hearing a second appeal should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. ( 11 ) SOME statements of facts are basic in nature and those carry legal implications and effects having important and material bearing on the determination of the issues involved in the case. Failure to appreciate the correct legal effect or consequence of such basic statements of facts is an error which is liable to be interfered with in second appeal. In the present case the courts below have failed to appreciate the legal implication and the effect of the statements made by the plaintiff himself. ( 12 ) MOREOVER, in the present case the courts below have also failed to perform a legal duty cast upon them by S. 20 of the Specific Relief Act and thereby committed a material error in exercise of their jurisdiction. ( 13 ) MR. Samal has pointed out some inconsistencies in the evidence of the defendant. It is well settled that the plaintiff cannot succeed on the basis of inconsistencies in the defence case, but he is to prove his case beyond all reasonable doubts. Moreover, in view of the plaintiff's own categorical statement, the inconsistencies in the defence case have lost their significance, if any. ( 14 ) IN the suit the plaintiff has prayed for an alternative relief for a decree for repayment of the amount advanced together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Learned Advocate for the appellant also submits that the appellant is ready to return the money together with reasonable interest. ( 14 ) IN the suit the plaintiff has prayed for an alternative relief for a decree for repayment of the amount advanced together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Learned Advocate for the appellant also submits that the appellant is ready to return the money together with reasonable interest. The defendant has also alleged in the written statement that he wanted to pay back the amount with interest. As already pointed out, the plaintiff has been continuing in possession of the disputed land, and has been enjoying usufructs thereof. Although the plaintiff has claimed interest @ 12% per annum, in view of the admitted position that he has been enjoying the usufructs from the lands the plaintiff is allowed interest @ 6% per annum. ( 15 ) FOR reasons stated above, the judgments and decrees for specific performance of the agreement passed by the courts below are set aside. The plaintiff is, however, granted decree for recovery of the amount of Rs. 3000/- paid to the defendant together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date when the said amount was advanced till he deposits the said amounts with interest in the trial Court or the executing Court upon notice to the plaintiff subject to the condition that the plaintiff will deliver possession of the suit lands to the defendant. The defendant-appellant is directed to deposit the said amount with interest within 3 months from to-day with notice to the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff is directed to deliver possession of the suit lands within one month from the date of receipt of notice of the deposit of the decretal amount by the defendant. The plaintiff will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited only after satisfying the trial Court or the executing Court that the possession of the suit land has been handed over to the defendant. If the defendant fails to make the deposit within 90 days the plaintiff will be at liberty to execute the decree. Similarly, if the defendant deposits the entire amount as directed and the plaintiff fails to deliver back the possession of the suit lands to the defendant within the time indicated hereinabove the defendant will be entitled to obtain possession of the suit lands through Court. ( 16 ) THE appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There is no order as to costs. ( 16 ) THE appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There is no order as to costs. ( 17 ) RECORDS of the courts below be sent down expeditiously. Order accordingly.