JUDGMENT 1. - The third respondent Shri Rama Kishan s/o Shri Ghewar Lal Goyal was appointed Junior Accountant in Antodaya Scheme. The scheme came to an end and his service stood terminated as a result thereof w.e.f. 15-7-84. Respondent No. 3 was offered the job of L.D.C. but he refused to accept the same. Thereafter the third respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was registered as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 267/85. Third respondent prayed for the following relief:- " 15/A. That, by appropriate, writ, order or direction this Hon'ble Court may he pleased to declare that order of termination dated 31st October, 1984, Annexure-6. is illegal and may be quashed. The respondents be directed to absorb the petitioner on a post equivalent to the post of Junior Accountant and if it is considered that petitioner is entitled to be appointed only in the Respondent Bank then Respondent Bank may be directed to absorb the petitioner on a post equivalent to the post of Junior Accountant or at least to the post of Supervisor and it may be directed to do so on and from the date the termination of the services of the petitioner was brought about." 2. After hearing the parties, the aforesaid writ petition was rejected by order dated 8-5-86. The third respondent preferred a special appeal before a Division Bench of this Court, which was registered as D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 2/89. The said appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench vide its judgment dated 8-8-89. As a result of the dismissal of the special appeal, the order of termination passed against the third respondent was upheld. The third respondent after the dismissal of his special appeal. filed an application on 21-9-89 under section 28-A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. 1958 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') before the fourth respondents claiming the relief that he should be paid wages from 1-7-84 and he be taken back in service and he should be declared to be in service right from that date. In other words, he has claimed the relief that his termination from service was illegal. bad and without authority of law and be set aside and he should he deemed to be in service from that date and is entitled for all service benefits. In other words, he has claimed the relief that his termination from service was illegal. bad and without authority of law and be set aside and he should he deemed to be in service from that date and is entitled for all service benefits. As the application was not filed within the period of limitation prescribed under section 28-A(2) of the Act within thirty days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge, the third respondent moved an application for condonation of delay. The ground taken for condonation of delay is that his services have been terminated vide order dated 30-10-84 w.e.f. 15-7-84 and for the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the delay in filing the application he condoned. The affidavit states that he was appointed on 6-3-80 by orders of the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies,Jodhpur camp Nagaur, that his services are terminated by order dated 31-10-84 from retrospective date i.e. 15-7-84 against which he had preferred a writ petition in the High Court but his writ petition was ultimately dismissed and against the dismissal of the writ petition, he preferred a special appeal which was also dismissed on 8-8-89 on technical grounds. He had applied for the certified copy on 14-8-89. The copy was delivered to him on 26-8-89 and thereafter he has immediately moved an application under section 28-A of the Act. In the aforesaid circumstances, the delay in filing the application be condoned. 3. The petitioner filed his reply raising objection that the application under section 28-A is not maintainable and the Prescribed Authority, Bikaner, under the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under section 28-A of the Act. It is also alleged that the application is hopelessly barred by limitation. Both these objections have been overruled by respondent No. 4, Prescribed Authority and, therefore, the present petition is filed by the Project Officer-cum-Secretary, Nagaur Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., Nagaur. 4. It is argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the petition filed under section 28-A of the Act is barred on the principle of constructive res judicata and secondly that the limitation commenced for making an application against dismissal or discharge from the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge and not from the date of the orders passed by the High Court and, therefore, the petition was barred by limitation. It is contended by the counsel for the respondents that the decision of the High Court was not on merits but on technical grounds and, therefore, the principle of constructive res judicata has no application. Secondly, that as the matter was pending consideration before the High Court, the respondent is entitled for condonation of the delay of the period, the matter was pending consideration in the High Court and, therefore, the Authority was well within its jurisdiction to condone the delay. 5. It is apparent that in a previous petition, the third respondent has claimed the relief from the High Court that the order of termination dated 31-10-84 was illegal and, therefore, be quashed. In the petition under section 28-A, the third respondent is claiming a relict that the order of termination dated 31-10-84 is illegal and should be set aside. This relief is claimed although under different premises, which are provided under section 28A of the Act. The question is whether the order of termination can be challenged before different authorities on different grounds. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain, AIR 1977 SC 1680 , the apex Court has lucidly enunciated the principle of constructive res judicata and it is said that the principle of estoppel per res judicatum is it rule of evidence and the doctrine is based on two theories : (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. On consideration of these principles, it is not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same relief on the same cause of action, which is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. It may be, that the same set of trades, may give rise to two or more causes of action and in such a case, if a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at once time and reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have, therefore, treated such a course as an abuse of its process and this rule has been referred to as a constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. Courts have, therefore, treated such a course as an abuse of its process and this rule has been referred to as a constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. Here in the instant case, when the petitioner has claimed the relief of quashing the order of termination on the ground that other similarly placed persons have been retained and his services are terminated, could have also raised the question of his termination being had on account of contravention of the provisions of S. 28-A of the Act. The petitioner having not raised all questions, which could have declared his termination from service bad, cannot now be permitted to raise that question in the subsequent proceedings and the proceedings under section 28A are hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. 6. Under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner sought condonation of delay in filing the petition under section 28-A on the ground that the High Court has decided the matter on 8-8-89 and he has obtained the certified copy only on 26-8-89. It is manifest from sub-sec.'(2) of S. 28-A that the application has to be filed within thirty days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge and not from the date of the order passed in the proceedings taken up before any court. The petitioner is claiming the relief under section 28-A and, therefore, the petition under section 28-A should have been filed within thirty days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge. The order of dismissal was passed on 30-10-84. The petition had been filed on 21-9-89, which is nearly five years after the order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner. The petitioner is claiming relief under section 28-A of the Act and the matter is not related to the grounds raised in the petition filed before the High Court. The petitioner is not entitled for condonation of delay for the period spent in the High Court. The petition under section 28-A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958, is hopelessly time barred. The reason given for condonation of delay that he was prosecuting his case before the High Court, cannot he a ground for condonation of delay. The petitioner is not entitled for condonation of delay for the period spent in the High Court. The petition under section 28-A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958, is hopelessly time barred. The reason given for condonation of delay that he was prosecuting his case before the High Court, cannot he a ground for condonation of delay. A person cannot he permitted to prosecute the remedy in one court, wait for its result and thereafter approach another forum on other grounds for the same relief and also claim the condonation of limitation on the ground that he was prosecuting his remedy before another forum. The application filed by the petitioner was barred by limitation and in my view, there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay. The order passed by respondent No. 4 is contrary to law. 7. The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 30-4-90 (Annex. 1) passed by the Prescribed Authority, Bikaner, under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, is quashed. As a consequence thereof, the application filed by the petitioner under section 28-A is dismissed. There shall he no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******