These revision petitions have arisen against the order dated 15.12.94 passed by the Munsiff No.l, Jorhat in Title Execution No.18 of 1991. 2. Revision petitioner as plaintiff instituted the Title Suit No.88 of 1975 against the opposite parties as defendant for ejectment, recovery of arrear of rents, contending inter alia, that the opposite parties are the tenants under one Shri Asrafi. The said Mr. Asrafi, sold the suit property to the plaintiff on 18.6.73 by a registered deed and intimated the tenants to that effect to attorn the plaintiff/ petitioner as their landlord. The plaintiff/petitioner required the house for his own use and occupation served a notice on the opposite parties to vacate the demised premises. 3. Defendant/opposite parties contested the suit by filing written statement denying plaintiffs claim as a design to harass the defendant/opposite parties. 4. After trial the suit was decreed and being aggrieved preferred appeal being Title Appeal No. 18 of 1987 before the Assistant District Judge, Jorhat and the same was dismissed. The Civil Revision No. 163 of 1991 preferred before this Court by the opposite parties was allowed and thereby dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff/petitioner filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court impugning this Court judgment and leave was granted and the appeal was registered as Civil Appeal No.2966 of 1992 and the appeal was finally disposed of on 8.3.94 by allowing the appeal, decreed the plaintiff suit by setting aside the judgment passed by this Court. 5. While allowing the appeal, the Apex Court granted six months time to the opposite parties to vacate the demised premises, subject to the filing of usual undertaking with four (4) weeks time from the date of judgment. In the undertaking, the opposite parties stated that - (1) they shall not induct any other person in the suit premises and shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord on or before 7th September, 1994; and that (2) the tenants (opposite parties) shall pay to the landlord arrears of rent, if any, within one month from 8.3.94 and shall pay future compensation for use and occupation of the premises month by month before 10th of every month. But this undertaking was not accepted by the Apex Court as the same was not filed within time as directed. But this undertaking was not accepted by the Apex Court as the same was not filed within time as directed. The reason of this rejection is that the time of six months allowed by the Apex Court to vacate the land has automatically stand cancelled. 6. The petitioner, accordingly put the decree in execution being Title Execution No. 18 of 1990. The opposite party/judgment debtor filed an objection under section 47 CPC alleging inter alia that on 20.8.90 the demised premises completely gutted by fire and the decree ceased to exist and become unexecutable and prayed for dismissal of the execution case. The petitioner/decree-holder filed objection. Petitioner as landlord has some other-tenants adjacent to the demised premises. All the tenant including the opposite parties started repairing works in a permanent nature, immediately after fire incident - as the houses damaged partly. Plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.58 of 1990, for permanent injunction in the Court of Assistant District Judge, Jorhat with prayer for decree and a permanent injunction; for restraining the defendants, their agents, workmen, servants of any other person to raise further constructions on the land comprising tenanted premises and to pull down and remove such construction therefrom. Defendant opposite parties along with others filed joint written statement contending and admitting that some of the answering defendants whose shop premises and trade commodities were gutted by the said fire made some repair in their premises in order to enable them to start business afresh so that they may be in a position to maintain their business reputation. Trial Court granted injunction, but on appeal the said order was modified by this Court in Misc Appeal (F)No.82 of 1990. 7. On the backdrop of the facts, the point for consideration, before this Court is whether the decree obtained in Title Suit No.88 of 1975 by the plaintiff petitioner is executable or not. 8. The precise position is that the opposite parties/defendants are in occupation of the demised premises and the said premises were not completely gutted by fire which is admitted position in TS No.58 of 1990 from the statement made in the written statement of the defendants. The demised premises was gutted on 20.8.90, ie during the pendency of the civil revision before this Court. The demised premises was gutted on 20.8.90, ie during the pendency of the civil revision before this Court. Admittedly the opposite parties did not bring this fact inviting judicial attention of this Court, nor before the Supreme Court that the demised premises ceased to exist. For the first time after the disposal of the appeal by the Apex Court with direction to hand over the vacant premises within six months imposing condition precedent that the opposite parties had to make an undertaking within the stipulated time. Obviously the effect of rejection of the undertaking by the Apex Court for non compliance of the direction within stipulated period is that the extension of six months to vacate the demised premises disentitled the opposite parties to the benefit of the extension order. In that view of the matter, the opposite parties have no locus standi to file a petition under section 47 of the CPC to claim that the decree is unexecutable. 9. Mr. Lahiri, senior counsel of the petitioner has submitted that the application under section 47 CPC was untenable after the judgment of the Supreme Court, and entertaining the petition, the executing Court not only acted illegally but acted in excess of its jurisdiction by undermining the clear direction of the Apex Court. That in spite of Apex Court's judgment and direction which was precise and clear in its terms, the Court ought to have rejected the said application in limine, the Court exceeded jurisdiction being unmindful of its limitation by allowing the opposite parties to adduce evidence that too, on a verbal prayer. I find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. Lahiri, and constrained to hold that, the executing Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 47 CPC has been restricted, in view of facts and circumstances as discussed above therefore the opposite parties' claim under section 47 CPC has no footing as its conditional undertaking was rejected by the Apex Court as time barred. 10. In the case of Mahendra Prasad Shaw (Dr) vs. Rajkumar Shah, (1994) Supp 3 SCC 30/, while deciding question regarding undertaking given to the Supreme Court, their Lordships pointed out to the duty of the person giving such undertaking to implement it and restricted other Courts against interdicting the implementation of the same. 10. In the case of Mahendra Prasad Shaw (Dr) vs. Rajkumar Shah, (1994) Supp 3 SCC 30/, while deciding question regarding undertaking given to the Supreme Court, their Lordships pointed out to the duty of the person giving such undertaking to implement it and restricted other Courts against interdicting the implementation of the same. In that case unconditional undertaking was given to the Supreme Court to deliver vacant possession of the premises without the time limit fixed by the Supreme Court. It was held by their Lordships that non compliance could not be permitted to be subverted in execution proceedings, even if there was a subsequent agreement between the parties to continue the tenancy. That relief in such case can be granted only by the Supreme Court and not by any other Court. 11. Conduct of the opposite parties, in my considered view, amounts to dilatory tactics to prolong its illegal possession over the demised premises. The impugned order dated 15.12.94 passed by the Munsiff No.1, Jorhat in Title Execution Case No. 18 of 1991 and the maintainability of the application under section 47 CPC are set-aside. The executing Court is directed to proceed with the execution proceeding under the provisions of law. 12. In the result the revision petitions are allowed. Opposite parties are directed to pay Rs.1,000/- to the revision petitioner as costs.