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1995 DIGILAW 162 (BOM)

Sitaram Ganpat Hanumante since deceased by his legal representatives and others v. Sunayana Vinayak Revankar alias Khedekar alias Baby Ghare and another

1995-03-10

M.L.DUDHAT

body1995
JUDGMENT - M.L. DUDHAT, J. :---This second appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 8th February, 1985 passed by the Assistant Judge, Thane, in Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1982 preferred against the judgment and decree dated 13th April, 1982 passed by the III Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane, in Regular Civil Suit No. 263 of 1977. By the aforesaid decision the lower Appellate Court confirmed the decision of the trial Court. 2. The appellants in this case are the legal representatives of original plaintiff who filed the suit for possession of the suit premises which consists of room being Room No. 14 admeasuring about 12 x 10 in a chawl known as Baithya Bohari Chawl, opposite Old Bohra Cemetary, bearing Tika No. 12, House No. 87 on Govind Bachaji Road, Charai, Thane. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that somewhere in the month of May 1973 the defendant approached him for accommodating her temporarily as she had lost her residential accommodation. Out of sympathy he granted a licence of the suit premises for payment of compensation of Rs. 20/-. Though the defendant promised to vacate the suit premises after the rainy season, the defendant avoided to leave the suit premises under one pretext or the other and, therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file Regular Civil Suit No. 263 of 1977 against the defendant after terminating her licence. 3. As against this, it was contended on behalf of the defendant that in fact she obtained possession of the suit premises as a tenant and paid Rs. 5,000/- as and by way of Pagri and undertook to pay Rs. 20/- per month. It was contended by the defendant that she is occupying the suit premises as a tenant from October, 1972. 4. After hearing both the sides and allowing both the parties to lead evidence, both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that the defendant was occupying the suit premises as a tenant and not as a licensee and, therefore, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. It is against this, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 5. In this case the defendant led the evidence of the Bank official who produced the correspondence made by the defendant with the Bank. It is against this, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 5. In this case the defendant led the evidence of the Bank official who produced the correspondence made by the defendant with the Bank. After going through the aforesaid correspondence and the testimony of this witness, both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that in fact the defendant requested the Bank in December, 1972 to change her name and address from the old address to the present address where she is residing as a tenant. As per her request the Bank officials made the change in her residential address. By relying on the aforesaid correspondence, both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that the aforesaid evidence as led by the defendant supports her contention that she in fact obtained the suit premises on rental basis in October, 1972. That being the position, both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that in view of the amendment to the Rent Act, the defendant has become protected licensee as per section 15-A of the Rent Act. Apart from that after taking into consideration the continuous exclusive possession, both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that the defendant is a tenant and not a licensee. 6. In view of this concurrent finding of fact given by the lower Courts, this Court cannot interfere with the said finding of fact and hence this second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. *****