Judgment :- Ramakrishnan, J. This appeal under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act (for short "the act" ) is against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in E.F.A.No. 8 of 1995. The Execution First Appeal itself was against an order passed in E.A. No. 23 of 1995 in E.P.No. 59 of 1990 on the file of-the Sub Court, Palakkad. As per the order passed in E.A. No. 23 of 1995, the learned Sub Judge has declined to entertain the claim filed under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC reserving the right of the petitioners in the E.A. to initiate independent action to establish their right in the property. Obviously, the learned judge seems to have exercised his power under clause (b) of the proviso to Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and dismissed the E.A. as unnecessarily delayed. In the appeal the learned Single Judge as confirmed the order making it clear that the disposal is under clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 58 and expressly reserving the right of the appellants to file a regular suit to establish the right claimed as provided under Order XXI Rule 58(c) CPC. 2. At the time when the appeal came up for admission before us in the usual course, we heard the learned counsel for the appellants Shri. S. Ananthakrishnan on the question of maintainability of the appeal as we entertained doubt about it. For the appellants it was submitted that the appeal is maintainable specifically under clause (ii) of S.5 of the Act which is as under: "5. Appeal from judgment or order of Single Judge:-An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two judges from (i) omitted. (ii) a judgment of a single judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by a subordinate court". It is clear from the above provision that the maintainability of the appeal will depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Sub Court while passing the order dismissing the E.A. As such 'the question to be considered is whether the order passed in the E.A. declining to entertain the claim preferred by the appellants is an order passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Sub Court or not? 3. 3. While arguing for the maintainability of the appeal it was vehemently submitted that even though the appellants have approached the execution court for necessary reliefs, as far as they are concerned, the E.A. is an original proceeding inviting an adjudication into the claim by the court as a court of first instance and as such the order passed in the E.A. must be treated as one made in exercise of original jurisdiction of the sub court. Learned counsel pointed out that this is especially so in view of the amended provisions contained in Order XXI Rule 58 CPC whereby the court which executes the decree has been conferred with exclusive and comprehensi a jurisdiction to settle all questions including the question regarding title to the property attached, in the execution proceedings itself. The provision in Order XXI Rule 58(4) CPC which states that where any claim or objection has been adjudicated upon under the rule, the order made thereon shall have same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree, was also relied upon in support of the submission made by the learned counsel. 4. As already indicated, in this case we are only concerned strictly with the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a court executing a decree while declining to entertain a claim application under the proviso to Rule 58(1) of Order XXI CPC. Petitioners have at the first instance itself approached the court executing a decree already passed in exercise of its original jurisdiction by filing an E.A. for necessary reliefs. Trie execution court in this case has evidently declined to entertain the claim that application in exercise of a power specially vested in it as part of its jurisdiction to execute decrees. Except when the provisions in Rule 58 is applied to attachments before judgment by virtue of the provisions in Order XXXVIII Rule 8 CPC the power under that provision can be exercised by court only while functioning as execution court. It is a power specifically and exclusively vested in execution courts under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and exercisable only when courts function on the execution side in contrast to the original side of the court. It is a power specifically and exclusively vested in execution courts under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and exercisable only when courts function on the execution side in contrast to the original side of the court. We think that the words 'orginal jurisdiction' have been used in S.5(ii) of the Act to indicate the jurisdiction of the courts to try and dispose of a matter as the court of first instance and to differentiate the said jurisdiction from the jurisdiction to execute such decree or order passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction and the appellate jurisdiction. As such we have no hesitation in holding that the order passed by the learned sub judge in E. A. No. 23 of 1995 refusing to entertain the claim in exercise of the power conferred on it under clause (b) of the proviso to Order XXI Rule 58(1) CPC is not an order passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Sub Court. In this view of the matter, we would hold that the appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in E.F.A. No. 8 of 1995 is not maintainable under S.5(ii) of the Act. 5. Though we do not want to pronounce finally our view on the question whether an order passed under Order XXI Rule 58(3)CPC after a proper adjudication of the claim could be treated as an order passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court, we would like to observe the following regarding the submissions made by the learned counsel in that regard: The fact that the amended provisions in Order XXI Rule 58 CPC provide for settlement of all claims to the property attached in the execution proceedings itself may not be a sufficient reason to hold that the orders passed under the above provision adjudicating a claim is the result of an exercise of original jurisdiction even as regards the claimants, it may be true that in a claim proceeding the execution court may also be bound to adjudicate the claim in its entirety as if it is a court-of first instance. It may also be true that the order passed as a result of such adjudication may have the force of a decree for the purpose of appeal under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 58(4) CPC. It may also be true that the order passed as a result of such adjudication may have the force of a decree for the purpose of appeal under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 58(4) CPC. But whatever may be the scope and ambit of the enquiry to be conducted and the legal effect of the result of the adjudication, still the jurisdiction actually exercised can never be treated as anything different from that of an execution court. The jurisdiction exercised though may be wide and akin in many respects to -original jurisdiction it will still be subject to all the limitations of the jurisdiction of the executing court. The proceedings will remain as proceedings initiated on the execution side of the court in contrast to the original side of the court. The provisions in Order XXII Rule 12 will apply to such proceedings also. As such the broad submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that even though the initial order is One passed in an E.A. under Order XXI Rule 58, it has to be considered as an order passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction taking note of the special provisions in Order XXI Rule 58(2), (3) and (4) cannot be accepted as correct. The legal effect of the provisions in Rule 58(3) and (4) is only to widen the scope of the jurisdiction of the court on its execution side and to treat the orders passed under Rule 58(3) as a decree passed in a suit itself, the main purpose behind the amendment was to widen the jurisdiction of the court on its execution side and to dispose of the claims finally on the execution side itself rather than relegating it to the original side of the court by permitting the litigants to file regular suits to establish their claims. We would, however, like to leave the matter open without finally deciding the issue with reference to an order passed in the claim on merits. - Accordingly the appeal fails and it is dismissed as not maintainable.