ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH this case was listed far admission, at the request and with the consent of learned counsel for parties it is taken up for final disposal. ( 2 ) PETITIONER faced trial for allegedly having committed offences punishable under Sections 448 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1850 (in short, 'i. P. C. ' ). The accusations in short were that on 22-11-1992 at about 5 p. m. information was lodged by one Sarat Maharana that while he was on the village road, the accused-petitioner tried to beat him with a lathi. The informant caught hold of the said weapon to save himself, but the accused beat his wife Chanduri Maharana (P. W. 1 ). As a result of the assaults, she became sense-less. She was shifted to Khurda Hospital where she was referred to Capital Hospital for treatment. On the basis of information lodged, investigation was undertaken and charge-sheet was submitted on completion of investigation. The accused pleaded innocence and false implication. ( 3 ) TAKING into consideration the evidence of informant, and injured and P. Ws. 9 and 10, who were stated to be eye witnesses, learned Magistrate found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 325, I. P. C. , but held that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence punishable under Section 448, I. P. C. , and sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to undergo R. I. for one year. In appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar maintained the conviction and sentence. ( 4 ) IN support of the revision application it is submitted that the evidence was discrepant and the Courts below should not have placed reliance on it to record conviction. It is also submitted that the sentence as imposed is extremely hard. With reference to Sections 29 and 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'code'), it is submitted that the default sentence awarded is in excess of jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate, who was a Judicial Magistrate of the first class. It is also submitted that in the meantime the petitioner has suffered the sentence of two years relatable to substantive sentence and for the default in payment of fine has already undergone custody for about five months. It is also submitted that in the meantime the petitioner has suffered the sentence of two years relatable to substantive sentence and for the default in payment of fine has already undergone custody for about five months. The learned counsel for State submitted that the Courts below have analysed the evidence in great detail and while exercising revisional jurisdiction there is no scope for interference. So far as legality of default sentence is concerned it is submitted that such technicality should not weigh with this Court. ( 5 ) SO far as conclusions on factual aspects are concerned. I do not find any perversity in them. This Court's scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction is very limited. Unless the conclusions of the Courts below are perverse, unreasonable, and are of such nature that no prudent man can arrive at such conclusions, there is no scope for interference. Merely because view is possible to be taken, that cannot be a ground for interference. The object of revisional jurisdiction is to confer upon the High Court a kind of supervisory power in order to prevent miscarriage of justice, and this power, which is disceretionary in nature is exercisable in the larger interest of justice. The miscarriage of justice arises in cases where lower Court has acted under misconception of law, or has committed irregularity of procedure and similar infirmities. The revisional Court will not interfere with an order of the lower Court where there has been no failure of justice. The revisional Court does not interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below unless the Courts below had overlooked essential parts of evidence and/or acted upon in admissible and extraneous matters. The revisional Court ought not to interfere merely because the lower Court has taken a particular view of the evidence and that view does not commend itself to the revisional Court. I, therefore, find no substance in the plea that there has been improper assessment of evidence to record conviction. ( 6 ) SO far as default sentence aspect is concerned, it is necessary to take note of Sections 29 and 30 of the Code. The former relates to sentence which Magistrates may pass while the latter relates to sentence of imprisonment in default of fine. ( 6 ) SO far as default sentence aspect is concerned, it is necessary to take note of Sections 29 and 30 of the Code. The former relates to sentence which Magistrates may pass while the latter relates to sentence of imprisonment in default of fine. Different punishments axe defined in Chapter III of I. P. C. Section 53 indicates six categories of punishments under the provisions of I. P. C. Category "sixthly" relates to fine. Section 63 says that where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive. Section 64 deals with sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine. It provides that in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment, and in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment of fine, or with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall stiffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence. Section 65 deals with the limit to imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when imprisonment and fine are awardable. It provides that the term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisonment in default of payment of a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the offence, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment as well as fine. Section 67 deals with case of imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when offence is punishable with fine only. ( 7 ) SECTION 325, I. P. C. provides that maximum custodial sentence of seven years and also fine can be imposed. It is triable by any Magistrate. Obviously, therefore, the maximum sentence which can be imposed in default of payment of fine is not to exceed one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment, i. e. seven years. But further restraint is provided in Section 30 of the Code. It is triable by any Magistrate. Obviously, therefore, the maximum sentence which can be imposed in default of payment of fine is not to exceed one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment, i. e. seven years. But further restraint is provided in Section 30 of the Code. Section 29 of the Code indicates the sentences which Magistrates may pass. The default sentence is not to be in excess to the limitations imposed under Section 30. The Court of Magistrate, first class can pass a maximum sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years, or fine not exceeding Rs. 5,000/- or of both. Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 30 of the Code provides that the default term is not to exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which the Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than as imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. Since the Court of Magistrate, first class can pass a maximum sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, on a plain reading of the provision it is clear that default sentence cannot be in excess of one-fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment which he is competent to inflict. Therefore, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to inflict default sentence of more than nine months in case of an offence punishable under Section 326, I. P. C. ( 8 ) FROM the statement made in paragraph 6 of the application, it is seen that petitioner has already undergone custodial sentence of two years, and also has undergone custody for about five months in default in making the payment of fine. In the peculiar circumstances, I direct that the custodial sentence in default in payment of fine be restricted to the period already undergone. The revision application is accordingly disposed of. Order accordingly.