JUDGMENT This writ petition is against the order dated 4th January, 1990 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No.5 of 1989. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, invited application for grant of permanent stage carriage permits of several routes including the route Burdwan to Ranchi via G.T. Road and Durgapur Barrage. The writ petitioners applied for stage carriage permit in respect of the said route and they claim that they had submitted all the necessary documents to the respondent No.2 for verification in support of their claim. They claim to have produced income tax clearance challan showing payment of professional tax certificate about spare vehicle issued by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Purulia in respect of Bus No. WGW 384 of 1987 model registered in the names of the petitioners, certificate and documents regarding unemployment, driving licence, documents reflecting the business of the petrol pump of the father of the petitioners. 3. It is the further case of the petitioners that there was another candidate Shakti Kumar Goswami, the respondent No.3 in this proceedings. it is alleged by the writ petitioners that the respondent No. 3 Shakti Kumar Goswami holds permanent inter-state permit on the route Purulia to Bokaro also a permit on the route Purulia to Suisa and also holds another permit on the route Tulin to Purulia Via Jhalda. The said Shakti Kumar Goswami suppressed all these, facts while applying for permit in respect of the route for which the writ petitioners also applied. 4. It is claimed by the writ petitioners that the respondent No.2 after considering all the applications selected the writ petitioners for grant of permit on the route Burdwan to Ranchi and respondent No.2 found that the writ petitioners are educated unemployed, they have a vehicle, but the same is lying idle. The permit if allowed, would enable them earning living. It was also recorded by the S.T.A. that it was satisfied as to the financial capacity and the experience of the writ petitioners. Accordingly, the permit was granted in favour of the writ petitioners. 5. The permit if allowed, would enable them earning living. It was also recorded by the S.T.A. that it was satisfied as to the financial capacity and the experience of the writ petitioners. Accordingly, the permit was granted in favour of the writ petitioners. 5. The respondent No.3 said Shakti Kumar Goswami moved a writ application in this Court challenging the selection of the writ petitioners in respect of the said route Burdwan to Ranchi, The said writ petition, according to the present writ petitioners was dismissed on the ground that the writ petition involved disputed questions of facts. Against such order of rejection of the writ petition filed by said Shakti Kumar Goswami, an appeal was preferred The said appeal was also dismissed, but before 'dismissing the said appeal, the Appeal Court directed that the certified copy of the resolution on the basis of which stage carriage permit was granted in favour of the writ petitioners should be furnished within 48 hours, if applied for, by the said Shakti Kumar Goswami, the respondent No.3 herein. 6. The respondent No.3 in this proceedings, after obtaining the certified copy of the resolution dated 15th March, 1989, preferred an appeal before the respondent No.1, the state Transport Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was registered as Appeal No 5 of 1989. Another appeal was also preferred against the order of the State Transport Authority in respect or the said resolution dated 15th March, 1989, by one Omprakash Gupta. 7. The said two appeals were finally heard by the respondent No.1 and the respondent No. I passed a judgment and order dated 4th January, 1990 which is being challenged in this proceedings. By the said judgment and order the respondent No.1 set aside the impugned resolution dated 15th March, 1989, so far as it was concerned to grant of permit to the writ petitioners by the said order. Further, the respondent No.1, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal found the claim of the appellant Shakti Kumar Goswami, the respondent No. 3 herein, as genuine and granted him the permit in place of the writ petitioners. The claim of the other appellant was, however, rejected. By the said order the respondent No.2 was directed to grant permit to the respondent No.3 said Shakti Kumar Goswami after canceling the permit granted to the petitioners on the route Burdwan to Ranchi. 8. The claim of the other appellant was, however, rejected. By the said order the respondent No.2 was directed to grant permit to the respondent No.3 said Shakti Kumar Goswami after canceling the permit granted to the petitioners on the route Burdwan to Ranchi. 8. This judgment and order of the respondent No.1 is being challenged on several grounds taken in the petition 9. It appears from the impugned judgment and order passed by the respondent No.1 that the Tribunal found in respect of the writ petitioners that: (i) they did not produce the professional tax clearance certificate and any paper in support of their financial capacity, (ii) in the verification sheet the writ petitioners gave their present occupation as sale and distribution agent of petrol and S.D. Mobil Oil, (iii) the writ petitioners had no professional experience, (iv) the observation of the State Trans port Authority that it was satisfied of the financial capacity and experience was not supported by any evidence. 10 Finally, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the writ petitioners were granted permit solely on the ground that they were educated unemployed and they had a vehicle and if any permit is granted, it will enable them to earn a living. The Tribunal further found that the State Transport Authority selected the writ petitioners on compassionate ground of hardship. The Tribunal held that consideration of compassionate ground was not a relevant consideration under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 11. The Tribunal. so far as the respondent No.3 is concerned, found that the respondent No.3 had operational experience, financial capacity of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It was also found that the respondent No.3 had one permit in the route Purulia to Suisa and another permit jointly with another in the route Purulia to Bokaro. The Tribunal also found that the respondent No.3 was also selected for permit in another inter State route Nawadi to Tata. It was found by the Tribunal that the state Transport Authority rejected the application of the respondent No.3 on the ground that the respondent No.3. was selected in other route being Nawadi to Tata. The Tribunal held that this grant was neither a qualification nor a disqualification under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Tribunal also found that the respondent No.3 did not have five permits which was the maximum permissible limit under the motor Vehicles Act. 12. was selected in other route being Nawadi to Tata. The Tribunal held that this grant was neither a qualification nor a disqualification under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Tribunal also found that the respondent No.3 did not have five permits which was the maximum permissible limit under the motor Vehicles Act. 12. The learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has submitted before me that the respondent No.1 was wrong in setting aside the resolution of the State Transport Authority deciding to grant permit in favour of the writ petitioners and this is a fit case where the Court should interfere with the said order of the Tribunal. It is submitted - by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the State Transport Authority while resolving to grant permit in favour of the writ petitioners was aware of the provisions of Article 39 of the Constitution which laid down that the State should secure the citizens adequate means of livelihood and the youth should be protected against exploitation. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the Tribunal while reversing the decision of the State Transport Authority did not adhere to the principles enunciated in Article 39 of the Constitution. 13. The next submission on behalf of the writ petitioners is that the respondent Tribunal was wrong in holding that the writ petitioners did not produce professional tax clearance certificate It was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the State Transport Authority received the professional tax clearance certificate from the writ petitioners and also challans in regard thereto. 14. The main thrust of the argument on behalf of the writ petitioners is that the respondent No.3 holds several permits in respect of different routes while the writ petitioners did not have any permit in respect of any route. So, in consideration of this fact and in consideration of employing educated youth, the State Transport Authority was right in granting permit to the writ petitioners. The learned Counsel has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in (I) 19750) Supreme Court Cases 55, Ajantha Transports (P) Ltd Coimbatore v. M/s. T.V. K. Transports, Pullampati, Coimbatore. So, in consideration of this fact and in consideration of employing educated youth, the State Transport Authority was right in granting permit to the writ petitioners. The learned Counsel has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in (I) 19750) Supreme Court Cases 55, Ajantha Transports (P) Ltd Coimbatore v. M/s. T.V. K. Transports, Pullampati, Coimbatore. Citing this decision, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners argued that where everything was equal preference ought to be given to a person who is a fresh entrant into the business and according to the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, the writ petitioners being new entrants in the field, preference should be given to them for grant of permit. 15. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 submitted that the unemployed youths should be shown preference, for grant of permit if other things being equal, is not the principle relating to grant of permits under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is further Submitted on behalf of the respondent No.3 that grant of permit on the compassionate ground was not the criteria at all under that relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 has related on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2) AIR 1977 SC 1563 , Cumbum Roadways (P) Ltd. v. Balaguru Bus Services (P) Ltd. Relying on this decision the learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 has submitted that no permit should have been granted in favour of the writ petitioners on consideration of grace, charity and compassion at the expense of public interest. It has also been argued on behalf of the respondent No.3 that a person applying for permit may have permits in respect of other routes, but that itself could not be a bar to grant of permit applied for, if permits in respect of other routes held by the applicant is within the permissible limit under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent No.3, even if the respondent No 3 holds permits in respect of other routes not exceeding five, he can still apply for grant of permit in respect, of another route provided the total number of permits held by the applicant should not exceed five. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent No.3, even if the respondent No 3 holds permits in respect of other routes not exceeding five, he can still apply for grant of permit in respect, of another route provided the total number of permits held by the applicant should not exceed five. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 had also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in (3) 1990(4) SCC 459 , S. V. Shivaswami Sarvai v Hafez Motor Transport (Firm) and Ors, to contend that refusal of the State Transport Authority to consider the claim of the respondent No.3 on the ground that they had been granted permits for some other route, is untenable. It is observed by the Supreme Court that the question of grant of permit is to be decided by the Transport Authority having regard primarily to the interest of the general public and other prescribed relevant factors and it is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of conflicting interest of the private individuals alone. 16. Finally, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent No.3 that the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should be reluctant to interfere or to disturb the decision of the specially constituted authorities or Tribunals under the Act specially when the Legislature has entrusted the task of granting and renewing stage carriage permit to the said authorities or Tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provisions contained in the Act. It is submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent No.3 that the Court does not exercise jurisdiction in the instant case of an Appellate Court and the findings or conclusions on the questions of fact cannot be re-appraised or the same cannot be disturbed by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there are, however, some well recognised exceptions in the matter, perversity or violation of usual norms or procedure etc. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 has referred to in this connection several decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (4) AIR 1964 SC 477 , Syed Yakub v. K.S. Radha Krishnan and Ors., (5) AIR 1965 SC 107 , Sri Rama Bilas Service v. Chandrasekharan and (6) AIR 1978 SC 949 , Abdul Rahman and Ors. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 17. I have already indicated the findings of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the respondent No.1 in dealing with the appeal preferred by the respondent No.3 against the order of the respondent No.2, the State Transport Authority in making an order granting permit in favour of the writ petitioners. The respondent No.1, the Tribunal, has found as a fact that the concerned authority made an order for granting permit to the writ petitioners mainly on the ground that they are educated unemployed and they had a vehicle but the same was lying idle, and a permit, if granted, would enable them to earn a living. It also appears that the respondent No.1, the Tribunal found that the writ petitioners could not produce the particulars as to their financial capacity and the experience in the field. According to Tribunal the writ petitioners also Gould not establishes that they had experience as transport operators in other routes. The authority from whose decision the appeal has been preferred by the respondent No.1 has also concluded while making an order in favour of the writ petitioners that the respondent No.3 had also permits in respect of other routes It was also found by the Tribunal that the writ petitioners could not produce professional tax certificate, and the finding of the State Transport Authority that the writ petitioners had the financial capacity and also had necessary experience in the field had no basis according to the respondent Tribunal. 18. The only consideration that weighed with the Transport Authority, according to the Appellate Tribunal, was that they were unemployed educated youth and as they had a vehicle, a permit, if allowed, would enable them to earn a living. According to Tribunal this is not the requisite criteria for grant of permit under the provisions of the Act. 19. 18. The only consideration that weighed with the Transport Authority, according to the Appellate Tribunal, was that they were unemployed educated youth and as they had a vehicle, a permit, if allowed, would enable them to earn a living. According to Tribunal this is not the requisite criteria for grant of permit under the provisions of the Act. 19. The Tribunal finally set aside the impugned resolution in so far as it concerned grant of permit to the writ petitioners and in so far as it had rejected the claim of the respondent No.3 Shakti Kumar Goswami as being illegal. The Tribunal directed that instead of the writ petitioners, the respondent No.3 Shakti Kumar Goswami should get the permit in the route in question. 20. It appears from the impugned resolution of the Transport Authority that the observation so far as the respondent No 3 is concerned is that the respondent No.3 furnished P.T.C.C. and also offered the vehicle. Further he seemed to have sufficient financial capacity and experience. But the Authority also observed that the respondent No.3 Shakti Kumar Goswami had been considered by the Transport Authority against the other routes. Therefore, the Authority decided that the application against the route in question by the said Shakti Kumar Goswami, the respondent No.3 herein, should be rejected. 21. Regarding the writ petitioners, the observation of the Transport Authority was that they were educated unemployed. They had a vehicle which was lying idle, and a permit if allowed, would enable them to earn a living. It is also observed that the State Transport Authority was satisfied as to the financial capacity and experience. The State Transport Authority accordingly decided to grant permit in favour of the writ petitioner on the route in question. 22. As I have indicated above, the respondent No.1, being the State. Transport Appellate Tribunal found that the observation of the State Transport Authority as to the financial capacity of the writ petitioners had not been supported by any documents. Further, the Transport Authority found as a fact that the writ petitioners had no experience as transport operators in the field and the only consideration that weighed with the Transport Authority was really on compassionate ground that the writ petitioners were educated unemployed youth and if a permit is granted, it would enable them to earn a living. Further, the Transport Authority found as a fact that the writ petitioners had no experience as transport operators in the field and the only consideration that weighed with the Transport Authority was really on compassionate ground that the writ petitioners were educated unemployed youth and if a permit is granted, it would enable them to earn a living. According to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal the respondent No.1, this is not the criteria or relevant consideration for grant of a permit under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. 23. It appears to me that the findings: both of the State Transport Authority as also the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were in respect of facts and Tribunal found that the facts found by the State Transport Authority in favour of the writ petitioners were not supported by materials on record 24. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners had drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 107 . Rama Bilas Service Private Limited v Chandrasekharan and Ors. In reference to the said decision the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners has contended that the Supreme Court in this case has deprecated the granting of monopoly to a bus operator as the same may be prejudicial to the public interest. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the respondent No 3 had obtained several permits on various routes and if any permit is granted in respect of the route in question to the respondent No.3, then it would exceed the permissible limit as provided under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is true that one particular applicant should not be favoured with a number of permits on different routes so as to enable him to have monopoly in transport business. But in order to check this there is a provision in Motor Vehicles Act that one should not have more than 5 permits and, as I have indicated above, the respondent No.1 found as a fact that the respondent No.3 did not have permits exceeding the limit as prescribed by the Act. 25. The other decision cited by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners is 1975(1) SCC 55 (supra). 25. The other decision cited by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners is 1975(1) SCC 55 (supra). Relying on the observation of the Supreme Court in this case, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners has sought to argue that in cases where everything else is equal, the preference ought to be given to a person who is a fresh entrant into the business. There is no quarrel to this proposition but before a decision is taken for grant of a permit in favour of an operator the requisite criteria as prescribed by the Act should be taken into consideration and if two applicants place themselves on equal footing, then one may be favoured in preference of other if the former is a new entrant. But in the instant case on the facts as found both by the State Transport Authority as also be the Appellate Authority being the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the writ petitioners had no financial capacity, no experience in the field and the vehicle as sought to be produced before the concerned authority by the writ petitioners remained idle. The only ground for consideration of grant of permit was that the writ petitioners should have a permit as they were unemployed educated youth. Therefore, it appears that one is not the equal to the other. So, this decision has no application to the instant case. 26. Now, the question which I have to consider is whether the Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should interfere with or disturb the decision of the respondent No.1, the specially constituted Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. In AIR 1978 SC 949 (supra) it is observed that in dealing with the applications for Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does net exercise the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court and the findings or conclusions on examination of fact could hardly be reexamined or disturbed by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court further observed that the legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the authorities or the Tribunals under the Act which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provisions contained in the Act. 27. The Supreme Court further observed that the legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the authorities or the Tribunals under the Act which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provisions contained in the Act. 27. In AIR 1977 SC 1563 (supra) where the Supreme Court has observed that in granting a permit the Transport Authority cannot prefer a candidate with lesser marks on the ground that the rival with the larger marks has already got a permit on an overlapping route It is further observed by the Supreme Court that scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act is that who can serve the traveling public best, is to be chosen as a permit holder, considerations of grace charity and compassion are an act of unfairness to the Act. In 1990(4) SCC 459 (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that the question of grant of permit is to be decided by the Transport Authority having regard primarily to the interest of the general public and other prescribed relevant factors. It is observed that it is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of the conflicting interest of the private individuals alone. The Supreme Court in this case further observed that the grant of a permit for another route to another operator would only be a relevant circumstances while assessing the operative merits of all the applicants, but that by itself could not be decisive or sufficient to refuse consideration of their claim. It is further observed by the Supreme Court that State Transport Appellate Tribunal would be justified in int1errering with the Transport Authority's order on this ground and the Tribunal can either remand the matter to the appropriate Transport Authority from whose decision the appeal bas been preferred or considering the same itself on merits. 28. It will appear from the records and also the facts, as stated above. 28. It will appear from the records and also the facts, as stated above. that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was justified in interfering with the order passed by the Transport Authority in favour of the writ petitioners and upon the facts as found by the Tribunal, the Tribunal was also justified in holding that the respondent No.3 said Shakti Kumar Goswami should be granted permit in respect of the route particularly when it was found by the Tribunal that said Shakti Kumar Goswami did not have permits in the other routes in excess of the limit prescribed under the Act. It is true that unemployed educated youth should be given a liberal consideration and if such applicant being unemployed youth satisfies the Authority as to the compliance of the minimum requisites as prescribed by the Act, then the Authority concerned may, lean towards such applicants on some compassionate ground but, an order simply on the compassionate ground alone should not be the only criteria and this is not laid down in the Act either, 29. I, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the order of the respondent No.1, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being challenged by this writ proceedings is sustained. The writ application fails and is dismissed. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. I do not, however, propose to make any order as to costs A prayer for stay of operation of the judgment and order is made and the same is refused.