M. JAGANNADHA RAO ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Delhi State Entrepreneurs Association (Registered) and three others against the Judgment dated 24. 8. 1994 in a batch of Writ Petitions. The respondents in this appeal are Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Limited, Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary. Lt. Governor of Delhi and the Union of India represented by the Secretary, Planning Commission and the Secretary Ministry of Industry. ( 2 ) THE Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Judgment in C. W. P. 2874 of 1987 in the batch. The learned Single Judge by his elaborate Judgment dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants. That is how the writ petitioners in that Writ Petition have preferred this appeal. ( 3 ) IN the Writ Petition the petitioners have sought various reliefs, namely, (i) to declare that they have become owners of sheds subject to payment of cost of land and shed, (ii) to direct the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter called DSIDC) to disclose particulars of cost paid for land and construction, (iv) that they would pay at Rs. 33. 25 per sq. ft. , (v) to quash 1986-87 offers (Annexures T andu) and (vi) not to take punitive action except recovery of balance at Rs. 33. 25 per sq. ft. The writ petition was filed in September, 1987. ( 4 ) COUNTERS were filed by the respondents and the learned Single Judge pointed out that in a sense the appellants were aggrieved by the fixation of the price in respect of the land and shed (referred to as industrial sheds) by the DSIDC. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the contentions of the appellants, the learned Single Judge framed four points for consideration, which read as under:- " (1) The State cannot act in a manner so as not to disclose the basis as to how it arrived at the cost of these premises; failure to disclose the basis renders the price arbitrary. There is an interim order of this Court directing the respondents to disclose the basis own which cost has been computed; that not being done, respondents are precluded now from sustaining the hire-purchase price as reasonable. (2) State having formulated a policy cannot insist that the petitioners may either accept it or reject it. There is an interim order of this Court directing the respondents to disclose the basis own which cost has been computed; that not being done, respondents are precluded now from sustaining the hire-purchase price as reasonable. (2) State having formulated a policy cannot insist that the petitioners may either accept it or reject it. The implementation of the policy should be in fair and reasonable manner so as to advance the object sought to be achieved by the policy. (3) The terms of the contract relied upon by the respondents are unconscionable and hence void. (4) The rate of rent per month fixed under the lease deed is Rs. 2,970 (as an illustrative case, one of the writ petition is relied upon for the figure), as against the rent of Rs. 1250. 00 that would reflect the actual cost revealed from the Study report; hence the high rate of rent is opposed to the principle of "no profit, no loss" announced in the relevant scheme. " ( 6 ) ON these questions the learned Single Judge mentioned that so far as the reasonableness of the price was concerned, the same was already upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in DSIDC vs. Chandra Prakash (C. W. P. 4446 of 1992 dated 26. 11. 1993 ). It was also found that there was no definite promise by the respondents to the allottees that the price to be charged would be the actual cost incurred in respect of the land and the cost of construction dehors other charges and expenditures incurred by the DSIDC. Learned Single Judge also held that Courts could not go into the details of the price fixation: it was a matter of executive policy as well as a matter of economic policy; under particular circumstances, it might also be a legislative function (See M/s. Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd vs. Union of India : AIR 1990 SC 1276 ). Even though the scheme might have mentioned a particular estimate of costs, the respondents, the learned Single Judge held, could not be pinned down to the said estimated costs for cost would escalate during the course. of implementation of the project, because of the increased compensation when a land was acquired and also the delay involved in litigation. Developmental and construction activities involve several imponderables. of implementation of the project, because of the increased compensation when a land was acquired and also the delay involved in litigation. Developmental and construction activities involve several imponderables. Even if some figures were given estimating the cost, it should be treated as tentative. (See Bareilly Development Authority vs. Ajay Pal Singh : AIR 1989 SC 1076 and Premji Bhai vs. Delhi Development Authority: AIR 1980 SC 738 ). The learned Single Judge pointed that in the latter case the Supreme Court observed that the term no profit no loss had no statutory flavour which could be enforced. On the other questions raised, it was held that the decision of the Division Bench in Chandra Prakash s case (supra) was binding and there was no need for a further discussion of the matter. The learned Single Judge then adverted to the fact that some of the lessees did not even pay the rent. Even after the filing of the writ petition the appellants had taken the stand that they ceased to be the lessees having allegedly exercised the option to purchase the properties subject to the price being determined in the Writ Petition. It was pointed out that the Division Bench had held in Chandra Prakash s case that the DSIDC continued to be the owner, that the requisite option was not exercised by the lessees and that the property would get transferred to them only when the last instalment under the hire purchase scheme was paid. The contention that the option was exercised by the lessees for hire purchase was not accepted by the Division Bench in Chandra Prakash s case. The Division Bench had also held that if the lessees wanted to challenge the price which was demanded from them, they were not entitled to continue in the premises without payment of anything to the DSIDC. It was not for the lessees to insist as to how the price was to be fixed as that was the matter for the DSIDC to determine. Relying upon the above decision of the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge held that there was a clear and specific finding that the price fixed by DSIDC could not be challenged and the same could not be said even to be arbitrary. The lessees could not insist that the price should be refixed in the manner they preferred. Relying upon the above decision of the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge held that there was a clear and specific finding that the price fixed by DSIDC could not be challenged and the same could not be said even to be arbitrary. The lessees could not insist that the price should be refixed in the manner they preferred. He also held that the terms of the lease were not challenged in any writ petition. The appellants relied on a circular dated 15. 3. 1977 of the DSIDC to say that it promised to demand nothing more than the actual cost and the depreciated book value on the date of the transfer. Learned Single Judge pointed out that the clause (iii) had to be read with clause (iv) of the circular which statedthat "the entrepreneurs would be required to clear the arrears of rent due to be paid to DSIDC before any Hire Purchase Agreement is entered into. The banks may sanction credit facilities for this purpose on selective basis". The circular also stated that the above was merely an indication of the broad outline of the pattern of Hire Purchase and the details of the cost estimate and other terms and conditions were still under negotiations. The circular clearly stated that the position stated in the circular was purely "provisional" and subject to change in the light of further discussions with the bankers and other concerned authorities. In fact, the above circular was already considered in Chander Prakash s case and a similar contention was negatived. The DSIDC had properly explained in its counter, how it had arrived at the price. While Rs. 48. 55 lakh was recoverable by the DSIDC, it could recover only a sum of Rs. 30. 01 lakhs. The counter also referred to Suit No. 271/89 by the Bank of India for recovery of Rs. 14. 69 lakh: Suit No. 1329/89 filed by the Allahabad Bank for Rs. 3. 49 crores: Suit No. 1330/89 by the Allahabad Bank for Rs. 1. 84 crores, Suit No. 1331/ 89 by the Allahabad Bank for Rs. 1. 40 crores; and Suit No. 2502/88 by the State Bank of India for Rs. 5. 56 crores. After referring to various paragraphs in the counter affidavit, the learned Single Judge held that judicial review had its own limitations in the context of price fixation for hire purchase. 84 crores, Suit No. 1331/ 89 by the Allahabad Bank for Rs. 1. 40 crores; and Suit No. 2502/88 by the State Bank of India for Rs. 5. 56 crores. After referring to various paragraphs in the counter affidavit, the learned Single Judge held that judicial review had its own limitations in the context of price fixation for hire purchase. It was further held that as the lessees persisted in the defaults, the DSIDC came forward to accept rents at a reduced rate and this reduced rate offered as a concession could not be relied upon by the appellants to compare them with the rates applied to fix the hire purchase price. According to the learned Single Judge, the original cost of acquisition, interest on borrowings, establishment charges, developmental costs, litigation expenses, the need to have some reserve for its other welfare measures, the financial burden occasioned by the failure of those who derived benefit from the organisation to make prompt payments of the amounts payable by them, the unanticipated and unforeseeable losses and expenditure caused or likely to be caused due to events on which the organisations might not have any control were some of the major factors in price fixation. It was sufficient therefore, if there was a broad correlation between the fee and the cost incurred towards the services (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd vs. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others ( AIR 1971 SC 344 ). ( 7 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition was dismissed. ( 8 ) IN this appeal, it was contended for the appellants that the learned Single. Judge did not notice that Chandra Prakash s case related to Okhla Industrial Scheme and not to the Rohtak Road Scheme, that petitioners or members of their association were not parties to the said case and that decision is not "binding" on the petitioners. It was also contended that it was the bounden duty of the DSIDC to give details of costs of land and construction and not merely mention the components. It was argued that the respondents had given various rates of costs on various occasions namely: (I) according to certificate dated 18. 11. 86 of DSIDC. (page 104 of paper book) Rs. 83. 71 per (ii) according to counter affidavit filed in January,1988. Rs. 289. 31 (page 193 of paper book) per sq. ft. It was argued that the respondents had given various rates of costs on various occasions namely: (I) according to certificate dated 18. 11. 86 of DSIDC. (page 104 of paper book) Rs. 83. 71 per (ii) according to counter affidavit filed in January,1988. Rs. 289. 31 (page 193 of paper book) per sq. ft. (iii) according to DSIDC s Rs. 187. 48 auditors. per sq. ft. (vide affidavit dt. 21. 7. 90) (in 1983) (iv) according to offer Rs. 309. 63 dt. 19. 11. 1986 per sq. ft. (page 149 of paper book) (v) according to offer Rs. 289. 31 dt. 17. 6. 1987 per sq. ft. (page 152 of paper book) (vi) according to offer of Rs. 378. 45 April, 1989. per sq. ft. (page 214 at 216 of paper book)AND, therefore the respondents had no consistent stand. Therefore, the Court must call for facts and decide the actual cost or appoint an independent agency. Reference was also made to an order of one of us (Justice Anil Dev Singh) ( Kimti Lal Rahi vs. Union of India dated 23. 9. 1992 49 (1993) DLT 56 ) in I. As in suits relating to this very Rohtak Road Scheme that there was undue delay on the part of the DSIDC in fixing up the cost of land and construction, and that the Civil Court could go into the cost structure. It was argued that the actual point posed by the learned Single Judge "whether the price fixed is arbitrary and unreasonable" was not correct question (see para 5 of Judgment under appeal) but the question was what were the details of the actual cost of land and construction. Reliance was placed on an interim order of a Division Bench of this Court dated 25. 2. 1991 directing the respondents to give the cost structure. The promise was that cost would be recovered on no profit, no loss basis. ( 9 ) IT was stated before us by the appellants counsel that the appellants were prepared to pay at the rate of Rs. 175 per sq. ft. but not at Rs. 378. 45 per sq. ft. as demanded. Appellants counsel brought demand drafts for a few lakhs of Rupees and said that the amount should be directed to be received. 175 per sq. ft. but not at Rs. 378. 45 per sq. ft. as demanded. Appellants counsel brought demand drafts for a few lakhs of Rupees and said that the amount should be directed to be received. So far as the suits said to have been filed against the DSIDC as referred in to the counter/judgment, it was said that for Rohtak Road constructions, the suits were by State Bank of India and Punjab and Sind Bank. In some cases, suits filed by the allottees were pending. After interim order dated 18. 10. 1989 by a Division Bench, some petitioners paid, while some did not. ( 10 ) THE counsel for respondents has contended that this Court under Article 226 could not investigate into the cost structure, that the DSIDC had made enough disclosure in its counters as stated by the learned Single Judge, that even assuming that Chandra Prakash s case which relates to Okhla scheme was not binding on petitioners. Still the judgment was binding on us as a precedent when it said that the price fixed for the Okhla scheme - which is an identical scheme - was not arbitrary, that inspite of repeated concessions, the offer for opting for the hire purchase scheme was never accepted by the petitioners that they never became owners but continued to be tenants in default of huge rents to the tune of lakhs, that they had no right to continue in the sheds even as tenants. The interest being paid by the DSIDC to the State Bank of India and Punjab and Sind Bank and other expenditure including litigation costs, loss on account of deferment in payment by the petitioners are all relevant factors taken into account and this Court cannot interfere. Reliance is placed on several passages in the Judgment of Chandra Prakash. ( 11 ) ON the basis of these contentions we have to decide whether in Writ Jurisdiction, we can call for the facts relating to the cost of land and building for the purpose of holding that the cost demanded by DSIDC is arbitrary. What is the effect of the interim order of the Division Bench dated 25. 2. 1991 calling for particulars ? What is the effect of the Judgment in Chandra Prakash case ? What is the effect of the interim order of the Division Bench dated 25. 2. 1991 calling for particulars ? What is the effect of the Judgment in Chandra Prakash case ? Whether the petitioners have not defaulted in payment of rent and whether the amounts paid or to be paid can be adjusted towards the consideration payable under the proposal for hire purchase ? ( 12 ) AT the outset, it is necessary to see whether the findings given, while dealing with the Okhla scheme, by the Division Bench in Chandra Prakash case are relevant or binding. In our view, strictly, it does not operate as resjudicata because it related to the Okhla scheme, while present case before us relates to the Rohtak Road scheme and also because petitioners were not parties to that writ petition. ( 13 ) BUT, even though the Judgment is not res judicata, it can still operate as a precedent and can certainly have persuasive value. In that case too the various steps involved were the same as in the present case. The sheds were constructed and given on lease in 1976-77 and by the same circular dated 15. 3. 1977 (Annexure L) option was given to the lessees to opt either for outright purchase or for hire purchase scheme. The conditions for opting were the same, which included payment of arrears of rent. Now, as in that case, the petitioners in the present case also did not (see allegations in C. W. P.) question the rental rate of Rs. 1. 10 per sq. ft. and did not pay, though they signed the lease (Annexure K ). Before the learned SingleJudge, they even went to the extent of saying that they signed the leases under economic pressure and the terms were unconscionable. The letter dated 18. 9. 1978 (Annexure N) of the DSIDC (see page 98) showed that no final decision was taken on the hire purchase issue but that rent would have to be paid at various rates as "prescribed" and "the amount so recovered shall be treated as rent/hire purchase as finally decided. The amount/interest shall be adjusted in accordance with the decision of Government and terms of the existing agreement. " ( 14 ) WE find that the proceedings of DSIDC in Annexure-o dated 25. 7. The amount/interest shall be adjusted in accordance with the decision of Government and terms of the existing agreement. " ( 14 ) WE find that the proceedings of DSIDC in Annexure-o dated 25. 7. 1980 (Page 99) showed that in the Joint meeting, the petitioners contended that they had already become owners but this was not accepted and it was said that the matter was pending with Government ( Government being the real owners as held by learned Single Judge) and till then the lease terms would hold good. Petitioners contended that they were not lessees but were owners and filed a stray receipt dated 23. 5. 1984 (page 103) which showed that the amount was paid towards "hire purchase". But admittedly, there was no option by petitioners to come under the hire purchase and there was decision of Government regarding hire purchase after 25. 1. 1980. Obviously, the sole printed receipt was issued by the DSIDC from a wrong receipt book. On the other hand, respondents filed other receipts to show that money was received towards "rent/hire purchase". ln fact the letter dated 18. 9. 1978 (Annexure N) dealt with (i) "rent" or (ii) "hire purchase" as finally decided by Government. The letter also said that Government was yet to take a final decision on hire purchase. Hence the payments by petitioners who had not cleared the rents, who in fact claimed to be owners, who contended that rent at Rs. 1. 10 per sq. ft. was arbitrary, and who never signed any letter exercising to come under hire purchase scheme - could not prima facie claim that they became owners and that payments,if any, made were not towards rent, but were towards hire purchase. The contentions here bear a close parallel to those in Chandra Prakash s case which concerned itself with Okhla Scheme. The Division Bench found that as per the circular dated 15. 3. 1977 (Annexure L), the petitioners had to exercise option for conversion of lease into hire purchase, and none had executed any such document and that therefore the "premises" remained "public premises" and not the property of the allottees. The allotment continued to be on lease basis. The position in relation to Rohtak Road complex is, as pointed above, also the same. The allotment continued to be on lease basis. The position in relation to Rohtak Road complex is, as pointed above, also the same. That is why the decision in Chandra Prakash s case that the allottees continued to be lessees and not owners applies to the facts before us. ( 15 ) THE subsequent events in the Okhla scheme also bear a close analogy to what happened in this Rohtak Road scheme. On 18. 11. 1986 (page 109), on 17. 6. 1987 (page 152), in April,1989 (pages 212-213) and on 14. 8. 1989 (page 234), the DSIDC went on making identical concessions from time to time to attract the petitioners to adopt the hire purchase scheme Chandra Prakash s case contains a detailed analysis of these very concessions and they included giving rebates, permission to construct another floor etc. But the petitioners here, as the petitioners there, were adamant. They were neither exercising any option to accept the hire purchase offer nor were they paying the rentals as demanded. Therefore, the relationship continued to be that of lessor and lessee, petitioners did not exercise any option nor did they come under the hire purchase scheme, and payments, if any, made can go only in discharge of arrears of rent and not towards hire purchase. On all these aspects Chandra Prakash s case is a precedent on similar facts as to status of the parties. We are not persuaded to take a different view and, in fact, there are no documents executed between parties which can be said to have altered their. position from that of a tenant to that of an owner. The learned Single Judge was therefore, right in following Chandra Prakash s case in this respect. In fact, he found that Government was the owner of the land and DSIDC could not transfer title without Government s approval. ( 16 ) IT has, however, to be noticed that in Chandra Prakash s case, the main point was whether the premises was not public premises for purposes of eviction and whether the learned Additional District Judge was right in thinking that the allottees had become owners. The observation as to the price for hire purchase not being arbitrary was made on a matter incidentally in issue and that observation, on facts, was referable and could be referable only to the price fixed for the Okhla Estate sheds. The observation as to the price for hire purchase not being arbitrary was made on a matter incidentally in issue and that observation, on facts, was referable and could be referable only to the price fixed for the Okhla Estate sheds. That observation in Chandra Prakash s case cannot be said to have any bearing on the price of the Rohtak Road sheds. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, mistaken into thinking that the observation in regard to the price was also binding. The question of price or cost of land and sheds at Rohtak Road was not the subject matter of Chandra Prakash s case. ( 17 ) BUT then the question is whether we can, in Writ Jurisdiction, go into the said aspect. It is true that the Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order on 25. 2. 1991 directing the respondents to give details of the cost structure. Let us assume that the same was not effectively complied with by the respondents. Even so, in view of the exhaustive reasons given by the learned Single Judge, we cannot, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, go into the question of pricing and even if get the break up of the expenditure as now demanded - which contains several variables and even imponderables we cannot decide whether it is just or fair, in writ jurisdiction. ( 18 ) THE learned Single Judge has. however, given a finding that the price demanded is justifiable because factors like interest paid by the DSIDC to the banks. loss incurred by DSIDC on account of non-payment of rents by petitioners, land acquisition, litigation cost etc. etc. , also enter into the pricing. The learned Single Judge also accepted the cost-structure as presented in the counter and arrived at the conclusion that the cost was not arbitrary and for that purpose relied on Chandra Prakash s case without noticing that if related to Okhla Scheme. Here we may say that it is not necessary for us to say, on the facts of the Rohtak Road scheme, that the price for hire purchase fixed is proper or not or was not arbitrary. Here we may say that it is not necessary for us to say, on the facts of the Rohtak Road scheme, that the price for hire purchase fixed is proper or not or was not arbitrary. This is because, there are a large number of suits pending between petitioners and the DSIDC on this very issue and interim orders have beenpassed in a batch by one of us (Justice Anil Dev Singh) in Kimti Lal Rahi vs. Union of India (49 (1993) DLT 56 ). There it was held that prima facie, question of price could be gone into in the main suit. In view of the pendency of the suits in relation to Rohtak Road scheme we leave open the finding of the learned Single Judge that the price or cost of land and structure of the sheds at Rohtak Road was a proper price. ( 19 ) IT is true that in the case of Okhla scheme, the Division Bench held in Chandra Prakash s case that the price fixed for hire purchase was not arbitrary. In that case, there was no question perhaps of any suits being pending on the question of price. But in the case before us, number of suits are pending in relation to the cost of land/sheds at Rohtak Road complex. Hence, we do not want to go into this aspect. The finding of the learned Single Judge as to the cost factor is left open. ( 20 ) TOWARDS the closure of the arguments, we directed the respondents to file a statement as to how many of the members of the Association were in arrears of rent and upto what extent. Learned counsel for the respondent filed a detailed statement which showed arrears as on 30. 11. 1994 - as per old rental rate/or fee in Rs. 1. 43 crores or as per revised rate/or fee in Rs. 3. 48 crores. ( 21 ) A counter statement was filed by petitioners mentioning payment due in terms of letter dated 1. 5. 1982 and in terms of interim order of one of us (Justice Anil Dev Singh) without interest; payments made, deficit and payment now being offered, cheques/pay orders for it is said, Rs. 82 lakhs. ( 22 ) IT will be totally impossible for us to go into these tabular statements. 5. 1982 and in terms of interim order of one of us (Justice Anil Dev Singh) without interest; payments made, deficit and payment now being offered, cheques/pay orders for it is said, Rs. 82 lakhs. ( 22 ) IT will be totally impossible for us to go into these tabular statements. In case the order of one of us (Justice Anil Dev Singh) in the suits has not been complied with, it is not for us in this L. P. A. to issue any directions. Parties have to resort to their appropriate remedies. ( 23 ) IN the result we hold that there is no material to hold that the petitioners who were lessees became owners of the property. We hold that they continue to be lessees and that the payments, if any, made by them could only be towards rent and not towards any hire purchase. There is no proof of any option exercised for coming under hire purchase scheme. To this extent, we follow Chandra Prakash s case. We however, leave open the question as to what is the proper price payable for the land and sheds because we cannot go into that question in Writ Jurisdiction. As the question is pending in civil suits, parties have to urge their contentions there. If interim orders in the suit are not complied with, it is for the parties to take appropriate action. ( 24 ) THE L. P. A. is disposed of accordingly.