Judgment :- 1. The lands in Survey No. 17, Villivakkam village, Saidapet taluk belongs to the Gurukkals of Agasteeswarar temple and the 7th petitioner claims to be the cultivating tenant under the Gurukkals. No reference is made as to the interest of the other six petitioners. The notification for acquisition of the said lands was issued in G.O.Ms. No. 76, Housing Department dated 20.7.1977. According to the petitioner, he had filed objections claiming to be a cultivating tenant. However, the 7th petitioner was not called for an enquiry under S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On 28.12.1978, he received a letter stating that his objections dated 6.12.1977, were overruled. A declaration under S. 6 of the Act was published in G.O.Ms. 1314, Housing and Urban Development dated 7.9.1978. The petitioners also refer to an award having been passed on 8.3.1989. The petitioners caused a lawyers notice to be issued on 24.5.1989. According to him, he continues to be in possession of the property and he prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the S. 4(1) Notification dated 20.7.1977, declaration made under S. 6 of the Act dated 7.9.1978 and the award 1/1989 dated 8.3.1989. 2. Miss. V. Sumathi, the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued the following points in support of the writ petition. (1) No notice was served on the petitioners for the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. (2) The notification and declaration are vitiated by vagueness and such a vague description of the purpose of acquisition has prejudiced the petitioners. (3) The award, having been passed only on 8.3.1989 is liable to be set aside because it is beyond the period of limitation, prescribed under S. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act 3. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board, for whose benefit the lands were acquired, has filed W.M.P. No. 30665 of 1994 and the same was ordered on 11.1.1995. 4. The respondents 1 and 2 have filed a counter affidavit. It is stated that at the instance of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, steps were taken to acquire an extent of 20.65 acres for Villivakkam Housing Scheme. The acquisition includes of S. No. 17 measuring 1.11 acres. The other details regarding the issue of the 4(1) Notification on 20.7.1977 is admitted. It is stated that at the instance of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, steps were taken to acquire an extent of 20.65 acres for Villivakkam Housing Scheme. The acquisition includes of S. No. 17 measuring 1.11 acres. The other details regarding the issue of the 4(1) Notification on 20.7.1977 is admitted. It is stated that an enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act was conducted on 12.9.1977 observing all the formalities. The declaration under S. 6 was issued on 3.9.1978 and published in the Gazette on 27.9.1978. The award enquiry was conducted on 6.11.1978. The writ petition was also served with the award enquiry notice on 17.10.1978. It is also stated that Survey No. 17 of the extent of 1.11 acres stands registered in the name of Sri Agastheeswarasamy. No records were produced to show that the petitioners were cultivating the lands as tenants. One Arumuga Gurukkal and the 7th petitioner appeared at the 5-A enquiry and claimed compensation proportionately. It is also pointed out that earlier Writ Petition Nos. 10147 and 10148 of 1983 and 8245 of 1989 filed by other interested persons had been dismissed. About 1934 acres out of 20.65 acres were taken possession of and handed over to the Housing Board for the execution of the Scheme. It is stated that 15 cents in S. No. 17/2 could not be taken possession of because of the earlier Writ Petition Nos. 10147 and 10148 of 1983 and 8245 of 1989, filed by other interested persons, were dismissed only on 11.11.1991. Those writ petitions were filed by certain persons claiming to be occupiers. The Writ Petition No. 8245 of 1989 was dismissed on 27.11.1991. 5. The Housing Board in its counter affidavit states that out of 1.11 acres in S. No. 17, O. 95 cents were handed over to the Housing Board on 15.6.1989. The scheme has already been put into effect in respect of the land taken possession of by the Housing Board. So far as the 15 cents of land is concerned, it is stated that it is not in occupation of any of the petitioners and the respondents are taking separate action for taking possession of the same. 6. The scheme has already been put into effect in respect of the land taken possession of by the Housing Board. So far as the 15 cents of land is concerned, it is stated that it is not in occupation of any of the petitioners and the respondents are taking separate action for taking possession of the same. 6. Learned Special Government Pleader has raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the 7th petitioner is only a cultivating tenant and if at all, he can only claim compensation and he has no right to challenge the acquisition itself. It is also stated that the 7th petitioner did have the notice of the award enquiry. Secondly it is pointed out that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. In support of these two contentions several judgments are relied on. I am not referring to the earner judgments because of the judgment of D. Raju, J. in W.P. Nos. 10147 and 10148 of 1983 dated 11.11.1991. As already stated, these two writ petitions are decided by D. Raju, J. relating to the very land in question filed by another occupier. It specifically relates to the 15 cents of land in S. No. 17, Villivakkam village and the land is claimed to be a factory building. Relying on the judgment of this Court in T.K. Sambanda Rao, A Registered Partnership Firm v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry 1984 Writ L.R. (Summary of Judgments) 134, the learned judge held that a lessee is not a person interested for the purpose of S. 5-A of the Act and that he has no locus standi to challenge acquisition proceedings issued under Ss. 5-A and 6 of the Act. In Kesavan v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1992 Writ L.R. 453, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the same view. In this case also, several judgments are relied upon and consequently, the Division Bench has held that persons who are having only a status of a lessee have no locus standi to agitate a writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. The above judgments conclude the issue against the petitioners that a cultivating tenant cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings, but, he may have an interest only in claiming compensation. The above judgments conclude the issue against the petitioners that a cultivating tenant cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings, but, he may have an interest only in claiming compensation. In trying to meet this point, the learned counsel for the petitioner says that some of the Gurukkals are parties to the writ petition and therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. I have already indicated that in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, only the 7th petitioner is stated to be a cultivating tenant and the interest of other petitioners has not at all been spoken to in the affidavit. In this state of affairs, I have no other option except to hold that the writ petition is not maintainable. 7. The second aspect of the case is that the writ petition has been filed only on 28.8.1991 challenging a 4(1) notification of the year 1977 and a declaration of the year 1978. Therefore, it is pointed that the petitioner is guilty of laches and the writ petition does not merit consideration. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, absolutely no grounds are made out, explaining the delay in filing the writ petition. In the affidavit itself it is admitted that the 7th petitioner received a letter from the Special Deputy Collector on 6.12.1977, rejecting his application. In my opinion, on this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. If the petitioner cannot explain the delay in filing the writ petition from the date of service of the said letter dated 6.12.1977, the petitioner certainly cannot maintain the writ petition. There are innumerably decisions which hold that a writ petition filed after the lapse of a considerable time and after the S. 4(1) notification is liable to be dismissed. I need only to quote a latest judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Rajendran and 23 others 1993(2) L.W. 352 . In that case, there was a delay of five years from the date of the 4 (1) notification and three years in another case. The Division Bench, observed as follows: (at page 358) “It is not as if the petitioners were not aware of the acquisition proceedings, for, they have filed objections to the notification published under S. 4(1) and have also participated in the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. The Division Bench, observed as follows: (at page 358) “It is not as if the petitioners were not aware of the acquisition proceedings, for, they have filed objections to the notification published under S. 4(1) and have also participated in the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. Nevertheless, they waited in some cases for three years and in another case for five years. In between, it may be pointed out that two writ petitions had been filed by the owners of other lands acquired under the same notification to which we have already adverted. One matter was taken up in writ appeal. Of course, before that writ appeal was decided, these writ petitions came to be filed. In addition to this there is no explanation for this long delay” In this case also, I have already pointed out that the 7th petitioner, admittedly, received a letter on 6.12.1977 rejecting his application and there is no explanation for the delay in filing this writ petition. There is also a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in Yusuf Bhai Noormohamed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat , A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1020. 8. Notwithstanding the above insurmountable obstacles, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners says that the acquisition proceedings ad statutorily lapsed and therefore the statutory position has to be declared by this Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that one award was passed on 10.9.1980 and another award was passed on 28.9.1991, as stated in the counter affidavit of the Government. There was a third award 1/89 passed on 8.3.1989. It is only in respect of the third award that the contention is raised that it is beyond the period of two years mentioned in S. 11-A of the Act. According to S. 11-A of the Act, the award should be passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration. The proviso says that where the declaration had been passed prior to the amendment Act, the award should be made within two years from the date of such commencement. The amendment Act came into force on 28.9.1984. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader is that the writ petitions filed earlier had been dismissed only on 11.11.1991 and 27.11.1991. The proviso says that where the declaration had been passed prior to the amendment Act, the award should be made within two years from the date of such commencement. The amendment Act came into force on 28.9.1984. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader is that the writ petitions filed earlier had been dismissed only on 11.11.1991 and 27.11.1991. Therefore, it is contended that the period taken by the pendency of the said writ petitions has to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation. So construed, the award passed on 8.3.1989 is said to be within the time. The Explanation to S. 11-A of the Act says that the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of a declaration under S. 6 is stayed, the same, should be excluded from the period of limitation. In this case, since the writ petitions in respect of the very acquisition had been pending till 11.11.1991 and 27.11.1991, the period of two years has to be calculated only from those two days in respect of the land covered by those writ petitions. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to say how the passing of the award is beyond the period of two years, after taking note of the earlier writ petitions. The argument that the interim injunction granted in W.M.P. No. 15671 of 1983 in W.P. No. 10147 of 1983 was made absolute on 9.3.1987, only in respect of the taking possession and therefore the respondents were free to pass the award, cannot be accepted. This is because, the Explanation to S. 11-A refers to “any action or proceeding” being stayed. Therefore, even the stay of delivery of possession can be taken note of by the respondents for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation under S. 11-A of the Act. This pos ition is now beyond dispute in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2153. 9. There was some argument about the vagueness of the notifications and the absence of a scheme etc. I do not propose to go into these questions because I have already held that the writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on the ground on the laches. 10. For all the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.