CONSUMER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA
1995-03-24
B.N.KIRPAL, H.L.GOKHALE
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
B. N. KIRPAL, J. ( 1 ) THE challenge in these three matters is to the validity of the Notification issued by the State of Gujarat, which had the effect of cancelling the earlier Notification, under which a Wild life Sanctuary had been established under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The aforesaid Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") was enacted by the Parliament and it came into operation on 9th of September, 1972. The said Act was extended to the State of Gujarat on 1st of February, 1973. On 14th of April, 1981, a Notification was issued by the State of Gujarat, whereby 765. 79 sq. kilometres of land in Lakhpat Taluka of Kutch District was declared as a Wildlife sanctuary under Sec. 18 (1) of the said Act. The sanctuary is more commonly known as the "narayan Sarovar Sanctuary". The declaration of the sanctuary was to be by a Notification and Sec. 21 of the Act required the Notification to be published in the regional language in every town and village in or in the neighbourhood of the area comprised therein, and by virtue of the provisions of sec. 20, no person could acquire any right in any of the lands which form part of the sanctuary. The operative part of the aforesaid Notification is as follows :-". . . . . . . WHEREAS it appears to the Government of Gujarat that the area limits of which are defined in the Schedule annexed hereto, is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural, or zoological significance for the purpose of protecting, propagating and developing wild life and environment; now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 18 (1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (53 of 1972), the Government of Gujarat hereby declares the forest area in the Lakhpat Taluka falling in Kachchh District specified in the schedule annexed hereto as a "wild Life Sanctuary. . . . . . . . "the Notification also includes a Schedule and reference is made to "the limits of the area intended to be declared as Wild Life Sanctuary". There is then a list containing the names of villages and boundaries thereof, which are included in the wild Life Sanctuary in the said Taluka of Lakhpat.
. . . . . . . "the Notification also includes a Schedule and reference is made to "the limits of the area intended to be declared as Wild Life Sanctuary". There is then a list containing the names of villages and boundaries thereof, which are included in the wild Life Sanctuary in the said Taluka of Lakhpat. ( 3 ) THE Parliament passed The Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 1991 on 20th of September, 1991 and it came into force on 2nd of October, 1991. Some important provisions of the Act were amended, to which we shall revert to presently. Thereafter, on 27th of July, 1993, two Notifications were issued by the State of gujarat. By the first Notification No. GVN-16 (93)-WLP/1092/2156/v2, it was provided as follows :-". . . The Government has declared a Wild life Sanctuary in the Lakhpat Taluka of Kutch district, vide Agriculture, Forests and Co-operation Departments Notification No. AKH/62/81/wlp/1080/10872/p2, dated 14th April, 1981. The area of this Sanctuary is 765. 79 sq. kilometres. Since this area is substantially in excess of the requirements of the sanctuary, in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 18 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 read with Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government of Gujarat hereby cancels the Agriculrure, Forests and Co-operation Departments Notification No. AKH/ 62/81/wlp/1080/ 110872/p2, dated 14th April, 1981. . . . . . "simultaneously, another Notification of the same date was issued which is as follows :-"no. GVN-17 (93)-WLP/1092-2156-V2.- Whereas it appears to the Government of gujarat that the area, the limits of which are defined in the Schedule annexed hereto is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance for the purpose of protecting, propagating and developing wild life and environment. Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 26-A (1) (b) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, Government of Gujarat hereby declares the Reserve forest areas specified in Schedule I annexed hereto, as the Chinkara Wild Life Sanctuary from the date of this Notification. . . . . "the Schedule to the second Notification listed the villages which are included in the new Chinkara Wild life Sanctuary in Lakhpat Taluka. ( 4 ) THE effect of the said Notifications, viz.
. . . . "the Schedule to the second Notification listed the villages which are included in the new Chinkara Wild life Sanctuary in Lakhpat Taluka. ( 4 ) THE effect of the said Notifications, viz. , on Notification of 1981, and two notifications of 27th July, 1993, was that by the first Notification, a wild life sanctuary was established, having a total area of 765. 79 sq. kilometres. By the second Notification, the earlier Notification of 1981 was cancelled and, as a result, the said sanctuary ceased to exist with effect from that date. A new sanctuary came into existence in the Reserve forest area, which is specified in the last Notification and the area of this new Chinkara Wild Life Sanctuary was only 94. 87 sq. kilometres. ( 5 ) TWO petitions have been filed by separate organisations, viz. , the Consumer education and Research Society (Petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 13139 of 1993) and the Centre for Environmental Law (Petitioner in Special Civil application No. 6061 of 1994 ). Letters Patent Appeal No. 197 of 1994 is filed by the Consumer Education and Research Society from the order of a learned single Judge declining interim relief in Special Civil Application No. 13139 of 1993. These petitioners have sought to challenge the Notification of 27th July, 1993, purportedly issued under Sec. 18 of the Act, read with Sec. 21 of the general Clauses Act, which had effect of cancelling the first Notification, whereby the Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary was established. The only ground, which has been agitated before us for challenging this Notification is that the State Government has no jurisdiction to issue such a Notification and the boundary of a Sanctuary could only be altered by a Resolution of the Vidhan Sabha. It is further alleged by the petitioners that they have the locus standi to file the present writ petitions and the action of the respondents in issuing the impugned Notification is not only violative of Sec. 26-A (3) of the said Act, but the same also infringes Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the respondents, it has been contended that the Government had the power and the jurisdiction to cancel the Notification which has been issued in 1981. The source of this power of cancellation is traced to Sec. 21 of the general Clauses Act.
14 and 21 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the respondents, it has been contended that the Government had the power and the jurisdiction to cancel the Notification which has been issued in 1981. The source of this power of cancellation is traced to Sec. 21 of the general Clauses Act. On behalf of the respondent No. 3, which is the Company in whose favour a mining lease for quarrying limestone and for setting up a cement factory is sought to be granted, it has been contended that there was, in fact, no valid declaration of Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary under Sec. 18 of the said Act and further, this could not be regarded as a public interest litigation and the petitioners have no locus standi to file the present writ petitions. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of law. ( 8 ) THE Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was enacted with the object to provide for the protection of wild animals and birds and for matters connected therewith. Chapter IV of the said Act deals with Sanctuaries, National Parks, Game reserves, and Closed Areas. sanctuary was defined in Sec. 2 (26), before it was amended in 1991, as follows :-"2. . . . . . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. . . . . . . . (26) "sanctuary" means an area declared, whether under Sec. 18 or Sec. 38, or deemed, under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 66, to be declared, as a wild life sanctuary;"sec. 18 provided for declaration of a sanctuary and the said section, before it was amended in 1991, was as follows :-"18. Declaration of Sanctuary : (1) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area to be a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural, or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating wild life or its environment. (2) The notification referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such area. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe the area by roads, rivers, ridges, or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries.
(2) The notification referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such area. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe the area by roads, rivers, ridges, or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries. "the effect of the declaration under Sec. 18 was that the sanctuary came into existence the moment the Notification was issued. Being conscious of the fact that some persons may be having rights over the areas which have now been declared to be sanctuary, Sec. 19 required the Collector to inquire into and determine the existence, nature, and extent of the "rights of any person in or over the land comprised within the limits of the sanctuary". In order to enable him to do so, the claims could be filed within the specified period before him under Sec. 21 (b) and after the inquiry was made, the Collector could pass orders under Sec. 24, which reads as follows :-24. Acquisition of rights : (1) In the case of a claim to a right in or over any land referred to in Sec. 19, the collector shall pass an order admitting or rejecting the same in whole or in part. (2) If such claim is admitted in whole or in part, the Collector may either - (a) exclude such land from the limits of the proposed sanctuary, or (b) proceed to acquire such land or rights, except where by and agreement between the owner of such land or the holder of rights and the Government the owner or holder of such rights has agreed to surrender his rights to the government, in or over such land, and on payment of such compensation, as is provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894 ). "sec. 25 gave the power to the Collector to acquire land, but we are not concerned with that provision in this case. ( 9 ) THE combind effect of all these provisions was that the Notification declaring the Sanctuary was final unless and until it was altered by an order of the Collector under Sec. 24 (2) of the Act.
"sec. 25 gave the power to the Collector to acquire land, but we are not concerned with that provision in this case. ( 9 ) THE combind effect of all these provisions was that the Notification declaring the Sanctuary was final unless and until it was altered by an order of the Collector under Sec. 24 (2) of the Act. Before the declaration was issued, no opportunity of making any claim was required to be given to any person and Sec. 18 was so worded that any area, whether it be land or a mass of water, forest area or nonforest area, could be declared to be a sanctuary. ( 10 ) THE declaration of a sanctuary led to certain restrictions, with which we are not concerned. ( 11 ) SOME important changes were made in the Act with its amendment in 1991. Possibly, these amendments were incorporated in consequence of the incorporation of Art. 48a and Art. 51a in the Constitution and also keeping in view the fact that no hearing was being given to any affected party before any area was included in a sanctuary. ( 12 ) TWO important amendments which were made in the Act were the substitution of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 and the enactment of a new section, being sec. 26a. The amended Sec. 18 and the said Sec. 26a reads as follows :-"18. Declaration of Sanctuary :- (1) The State Government may, by notification declare its intention to constitute any area other than area comprised with any reserve forest or territorial waters as a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, gemorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment. (2) The Notification referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such area. Explanation :- for the purposes of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe the area by roads, rivers, rigdes, or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries.
(2) The Notification referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such area. Explanation :- for the purposes of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe the area by roads, rivers, rigdes, or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries. ""26-A Declaration of area as Sanctuary : (1) When-- (a) a notification has been issued under Sec. 18 and the period for preferring claim has elapsed, and all claims, if any, made in relation to any land in an area intended to be declared as a sanctuary, have been disposed of by the State government, or (b) any area comprised within any reserve forest or any part of the territorial waters, which is considered by the State Government to be of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment, is to be included in a sanctuary, the State Government shall issue a notification specifying the limits of the area which shall be comprised within the sanctuary and declare that the said area shall be sanctuary on and from such date as may be specified in the notification : provided that where any part of the territorial waters is to be so included, prior concurrence of the Central Government shall be obtained by the State government : provided further that the limits of the area of the territorial waters to be included in the sanctuary shall be determined in consultation with the Chief Naval hydrographer of the Central Government and taking adequate measures to protect the occupational interests of the local fishermen. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), the right of innocent passage of any vessel or boat through the territorial water shall not be affected by the notification issued under sub-sec. (1 ). (3) No alteration of the boundaries of a sanctuary shall be made except on a resolution passed by the Legislature of the State. "it is only with the incorporation of the amending Act that there is a reference to forest area, including a reserve forest in the Wild Life (Protection) Act. Along with this, Sec. 2 (26) was also amended and new definition of the word "sanctuary" is as follows :-"2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -.
Along with this, Sec. 2 (26) was also amended and new definition of the word "sanctuary" is as follows :-"2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -. . . . . . . . . . . . (26) "sanctuary" means an area declared whether under Sec. 26 (A) or Sec. 38, or deemed, under sub-sec. (3) Sec. 66, to be declared, as a wild life sanctuary;"the effect of this new definition is that there is no reference to Sec. 18, but there is a reference to Sec. 26 (A ). ( 13 ) WITH the insertion of new sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 as well as Sec. 26a, the scheme of Chapter IV has undergone a major change. Whereas under the unamended sec. 18, the declaration of a sanctuary was final, unless modification takes place by an order under Sec. 24 (2), under the new sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18, the Notification of the State Government is merely a declaration of its intent to constitute any area as a sanctuary. This area, with respect to which the Notification is to be issued, is to be an area which is other than any reserve forest or territorial water. To put it differently, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 now does not apply to reserve forest areas or territorial waters and the State Government could issue a Notification under Sec. 18 (1) with regard to other areas. This Notification under Sec. 18 (1) can be regarded as being similar or akin to a Notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. After the Notification is published or proclaimed in the manner specified in Sec. 21, the Collector is required to go into any claim which may be made with regard to the rights of any person for the land, which is proposed to be incorporated in the limits of the sanctuary. In determining the said claims, the Collector, by virtue of sec. 23, has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court in trial of a suit and after the claims are decided, a declaration of an area as a sanctuary is made under sec. 26a (1 ). It is because the declaration of an area as sanctuary is made under sec.
23, has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court in trial of a suit and after the claims are decided, a declaration of an area as a sanctuary is made under sec. 26a (1 ). It is because the declaration of an area as sanctuary is made under sec. 26a (1) that the Legislature amended Sec. 2 (26), which defines the word sanctuary, and in place of Sec. 18, reference is made in Sec. 2 (26) to Sec. 26a. ( 14 ) TAKING advantage of the deletion of the word sec. 18 and the incorporation of the words sec. 26 (A) in the definition of the word sanctuary in Sec. 2 (26) of the said Act, it has been contended by the Advocate General and Mr. V. B. Patel that the provisions of the newly added sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a would not apply to a sanctuary, which is declared as one under unamended Sec. 18. ( 15 ) SEC. 26a, apart from providing for declaration of a sanctuary under subsec. (1), makes a provision, under sub-sec. (3), to the effect that there shall be no alteration of the boundaries of a sanctuary except under Resolution passed under the Legislature of the State. It may here be noticed that in the original bill, which was drafted for amending the Wild Life (Protection) Act, there was no clause in the Bill corresponding to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a. It was only during the course of the debate in the Rajya Sabha that, at the instance of one Member of Parliament shri Pachhori, an amendment was moved and sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a was incorporated. It has been contended by the learned Counsels for the petitioners that this sub-section has an independent existence and it cannot be restricted to a sanctuary, which is declared as such under Sec. 26a (1 ). ( 16 ) SUB-SEC. (3) of Sec. 26a uses the words a sanctuary. This sub-section does not state that it will apply to a sanctuary, which is declared as such only under sec. 26a. There are no words limiting the operation of the word a sanctuary. The said sub-section is clear and unambiguous, which provides that it is only the State legislature which can alter the boundaries of a sanctuary.
This sub-section does not state that it will apply to a sanctuary, which is declared as such only under sec. 26a. There are no words limiting the operation of the word a sanctuary. The said sub-section is clear and unambiguous, which provides that it is only the State legislature which can alter the boundaries of a sanctuary. This provision is similar to Sec. 35 (5), which provides that there can be no alteration of the boundaries of a National Park except by a resolution passed by the State Legislature and Sec. 38, which makes the provisions of Secs. 18 to 35 applicable to Sanctuaries or National parks, which are declared by the Central Government and which provides that reference to the State Legislature should be construed as reference to Parliament. The effect of this Sec. 38 is that with relation to Sanctuaries or National Parks declared by the Central Government by virtue of Sec. 26a (3) and Sec. 35 (5), it is only the Parliament which can alter the boundaries of a sanctuary declared as such by the Central Government. ( 17 ) PRIOR to its amendment in 1991, Sec. 2 (26) defined a sanctuary as meaning an area which was declared as such whether under Sec. 18 or Sec. 38 or deemed, under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 66. Sec. 66 (3) provided that an area, which is deemed to have been declared as a Sanctuary or a National Park under any Act, which was repealed by the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 shall be deemed to be a Sanctuary or a National Park under this Act. While amending Sec. 2 (26), instead of incorporating the words "sec. 26 (A)", what has been done is that the words "sec. 18" have been substituted by the words "sec. 26 (A)". It is because of this substitution that a contention has been raised by the said learned Counsels for some of the respondents that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a will not apply to a sanctuary which was declared as such under Sec. 18. ( 18 ) WHEN Sec. 26a will apply to even a deemed sanctuary, viz.
26 (A)". It is because of this substitution that a contention has been raised by the said learned Counsels for some of the respondents that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a will not apply to a sanctuary which was declared as such under Sec. 18. ( 18 ) WHEN Sec. 26a will apply to even a deemed sanctuary, viz. , a sanctuary which had been declared as such under an Act which was repealed by the 1972 act, in addition to the sanctuary declared under Sec. 26a or Sec. 30a, it would not be logical or would not stand to reason that the said sub-section (3) of Sec. 26a would not apply to sanctuary declared as such under the unamended Sec. 18 of the present Act. The said Sec. 2 begins with the words ". . . . . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. . . . . . . . . " and then, inter alia, defines the word sanctuary. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 contains various provisions applicable to sanctuaries, like Sec. 26, dealing with restriction on entry in sanctuary, sec. 29 which provides for prohibition of destroying Wild Life etc. in the sanctuary and it cannot be that because of the amendment to Sec. 2 (26), the restrictions contained in the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, will apply to deemed sanctuaries under Sec. 66 (3), as well as sanctuaries declared as such under Sec. 26a or Sec. 30a, but will not apply to sanctuaries declared as such under this Act under unamended Sec. 18. In our opinion, the context in which the word sanctuary appears, the restriced definition of Sec. 2 (26) will not apply and the word sanctuary, occurring in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a, must be given its normal meaning which is that it is a sanctuary declared as such under any law. ( 19 ) THE said provision Sec. 26a may be viewed from another angle. In 1993, when the impugned Notification was issued, the pre-amended Sec. 18 was not in existence. Sec. 26a had been incorporated into the Act. What is the effect of this amendment ? The rule in this behalf, as observed by Vivian Bose, J. in Shamrao v. Parulekar and Ors. v. District Magistrate, Thana and Ors. , AIR 1952 SC 324 , at page 326, is as follows :". . . . . .
Sec. 26a had been incorporated into the Act. What is the effect of this amendment ? The rule in this behalf, as observed by Vivian Bose, J. in Shamrao v. Parulekar and Ors. v. District Magistrate, Thana and Ors. , AIR 1952 SC 324 , at page 326, is as follows :". . . . . . THE rule is that an unamended Act must be read as if the words of amendment had been written into the Act except where that would lead to an inconsistency. . . . . . "these observations have been reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court in Yadlapati venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 704 , at page 709. Therefore, the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a were applicable to all the sanctuaries, which had been declared as such under Sec. 18 or under Sec. 26a or were deemed sanctuaries by virtue of Sec. 66 (3 ). ( 20 ) IT was sought to be contended that repealing a Notification in exercise of the powers under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act would not amount to altering the boundaries of the Sanctuary. We are unable to agree to this contention. When the Notification of 1981 was sought to be repealed, the effect undoubtedly was that the boundary of the Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary was completely altered. It is difficult to accept the contention that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a would apply and a Resolution of the State Legislature would be required only if, for example, the area of the sanctuary was to be reduced, thereby resulting in the alteration of its boundaries but that such a Resolution would not be necessary when the existence of a sanctuary is being brought to an end. . ( 21 ) WE are also of the opinion that the Government did not have jurisdiction or power to invoke Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act in the present case. The wild Life (Protection) Act is a special Act, and whereas power is given to the State government to notify an area as a sanctuary, the power to alter the boundary has been expressly reserved with the State Legislature under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a.
The wild Life (Protection) Act is a special Act, and whereas power is given to the State government to notify an area as a sanctuary, the power to alter the boundary has been expressly reserved with the State Legislature under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26a. Once a sanctuary has been notified as such, then the State Government, for the purposes of altering its boundary, would become functus officio and the only authority or body, which would have a right to amend the boundaries is the State Legislature. A question with regard to invoking Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act arose in the case of State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly, AIR 1958 SC 1018 , where reference has been made under Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that reference was sought to be cancelled or superseded, in purported exercise of the powers of sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court held that once a reference had been made under Sec. 10 (1), the rule of construction enunciated by Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act in so far as it refers to the power of rescinding or cancelling the original order could not be invoked in respect of the provisions of sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The same principle would, in our opinion, apply in the present case as well. Once the power to declare a sanctuary has been exercised, then the State Government is left with no power to alter its boundaries, whether by reducing the same or by cancelling the earlier Notification, whereby the area was declared as a sanctuary. To the same effect is the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma, air 1970 SC 1576 . In that case, after the proceedings under the Land Acquisition act had been completed and possession taken, the question arose whether the government could cancel the Notification under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses act. It was held by the Supreme Court that by Notification under Sec. 21 of the general Clauses Act, the Government could cancel or rescind the notifications issued under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, but the power under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be exercised after the land had statutorily vested in the State Government.
4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, but the power under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be exercised after the land had statutorily vested in the State Government. Same is the position in the present case. Once, statutorily an area has been declared to be a sanctuary, then the said area can be varied only in accordance with the Act and with Sec. 26a (3), in particular. The State Government could not, in law, seek to invoke Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act and rescind the Notification declaring the Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary. ( 22 ) MR. V. B. Patel, appearing for M/s. Sanghi Cement Limited, a company, in whose favour mining lease was proposed to be granted, submitted that, in fact, there was no notification in law declaring any area as a Sanctuary. It was submitted in this connection that the Notification of 1981 was not final as it stated that the area, which was "intended to be declared" as Sanctuary had been specified, but this intention had never became final. The learned Counsel is seeking to base his argument because of the use of the word intended in the Schedule to the Notification of 1981. This Notification, under the tenets of construction, has to be read as a whole. It has also to be read in the light of the statutory provisions. The statutory provisions which existed in 1981, were that an area could be declared as a sanctuary under Sec. 18. The area could be modified, on rights being established by an order passed under Sec. 24 (2 ). If no order under Sec. 24 (2) was passed, determination of the area as a sanctuary remained. In the operative portion of the Notification dated 14th April, 1991, there is a categorical declaration of the area specified in the Schedule as being a "wild Life Sanctuary". The use of the word intended, in the Schedule, only meant that the area described therein could be changed or altered in accordance with law, viz. , if an order under Sec. 24 (2) was passed. If no order under Sec. 24 (2) was passed, the area as mentioned in the Schedule remained a part of the Sanctuary. Unamended Sec. 18 did not contemplate any preliminary Notification being issued prior to the final declaration of an area as a Sanctuary.
, if an order under Sec. 24 (2) was passed. If no order under Sec. 24 (2) was passed, the area as mentioned in the Schedule remained a part of the Sanctuary. Unamended Sec. 18 did not contemplate any preliminary Notification being issued prior to the final declaration of an area as a Sanctuary. ( 23 ) IT was submitted that the principle of natural justice would have required that the affected parties should be given a hearing before an area was declared as a Sanctuary. It is no doubt true that declaration of an area as a Sanctuary may result in some civil consequences. But, the principles of natural justice can be complied with if an ex post facto hearing is given. That is what was contemplated under the scheme of the Act prior to its amendment in 1991. After the notification under Sec. 18 was issued, persons who had any right in that area could make a representation and their claims had to be adjudicated upon and an order passed and thereupon, under Sec. 24 (2), portions of land could be excluded from the proposed sanctuary. This ex post facto hearing has now been replaced and with the amendment in 1991, a Notification under Sec. 18 merely signifies the intention of the Government to declare an area as a Sanctuary. Principles of natural justice are now complied with prior to the declaration of an area as a Sanctuary under Sec. 26a (1 ). This would not make sub-sec. (3) in any way inapplicable to a Sanctuary, which was declared an such under the unamended Sec. 18 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. ( 24 ) IT was vehemently contended that this could not be regarded as a public interest litigation and secondly, the petitioners had no locus standi to file the present petitions. We are unable to agree with this submission. Environment, more than anything else, is and should be a concern for all. It is one thing which is available free to all the inhabitants of an area and it is essential that this envionment is maintained for the purposes of ensuring a healthy life. This issue, in fact, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court, in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991 (1) SCC 598 , at page 604 observed that :-". . . . .
This issue, in fact, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court, in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991 (1) SCC 598 , at page 604 observed that :-". . . . . RIGHT to live is a fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Art. 32 of the Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life. . . . . . . "with regard to locus standi, the answer is squarely given by the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of The Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 . Dealing with the question of locus standi, vis-a-vis public interest litigation, it was observed by the Court, at page 909, as follows :-". . . . . . IN contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like actio popularis of Roman Law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict. . . . . . . . . . "at page 919, the Supreme Court took note of the contention of the Counsels, which was as follows :-". . . . . . . MR.
. . . . . . . . . "at page 919, the Supreme Court took note of the contention of the Counsels, which was as follows :-". . . . . . . MR. Jethmalani expostulating the objectives of PIL urged with vehemence and persistence that H. S. Chowdhary does not have any locus standi to initiate this litigation and as such his petition is liable to be rejected even at the threshold. According to him, the true Public Interest Litigation is one in which a selfless citizen having no personal motive of any kind except either compassion for the weak and disabled or deep concern for stopping serious public injury approaches the Court either for (1) Enforcement of fundamental rights of those who genuinely do not have adequate means of access to the judicial system or denied benefit of the statutory provisions incorporating the directive principles of State Policy for amelioration of their condition, and (2) preventing or annulling executive acts and omissions violative of Constitution or law resulting in substantial injury to public interest. . . . . . "the said contention was approved by the Supreme Court at page 920 in paragraph 117 in the following words :-". . . . . . . AFTER deeply and carefully considering the submissions of all the parties, we see much force in the submissions made by the learned Solicitor General, Mr. A. D. Giri and Mr. Jethmalani, Senior Counsel. . . . . "it would, therefore, follow that a public interest litigation at the behest of an organisation or a group of individuals, who have no personal gain or private motive or any other oblique consideration except to see that public injury does not take place and to prevent or annul executive acts and omissions which are violative of the Constitution or the law, would be maintainable. In the present case, this is precisely so. The two petitioners are voluntary organisations deeply concerned and involved in the maintenance of a clean environment. The only point which has been raised by them is that there has been a violation of the law in as much as the impugned Notification which has been issued by the Government is in conflict with Sec. 26a (3) of the Wid Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and is, therefore, ultra vires.
The only point which has been raised by them is that there has been a violation of the law in as much as the impugned Notification which has been issued by the Government is in conflict with Sec. 26a (3) of the Wid Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and is, therefore, ultra vires. None of the petitioners has any personal gain or any other oblique motive in filing the present petitions and we are satisfied that they have the locus standi to file the present petition. ( 25 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we come to the conclusion that the impugned notification No. GVN-16 (93)-WLP/1092/2156/v2, dated 27th of July, 1993, purporting to cancel the earlier Notification dated 14th April, 1981 is illegal and is quashed. As a consequence thereof, the second Notification also dated 27th of july, 1993, whereby a new Sanctuary, of a much smaller area, was sought to be set up in the same taluka, is also quashed. As a result of the quashing of the notification dated 27th of July, 1993, the earlier Notification dated 14-4-1981, establishing Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary is revived. We express no opinion with respect to the desirability or otherwise of the reduction in sanctuary area. This judgment should not be construed as expressing any opinion on this aspect one way or the other. ( 26 ) THE petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The petitioners shall also be entitled to costs. Counsels fee determined at Rs. 1,500. 00. ( 27 ) LETTERS Patent Appeal No. 197 of 1993 is filed against the refusal of interim relief in Special Civil Application No. 13139 of 1993. The Appeal has been admitted and during the pendency of the appeal, there was stay of the Notification dated 27th July, 1993, which Notification is now quashed by the present judgment. In view of the fact that Special Civil Application Nos. 13139 of 1993 and 6061 of 1994 are allowed, quashing the impugned Notification, Letters Patent Appeal No. 197 of 1994, arising from Special Civil Application No. 13139 of 1993, is also allowed. .