J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) A very substantial and significant question that arises for consideration and determination is whether a conviction and eviction of a serviceoccupier under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, withholding companys premises after termination of employment, by any reason, is competent and maintainable or not in view of the protection and provision of Sec. 28 of the bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ? ( 2 ) THE appellant herein - original complainant who was working as Deputy manager in "new Shorrock Mills", a unit of Mafatlal Industries Limited (the company for short) had filed Criminal Case No. 6545 of 1988, on 18-10-1988, in the Court of the learned Chief J. M. F. C. , Nadiad, inter alia, contending, that respondent No. 1-original accused has wrongfully withheld possession of Room no. 30 in New Shorrock Nagar bearing Municipal Census No. 5/947 situated on kapadvanj Road, Nadiad, the property of the company (the disputed property for short), after his retirement from the employment of the company. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the complainants case, the disputed room was given to the accused on account of the fact that he being in service of the company at that time. The accused was given the disputed room in a chawl of company for his use and occupation, on the leave and licence basis. One of the conditions of the said leave and licence agreement between the company and the accused, was that the accused shall not be entitled to occupy the disputed room after determination of his service. Thus, it is alleged by the complainant that the accused was entitled to keep the disputed room, as long as, he was in service of the company and as per the terms and conditions of the licence agreement between the company and the empolyeeaccused, the company is entitled to the possession from him on severence of the relationship of master and servant. The accused retired from the service of the company with effect from 1-9-1984 receiving all the retiral benefits from the company. Therefore, the accused was bound to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the disputed room to the company as he was no more in service of the company and he has obtained big bungalow, in Punit Park Society, Nadiad. Therefore, the accused was bound to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the disputed room to the company as he was no more in service of the company and he has obtained big bungalow, in Punit Park Society, Nadiad. The accused was also paid all dues and retirement benefits in accordance with law. However, inspite of repeated requests and demands made by and on behalf of the company, the accused failed to hand over possession and continued to wrongfully and unlawfully occupy and possess the disputed room. Therefore, the case of the complainant is that the accused had committed an offence punishable under sec. 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 (the Companies Act for short ). ( 4 ) THE accused came to be tried by the learned Chief J. M. F. C. , Nadiad for the aforesaid offence. The prosecution relied on the evidence of P. W. No. 1 deputy Manager, Mr. P. R. Mehta, at Ex. 26, and also on the evidence of old employee of the company who was working as Sanitary Inspector, at the relevant time, P. W. No. 2-Mr. V. D. Rana, at Ex. 30. The prosecution also relied on the complaint, at Ex. 25, letter of resignation of the accused, at Ex. 29, and leave and licence agreement, dated 11-7-1970, Ex. 31, and 10-7-1980, at Ex. 32. The accused admitted that he had retired from service with effect from 1-9-1984. However, he inter alia contended that he is a protected tenant and not a licensee and, therefore, he is not liable for the alleged offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. In support of his contentions, he relied on the evidence of defence witness one Mr. S. M. Patel, at Ex. 36. ( 5 ) ON examination of the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record, the trial Court acquitted the accused from the charge under Sec. 630 of the companies Act holding that he is a lessee (tenant) and not a licensee as contended by the complainant, by his judgment and order recorded on 9-11-1993. 36. ( 5 ) ON examination of the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record, the trial Court acquitted the accused from the charge under Sec. 630 of the companies Act holding that he is a lessee (tenant) and not a licensee as contended by the complainant, by his judgment and order recorded on 9-11-1993. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of acquittal of the trial Court, passed in Criminal Case No. 6545 of 1988, the original complainant has come up, before this Court challenging its legality and validity by filing this acquittal appeal under the provision of Sec. 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code for short ). ( 6 ) LEARNED Advocate Mr. Mehta appearing for the appellant-original complainant has, seriously, criticised the impungned acquittal judgment on the following premises : (1) That the finding of the trial Court that the accused is a lessee and not a licensee is, totally, perverse and erroneous. (2) That even in case of the accused being lessee or tenant, prosecution under sec. 630 of the Companies Act, is maintainable; (3) That the provisions of Sec. 630 will override the provisions of the Bombay rent Act; (4) That the trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused despite a clear and consistent evidence that the accused has wrongfully withheld the disputed room of the company after his retirement from service and having obtained beautiful, big bungalow in Punit Park Society, at Nadiad; (5) That the accused is liable for punishment for wrongful withholding of the property of the company under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and that the accused should be directed to deliver or return the disputed room of the company meant for employees of the company, wrongfully withheld by him or, in default, to undergo exemplary imprisonment. ( 7 ) WHILE challenging the aforesaid contentions, learned Advocate Mr. ( 7 ) WHILE challenging the aforesaid contentions, learned Advocate Mr. A. J. Patel, for the original accused has raised the following contentions : (1) That the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are not attracted in the present case as there is bona fide dispute with regard to the tenancy right in relation to the disputed room; (2) That the prosecution initiated by the company is barred by limitation as it is filed beyond the period of three years; (3) That, in the alternative, the matter may be remanded back to the trial Court as the question of tenancy right was not placed in the focus; (4) That the discretionary provisions of Sec. 630 (2) of the Companies Act should not be invoked against the accused. ( 8 ) THE learned A. P. P. Mr. S. T. Mehta, has supported the submissions raised on behalf of the appellant-original complainant and has also contended that the accused is liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the companies Act and the discretion should not be exercised in favour of the accused in view of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case. The complaint came to be filed under the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act on the allegation that the accused was given possession of the disputed room as an employee of the company and after termination of service on account of voluntary retirement of the accused with effect from 1-9-1984, the accused was obliged to return or restore the possession of the disputed room to the company. Having not done so, the accused is liable for penalty in wrongfully withholding of the property of the company under Sec. 630. It would be necessary, at this stage, to refer to the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. It reads as under :"630. (1) If any officer or employee of a company - (a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or (b) having any such property in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the Articles and authorised by this Act; he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory, thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (2) The Court trying offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within a time to be fixed by the Court, any such property, wrongfully, obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. "the provisions of Sec. 630 clearly go to show that the purpose of enacting Sec. 630 is to provide a speedy relief to the company when its property is wrongfully withheld by a service-employee. The analysis of the section shows that what is penalised is not only wrongfully obtaining possession of property and the subsequent wrongful withholding of it but also refusal to delivery of the property within the time fixed by the Court for such delivery. The former is punishable under sub-sec. (1) and the latter under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 630. There is no doubt about the fact that this section does not apply to any person unless he has been an officer or employee. It thus applies to a past officer or employee, if the wrongful obtaining, withholding or application of the property was done in his capacity as such officer or employee. Thus, when an employee refuses to vacate the premises of the company on determination of the employment or on his retirement but continues in possession even after his retirement, the employee can be held liable under Sec. 630. ( 9 ) THE learned Magistrate while passing the impugned acquittal order has held that the complainant has, successfully, proved that the accused was given possession of the disputed room of the company for the limited period of his employment. Thus, it is held by the learned trial Magistrate that the accused got inducted in the disputed room of the company as an employee out of his relationship with the company as an employee. Thus, the case of the company is that the accused was allotted and given possession of the disputed room as a result of his employment with the company. However, the case of the company for an offence under Sec. 630 is not found favour with the trial Court as according to the opinion of the trial court, the accused is a lessee-tenant and not a licensee. Therefore, wrongful withholding of the property of the company is not believed. However, the case of the company for an offence under Sec. 630 is not found favour with the trial Court as according to the opinion of the trial court, the accused is a lessee-tenant and not a licensee. Therefore, wrongful withholding of the property of the company is not believed. In the opinion of the trial Court, provision of Sec. 630 (1) (b) is not applicable as retention of the possession of the disputed room cannot be said to be wrongful or illegal in view of the fact that the accused is an allottee as a tenant and not a licensee and entitled to protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the bombay Rent Act for short ). Therefore, though the learned Magistrate held that the accused was given possession of the disputed room by the company only in his relation to the employment, the company is not entitled to possession in view of the fact that the accused is a protected tenant. This is precisely the reason why the original complainant has come up before this Court in this acquittal appeal. ( 10 ) THE question, therefore, requires to be adjudicated upon at this juncture is as to whether or not the accused is liable for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. What is the effect of provisions of the Bombay Rent act ? The trial Court has placed reliance on the decision of this Court rendered in Govindbhai v. New Shorrock Mills, [1984 (1)] XXV (1) GLR 156 for concluding and deciding that the agreement of licence executed by the accused in favour of the company is, as such, an agreement of tenancy. Therefore, it is observed that the clauses in the leave and licence agreement providing termination of licence with the termination of service are not binding on the accused. Thus, the interpretation of the trial Court is that in view of the tenancy created in favour of the accused, he is not obliged to return possession of the disputed room to the company on termination of his service being a tenanted property under the Bombay Rent Act. Thus, the interpretation of the trial Court is that in view of the tenancy created in favour of the accused, he is not obliged to return possession of the disputed room to the company on termination of his service being a tenanted property under the Bombay Rent Act. The agreement of leave and licence between the parties providing a clause coterminus with the termination of service is in reality creating a tenancy in favour of the accused-employee and his continuance in the property as tenant under the bombay Rent Act cannot be said to be wrongful or illegal. ( 11 ) THE question requiring adjudication is - as to whether the provisions incorporated in Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are in any way repugnant or conflicting with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, and if yes, what is the legal effect ? In order to appreciate this important issue, it may be stated that the following aspects have emerged from the evidence on record unquestionably : 1. That the accused was inducted in the disputed room situated in chawl of company meant for employees by the company on account of the employment. 2. That the disputed room is situated in the companys premises and it is belonging to the company. There are several such rooms meant and given to its employees on account of their employment with company only. 3. That the agreement between the accused and the complainant company provided termination of possession or occupation of the disputed room co-terminus with the termination of service. 4. The accused agreed to vacate the premises of the company on his retirement. The accused retired from the service receiving all benefits with effect from 1-9-1984. 5. The accused has not vacated the disputed room of the company on his retirement but continued in possession even after his retirement claiming to be tenant under the Bomaby Rent Act. ( 12 ) ASSUMING that the finding of the trial Court that the accused is a tenant is accepted to be true, then in that case, could it be said that the provisions of sec. 630 of the Companies Act will not be attracted ? In other words, even on the premise that the accused is a tenant, the criminal complaint under Sec. 630 of the companies Act is not maintainable ? 630 of the Companies Act will not be attracted ? In other words, even on the premise that the accused is a tenant, the criminal complaint under Sec. 630 of the companies Act is not maintainable ? The trial Court took the view that Sec. 630 providing a criminal complaint is not applicable against the tenant. Could tenancy be taken as defence to obviate criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 of the Companies act ? It appears from the impugned judgment of acquittal that the trial Court has held that criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 is not maintainable against the accused as he is held to be a tenant and not licensee. ( 13 ) RELYING upon the finding of the trial Court, it has been, vehemently, contended that there was no wrongful withholding of possession of the disputed room of the company. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the accused that since tenancy was created in favour of the accused, the provisions of Sec. 630 are not applicable. The initial occupation and possession of the disputed room was in accordance with law and once the tenancy has been created, it has been contended that the only remedy available to the company was under the Bombay Rent Act for recovery of the companys premises on termination of service. As against that, it has been canvassed on behalf of the company that the tenancy "ipso-facto" does not preclude or bar criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act after termination of service, as there is a special provision for a particular class of landlords like the companies for getting speedier relief under Sec. 630. It is also contended that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and the provisions of sec. 630 of the Companies Act should be harmoniously interpreted so that the object and policy for which provisions of Sec. 630 are incorporated, are advanced. In short, the submission raised on behalf of the company is that even if on the interpretation of the agreement of leave and licence, the accused is held to be tenant, there will not be a ban or a bar of the enforcement of the provisions of Sec. 630 on the correct interpretation of the statutes. Right to occupy and possess is limited to the period of sevice or employment in the agreement. The accused is rightly held to be a "service-occupier". Right to occupy and possess is limited to the period of sevice or employment in the agreement. The accused is rightly held to be a "service-occupier". Right to occupy premises of the company is co-terminus on termination of the service. Therefore, after severence of service relationship on account of voluntary retirement or by any mode from the company, right to occupy it comes to an end. Even under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, serviceoccupier has no right to continue in the tenanted premises after the end of service. In Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Bombay Rent Act, a specific provision is made for eviction of service-tenant. It would be necessary at this stage to refer to Sec. 13 (1) (f ). It reads as under :"sec. 13 (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (but subject to the provisions of Secs. 15 and 15a), a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied : xxx xxx xxx xxx (f) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and that the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the coming into operation of this Act, to be in such service or employment. . . . . . . . "xxx xxx xxx xxx it can very well be seen from the aforesaid provision that if the premises are let to a tenant for use as a residence in consequence of his being in service of the landlord and such a tenant has ceased to be in such service, it is also a ground for eviction. This clause refers to an occupation by a servant as tenant, whether by way of remuneration or a part-payment of services or whether paying rent or not. The grant of tenancy to an employee may be either simultaneous or at a later date in consequence of his employment. The finding of the trial Court is that occupation of the room of company by the accused was in consequence of his employment with the company is justified. The grant of tenancy to an employee may be either simultaneous or at a later date in consequence of his employment. The finding of the trial Court is that occupation of the room of company by the accused was in consequence of his employment with the company is justified. It is, therefore, clear from the evidence on record that the accused who was an employee was inducted in the premises of the company in relation to his employment and his possession was conditional upon his remaining in the employment of the company. That relationship of master and servant or employee and employer resulted into occupation of the disputed room of the company. Under the provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Bombay Rent Act, if the company proves that the accused was a tenant on account of his being in service of the company and that such employee has ceased to be in such service, such serviceoccupier is also liable to be ejected. He has personal right to occupy the premises of the company so long as he remains in service of the company. If the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in service or employment of the company and that tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment, it is also a ground for eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (f ). Therefore, even in case of tenancy between the accused and the company under Sec. 13 (1) (f), the accused as a tenant is liable to be ejected and the company is entitled to possession. If the company decides to seek possession under Sec. 13 (1) (f) against the employeetenant, the company has to pursue the remedies before a competent Court as provided under Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. The provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies act also provide a special remedy which is summary in nature against a person who ceases to be in employment of the company who was given possession of the premises out of such service relation. Thus, the company has option either to pursue the remedy provided under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act or under Sec. 13 (1) (f) under the Rent Act. There are thus two remedies open to the companies. Thus, the company has option either to pursue the remedy provided under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act or under Sec. 13 (1) (f) under the Rent Act. There are thus two remedies open to the companies. In view of the decision in the case of Govindbhai v. New Shorrock Mills (supra), the remedy for seeking possession of the demised premises in a civil Court under Sec. 13 (1) (f) is only by filing a suit in a competent civil Court under Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. If the company decides to file an eviction suit under the Rent Act, the same has to be pursued in a civil Court created under Sec. 28. However, the provisions enacted in sec. 13 (1) (f) or Sec. 28 of the Rent Act do not constitute a hurdle or hindrance in the way of pursuing remedy under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. ( 14 ) IT cannot, therefore, be contended that the company is not entitled to pursue remedy under Sec. 630, solely on the ground that the accused is held to be a tenant. Even in case of service-tenancy between the accused and the company, the option is with the company either to pursue the remedy provided under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act or provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Rent Act. Both the provisions give different but concurrent remedies to the companies. It is for the company to pursue any one of the concurrent legal remedies at its option. In the present case, the company has resorted to the provisions of Sec. 630 of the companies Act. The learned trial Magistrate despite clear finding that the accused was inducted in the premises of the company in relation to the employment with the company, i. e. , as a service-occupier and that there was termination of service. However, he has further held that the criminal prosecution contemplated by the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act is not maintainable. This finding, with due respect to the learned Magistrate, is not only illogical but is illegal and perverse requiring interference in this acquittal appeal. If the view taken by the learned Magistrate is subscribed to, it would undoubtedly render the provisions of the Sec. 630 otiose. Such interpretation can never be allowed to be made. This finding, with due respect to the learned Magistrate, is not only illogical but is illegal and perverse requiring interference in this acquittal appeal. If the view taken by the learned Magistrate is subscribed to, it would undoubtedly render the provisions of the Sec. 630 otiose. Such interpretation can never be allowed to be made. It appears that the learned Magistrate has also failed to appreciate in its proper perspective the decision of this Court in the case of Govindbhai (supra ). There is no dispute about the fact that the question precisely in focus in the present case was not at all under consideration before the Division Bench in that case. It is very clear from the said decision that the question of interpretation and the applicability and enforcement of the provisions of Sec. 630 was not at all under consideration before this Court in that decision. What is held by the Division Bench in that case is that Civil remedy for possession under a Civil law against a tenant is competent in a Court, specially created only under Sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, the aforesaid decision of this Court cannot be pressed into service to thwart the criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. It cannot be said, therefore, that provisions of Sec. 630 cannot be invoked. ( 15 ) TWO remedies available to the landlords are concurrent, one is for criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act; whereas, the other remedy is provided under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Once the Court finds that where even tenancy and, not a licence, was created in consequence of the employment of the accused, the company is empowered to invoke provisions of Sec. 630 for filing prosecution. The company incorporated under the Companies Act can be a landlord for the purposes of Sec. 13 (1) (f) and is entitled to file a suit for recovery of possession under the Bombay Rent Act. The right of the service-occupier may be licensee or lessee, is personal and is attributable to the employment with the company or master. Therefore, even in case of death of such employee, pending the proceedings before the Court, his heirs or legal representatives have no "locus-standi" and have no right to claim tenancy rights. This proposition is very well explained and established by several decisions. Therefore, even in case of death of such employee, pending the proceedings before the Court, his heirs or legal representatives have no "locus-standi" and have no right to claim tenancy rights. This proposition is very well explained and established by several decisions. It is also held by many Courts that in such a case heirs of deceased employee may be directed to vacate such premises. Entitlement of an employee of a company registered under the Companies act to occupy companys premises is co-terminus with termination of his service and such right would stand extinguished as soon as the employment ceases and the employee is bound to hand over possession to the company. This view is very well explained and established in Baldev Krishna Sahai v. Shipping Corporation of India, air 1987 SC 2245 . Special provisions are made in Sec. 630 for conviction and eviction which will be rendered unworkable if not nugatory if the contention of the accused is accepted that in case of tenancy, provisions of Sec. 630 are not invokable. Special provisions for certain class of public premises are also made even in the public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (public Premises act for short ). Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Rent Act deals with rights of landlords and tenants in general; while provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and Sec. 2 (c) (ii) of the Public Premises Act, are special provisions contained in special statutes. The objective of the said statutes cannot be said to be conflicting but as such is common and the remedy is concurrent provided thereunder. It would be interesting to mention at this stage that pursuant to the policy of the legislature in the similar act in Maharashtra State by Maharashtra Act (XVII of 1973) embodied in Sec. 5 (4a) in the Bombay Rent Act, a person in the service or employment of the licensor and occupying his employers (licensors) premises is not protected as a licensee under the provisions. It will also be interesting to mention that in one case of Govt. It will also be interesting to mention that in one case of Govt. premises, the employee was allotted premises with a condition in the agreement of tenancy that the premises should exclusively be used by the allottee and his family members but the employee on his marriage shifted to another premises with his wife leaving other members of his family like brothers and sisters to continue to reside in the government premises, it was held by the Apex Court in State of W. B. v. Sanat kumar Sen Gupta, 1986 (3) SCC 45 that the employee had violated the terms of tenancy. Thus, the provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Rent Act and the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are providing concurrent two remedies. Therefore, it cannot be contended that once tenancy is proved, the remedy under Sec. 630 is barred or not available to the company or employer. ( 16 ) ). The principle to be followed for construction or interpretation of a statute is that if the meaning of the statute is plain, no regard should be paid to the previous law. The proper course in the first instance is to examine the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law. In order to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole statute, to consider what was the law before the Act was passed, what was the mischief or defect for which the previous law had not provided, what remedy the legislature has provided in the present statute and the reasons for the remedy. If the words are capable of one meaning alone, it must be adopted, but if they are susceptible of wider import, the Court has to pay regard to the objects and purposes for which the particular piece of legislation had been enacted. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. The intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of the enactment in question. The text is not to be interpreted without reference to its nature or purpose. The statute should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. The intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of the enactment in question. The text is not to be interpreted without reference to its nature or purpose. The statute should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. No doubt, if there is an obvious anomaly in the application of the law, the Courts could shape the law to remove the anomaly. If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the Court should discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature. ( 17 ) THE words of the Act of Parliament must be so construed as to give them a sensible meaning, following the principle, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The primary test is, however, the language employed in the Act, it is the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter to put upon the language of the legislature its plain and rational meaning and to promote its objects. Could it be said that right to file a complaint under Sec. 630 available to the company in case of a service-occupier or tenancy is affected or jeopardised by reason of the provisions contained in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act ? The obvious answer would be in the negative. If it is interpreted otherwise, it would render the provisions of Sec. 630 not only unworkable but also may render it nugatory. ( 18 ) NO doubt, a non-obstante clause in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act makes a provision self-contained in Sec. 28. However, the non-obstante clause does not override the subsequent special provisions in the statute made by the same legislature or by the Parliament. Where the Court has to construe non-obstante clause of two different statutes, the Court must determine the effect of such clauses on a broad consideration of the purpose and policy underlying the two statutes and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions of both the statutes. Where there was a conflict between non-obstante clauses of two statutes, viz. , delhi Rent Control Act of 1952 and the Slum Clearance Act of 1956, it was held by the Apex Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, 1962 (2) SCR 125 that both the said Acts would operate in the area declared as slum. Where there was a conflict between non-obstante clauses of two statutes, viz. , delhi Rent Control Act of 1952 and the Slum Clearance Act of 1956, it was held by the Apex Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, 1962 (2) SCR 125 that both the said Acts would operate in the area declared as slum. Likewise, provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and provisions of sec. 13 read with Sec. 28 of the Rent Act are operating in the filed of tenancy, simultaneously, providing concurrent two remedies in both the statutes. ( 19 ) THE learned Magistrate should not have terminated the proceedings by passing impugned acquittal order under Sec. 630 on merely finding that the accused is a tenant. Even in case of tenancy, provisions of Sec. 630 are invokable and are available to the company. Many companies have adopted a broad and liberal outlook or policy to provide service accommodation with a view to see that employees or their staff members remain contented and have no worry to find out residential accommodation while in service and in this manner their work will be more satisfactorily done. The companies, therefore, provide good accommodation, quarters, flats or premises to the staff during the period of service. Thus, companies in many cases provide residential accommodation to some of members of their staff during the period of service for which accommodation the employee has either not to pay anything or to pay house rent which is deducted from the house rent allowance and which accommodation the employee has to vacate when the employee is transferred from one place to another or in case of expiry of service. In several cases, the employees fail to vacate the residential accommodation given to them and they contend that they are either tenants or protected licensees. The legislature has, therefore, designedly treated such an attitude on the part of the employee as an abuse of the benefit or privilege and has made a specific provision for that purpose by providing Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. Sec. 630 provides conviction and consequential eviction against such employees. In order to protract proceedings under sec. 630, applications are made by the employees for staying proceedings under sec. 630. Sometimes, even suits are filed by the employees after termination of service so as to lengthen the proceedings under Sec. 630. Sec. 630 provides conviction and consequential eviction against such employees. In order to protract proceedings under sec. 630, applications are made by the employees for staying proceedings under sec. 630. Sometimes, even suits are filed by the employees after termination of service so as to lengthen the proceedings under Sec. 630. In such a situation, the attitude of the employees cannot be encouraged by staying the criminal proceedings. ( 20 ) IT has been, rightly, held by the Apex Court that criminal proceedings under Sec. 630 should not be stayed pending civil litigation between the company and the employee. Not only that, the contentions that such employees are tenants, that there are bona fide disputes, that it does not apply to past officers or employees and so on and forth have been rejected by the Courts. Some of the decisions in that regard will be considered and examined a little later. However, there is no conflict between Sec. 630 and the provisions of the Rent Act. Sec. 630 is intended to give two special summary remedies, civil as well as criminal, which would be speedier than those provided under the Rent Act. The provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (f) read with Sec. 28 provide a remedy for eviction of the employee, even if he pleads tenancy. The provisions of sub-sec. (4a) of Sec. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act (applicable in Maharashtra) provide that even as a licensee such an employee has no protection of the Rent Act. The relevant words in that sub-section are a person in the service or employment of the licensor. Such a person is excluded from the protection of the Rent Act. Thus, the provisions of the Rent Act and the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are required to be interpreted harmoniously so that the object of both the statutes is advanced and not defeated. The interpretation made by the trial Court and supported by the learned Advocate for the respondentaccused, if accepted, would not have only paralytic impact on the provisions of sec. 630 which is a Central law but in reality will as such render it otiose. Such an interpretation is not warranted and not permissible. The interpretation made by the trial Court and supported by the learned Advocate for the respondentaccused, if accepted, would not have only paralytic impact on the provisions of sec. 630 which is a Central law but in reality will as such render it otiose. Such an interpretation is not warranted and not permissible. Therefore, applying the test and yardstick of harmonious construction, it can very well be concluded that the provisions of both the statutes, one of the State and one of the Central are required to be construed and interpreted harmoniously so that the object of each statute can be advanced. The interpretation made by the learned Magistrate would mean obliterating the material provisions of Sec. 630 from the live statute book apart from doubting the wisdom of the Parliament. Such a construction or interpretation is not only erroneous and unreasonable but is patently perverse and manifestly illegal. . ( 21 ) IT is true that under the Rent Act, specified Courts (Sec. 28) are given exclusive jurisdiction and they act according to the prescribed procedure. Presumably and probably, such procedure is more liked or preferred. This is in respect of getting peaceful and vacant possession of the tenanted premises from the employee. The underlying purport and purpose of providing speedy and summary procedure in Sec. 630 against service-occupier on termination of service appears to provide residential accommodation to deserving, desiring and requiring and waiting employees of the companies. The said class of landlords like Corporate-landlords is given a special remedy as they are not engaged in professional, profiteering and real estate business but with a view to see that similarly situated employee or needy and deserving employee is given residential accommodation for his convenience as well as for effectual and efficient discharge of duties connected with the employment of the companies. When a special provision is devised, designed by the Central legislature with such a motto and object, the same cannot be interpreted in such a way as it is done by the learned Magistrate, rendering it not only ineffective and unworkable but rendering them otiose. ( 22 ) WHILE considering the question of interpretation of statute even in case of conflicting statutes, the Court approaches, in the first instance to find out whether there can be harmonious interpretation of two Acts having regard to the purport, purpose, policy, scope and object of both the statutes. ( 22 ) WHILE considering the question of interpretation of statute even in case of conflicting statutes, the Court approaches, in the first instance to find out whether there can be harmonious interpretation of two Acts having regard to the purport, purpose, policy, scope and object of both the statutes. Apparently, therefore, there would be no conflict. In the second instance, the Court should consider the scope of both such Acts. Rent Act is intended to provide speedy remedy or machinery for dealing with diverse relations and matters between ordinary landlords and their tenants and licensors and lincensees, in general. The Rent Act has a broader spectrum compared to Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. The provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act would prevail over the provisions of Sec. 28 of the Rent act. One approach is whether the legislation is by the same legislature or by a different legislature. In case, two statutes are made by the same legislature, then the principle to be applied is that subsequent or later law should prevail over the earlier one. The approach in the third instance should be - whether it is enacted by the Parliament or by the State legislature and in that eventuality, the provisions of Art. 254 of the Constitution would come into play. Art. 254 makes constitutional provisions in case of inconsistency between the laws made by the Parliament and laws made by the legislature of States. Applying the test envisaged by Art. 254, in the alternative also, the provisions of the Central Act which again are later in point of time will prevail over the provisions of the State law. It is a settled proposition of law that in case of conflict between the two Acts or provisions, the later provision will prevail over the earlier one. In case of any conflict between the Central law and the State law, the Central law will prevail over the State law. Therefore, from any angle, either interpreting the provisions of both the Acts on the touch-stone of harmonious construction or from later in point of time or in light of the provisions of Art. 254 of the Constitution of India, provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are unaffected and also invokable irrespective of the non-obstante clause contained in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. ( 23 ) THE decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sushila Mittal v. VXL India Ltd. , 1992 (74) Company Cases, 836 is very appropriate decision to mention here. In that case, a criminal complaint under Sec. 630 was filed by the company against the petitioner Sushila who was allotted a residential quarter on the basis of her employment with the company. She continued to be in possession of the said quarter even after she ceased to be an employee of the company. A suit was filed by her for a declaration that she was entitled to possession as a tenant. Thus, it was contended by her that she was in possession of the quarter which was rented to her by the company and she was protected by the Rent Act. She had filed a civil suit for perpetual injunction against the company restraining the company from evicting the petitioner by force. A suit which was also filed by the company for possession was decreed against the employee directing her to vacate the quarter and hand over possession. An appeal which was filed by the petitioner against the decree was also dismissed. The petitioner, however, continued to retain possession. The company thereafter filed a complaint under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. The petitioner filed a petition under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to have the complaint quashed. It was held, dismissing the petition that the complaint under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act is maintainable. Relying on the said decision, it is contended by the company that, merely, because the respondent is intending to file a suit or raise a dispute of tenancy, the criminal prosecution is not incompetent. It was held, dismissing the petition that the complaint under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act is maintainable. Relying on the said decision, it is contended by the company that, merely, because the respondent is intending to file a suit or raise a dispute of tenancy, the criminal prosecution is not incompetent. ( 24 ) IN Ajoy Kumar v. Union of India, 1984 (3) SCC 127 , it was held that in case of conflict between the two Statutes - one special and the other general - the tests to determine as to which one would prevail are : (i) The legislature has right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provision, (iii) A later general law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a later general law. Thus, it can very well be seen from the said decision that the later general law will also override prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist, even in absence of a specific provision in that behalf in the general law; whereas, in the present case the special provision is made in Sec. 630 of the companies Act out of general law of landlords and tenants. Even if provisions of secs. 28 and 630 both are treated as special laws, then also, Bombay Rent Act is of 1947 and the Companies Act is of 1956. Sec. 630 even if it is held to be in conflict will prevail over the provisions of Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. No doubt, it is found by this Court that provisions of Sec. 28 read with Sec. 13 (1) (f) of the rent Act and the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are operating, simultaneously, and providing different remedies which are concurrent in nature. Thus, on a harmonious construction and considering the object and purpose of both the statutes, this Court has found that both can co-exist together. Thus, on a harmonious construction and considering the object and purpose of both the statutes, this Court has found that both can co-exist together. Even in case of repugnancy or conflict between the two laws, provisions of Sec. 630 will prevail over the provisions of Sec. 13 (1) (f) read Sec. 28 of the Rent Act being a statute of the State legislature and earlier one. ( 25 ) IN Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 , the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has held that in case of conflicting laws, the later law should abrogate earlier contrary law. The provisions of the Public premises Act, to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Delhi rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Act, and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under Sec. 2 (e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act. It is also held in that case that one of the principles of statutory interpretation which is applied to resolve conflict in laws is contained in the maxim : "leges posteriores priores conterias abrogant" (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws ). Of course, it is true that this principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" (a general provision does not derogate from a special one ). It is observed by the Supreme Court that the Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enacted on 23-8- 1971, whereas the Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted on 31-12-1958. It represented the later will of Parliament and should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the Public Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent control Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent Control act should prevail over the Public Premises Act. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent Court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in Civil P. C. , the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order for eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. Both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act, and the Public Premises Act are, therefore, special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since the Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate earlier contrary law, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control act. Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the provisions of the Public premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments. ( 26 ) IN the present case, it can very well be seen that the Bombay Rent Act is a special law relating to relationship between landlords and tenants. Thus, special provisions are designed relating to general class of landlords and tenants in a special enactment. So, the sphere and horizon under the Bombay Rent Act of its subjects is wider in relation to the relationship of landlords and tenants. In the Public Premises act provisions are also made with a view to provide speedy and effective remedies for eviction against unauthorised occupants of certain public premises. So, the sphere and horizon under the Bombay Rent Act of its subjects is wider in relation to the relationship of landlords and tenants. In the Public Premises act provisions are also made with a view to provide speedy and effective remedies for eviction against unauthorised occupants of certain public premises. Thus, the circle or sphere of the subject and object both is smaller than the Bombay Rent act and it is still smaller and wholly circumscribed to the special class of Corporate owners or landlords and service-occupiers under the provisions of Sec. 630 of the companies Act. Thus, a special class is carved out by the Parliament by enacting provisions in Sec. 630. Therefore, a special law regulating relationship between landlords and tenants under the Bombay Rent Act which is wider in nature is circumscribed under the Public Premises Act in relation to public premises and very much circumscribed by enacting provisions under Sec. 630 limiting to the special class of companies and service-occupiers. It can very well be seen from the provisions of Sec. 630 that it is intended to deal with mischief of rampant unauthorised and wrongful withholding of company premises by providing speedy and summary machinery for eviction of persons in wrongful and unlawful occupation of the premises of the companies. In order to secure such an object and purpose, the Parliament in its wisdom designedly provided special and specific provisions for speedy and effectual machinery for conviction and eviction under Sec. 630 against service-occupiers. ( 27 ) THE object underlying the provisions of Sec. 630 is to safeguard the public interest of Corporate landlords and personalities by making available the premises for waiting, needy, deserving employees of the companies. For smooth and proper use and occupation of the premises of the company, a speedy machinery is provided in Sec. 630 so as to prevent abuse and misuse of such premises, as it has happened in the present case. An employee who has been out of service since 1-9-1984 after having received full dues and retiral benefits from the company, is using the premises belonging to the company for more than a decade, though he has his own bungalow constructed in Punitpark Society, Nadiad. An employee who has been out of service since 1-9-1984 after having received full dues and retiral benefits from the company, is using the premises belonging to the company for more than a decade, though he has his own bungalow constructed in Punitpark Society, Nadiad. Could a person who has been an owner of a bungalow be allowed to contend that the prosecution under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act is not maintainable only because of the fact that he has raised the dispute of tenancy and envisaged protection of Bombay Rent Act ? obvious answer would be in the negative. Such a dishonest contention goes counter to the purpose, purport and object of the beneficent provisions of Sec. 630. Therefore, even from any angle, the contention that prosecution under Sec. 630 is incompetent is farthest from the truth. In order to obviate such dilatory tactics and to make speedy and effective machinery for recovery of possession of the premises belonging to the company, the Parliament has designedly provided special and specific provisions in the Companies Act in Sec. 630 for conviction and eviction which cannot be allowed to be rendered nugatory by holding that the accused-employee of the company has raised a dispute of tenancy and protection under the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate of the respondent-accused that the provisions contained in sec. 630 cannot be applied to the disputed premises as it falls within the ambit of the Bombay Rent Act. The scope and ambit of the provisions of Sec. 630 cannot be restricted by reference to the provisions contained in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. Such an approach adopted by the learned Magistrate is not only illogical, unjust but is arbitrary and illegal. Such an approach would strike at the very root and object of the provisions of Sec. 630. This Court cannot cut down the provisions of Sec. 630 on the basis of the provisions under the Rent Act. ( 28 ) IT is also contended that if the view taken by the learend Magistrate is not confirmed, then, it is likely that many companies under the Companies Act may abuse the provisions for profiteering motives. Prima facie, such submission may appear to be subtle but not sound and sustainable. ( 28 ) IT is also contended that if the view taken by the learend Magistrate is not confirmed, then, it is likely that many companies under the Companies Act may abuse the provisions for profiteering motives. Prima facie, such submission may appear to be subtle but not sound and sustainable. Provisions of Sec. 630 enable the companies to recover possession of the premises under the speedier machinery and disable the right, if any, of the service-occupiers under the local Rent Act. ( 29 ) THE Supreme Court in Jain Ink Mfg. Co v. L. I. C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 , had an occasion to consider the provisions of Secs. 3 (a),14 and 25b of the public Premises Act and Sec. 1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The question was - whether provisions of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court held that in both the Acts, there is non-obstante clause but the question to be determined is whether non-obstante clause operates in the same field or two different spheres though there may be some amount of overlapping. Both the scope and the object of the Public Premises act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Public Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Sec. 2 of the public Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor government nor Corporate Bodies. Even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Sec. 25b which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. It is clearly held that there can be no doubt that the Public premises Act as compared to the Rent Act which has a very broad spectrum is a special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act. It is clearly held that there can be no doubt that the Public premises Act as compared to the Rent Act which has a very broad spectrum is a special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act. ( 30 ) IN the said decision, it is also held that the provisions of the Slums Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 are earlier and the provisions of the Public premises Act are subsequent and, therefore, the provisions of the Public Premises act will override the Slums Areas Act. It has been, vehemently, contended that the criminal prosecution should not be allowed to continue in view of the bona fide dispute of tenancy raised by the tenant-employee. In other words, it is contended that once the bona fide dispute with regard to tenancy is raised, the criminal prosecution should not be allowed and the parties should be permitted to exhaust their rights and remedies under the civil law. This contention cannot be sustained. What is a bona fide dispute is the question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the case. Apart from that, mere raising of a bona fide dispute would not constitute a hurdle in the criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 and with a view to support this contention and with a view to appreciate the important question, it would be necessary to refer to relevant case-law. The Bombay High Court has consistently held that under the guise of bona fide dispute, criminal prosecution under Sec. 630 cannot be sacrificed. It is consistently held that Sec. 630 plainly makes it an offence if an officer or employee of a company, who was permitted to use any property of the company during his employment, wrongfully retains or occupies the same after the termination of his employment. The term officer or employee in Sec. 630 applies not only to existing officers or employees of a company but also to past officers or employees, if such officer or employee either (a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company, or (b) having obtained such property during the course of his employment, withholds the same after the termination of his employment. The prosecution cannot be stalled on the ground of alleged bona fide civil dispute. In Baldev Krishna Sahai v. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) the Bombay High Court took the view that prosecution under sec. The prosecution cannot be stalled on the ground of alleged bona fide civil dispute. In Baldev Krishna Sahai v. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) the Bombay High Court took the view that prosecution under sec. 630 against a service-occupier who has retired from the company will be competent and maintainable even if the accused or the employee has filed a suit in the civil Court on the ground of tenancy. The contention that there is a bona fide civil dispute between the parties which can be resolved in a civil Court and therefore, on that ground, summary proceedings under Sec. 630 should not be permitted to thwart legal rights pertaining to tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act, is without any substance. Where there is a statutory provision and statutory remedy, providing effective and efficient speedy mechanism for conviction and eviction for the serviceoccupiers of the company, it cannot be said that the parties should only be permitted to resolve their dispute in the civil Court. Admittedly, there is no question of title involved in the present case. There is no dispute about ownership of the property. There is no dispute about termination of service. It is succinctly established without any doubt that the respondent was inducted in the companys premises on account of he being in the employment of the company. Right to occupy the companys premises is found to be co-terminus with termination of service. When service or employment has come to an end, right to occupy premises of the company also ends. Protection under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act does not exclude or supersede the special provisions made for the said class of companies in Sec. 630 which provide speedy and effective summary machinery for conviction and eviction. In this connection, it may be noted that a similar contention was raised before the bombay High Court in Baldev Krishnas case (supra) which was rejected relying on three earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court held in Krishna Avtar Bahadur v. Col. Irwin Extross, (1986) 59 Comp. Cases 417, while dealing with almost identical facts that merely because the petitioner had raised a dispute of tenancy, criminal proceedings under Sec. 630 cannot be stayed. The bombay High Court again took the consistent view in Harikishan Lakhimal Gidwani v. Achyut Kasinath Wagh, (1982) 52 Comp. Irwin Extross, (1986) 59 Comp. Cases 417, while dealing with almost identical facts that merely because the petitioner had raised a dispute of tenancy, criminal proceedings under Sec. 630 cannot be stayed. The bombay High Court again took the consistent view in Harikishan Lakhimal Gidwani v. Achyut Kasinath Wagh, (1982) 52 Comp. Cases 1 and also in Govind T. Jagtiani v. Sirajuddin S. Kazi, (1984) 54 Comp. Cases 329. Following the ratio in the aforesaid three decisions, the Bombay High Court thus once again took the same view in Baldev Krishnas case (supra ). In Baldev Krishna Sahai v. Shipping corporation of India Ltd. , AIR 1987 SC 2245 , the Supreme Court has upheld the view taken by the Bombay High Court that criminal proceedings cannot be stalled or stayed on the specious plea of tenancy under the Rent Act raised by the accusedemployee. The following observations of the Supreme Court are very important :"the beneficent provisions contained in Sec. 630, no doubt penal, has been purposely enacted by the legislature with the object of providing a summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company (a) where an officer or employee of company wrongfully obtains possession of property of the company, or (b) where having been placed in possession of any such property during the course of his employment, wrongfully withholds possession of it after the termination of his employment. It is the duty of the Court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provision in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. "it is also held that the term officer or employee in Sec. 630 applies not only to existing officers or employees of a company but also to past officers or employees, if such officer or employee either (a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company, or (b) having obtained such property during the course of his employment, withholds the same after the termination of his employment. ( 31 ) IT is very clear from the provisions of Sec. 630 that it is wrongful withholding of such property, meaning the property of the company after termination of the employment which is an offence under Sec. 630 (1) (b), as rightly pointed out by V. S. Kotwal, J. in Harikrishna Gidwanis case (supra ). ( 31 ) IT is very clear from the provisions of Sec. 630 that it is wrongful withholding of such property, meaning the property of the company after termination of the employment which is an offence under Sec. 630 (1) (b), as rightly pointed out by V. S. Kotwal, J. in Harikrishna Gidwanis case (supra ). In that case, petitioner had been General Manager of a company known as English Electrical Co. of India ltd. having its registered office at Calcutta. He had been allotted the premises of a flat, approximately 3,500 sq. ft. in area located at Mayfair Gardens, Little Gibs road, Bombay. He had been inducted into the flat only by virtue of his capacity as the General Manager of the companys branch office at Bombay but the company allowed him to retain the same on humanitarian grounds for a short period after his retirement to enable him to find alternative accommodation. The humanitarian and charitable consideration shown by the company was reciprocated by the petitioner by adopting an adamant attitude and he declined to vacate the same on one pretext or another. Therefore, a question had arisen as to whether there was wrongful retention of the flat amounting to an offence under Sec. 630. The Court repelled the contention that Sec. 630 applies only to the existing officers and employees of the company and not to former officers and employees and that the phrase any such property used in clause (b), even though clauses (a) and (b) are separated by the word or which must in the context in which it appears be read as and and so construed, must mean withholding of property wrongfully obtained by an existing officer or employee. The Bombay High Court, on a careful analysis of Sec. 630 held that the said section applies not only to the present officers and employees of the company but to the past officers and employees as well. ( 32 ) IN Govind T. Jagtianis case (supra), Kanade, J. following the critical analysis of Sec. 630 in the above case, observed that entitlement of an officer to the property of the company and the duration of such right would be co-terminus with the terms of employment and the right would stand extinguished with the termination to the employment giving rise to an obligation to hand over the property back to the company. The following observations at page 336 of the said decision are very pertinent :"if the property is held back, the retained possession would amount to wrongful withholding of the property of the company. While the existence of the capacity, right and possession would be during employment, the withhloding may be even after the termination of the employment and though the possession as it precedes the act of retention or withholding may be rightful in the past affording an opportunity to withhold, the withholding may be wrongful as in the present case. " ( 33 ) IT can safely be presumed that while making special speedy mechanism, in Sec. 630 of the Companies Act, the Parliament must have taken a note of non- obstante clause in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act providing that its provisions will override those of any other law. Of course, statutory interpretation has no convention protocol but in frequent situation like the one on hand, it can be inferred that parliament noticed and took note of non-obstante clause contained in Sec. 28 of the Rent Act which came into force on 19-1-1948, while making special provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 which came in force on 1-4-1956. Therefore, even in case of conflict or repugnancy, provisions of Sec. 630 shall override the provisions of the Rent Act. Interpretation of the provisions of the statute should be such which would advance the object thereof and not frustrate it. The Court cannot be oblivious to the special and specific purpose for which provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act are motivated and enacted. If the interpretation made by the trial Court and supported by the learned Advocate for the respondent-accused is accepted, it would mean that the Court would be reading sec. 630 of the Companies Act with the words subject to the provisions of the rent Act as applicable. Had that been the intention while enacting the special provisions of Sec. 630, the Parliament would have expressly added such words or expression in Sec. 630. The Court cannot legislate, the Court can interpret only. One of the fundamental objects and tests of interpretation of statutes is that it should be done in modern manner which further the end and policy and not frustrate or fester it. The Court cannot legislate, the Court can interpret only. One of the fundamental objects and tests of interpretation of statutes is that it should be done in modern manner which further the end and policy and not frustrate or fester it. A question would arise, if the interpretation of Sec. 630 made by the learned Magistrate is accepted and as supported by the learned Advocate for the respondent-accused, would it foster or fester the underlying aim and policy of the provisions of Sec. 630 ? Undoubtedly, it would fester and not foster the purpose. Such interpretation cannot be accepted. Therefore, such interpretation made by the learned Magistrate is, totally with due respect, without merit. It is also cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that later enactment must prevail over the earlier one even if a non-obstante clause is provided in the earlier enactment. Art. 254 of the Constitution makes a provision for inconsistencies between the laws made by the Parliament and the laws made by the legislatures of States. It reads as under :" (1) If any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact or to any provisions of an existing law, with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by the Parliament whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law shall prevail and the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters, enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provision of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in the State : provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the legislature. "the following aspects become very clear from a plain perusal of Art. 254 : (i) The State law does not become void as soon as the Union Parliament legislates with respect to the same subject. There is nothing to prevent the state legislature to legislate with respect to a Concurrent subject merely because there is a Union law relating to the same subject. Art. 254 (2) is attracted only if the State law is repugnant to the Union Act, which means that the two cannot stand together. The doctrine of occupied field has obviously no application in the interpretation of the Art. 254, (ii) There is no question of applying Art. 254 unless the State law is in its pith and substance, in law relating to the Concurrent List. If it is covered by an entry in the State List but only touches the Concurrent List incidentally, there is no application of Art. 254, and (iii) The onus of showing the repugnancy and the extent thereof is on the party who attacks the validity of the State law. The State law may be repugnant in any of the following situations : (i) When there is direct conflict between the two provisions. This may happen - (a) where one cannot be obeyed without disobeying the other. (b) two enactments may also be inconsistent although obedience to each of them may be possible without disobeying the other. Statutes do more often impose duties; they may, for instance, confer rights; and one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by the other even though the right be one which might be waived and abandoned without disobeying the statute which conferred the right. In other words, repugnancy is not confined only to the case where there is a direct conflict between two legislatures, e. g. , where the one says do what the other says dont. It may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together, e. g. , where both prescribe punishment for the same offence but the punishment differs in degree or kind or in the procedure prescribed. In such cases, the law made by the Parliament shall prevail over a State law, under Art. 254. (c) The principle of implied repeal may be applied to determine repugnancy for the purposes of Art. 254 (2 ). In such cases, the law made by the Parliament shall prevail over a State law, under Art. 254. (c) The principle of implied repeal may be applied to determine repugnancy for the purposes of Art. 254 (2 ). But there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes. (ii) Though there may not be direct conflict between the Union and the State legislation, where it is evident that the Union Parliament intended its legislation to be a complete and exhaustive Code relating to the subject, it shall be taken that the Union law has replaced the State legislation relating to the subject. ( 34 ) THERE is a consensus between all the Counsels that the Central Legislation companies law is on relation to items 43 and 44 provided in List - I in the Seventh schedule of the Constitution and that the subject of Bombay Rent Act falls in List ii (State list) in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Thus, the Companies Act, 1956 is enacted in relation to items in List I, Union list. In the circumstances, as provided in Art. 254 of the Constitution, the Central Legislation will prevail over the State legislation. It is reinforced by the decision of the Apex Court in Ashoka marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 . ( 35 ) THE contention that two agreements of leave and licence produced are in reality and in substance agreements of tenancy and not licence is accepted by the trial Court. Various factors are required to be considered in order to ascertain the real substance of the agreements. The trial Court has placed reliance on the decision of the aforesaid Division Bench of this Court and has held that Exs. 31 and 32 are agreements in relation to lease and not licence. It is also a settled proposition of law that it is not correct to say that exclusive possession of party is irrelevant but it is not conclusive. The intention of the party is also very important for the purpose of interpretation of lease or licence. Where a document creates any interest in the property or not is also one of the important considerations. The view of the trial court that accused is a lessee and not licensee under the agreements is questionable. The intention of the party is also very important for the purpose of interpretation of lease or licence. Where a document creates any interest in the property or not is also one of the important considerations. The view of the trial court that accused is a lessee and not licensee under the agreements is questionable. Whether one is a lessee or licensee under the agreement is a question of fact depending upon the facts of each case in a given case. However, without entering into this aspect, the main question of maintainability of the criminal prosecution can be adjudicated upon in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, assuming that interpretation made by the trial Court is correct, then also, it cannot be said that the criminal prosecution is incompetent under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. Be that as it may, it is amply clear from the agreement between the parties that possession of the disputed room of the company was given to the respondent-accused who was an employee, because of service relationship with the company. The disputed room was given for use and occupation as per the agreement so that the employee can function efficiently. Licence fee was fixed at Rs. 22. 00 per month as per the agreement. It is also very clear from the agreement between the parties that right to occupy the disputed room was co-terminus with termination of services. Agreement, Ex. 31 is dated 11-7-1977. Ex. 32 is also an agreement between the parties which is dated 10-7-1989. Both the agreements are styled as leave and licence agreements. The trial Court has interpreted the relationship of lessor and lessee and not licensee. However, without going into it and even assuming so, the trial Court has committed serious error of law in acquitting the accused merely because the accused is held to be lessee and not licensee in view of the aforesaid observations. ( 36 ) A contention is also raised that the prosecution is barred by the period of limitation in view of Sec. 468 of the Code. Section 468 provides bar to taking cognizance after lapse of period of limitation. Sec. 468 (2) (c) provides period of limitation of three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. The offence punishable under sec. Section 468 provides bar to taking cognizance after lapse of period of limitation. Sec. 468 (2) (c) provides period of limitation of three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. The offence punishable under sec. 630 of the Companies Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. The criminal complaint is filed, admittedly, after the period of three years. However, this contention of bar of limitation cannot be accepted as it is without any substance in view of the provisions of Sec. 472 of the Code. Sec. 472 provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. The respondent-accused voluntarily retired from service with effect from 1-9-1984. Therefore, according to the defence of the accused, the complaint ought to have been filed on or before 1-9-1987 in view of Sec. 468 (2) (c) of the Code. The complaint is filed on 18-10-1988 under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act. ( 37 ) IN light of the aforesaid circumstances and considering the provisions of sec. 630 of the Companies Act, provisions of Sec. 472 of the Code will be attracted. Wrongful withholding or wrongfully obtaining possession and wrongful application of the companys property, that is, for purposes other than those expressed or directed in the Articles of the company and authorised by the Companies Act, cannot be said to be terminated by a single act or fact but would susist for the period until the property in the offenders possession is delivered up or returned to the company. The offence under Sec. 630 is not such as can be said to be one time, one for all wrongful withholding of the property of the company. Thus, it is a continuing offence and shall continue until the property is delivered to the company. Therefore, Sec. 472 of the Code will apply and not provisions of Sec. 468 of the Code. This proposition of law is also very much established and settled by the Apex Court in Gokak Patel Volkar Ltd. v. D. Gurushiddaiah Hiremath, (1991) 71 Comp. Cases 403. Therefore, Sec. 472 of the Code will apply and not provisions of Sec. 468 of the Code. This proposition of law is also very much established and settled by the Apex Court in Gokak Patel Volkar Ltd. v. D. Gurushiddaiah Hiremath, (1991) 71 Comp. Cases 403. ( 38 ) CONTENTION that matter may be remanded to the trial Court for further trial in view of the observations of this Court and to complete the criminal trial against the accused is nothing but like polishing the brass when whole ship is sinking. It is totally misconceived and meritless submission. It is again an attempt to protract the proceedings and delay eviction and conviction by an accused who has constructed bungalow in Nadiad. ( 39 ) LASTLY, it is urged on behalf of the accused that provisions of Sec. 630 (2) should not be invoked as they are discretionary and such discretion in the facts and circumstances of the case should be exercised in favour of the accused. This contention is also meritless. More so, at this stage, when the question of passing sentence order will arise after recording conviction and thereafter hearing the accused on the quantum of sentence as mandated by the provisions of Sec. 235 of the Code. ( 40 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove and the testimonial collection examined thread-bare coupled with close scrutiny of the relevant case-law discussed hereinabove, this Court has no hesitation in finding that the impugned order of acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate is perverse and illegal. Therefore, it is required to be quashed. The prosecution has undoubtedly succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under sec. 630 of the Companies Act. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 630. While reversing the judgment and acquittal order, the respondent-accused is hereby, held guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 630. Obviously, here, there shall be a statutory pause as mendated by Sec. 235 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure. Before passing sentence order, it is incumbent to hear the accused on the quantum of sentence for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and the matter is, therefore, adjourned for the purpose of hearing the accused on the question of sentence. . Before passing sentence order, it is incumbent to hear the accused on the quantum of sentence for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and the matter is, therefore, adjourned for the purpose of hearing the accused on the question of sentence. . ( 41 ) PURSUANT to the direction contained above and the provisions of Sec. 235 (1) ofthe Code, the accused is present today and he is heard on the quantum of sentence. He has stated the following grounds for taking liberal and lenient view while passing sentence order : 1. That he has worked in the company for a long spell of more than 40 years; 2. That he is occupying the premises of the company and has not fully shifted to new Bungalow in Punit Park Society, Nadiad; 3. That he is an old man, and; 4. That he is a poor man. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-company and the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused and considering the aforesaid points raised by the respondent-accused and also in light of the facts and circumstances and the provisions of Sec. 630 of the Companies Act, ends of justice will be met if the accused is awarded sentence of fine of Rs. 500. 00 under Sec. 630 (1 ). Sec. 630 (2) further provides and empowers the Court to pass order directing the accused to return or hand over possession of the property wrongfully withheld or in defualt, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. ( 42 ) IN this connection, learned Counsel for the respondent-accused has submitted that the expression may employed in Sec. 630 (1) gives wider discretion to the court and considering the special facts and circumstances of the present case coupled with old age of the accused, powers under Sec. 630 (2) may not be exercised. It is true that under Sec. 630 (2) discretion is conferred on the Court. However, it has to be exercised judicially and in light of the attending facts and circumstances and also keeping in mind that beneficent law makes special provisions for effective and speedy remedy for conviction and eviction against unauthorised service-occupier. Therefore, the underlying purport and purpose and the mechanism of Sec. 630 is also required to be considered. However, it has to be exercised judicially and in light of the attending facts and circumstances and also keeping in mind that beneficent law makes special provisions for effective and speedy remedy for conviction and eviction against unauthorised service-occupier. Therefore, the underlying purport and purpose and the mechanism of Sec. 630 is also required to be considered. ( 43 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the present case and the aforesaid provision and its underlying purport and purpose and in the light of the fact that the accused has a Bungalow in Punit Park Society, Nadiad, ordinarily in such a case, accused should be directed to deliver up and hand over possession of the premises of the company immediately. However, since the accused is aged about 73 years, in the larger interest of justice, reasonable time may be given. In the circumstances, the respondent-accused is directed to deliver up and hand over possession of the premises of Room No. 30 bearing Municipal Census No. 5/947, New Shorrock Nagar, Nadiad belonging to company within 90 days, i. e. , on or before 10-6-1995 failing which or in deault, shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. ( 44 ) PARTING thought may be necessary. Quantum of fine and the quantum of sentence of imprisonment awarded above is on account of the peculiar facts and special circumstances emerging from the record of the present case together with the fact that the accused is aged about 73. The Court is obliged to strike the balance and has to exercise the powers under Sec. 630 so that the grounds personal to the accused at the stage of sentence can be considered and at the same time, mandate of Sec. 630 and the purpose of the special provision for conviction and eviction is also subserved. What should be the just and reasonable balance will have to be decided on the facts of each case. ( 45 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances, the respondent-accused Popatbhai Haribhai Patel is held guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and consequently, he is sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 500. 00, in default, to undergo S. I. for seven days. ( 45 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances, the respondent-accused Popatbhai Haribhai Patel is held guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 630 of the Companies Act and consequently, he is sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 500. 00, in default, to undergo S. I. for seven days. The accused is also directed to deliver up and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of disputed companys Room No. 30, bearing Municipal Census No. 5/947, New Shorrock Nagar, Nadiad belonging to complainant company on or before 10-6-1995 failing which or in default, shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. Accused is given time to pay the fine upto 31-3-1995. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the appeal is required to be allowed. Accordingly, it is allowed, setting aside the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. .