ALOK CHAKRABARTI, J. This writ petition was heard analogously with eight other writ petitions hearing this one as the main petition as points involved are identical. 2. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging deci sion refusing consideration of their candidature for appointment as Assistants as also letters dated 3-12-1993 communicating such decision to son of the petitioners. 3. The case in brief, as made out in the present writ petition, inter alia, is that the petitioners were Airmen in the Indian Air Force and had been discharged on respective dates after completing more than fifteen years of service. The dates of discharge of the petitioners as shown in paragraph No. 1 is between 28-2-1993 and 30-11-1993. 4. An advertisement was issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short LIC) inviting applications for the posts of Assistants in dainik Jagran published on 7-12-1992 (Annexure No. II to the writ petition ). The last date of submission of the application form was 28-12-1992 which was extended upto 11-1-1993. Advertisement showed that out of total vacancy in the post of Assistants, the posts shown reserved for ex-servicemen were nine. In response to the said advertisement the petitioners applied for the posts against the quota reserved for ex-servicemen specifically annexing no objection certificate which categorically certified that exact date on which the petitioners would be relieved from service. The petitioners were called to appear in the written test and subsequently were declared successful, Call for interview followed through necessary call letters. The petitioners accordingly appeared before the selection committee on the date fixed for interview and produced their original testimonials including no objection certificate. On 9-11-1993 the list was published by the respondent No. 3 on the notice board of the divisional office stating that the candidates, whose names were mentioned in the said list, have been declared successful. Petitioners claimed that they were issued letters on appointment dated 17-11-1993 (Annexures IV, V and VI to the writ petition) fixing 4-12-1993 for medical examination. 5. Identical letters, claiming to be appointment letters, were issued to all the petitioners. Thereafter, instead of getting the petitioners medically examined, they were handed over letters dated 3-12-1993 on 4-12-1993 whereby they were informed that their candidature for appointment as Assistants in LIC cannot be considered as per Rules. Challenging the said letters dated 3-32-1993 the present writ petition was move as aforesaid. 6. Thereafter, instead of getting the petitioners medically examined, they were handed over letters dated 3-12-1993 on 4-12-1993 whereby they were informed that their candidature for appointment as Assistants in LIC cannot be considered as per Rules. Challenging the said letters dated 3-32-1993 the present writ petition was move as aforesaid. 6. The petitioners also filed two supplementary affidavits. One affirmed on 4-10-1994 annexed a circular dated 3-8-1994 (Annexure SA-I) referring to which it has been contended that the LIC has reiterated that an ex-servicemen will be entitled to appointment provided he is actually discharged on the date of interview. By the second supplementary affidavit it has been contended that two persons, namely, Ved Prakash Gupta and Ramesh Chandra Singh similarly situated as the petitioners, had applied one year before the date of actual discharge in pursuance of the advertisement dated 7-12-1992 had been in fact appointed as Assistants and aw posted in Aligarh Division and are still continuing in the employment. 7. The respondents filed counter affidavit and contested the proceeding. The main contention of the respondents is that eligibility including requirement of discharge from service has to be on the first date of the month in which the employment notice has been issued which in the present case was 1st Decem ber, 1992. In support of such contention reference was made to the relevant circular dated 21- 10-1991 clarifying the position. It has been contended that the effective scrutiny of the eligibility was to be made at the final stage of selec tion/recruitment process when the candidates are required to produce their original certificates at the time of interview. 8. It has further been contended that the present writ petitioners being not ex-servicemen on 1-12-1992 as their dates of discharge were subsequent to 1-12-1992 they could not be appointed. The respondents further contended that the letters dated 17-11-1993 were not appointment-letters and they were simply letters inviting candidates to appear for medical examination. The case of two persons appointed, although were not ex-servicemen on 1-12-1992, as urged by the petitioners, were not disputed but it has been contended that the same was a case of wrongful procurement of appointment concealing the material facts and proceedings against them were contemplated in accordance with law. No steps were taken against them at any stage. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned counsel for the respondents. No steps were taken against them at any stage. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned counsel for the respondents. Parties agreed that the affidavit having been exchanged the writ petition may be disposed of finally at this stage. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the advertise ment dated 7-12-1992 at Annexure II to the writ petition has not prescribed any cut-off date and it was also not prescribed therein that the candidates were to be discharged from service by 1-12-1992 being the first day of the month in which the advertisement was published. It has been contended that only after the interview when the petitioners were already selected, the new provision purported to have been implemented prescribing the date or discharge from service by the first day of the month when the advertisement was published, namely, 1-12-1992. The clause 4 of the advertisement has been referred to which provides for upper age limit referring to the definition in terms of the prescription by the Government of India. It has further been contended that admittedly the interview was held, list of successful candidates was published and only thereafter the letters dated 3-12-1993 were issued informing in clear language that "we have now received a clarification from our zonal office, Kanpur that your candidature for appointment as Assistant in the Corpora tion cannot be considered as per Rules as you were not actually discharged on or before 30-11-1992". This being the contemporaneous disclosure of reasons for refusal the other reasons are after thoughts and not believable. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that the counter affidavit disclosed that the document dated 21-10-1991 (Annexure II to the counter-affidavit) was for the purpose of not considering the candidature of such personnel in the Armed-forces who were still in the service and thus might not be in a position to join alongwith others according to the scheduled recruitment exercise. The said document only provided that for consideration an ex-servicemen should be actually released or discharged from the active service of the Armed Forces. No cut-off date has been provided therein. He has further referred to the document at Annexure 1 to the writ petition to con tend that the same dated 25-2-1993 is in supersession of all prior instructions. The said document only provided that for consideration an ex-servicemen should be actually released or discharged from the active service of the Armed Forces. No cut-off date has been provided therein. He has further referred to the document at Annexure 1 to the writ petition to con tend that the same dated 25-2-1993 is in supersession of all prior instructions. On the basis thereof it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that in the circumstances the circular dated 21-10-1991 at Annexure II to the counter-affidavit stood superseded and did not apply in the case of the petitioners. The petitioners further contended that in the advertisement cut-off date was prescribed only in respect of age and accordingly the date of release from active service having no cut- off date in the advertisement itself, could not be subsequently burdened with a prescription as to date of effect and that too on the basis of letter of 1991. On behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed out that the letter dated 3-12-1993 at Annexure-8 to the writ petition itself records on admits that the respondents were given clarification at that stage and bar under the said clarification thus had been admitted to be non-existent at the relevant period of advertisement and interview. The petitioners contend that such subsequent imposition of bar is not permissible and the authorities are estopped from imposing such bar at the subsequent period. 12. The petitioners have also referred to paragraph No. 39 of the writ petition, the case of candidates who were appointed in spite of their subsequent discharge from active service and reference was also made to paragraph No. 23 of the counter-affidavit admitting the said fact. 13. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel made a reference to the law laid down in various cases. First case referred to was the case of Shankar Charan Tripathi v. Public Service Commission, reported in (1992) 1 UPLBEC 709 wherein advertisement by the Public Service Commission and the Ex- servicemen Re-employment in Central Civil Service and Post Rules, 1971 were considered as also the principles of promissory stopple and equitable estoppel have been explained. First case referred to was the case of Shankar Charan Tripathi v. Public Service Commission, reported in (1992) 1 UPLBEC 709 wherein advertisement by the Public Service Commission and the Ex- servicemen Re-employment in Central Civil Service and Post Rules, 1971 were considered as also the principles of promissory stopple and equitable estoppel have been explained. Upon consideration of the fact in the said case it was held that creation of two categories of candidates on their being released within six months from the last date of receipt of application, was arbitrary and the commission has been held to be estopped from cancellation of the candidature of the petitioner of the stage of interview. The next reference was made to the case of Dinesh Kumar Garg v. Public Service Commission, U- P. Allahabad anal others, reported in 1994 HVD (Alld) Vol. 1 page 297. The Division Bench in the said case also disapproved the rejection of the candi dature of the petitioner therein after scrutinizing his application form with open eyes and allowed him to appear in the interview finding him fully eligible and such procedure has been held to be abnormal one and arbitrary. 14. The next reference was made and strong reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner upon the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chandra Shekhar, reported in 1993 (1) SLR 379 in which considering the rules as also in the interest of getting best talents available, the candidates, who were fully qualified on the dates of interview, were held to be entitled to be selected. 15. The next reference was made to the case of U. P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana, report in 1994 (1) UPLBEC 242 but in the said judg ment the apex court explained the earlier judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) in the special factual background of the earlier case. It has been explained that there was a special fact of conscious decision by the appro priate authority for such candidates who submitted, the application after last date of receipt of the application but before the interviews, were held to be considered eligible for appointment. In such background only the earlier decision was found to be not required to be considered from die angle of validity. In such background only the earlier decision was found to be not required to be considered from die angle of validity. The delay in the matter of challenge in the said earlier case justi fying refusal of change, was also taken note of. Upon such consideration and considering the fact of this case the apex court approved the conduct of the Public Service Commission. The respondent in Alpanas case (supra) not qualified to apply on the date of application and there being no rule or practice permitting the entertainment of her application, rejection of her case was held to be right. 16. In the present case the petitioners also referred to earlier practice and subsequent practice. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioners have no legal right in the matter of appointment even after interview. It has further been contended that clause 3 of the advertisement indicates that a date was fixed for the purpose of eligibility and for whichever matter no date has prescribed, the date provided in clause 3 is applicable. As a matter of justi fication it was contended that if the cut-off date is the date of appointment, the same may vary in various cases leading to discrimination and arbitrariness. In the circumstances, it has further been argued that even if it is held by the court that no date has been prescribed as date of eligibility, it should be the date of application. 18. It has been contended that the said case lays down the principle that when fixed date for qualification not prescribed, qualifications are to be considered as on last date of preferring application. In support thereof refer ence was mass made to the cases of Mrs. Rekha Chalurvedi v. University of Rajasthan, reported in 1993 Labour and Industrial Cases 1250 ; Dr. M. V. Nait v. Union of India and others, reported in 1993 (1) JT 255 ; A. P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, reported in 1990 (4) SLR 235 and also the case of District Collector and Chairman v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, reported in 1990 (4) SLR 237. Relying upon the latter case it has been con tended that detection of want of qualification at a later stage and the cancella tion on the basis thereof is justified. 19. Relying upon the law laid down in the case of Dr. Relying upon the latter case it has been con tended that detection of want of qualification at a later stage and the cancella tion on the basis thereof is justified. 19. Relying upon the law laid down in the case of Dr. Manjula Das v. State of Assam and others, reported in 1992 Labour and Industrial Cases 2271, decided by the Division Bench of Gauhati High Court, it has been contended that the consideration of candidate not having requisite qualification along with qualified candidate tantamounts to treating the unequals equally in viola tion of fundamental right of qualified candidate. Further, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the apex court in the case of Parveen Jindal and others v. State of Haryana, reported in 1993 Labour and Industrial Cases 1019 and it has been contended that appearance at selection by the candidate itself is not sufficient for him to claim selection for appointment. In support thereof reliance was also placed upon the case of Jai Singh Dalai v. State of Haryana, reported in 1993 Labour and Industrial Cases 844. 20. Much reliance has been placed upon the case of and7. P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana, (supra) wherein the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) has been explained considering the fact of that case and the consideration of the facts as to prejudice of other candidate who may not apply, though superior to the other candidate applied, as the result of the examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of the applica tion. The administrative difficulty in case of other interpretation has also been referred to and relied upon. 21. Reference was further made to the unreported judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Balasubramaniam v. The Zonal Manager and others wherein the Ex-servicemen Re-employment in Central Service and Post Rules, 1971 were held to be not applicable in the case of a candidate applying to the post of Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation and the service in the Life Insurance Corporation was held to be not a civil service. Rejecting the writ petition it was held that the petitioner therein would not come under the category of ex-serviceman. 22. Question involved herein is not whether petitioners were qualified at the initial stage. Rejecting the writ petition it was held that the petitioner therein would not come under the category of ex-serviceman. 22. Question involved herein is not whether petitioners were qualified at the initial stage. In the present case admittedly the candidature of the petitioners was being considered although in the quota reserved for ex-service men knowing from the beginning their respective dates or discharge. So, the only point to be considered is whether respondents acted properly in deciding at the very late stage not to consider the candidature of the petitioners. No date of such decision has been disclosed by the respondents but at the hearing parties proceeded taking the said decision to be of 3-12-1993 being the date of the latter communicating such decision to only some candidates. The expres sion therein "we have now received clarification" indicate a matter of recent date. No rule has been shown requiring actual discharge of candidates on or before 30-11-1992. The employment notification advertised on 7-12-1992 also did not require the same. The letter dated 31-10-1991 also does not justify the stand on the respondents as the said letter expressed concern of possibility of waiting for release after selection. The said letter neither prescribed cut-off date nor clamped any bar. It only provided permission of the Government not to consider in such situation of waiting for discharge. The actual consi deration of the cases of petitioners till the late stage and the appointment of two other similarly circumstanced employees conclusively indicate that respon dents also were considering the cases of petitioners following the policy. Admittedly, there was no disclosure of any new material at the late stage justifying change of decision. Moreover, all the petitioners were actually discharged from active service before the impugned decision as communicated by letter dated 3-12-1993. Accordingly, I do not find any justification for refusal to consider the candidature of the petitioners by the impugned decision. 23. Other contentions raised by the parties at the hearing thus are not relevant in the facts and circumstances of this case. 24. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. The decision to refuse consideration of candidature of the petitioners including letters at Annexures 7, 8 and 9 to the writ petition communicating the said decision, are without justification and declared illegal and inoperative. 24. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. The decision to refuse consideration of candidature of the petitioners including letters at Annexures 7, 8 and 9 to the writ petition communicating the said decision, are without justification and declared illegal and inoperative. The respondents are directed to consider as early as possible the case of the petitioners for the purpose of recruitment in accordance with law from the stage upto which it was com pleted before the impugned decision to reject their candidature. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .