JUDGMENT A. L. Vaidya, J.—The present respondent was prosecuted under section 7/16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter to be called as the Act) for selling adulterated milk. He was carrying about 40 kg of Milk for the purpose of sale in September, 1987 at Nurpur, where the Food Inspector, in accordance with law, purchased sample of milk from the respondent for analysis- Public analyst opined that percentage of milk fat was deficient by 12% and the percentage of milk solids not fat was deficient by 41% than minimum prescribed standard. The respondent-accused before the trial Magistrate stated that he was totally innocent and sample of milk was taken without his consent by the Food Inspector and that milk carried by him was not meant for sale to the general public but it was for his personal use and he was carrying it from his field to his house. 2 The trial Magistrate, acquitted the accused and the State has assailed the said acquittal order, in the present appeal on various grounds. 3. As referred above, simple case of the accused, as put up before the trial Magistrate had been that he was carrying that milk for his own use to his house and without his consent sample was taken by the Food Inspector. The trial Magistrate, has not looked into this aspect of the matter but acquitted the accused on the sole ground that the complainant has failed to establish that before taking of sample, milk was not made homogeneous by stirring the same. According to the learned trial Magistrate, as this fact was not proved legally which created doubt and as a consequence thereof accused was given benefit of doubt and acquitted. 4. It is correct that accused has not taken specific defence that milk was not stirred at the time of taking of sample but such a defence, if it is available from the complainants evidence, accused is not legally debarred to avail that defence in his support. But in the present case facts reveal otherwise, which aspect would be taken up at a later stage. 5. The trial Magistrate, as mentioned earlier, has acquitted the accused by taking note of non-stirring the milk and the other pleas taken by the accused in his defence have not been discussed at all. But in the present case facts reveal otherwise, which aspect would be taken up at a later stage. 5. The trial Magistrate, as mentioned earlier, has acquitted the accused by taking note of non-stirring the milk and the other pleas taken by the accused in his defence have not been discussed at all. The trial Magistrate, as such, acted illegally by not dealing with all the pleas raised before the Court at the time of trial and disposing of the entire trial through a short cut method on one point alone. The trial Magistrate has referred this aspect in the judgment by making observations that while giving benefit of doubt to the accused, point is decided by holding that milk had not been stirred and made homogeneous, before sample was taken and therefore other pleas taken by accused need not to be discussed, in view of the fatal defect aforediscussed 6. Section 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the language and contents of judgment, It has been provided therein that every judgment referred to in section 353 which deals with the judgments in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction, shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. It may not be out of place to mention here that the learned trial Magistrate admitted in the judgment that there were other pleas taken by the accused also which according to the trial Magistrate need not to be discussed, in view of the fatal defect, pointed out earlier. Suppose so called fatal defect is not held to be fatal or otherwise legally established, this court either has to remand the case for deciding other matter or other pleas taken by the accused, to the trial Magistrate, but doing so, will take more time to complete the trial. 7. In order to avoid such a legal situation the trial Magistrate is required to determine all the points, raised during the trial, more so by the accused and give decision on all such points. In not complying with these mandatory provisions, the trial definitely prejudiced the accused and delayed the final disposal of the case. Such short cut methods must be avoided which do not help anybody. 8. In not complying with these mandatory provisions, the trial definitely prejudiced the accused and delayed the final disposal of the case. Such short cut methods must be avoided which do not help anybody. 8. This Court instead of remanding the case propose to dispose of the appeal on merit, after taking into consideration the evidence examined during the trial and the pleas raised by the accused in this behalf. Under section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has ample power in proceeding in that manner. 9. There is no doubt that a homogeneous and representative sample of milk is required to be taken so that the accused is not at all prejudiced. There is no specific rule provided in this behalf, but the fact remains that in the milk, it is distinctly possible that the fat settles on the top and in order to find out whether the milk has prescribed content, the sample must be homogeneous and representative so that analysis can furnish reliable proof of nature and content of the article of food under analysis. In the unstirred milk by movement of milk during transit the fat come at the top and if sample is taken, it may result in having more fats and less solid not fat. In order to avoid such a situation, representative sample by stirring is required to be taken. 10. In the present case, it may be referred that on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst not only milk fat but solids not fat have been found to be below the minimum prescribed standard. The fat contents were found to be 12 per cent deficient and percentage of milk solids not fat were deficient by 41%. So in a way such a result could not be there in case sample was not a representative one. Any way this is an inference but actually the factual side has to be gone into in this behalf. 11. The Food Inspector was examined as PW-1 who stated on oath that before purchase of the sample it was stirred properly. He further added that it was so done through a Jug, which was used as measure for 1000 m.l. PW-2 is one Sh, Som Nath. He has stated on oath that Jug through which milk was taken out of the utensil of the accused was taken from him. He further added that it was so done through a Jug, which was used as measure for 1000 m.l. PW-2 is one Sh, Som Nath. He has stated on oath that Jug through which milk was taken out of the utensil of the accused was taken from him. He denied the suggestion that milk was straightaway taken from the container of the accused through Jug and put into bottles He further added that it was tested with the instrument before the sample was taken. This witness was not specifically cross-examined whether the milk was made homogeneous by stirring 12. From the statement of these two witnesses, it cannot be said that on any ground whatsoever that milk was not stirred, before the sample was taken. The trial Magistrate simply came to the conclusion that milk could not be stirred in the manner deposed by the Food Inspector and the version given by the Food Inspector has not been supported by other witness PW-2 These inferences are most un called for on the basis of the circumstances present in this case, more so report of the Public Analyst in a way is not at all helpful to the case of the accused, especially in this aspect of the matter. Accused was carrying 40 kg of milk in a container and during transit likelihood of the fat having come at the top could not be ruled out and in case sample was taken in that very state, there was every likelihood of the sample having more fat contents than the minimum prescribed and lesser solids not fat contents, but it is not the case reflected from the report of Public Analyst. The trial Magistrates inferences in this behalf have to be interfered with. 13. The next point raised before this Court has been pertaining to the main defence of the accused that milk carried by him was not meant for sale but he was bringing that milk from his field to be taken for his personal use to his house, Under section 2 (xiii) of the Act, sale has been defined, which also means sale of any article of food for analysis. There is no doubt that sale for analysis though contains element of compulsion but it has to be regarded as a sale. There is no doubt that sale for analysis though contains element of compulsion but it has to be regarded as a sale. In case article is intended for consumption by a person,—in that event taking of sample by the Food Inspector may not amount to sale but simply because a person represents in that manner will not in any way exclude this transaction from the ambit of sale. If it is so and it is interpreted in that manner, every defaulter will be absolved from the criminal liability under the Act. In order to appreciate this aspect of the matter, evidence on record has to be scrutinised. 14. At the cost of repetition simple defence of the accused as disclosed before the trial Magistrate had been that the Food Inspector took the sample without his consent as he was carrying milk from his field to his house for his personal use. Accused examined two witnesses, in support of his defence. 15. DW-1 is Sh. Yakub Din, who stated on oath that sample from the accused Basir was taken in his presence by the Food Inspector and at that time Basir accused disclosed that he was taking this milk to his paternal uncles house for some marriage and was not taking this milk for sale. This witness very specifically admitted that it was correct that before the day of occurrence and thereafter also Basir accused has been selling the milk. Similar is one DW-2 Sh. Munshi Ram, who stated that on 7th September, 1987 marriage of the sister of the accused was being solemnised in village Damoh and on that day Basir accused has brought the milk. This witness is not of the occurrence. 16. It may not be out of place to mention that these two witnesses do not help the case of the defence at all. But on the other hand, it appears that this defence is an afterthought and in order to prove the same, some un-successful attempt has been made by the accused. It may further not be out of place to mention that this DW-1 who represent himself to be present at the spot, when the sample was taken, has not stated even a single word regarding taking of sample, moreso with respect to the stirring part of the milk of the accused. It may further not be out of place to mention that this DW-1 who represent himself to be present at the spot, when the sample was taken, has not stated even a single word regarding taking of sample, moreso with respect to the stirring part of the milk of the accused. In a way fact remains that DW-1 has been very specific in deposing that accused was dealing with milk and prior to the occurrence and after also he has been selling the milk. This version of the witness simply showed that so called defence has been an afterthought. But on the other hand, witness has in very clear terms deposed that accused Basir was dealing with milk and selling the same. Apart from the statement of DW-2 Sh. Som Nath, there it; nothing on record to suggest that accused has taken this milk for the marriage of his cousin. The accused did not say so when he was examined, under section 313, Cr P. C He simply stated that for personal use he was taking this milk to his house. There is no doubt that defence should be probable one but in the present case probability is also not made out from the circumstances discussed above. 17. No other plea has been raised on behalf of the accused and no other point has been stressed. 18. In view of the foregoing reasons, the trial Magistrate acted illegally in acquitting the accused without going into all the pleas raised by the accused during the trial, moreso, plea of non-stirring having been found not established in accordance with law, order of acquittal, therefore is interfered with and as a consequence thereof, present appeal is accepted and the respondent-accused is convicted under section 7/16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 19. It has been contended on behalf of the accused-respondent that a lenient view be taken in imposing the sentence. Section 16 of the Act, provides minimum sentence of six months which may extend to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. 20. Even section 20-AA of the Act, provided that nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act, unless that person is under eighteen years of age. 20. Even section 20-AA of the Act, provided that nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act, unless that person is under eighteen years of age. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that accused was entitled for this benefit also being under eighteen years of age. On the other hand, age of the accused, as revealed from the record was twenty two years. That being so, taking into considration all these aspects, accused- respondent for the aforesaid conviction is sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 (Rs One Thousand) and in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further imprisonment for three months. Order accordingly.