Cyriac Joseph ( 1 ) ACCORDING to the averments in the civil contemptpetition, the petitioner is a House Building Cooperative Society and retiredgovernment officials are members of the society. The petitioner society appliedto the DDA for the allotment of about two acres of land situated behind Plot No. E-108, Greater Kailash Enclave, Part-1, New Delhi for the purpose of setting up aprimary school. However the DDA refused to allot the land to the petitionersociety. The land was transferred to the Commissioner of Police for setting up apolice Station. ( 2 ) THE transfer of the land to the Commissioner of Police, the setting up apolice Station on the land, and the refusal to allot the land to the petitioner werechallenged by the petitioner in CWP No. 1298/90. The said CWP was disposedof by this Court on 13/08/1993. By the judgment dated 13/08/1993in CWP No. 1298/90 this Court prohibited the DDA and the Commissioner ofpolice from putting to use the above mentioned plot of land for any purpose otherthan for setting up a Primary School. However liberty was given to the respondentsto modify the Zonal Development Plan in accordance with the provisions ofsection 11a of the Delhi Development Act if they so desire. The respondents weregiven four months time for the said purpose. In the said judgment there was afurther direction to the respondents to take decision on the application of thepetitioner for allotting the said plot of land to the petitioner for setting up aprimaryschool, within four months. A copy of the judgment dated 13/08/1993 wasproduced alongwith the CCP as Annexure-P1. The allegation in the CCP is thatthe respondents in the CCP have wilfully disobeyed the directions contained in thesaid judgment and thereby committed Civil Contempt of Court. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the disobedience is in three ways : (I) Only four months were given to the DDA to modify the Zonaldevelopment Plan. No such modification was made within fourmonths. DDA cannot make any modification to the Zonal Development Plan in respect of the particular plot of land after the expiry offour months from the date of judgment. However the DDA is takingsteps for modification of the Zonal Development Plan for changing theland user of the particular plot from primary school to Police Station. This is violation or disobedience of the judgment dated 13/08/1993 of the High Court. However the DDA is takingsteps for modification of the Zonal Development Plan for changing theland user of the particular plot from primary school to Police Station. This is violation or disobedience of the judgment dated 13/08/1993 of the High Court. (ii) The application of the petitioner for allotment of the plot of land wasrejected by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner society isnot a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and that the land user of the specific plot is being processed formodification from primary school to Police Station. According to thepetitioner these grounds are untenable and the rejection of theapplication is a violation of the judgment. (iii) The application of the petitioner society for allotment of the land wasdirected to be disposed of within four months from the date ofjudgment. However it was disposed of only by letter dated 1 3/12/1993 and there is a delay of one day incomplying with thedirections. Even a delay of one day constitutes disobedience of thejudgment. ( 4 ) COMING to the first point, the stand of the respondents is that thestipulation of four months period in the judgment is applicable only to takingdecision on the application of the petitioner for allotment and not to themodification of the Zonal Development Plan. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the power to modify the Zonal Development Plan is astatutory power which should be exercised by the DDA in accordance with thestatutory provisions contained in the Delhi Development Act. Having regard tothe procedural formalities involved no time limit can be stipulated for exercise ofsuch statutory power. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel that the Courtcould not have intended to stipulate a time limit in the matter of modification ofthe Zonal Development Plan. I do not agree with the stand taken by therespondents in this regard. Even though the statute does not prescribe any timelimit for the exercise of the statutory power, the High Court while exercisingjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is competent to stipulatea time limit for the exercise of statutory power in a given case. In other words the Court has jurisdiction to direct the DDA to take a decision on the question ofmodification of the Zonal Development Plan in respect of the land user of aparticular plot of land which is subject matter of the dispute before the Courtwithin a stipulated period. In other words the Court has jurisdiction to direct the DDA to take a decision on the question ofmodification of the Zonal Development Plan in respect of the land user of aparticular plot of land which is subject matter of the dispute before the Courtwithin a stipulated period. Even if the respondents hold the view that the Courtcannot stipulate such time limit for modification of the Zonal Development Plan,they should have challenged the judgment stipulating the time limit. Having notdone so, it is not open to the respondents now to say that no time limit can bestipulated by the Court for modification of the Zonal Development Plan. Learnedcounsel for the respondents contended that it cannot be possible to complete allstatutory formalities for modification of the Zonal Development Plan within astipulated period like four months. If that is the contention of the respondents,then they should have brought it to the notice of the Court while passing thejudgment or they should have applied for enlargement of time. The practicaldifficulty in completing the procedural formalities within the stipulated period isnot adefence available to the respondents since they have not approached thecourt for enlargement of time. The bona fide of the respondents should be testedby their conduct. Being aware of the time limit stipulated by the Court and of thepractical difficulties in complying with the order within the time limit, if therespondents decided not to move the Court for enlargement of the time, they weretaking a risk and taking the Court for granted. The learned Counsel for therespondents then argued that the stipulation of four months period is notapplicable to the modification of the Zonal Development Plan. I do not accept thiscontention of the learned Counsel. A plain reading of the judgment in CWP No. 1278/90 will show that the question. of modification of the Zonal Developmentplan and the question of taking adecision on the application of the petitiorterfor allotment of land were considered separately and independently by the Court. The stipulation of the four months period is stated not at one place, but at twoplaces. After giving liberty to the respondents to modify the Zonal Developmentplan the Court added that the respondents were given four months time forcompliance. Thereafter the Court dealt with the application of the petitioner forallotment of land and directed that the decision on the application should betaken within four months. After giving liberty to the respondents to modify the Zonal Developmentplan the Court added that the respondents were given four months time forcompliance. Thereafter the Court dealt with the application of the petitioner forallotment of land and directed that the decision on the application should betaken within four months. Therefore, I am of the view that by judgment dated 13/08/1993 in CWP No. 1298/90 the respondents were granted liberty tomodify the Zonal Development Plan in respect of the plot of land in question if theyso desire, but such modification had to be effected within four months. This iswhat I understand from a plain reading of the judgment. I cannot accept thecontention of the respondents that the Court did not intend any such stipulationof time. The stipulation of time can be under stood in the context of the case wherethe petitioner challenged the transfer of the land to the Commissioner of police forsetting up a Police Station inviolation of the existing Zonal Development Plan andthe petitioner prayed for the allotment of the plot of land for a user in accordancewith the existing Zonal Development Plan. Obviously, the Court wanted to havesomedefiniteness regarding the user of the land in question, by the time DDAconsidered the petitioner s application for allotment. Otherwise the directions ofthe Court would have become meaningless and useless. ( 5 ) NOW the question is whether the respondents committed any civilcontempt of Court by not effecting modification to the Zonal Development Planin respect of the plot in question within four months. The Court only grantedliberty to the DDA to modify the Zonal Development Plan if they so desire. Therewas no mandatory direction to the DDA to modify the Zonal Development Plan. Therefore, by not effecting modification to the Zonal Development Plan in respectof the plot of land inquestion the respondents cannot besaid to have disobeyedany direction or order contained in the judgment dated 13/08/1993 in CWPNo. 1298/90. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the effect of thejudgment is that if the DDA desired to modify the Zonal Development Plan theyshould modify the Zonal Development Plan within four months and that theycan not do it after four months inrespect of the particular plot of land. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the effect of thejudgment is that if the DDA desired to modify the Zonal Development Plan theyshould modify the Zonal Development Plan within four months and that theycan not do it after four months inrespect of the particular plot of land. The learnedcounsel for the petitioner also prayed that the respondents maybe directed notto effect any modification of the Zonal Development Plan in respect of theparticular plot of land hereafter since the time allowed in the judgment dated 13/08/1993 for the said purpose has already expired. I am not inclined togrant this prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for two reasons. (I) While dealing with the CCR, I need not pass any anticipatory orderrestraining the respondents from doing something which may amountto Civil Contempt of Court. If and when anyone commits civilcontempt and if it comes to the notice of the Court the matter will thenbe dealt with by the Court in accordance with law. (ii) The respondents have not so far effected the modification to the Zonaldevelopment Plan. It is open to them, at any stage before effecting themodification, to approach this Court and to explain why more time isrequired to complete the statutory and procedural formalities and toseek enlargement of the time granted in the judgment dated 1 3/08/1993. It is not proper to deny to the respondents any suchoptions available to them. This CCP cannot be allowed to be used asa pre-emptive step against any possible future action of the respondents. Of course, the petitioner may oppose any application for enlargement of time, if and when such an application is filed. It is for thecourt dealing with the application for enlargement of time, toconsider such objections of the petitioner. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY the respondents have proceeded on the basis that the fourmonths time limit did not apply to the modification of the Zonal Developmentplan. That is how they understood the order of the Court with the aid of legaladvice from their lawyer. The files were placed before me for my perusal and I amsatisfied that the respondents acted on legal advice. The legal advice given by thelawyer and the interpretation given by him to the directions in the judgment maybe wrong. That is how they understood the order of the Court with the aid of legaladvice from their lawyer. The files were placed before me for my perusal and I amsatisfied that the respondents acted on legal advice. The legal advice given by thelawyer and the interpretation given by him to the directions in the judgment maybe wrong. But that is no reason for proceeding against the respondents forcommitting civil contempt because they have only acted bona fide on the basis oflegal advice and have not wilfully disobeyed any order. But since the matter hasbeen raised in this CCP and the effect of the directions in the judgment dated 1 3/08/1993 has been declared by this Court in this order, the respondents areexpected hereafter to proceed on the basis of the declaration given by this Courtin this order. ( 8 ) I shall now deal with the second point. If the petitioner is of the view thathis application for allotment was rejected on untenable grounds, he has tochallenge the said decision of the DDA in appropriate proceedings. Even if theorder passed by the DDA rejecting his application for allotment is a wrong orillegal order, it will not call for action under the Contempt of Courts Act unless itis shown that while taking the decision the DDA has wilfully disobeyed any orderof the Court or violated any undertaking given to the Court. Whether it ismandatory that a society should be registered for making application for allotmentof land, or whether the petitioner society is a society registered under thesocieties Registration Act, 1860 or whether registration under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 is sufficient, are matters to be considered when thepetitioner challenges the decision of the DDA in appropriate proceedings. In thenormal course the DDA is competent to reject an application for allotment of landon the ground that the land user of the plot of land is being processed formodification. If the contention is that such a ground is not available to the DDAin this case in view of the judgment in CWP No. 1298/90, the petitioner maychallenge the decision of the DDA in appropriate proceedings and get it quashed. Even a wrong rejection of the application will not attract the provisions of thecontempt of Courts Act. If the contention is that such a ground is not available to the DDAin this case in view of the judgment in CWP No. 1298/90, the petitioner maychallenge the decision of the DDA in appropriate proceedings and get it quashed. Even a wrong rejection of the application will not attract the provisions of thecontempt of Courts Act. ( 9 ) COMING to the third point, there is dispute between the petitioner andthe respondents on the question whether there was any delay in taking decision onthe application of the petitioner society. Learned Counsel for the petitioner assertsthat there was delay of one day whereas learned Counsel for the respondentssubmits that there was no delay. I do not propose to resolve this controversy andenter a finding since, according to me, it is not necessary for the purpose of takingadecision in this case. Even assuming that there was delay of one day in takingthe decision on the petitioner s application, I am not inclined to take action againstthe respondents for the delay of one day. Firstly, the respondents bond fidethought that they had time up to 13/12/1993 to take the decision and,therefore, there is no question of any wilful disobedience. Secondly the Court hasto take a practical view and the delay of one day due to some misunderstanding ordue to wrong calculation of the number of days has to be graciously condoned. Iam not satisfied that the respondents have committed any civil contempt onaccount of the alleged delay of one day in disposing of the petitioner sapplication. In these circumstances the CCP is dismissed subject to the observationsmade above.