JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. It is now a well settled principle of law by judicial precedence that discrimination is an anti-thesis of law and in the event there is existing the vice of discrimination-be it in a statute or in a governmental action-there ought not to be any hesitation on the part of the law courts to declare the same to be bad and illegal and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as embodied in Article 14 ought to be the prime consideration in the matter of ascribing the same as discriminatory. Article 14 declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. On a plain reading of the Article, it therefore appears that the framers of the Constitution have used two expressions, viz., 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the law'. The phrase 'equal protection of law' finds place in almost all the written Constitutions that guarantee the fundamental rights: to wit, s.1 of the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution records: "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law" and it is interesting to note that both these expressions have been used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (vide Article 7). The first expression 'equality before the law' is of English origin and the second, viz. 'equal protection of the law' has been taken from the American Constitution. Be it noted that both these expressions aim at establishing what it called equality of status in the preamble of our Constitution. While both the expressions may seem to be identical, but they do not convey the same meaning. While equality before the law is a somewhat negative concept implying the absence of any special privilege in favour of individuals and equal subject of all classes to the ordinary law, equal protection of law is a more positive concept implying equality of treatment in equal circumstances (Dr. J.H. Pandey: Constitutional Law of India). The Full Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the case of Shew Shankar vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1951 Nagpur 53) describes it as equal justice being one dominant idea common to both the expressions. J.H. Pandey: Constitutional Law of India). The Full Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the case of Shew Shankar vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1951 Nagpur 53) describes it as equal justice being one dominant idea common to both the expressions. In State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ) the Supreme Court observed that the second expression is corollary of first and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the violation of equal protection of laws will not be the violation of the equality before the law. Thus in substance one may state that the two expressions mean one and the same thing. 2. The concept of equality does not mean however absolute equality against human beings-it is a concept implying absence of any special privilege by reason of caste, creed or the like in favour of any individual and also the equal subject of individuals and classes to the ordinary law of the land. Dr. Jennings describes it that amongst the equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered. Without much dilation the Indian Supreme Court in no uncertain terms laid down that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both: in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed by laws. Equal law should be applied to all in the same situation and there should be no discrimination between one person and another and as regards the subject matter of legislation, their position is the same. As a matter of fact, the likes should be treated alike and not that unlikes should be treated alike. 3. Incidentally be it noted that the rule of equality cannot be treated to be an absolute rule and the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character or that the same laws should apply to all persons. Article 14 as a matter of fact permits classification, though however, prohibits class legislation, The classification, however, must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive but must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation (vide R. K. Garg vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 ). As a passing reference, however, be it noted that the classification to be reasonable must fulfil two conditions, viz., (a) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (b) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act-what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act which makes the classification and it is only when there is no reasonable basis for a classification, that legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory . 4. Whilst on the subject, one more decision of the Supreme Court ought also to be noted in this context. The Supreme Court in the case of Air India vs. Nergesh Meerza ( AIR 1981 SC 1829 ) did strike down the Air India and Indian Airlines Regulation on the retirement and pregnancy bar on the services of air hostesses as unconstitutional on: the ground that the conditions laid down therein were entirely unreasonable and arbitrary. The Supreme Court observed that the termination of service on pregnancy was manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary and was therefore clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court went on to observe that having taken in service and after having utilised the services for some years, to terminate her service if she becomes pregnant amounts to compelling the poor air hostess not to have any children and thus interfere with and divert the ordinary course of human nature. The termination of services of air hostesses in such circumstances is not only a callous and cruel act but an open insult to Indian womanhood the most sacrosand and cherished institution. The Court further observed that such a course of action is extremely detestable and abhorrent to the notions a civilized society and such a provision is not only manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but contains the quality of unfairness and exhibits naked despotism and is therefore clearly violative of Article 14. 5. The Court further observed that such a course of action is extremely detestable and abhorrent to the notions a civilized society and such a provision is not only manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but contains the quality of unfairness and exhibits naked despotism and is therefore clearly violative of Article 14. 5. Having discussed the law on the subject as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution and before adverting to the rival contentions in the present appeal, it ought to be noted that by the 74th amendment in 1992, Part IX-A was introduced in the Constitution containing 18 Articles, viz., Articles 243-P to 243-ZG. The Articles as introduced under the 74th Amendment Act contain provisions for constitution of Nagar Panchayats, Municipal Councils and Municipal Corporations. By and under Article 243-T it is provided:(1) Seats shall be reserved for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in every municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that municipality as the population of the scheduled castes in the municipal area or of the scheduled tribes in the municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constitutes in a municipality. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1) shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled castes or as the case may be, the scheduled tribes. (3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a municipality. * * * * * * 6. Be it noted here that Article 243-ZA(2) authorises the legislature of a State to make provisions with respect to all matters relating to or in connection with election to municipalities subject however to the provisions of the Constitution. 7. Be it also noted that in exercise of the aforesaid powers, the West Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1994 enacted the West Bengal Municipal Elections Act, 1994 which incorporates the relevant provisions of Part IX-AI of the Constitution. 7. Be it also noted that in exercise of the aforesaid powers, the West Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1994 enacted the West Bengal Municipal Elections Act, 1994 which incorporates the relevant provisions of Part IX-AI of the Constitution. Section 29 of the West Bengal Municipal Elections Act, 1994 provides for reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and for women in all municipalities and further provides that allotment of seats to be reserved shall be made by rotation. 8. It appears that in terms of the provisions of the West Bengal Municipal Elections Act, 1994, the State Government in exercise of the powers thereunder framed the West Bengal Municipal Elections (Reservation of Seats) Rules, 1994 and Rule 3 of the said Rules contains the detailed procedure for determining the number of seats to be reserved and also lays down the procedure for rotation of reserved seats amongst the constituencies of the municipalities. 9. Turning attention on to the writ petition, it appears that the petitioner's grievance is that the provision for reservation of seats for women made under Article 243-T of the Constitution and by s. 29 of the West Bengal Act of 1994 read with Rule 3 of the Rules of 1994 offends against Article 15(1) of the Constitution which forbids discrimination only on the ground of sex. Therefore it has been seriously contended that such reservation violates the basic features of the Constitution enshrined in Articles 14 and 15(1) and as such the 74th amendment is bad in law and as such unenforceable and void together with a prayer for declaration of s. 29 of the West Bengal Municipal Election Act, 1994 along with Rule 3 of the West Bengal Municipal Election (Reservation of Seats) Rules, 1994 in so far as reservation of seats of not less than one-third of the total number of seats including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in a municipality are ultra vires the Constitution of India and violative of the fundamental rights as contained in Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution and thus bad and unenforceable. 10. 10. It would, however, be convenient to note at this juncture that the writ petition was originally moved before Mitra, J. on 5th April, 1995 wherein an order of status quo as of 5th April, 1995 was directed to be maintained until 19th April, 1995 and the petitioners were given express liberty to pray for extension of the interim order upon notice to the respondents on the selfsame application. As against the order as above, the State Government preferred the instant appeal and by consent of the parties the writ petition along with the appeal were heard by this Bench having regard to the importance as well as the urgency of the matter since the municipal elections are to take place on the 8th and 9th July, 1995 but the preparations therefore would require an expeditious disposal of the instant litigation. 11. Coming back on to the main stream once again, the challenge to the legislation is mainly on three counts: Firstly, the Constitution 74th Amendment Act, 1992 and West Bengal Municipal Election Act, 1994 are ultra vires the Constitutional guarantee as contained in Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution read with Articles 40, 45 and 46 of the Constitution. Elucidating this, Mr. A. K. Sen appearing in support of the writ petition submitted that the guarantee of equality is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be altered and affected by a constitutional amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution. On the second count Mr. Sen contended that the Rules framed under the West Bengal Act of 1994 are also ultra vires and void as they must perish along with the Act and the 74th Amendment Act, as they provide for arbitrary selection of wards for being reserved for: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and women without laying down the guidelines and reasons such as population structure and financial, educational and social conditions of scheduled castes and women in the areas reserved for them. On the third count Mr. Sen contended that the West Bengal Act of 1994 is ultra vires the Constitution being based on 74th Amendment Act and violative per se of Article 14 and Article 15 of the Constitution. Mr. Sen contended that in making reservation for women, Parliament has discriminated against men on the ground only of sex which is not permissible under Article 15(1). Sen contended that the West Bengal Act of 1994 is ultra vires the Constitution being based on 74th Amendment Act and violative per se of Article 14 and Article 15 of the Constitution. Mr. Sen contended that in making reservation for women, Parliament has discriminated against men on the ground only of sex which is not permissible under Article 15(1). It was further contended that reservation for women in urban local bodies is not protected under Article 15(3) and Article 15(3) is not co-extensive with Article 15(1) but is a restrictive exception. It was further contended that Article 15(1) extends to political rights, but the protection of Article 15(3) does not extend to political rights and hence, provisions for reservation of seats or for separate representation on the ground of sex alone would be bad in law and Article 15(3) being only an exception to Article 15(1) will extend only to such special provisions for women and children as are related to the disabilities peculiar to women and children. In the same vein Mr. Sen contended that political backwardness is not a disability peculiar to women in India. Hence, reservation for women in urban local bodies which is made for their supposedly political backwardness is not a special provision within the meaning of Article 15(3) and is thus not protected. Such a reservation, according to Mr. Sen had to be introduced by a constitutional amendment and could not be left to the State as provided in Article 15(3) which clearly indicates that even the Constitution makers did not think that reservation of seats was a special provision for women within the meaning of Article 15(3). It is the further contention of Mr. Sen that there is no intelligible differentia for the classification between men and women since sex cannot under Article 15(1) be the basis for classification having a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., the advancement and upliftment of women. Therefore, such a discrimination is unreasonable and arbitrary and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Therefore, such a discrimination is unreasonable and arbitrary and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Sen drew inspiration from the fact that there exists no reservation for women for the State Legislatures and Parliament and while women can contest both for the reserved seats and the general seats, men can contest only in the general seats and thereby the State by its latest legislation on this score has discriminated, though such a discrimination is not permissible in law. Lastly Mr. Sen contended that there is no reasonable basis for fixing the figure for reservation at not less than one-third of the total number of seats. There is also no basis for adopting the policy of rotation in allotting the reserved seats amongst the constituencies. Mr. Sen also drew inspiration from the reservation of Assembly and Lok Sabha seats and submitted that the reserved seats are fixed and once a reserved seat, it continues to be a reserved seat always and there cannot be valid reason for any departure from the policy of reservation. As such, the rotational system is not only bad but inherently void. 12. Article 15(1) provides a general bar against discrimination on the ground only of sex. Discrimination, however, on the ground of sex coupled with some valid factors cannot but be termed to be lawful as is well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yusuf Aziz vs. Stare of Bombay (AIR 19,54 SC 321) where sex was held, to be a permissible classification. The Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of the report observed that Article 14 is general and the same must be read with other provisions which set out the ambit of fundamental rights. Sex is a sound classification and although there can be no discrimination in general on that ground, the Constitution itself provides for special provisions in the case of women and children. 13. Be it recorded that the Supreme. Court while dealing with an appeal involving the question as to whether s. 497 of the Penal Code contravenes Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution came to the finding that the two Articles read together validate the impugned clauses in s. 491 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. Be it recorded that the Supreme. Court while dealing with an appeal involving the question as to whether s. 497 of the Penal Code contravenes Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution came to the finding that the two Articles read together validate the impugned clauses in s. 491 of the Indian Penal Code. Incidentally be it also recorded that under s. 497 of the Indian Penal Code, the offence of adultery can be committed by a man, but in the absence of any provision to the contrary the woman would be punishable as an abetter. The last sentence in s. 497, how ever, prohibits this and it refers that in such a case the wife shall not be made punishable as an abetter. It is this which is said to be offending Articles 14 and 15. The Supreme Court recorded its inability to read any restriction into the clause nor recorded its agreement that a provision which prohibits punishment is tantamount to a licence to commit the offence. This observation of the Supreme Court stands approved by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Air India vs. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . In paragraph 66 thereof, the Supreme Court observed that even otherwise what Articles 15(1) and 15(2) provide is that discrimination should not be made only and only on the ground of sex. These Articles of the Constitution do not prohibit the State from making discrimination on the ground of sex coupled with other considerations. On this point the matter is no longer res interga but is covered by several authorities of the Supreme Court inclusive of Yusuf Abdul Aziz (supra) and Husseinbhoy Laljee, 1954 SCR 930 : AIR (1954) SC 321. 14. Be it noted that Article 15 provides for a particular application of the general principles embodied in Article 14. When a law comes within the prohibition of Article 15, it cannot be validated by recourse to Article 14 by applying the principle of reasonable classification. It is when the discrimination is based upon one of the grounds mentioned in Article 15 that the reasonableness of the classification will be tested under Article 14. When a law comes within the prohibition of Article 15, it cannot be validated by recourse to Article 14 by applying the principle of reasonable classification. It is when the discrimination is based upon one of the grounds mentioned in Article 15 that the reasonableness of the classification will be tested under Article 14. The issue therefore to be considered at this junction is whether there is any reasonableness of classification by reason of introduction of Article 243-T in the Constitution and by reason of the enactment of the West Bengal Act of 1994 based on the 74th amendment of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 15 directs that the State is prohibited to discriminate between citizens on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The word 'only' used in Article 15(1) indicates that discrimination cannot be made merely on the ground that one belongs to a particular caste or sex. To put it simply, if other classifications are equal, caste religion or sex cannot possibly be termed to be a ground for perference or disability. It therefore follows that discrimination on grounds other than religion, caste or sex is not prohibited. The Legislature taking into consideration the other facts, viz., the need for protective and beneficial measures for women in the present condition of our society, introduced the 74th amendment and consequently the West Bengal Legislature also did engraft in the statute book the Act of 1994. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 74th Amendment states that local bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self governance and having regard to the inadequacies, it is considered necessary that the provisions relating to urban local bodies are incorporated in the Constitution, particularly for providing adequate representation for weaker sections like scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and women" and with that background the 74th Constitution Amendment Act came into existence and consequently the West Bengal Act of 1994 and the Rules framed thereunder. 15. There is no manner of dobut that Artkle 15(3) reserves the right of the State in the matter of making special provisions for women and children. 15. There is no manner of dobut that Artkle 15(3) reserves the right of the State in the matter of making special provisions for women and children. A plain reading of Articles 14 and 15, therefore, depicts that the framers of our Constitution while preserving the universal doctrine of equality before law without being inhibited on the ground of religion, caste or sex or place of birth, but in the same vein conferred a power on to the State to make any special provision for women and children. The Constitution thus recognises a special class of person or persons, viz., women and children: this distinction and the special recognition cannot by any stretch however be termed to be discriminatory on a plain reading of Article 15(1) and (2) read with 15(3) of the Constitution. An attempt to provide certain special privileges for women and children cannot be described in any way. The special features in women and children have prompted the Constitution makers to insert Article 15(3) and in this context the observation of Chagla, C.J. in the case of Dattatrya Motiram More vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1953 Bombay 311) seems to be very apposite. Chagla C.J. while dealing with the matter, in no uncertain terms observed that it must always be borne in mind that the discrimination which is not permissible under Article 15(1) is a discrimination which is only on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 15(1). If there is a discrimination in favour of a particular sex, that discrimination would be permissible provided it is not only on the ground of sex or, in other words, the classification on the ground of sex is permissible provided that classification is the result of other considerations besides the fact that the person belonging to that class are of a particular sex. Chagla, C.J. further went on to observe that it would be very difficult for women to be elected if there was no reservation in their favour, and Government may well take the view that women are very necessary in local authorities because the point of view of women must be placed before the councilors before they decide any question affecting the municipality. 16. 16. Be it recorded that Article 15(3) cannot but be termed to be a proviso or an exception to the section, and in construing a proviso, care must be had to see that whether the same nu1lifies the section itself. The attempt of Law Courts would be, however, to see that the main effect of the section is not nullified in any way whatsoever. Chagla, C.J. however, observed that a proviso merely carves out something from the section itself. It does not destroy the whole section. According to Chagla, C.J., the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of the women, it does not offend against Article 15(1). Therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Article 15(1) and Article 15(2), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it may not discriminate in favour of men against women. 17. Strong reliance was placed on the two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., (1) Minerva Mill Ltd., & Others vs. Union of India & Others ( AIR 1980 SC 1789 ) and (2) Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India & Another ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ), but the said two decisions, in our view, do not lend any particular assistance in the facts of the matter under consideration. The makers of the Constitution, having due regard to the need to protect or introduce beneficial measures for women and children in the present condition of our society, have introduced Article 15(3) and as such, in our view, Article 14 of the Constitution cannot but be read subject to the other provisions of the Constitution within the Part relating to fundamental rights and any law, making special provisions for women under Article 15(3), cannot be challenged on the ground of contravention of Article 14 as has been stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Yusuf Abdul Aziz (supra). 18. 18. In any event, since the decision of Ramkrishna Dalmia ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ) it is now a settled principle of law that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. The Supreme Court in a long, catena of decisions recorded that it must be presumed that legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. There is no manner of doubt that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harmony and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration all matters of common knowledge, matter of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. While it is true that good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing for the basis of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there just be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain notices or characters to a hostile or discriminating legislation. 19. Be it noted that the Supreme. Court has also noticed that the principles noted above are to be borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of law. 20. Be it noted here further that in order to sustain the constitutionality of the Act, the Court would take judicial notice of common reports of social conditions that is available and facts of historical relevance and other necessary facts as are available. The above observations obtain support for the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 547 and 21so in AIR 1963 SC 864 . 21. The above observations obtain support for the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 547 and 21so in AIR 1963 SC 864 . 21. Be it recorded that the Court will not go into the political wisdom of any Act unless mala fide is alleged. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Sarup Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1959 SC 860 ) it has been held that in determining the constitutionality of a statute the Court is not concerned with the motive of the legislature and whatever justification some people may feel in their criticism of their political wisdom particularly of a legislative or executive action, the Court cannot be called upon to embark on an enquiry into public policy or investigate into questions of political wisdom or even to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a law which it is otherwise competent to make. 22. By reason of the doctrine of presumption of constitutionality, the legislature must be deemed to have been satisfied with the existence of conditions requiring such special provision. Whether by reason of transformation of the society such special provisions are no longer necessary is a matter for the legislatures and not for the Courts. In this respect the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Somotha Vishnu vs. Union of India ( AIR 1985 SC 1618 ) ought to be noted. In paragraph 6 of the report, the Supreme Court observed that it is for the legislature to consider whether s. 497 of the Indian Penal Code should be amended appropriately so as to take note of the transformation which the Society has undergone. True, the 42nd report of the Law Commission shows that there can be two opinions on the desirability of retaining a provision like the one contained in s. 497 on the statute book, but the section cannot be struck down on the ground that it is desirable to delete it. It will be found that the matter has to be looked into and considered by the legislature and not by the Courts nor the Court has any jurisdiction to entertain any grievance with regard thereto to the effect that it is otherwise desirable not to have such a legislation. 23. It will be found that the matter has to be looked into and considered by the legislature and not by the Courts nor the Court has any jurisdiction to entertain any grievance with regard thereto to the effect that it is otherwise desirable not to have such a legislation. 23. By reason of the doctrine of presumption of constitutionality, the legislature must be deemed to have been satisfied with the existence of conditions requiring such special provision. Whether by reason of transformation of society such special provisions are no longer necessary is a matter for the legislature and not for the Courts. In this context the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Sowmithri Vishnu vs. Union of India & Anr. ( AIR 1985 SC 1618 ) seems to be very apposite. 24. The short question, therefore, arises is whether reservation of seats for women in urban local bodies can be said to be a special provision for women within the meaning of Article 15(3). The special provisions referred to in Article 15(3) have been interpreted by the Courts to mean not only measures which are protective or beneficial to women but also measures which are not so beneficial in the strict sense of the term. In the case of Sm. Anjali Roy vs. State of W.B. & Ors. ( AIR 1952 Cal 825 ) the expression 'provision for' in Article 15(3) has been held to mean 'provision in favour of'. 25. Such special provisions as reservation of seats in local bodies, in our view, cannot be assailed on the ground that the same are not strictly protective of or beneficial to women. Without fear of contradiction it can safely be concluded that such measures are certainly intended for general advancement to women. There is no doubt that participation in the political and administrative process of the country is as much a right of women as of men and that even though the ratio of men and women is nearly equal, the ratio between representation of sexes in local self government is wholly fixed in favour of men. There is no doubt that participation in the political and administrative process of the country is as much a right of women as of men and that even though the ratio of men and women is nearly equal, the ratio between representation of sexes in local self government is wholly fixed in favour of men. Women must get and take the rightful place in local self government alongside men and political awareness cannot be termed to be an isolated facet of an individual's personality and it has been repeatedly held by the Law Courts that special measures for women in the field of education, economic position and the like are protected under Article 15(3). A natural corollary would be that measures for political advancement of women would also be equally protected and the contention that special measures that guarantee women a fair representation in self governance are not necessary because politically women are not backward is, however, without any substance and we cannot lend our concurrence in regard thereto. 26. Incidentally be it noted that no facts or figures have been produced by the petitioners regarding the relevant factors like the percentage of women in the country exercising franchise and what percentage of women population contests the elections or otherwise take part in the political process. As a matter of fact, there is no material whatsoever as to whether women can be said to be truly represented in the political process. Be it noted in this context that Article 15(3) was introduced only to ameliorate the conditions of women and children. In this connection reference may be made to Clause (4) relating to rights of equality in the Constituent Assembly debates introduced by Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel which records: "A provision has been made which was found to be necessary because even in a non-discriminatory clause it would be necessary in the present condition of our country to make special provision for women and children"-but unfortunately there is no suggestion even that the condition of the country which was existing as on the date of the debate has changed so as to warrant not to make any further provision for women and children. In fine, on this aspect of the matter be it noted here that there is no reason for the Court to doubt the wisdom of the law-makers and it is also well settled that even if the Court differs from the legislature's perception of the matter, it is the legislature's wisdom which must prevail. 27. As regards the submission that there is no reservation for women in the State legislatures or in the Lok Sabha under the Representation of Peoples Act, in our view, the question of declaring Article 243-T of the Constitution or the State Act of 1994 as void on the basis thereof does not and cannot arise. It is the legislature's wisdom which should prevail and it is for the legislature only to introduce such measures as it may deem expedient and not for the Law Courts to express its views in that regard. The U.S. Supreme Court case relied upon by the respondent writ petitioners, in our view, does not lead any assistance in the matter in issue since the decision is not a case of a provision not in favour of but a provision against men because of sex. Be it noted that in the U. S. Constitution there exists an equal rights clause which is left for interpretation by the Courts, but in our Constitution there is an express provision, viz., Article 15(3) by reason whereof the question of obtaining support from the U.S. Supreme Court decision does not and cannot arise. 28. As regards the issue of rotation, in our view, the same cannot be described in any way by reason of the theory of rationalism so as to afford opportunity by rotation to the entire women population of all the wards and to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates of all such wards. In any event, this is a policy decision and it is not for the Law Courts to interfere or intervene in such a policy. On the contrary, as noted above, this would be in proper spirit that every ward of the municipality would be able to obtain an opportunity on this score and the contention of Mr. Sen also cannot be sustained in that regard. 29. In that view of the matter, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. On the contrary, as noted above, this would be in proper spirit that every ward of the municipality would be able to obtain an opportunity on this score and the contention of Mr. Sen also cannot be sustained in that regard. 29. In that view of the matter, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside and in the view we have taken as above, the writ petition also fails and is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. No order as to costs. 30. Sidheswar Narayan, J.: While most respectfully agreeing with learned colleague I may add, even if not very much required, that the constitutionality of the Amending Act (74th Amendment), 1992 of the Constitution followed by the West Bengal Municipal Elections Act, 1994 and the West Bengal Municipal Elections (Reservation of Seats) Rules, 1994, having stood the test on the legal scale as elaborately dealt with above, has also got support of equity as of the experience of time. 31. Many illustrations of illustrious women in the history of this country were introduced in the argument of Mr. A.K. Sen and Mr. Bhola Sen, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, to forfeit the claim of special provision for women. Those illustrations fell far short in relation to the women's share of the vast population being almost half and, in practical terms, those provide hardly a logic in the matter in issue, At the best, those could be a substance for discussion on the floor of the Parliament or the Assembly before passing of the relevant Bills for enactment or even at the stage of ratification of the Amending Act, 1993. It was rather too late for reappraisal of the "object and reasons" behind the enactment under challenge and, that too, in a Court of Law, which would have certainly some amount of restraint in the matter of Government policy. 32. Be it for the legislation or the judiciary, two parameters would certainly occupy one's mind on the issue under consideration, and• those are, whether the women as a class was free from domination by men in the Indian Society and whether the interest of the class has been taken care of with required amount of expediency. 32. Be it for the legislation or the judiciary, two parameters would certainly occupy one's mind on the issue under consideration, and• those are, whether the women as a class was free from domination by men in the Indian Society and whether the interest of the class has been taken care of with required amount of expediency. Reasonings based on logic or objective factors can be certainly advanced for academic debate but an unprejudiced answer to both the questions would be, possibly, in the negative. Time to time, the necessity to frame special provisions to protect the interest or dignity of women has been felt and some enactments have been enforced also, but a society, definitely dominated by men, needs proper representation of women in statutory bodies, to begin with, like the Municipality or the Gram Panchayat at the grass-root. And, this factor or the aspect of the matter would amount to be an "Additional Factor" to strengthen the hands or the Authority of the State to frame special provision for women as provided in the bask structure of our Constitution embodied in Article 15(3). 33. So far as the rotational system was concerned, it has been introduced for the first time in the electoral process with a departure from what js in practice in the election of the Parliament or the Assembly in the history of our democratic set up. This was, however, a matter of Government Policy. There was nothing to suggest that it was opposed to the tenets of the democratic pattern, guaranteed in the Constitution. In the matter of retirement of the 1/3rd members of the Rajya Sabha and the Legislative Councils, the rotational system was adopted right from the initial stage. It is rather based on the theory of rationalism to afford opportunity by rotation to women folk of all the wards and to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates of all such wards, which have percentage of population to the extent of half or above to the percentage of population of the whole of the Municipality. 34. In the premises the Appeal succeeds and is thus allowed, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 35. Prayer for stay made on behalf of the writ petitioner respondent, but the same is refused. Appeal allowed.