This is a revision application against the order passed on 15.7.91 by the Assistant District Judge No.2 Guwahati in Misc Case No.77 of 1990 arising out of Title Execution Case No.8 of 1990 holding that the decree to be a nullity and dismissing the execution petition. 2. In the instant case a suit was filed by the plaintiff for ejectment of the defendant on the grounds of defaulter and bonafide requirement. Both the aforesaid grounds were denied by the defendant. Subsequently however, a compromise was entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant and the same was filed before the trial Court which passed a decree in terms of the compromise stating that the plaintiffs and the defendant have filed a joint petition stating that they have compromised the suit outside the Court and have prayed for compromise decree accordingly. The Assistant District Judge No.2 Guwahati after hearing Advocates of both the sides and after perusing the petition allowed the same on 6.1.88. The suit was decreed on compromise in terms of the petition. Under the said compromise decree the defendant was given a period of 34 months to vacate the said premises. After 34 months when the defendant did not vacate the said premises, the plaintiff approached the executing Court to get the premises vacated. The defendant at that stage took the defence that the said compromise decree was a nullity as such no execution can be effected of such a decree. The executing Court on agreeing with the submission made by the defendant held that there is nothing on record to show that the compromise decree was passed after satisfying the statutory grounds of ejectment. It further held that only because Order 23 Rule 3 applied to this suit does not remove the bar of prohibition of the Rent Control Act nor do they empower the Court to pass the decree for eviction 'dehoarsing'. The Court held that the decree was a nullity and stated that the same could not be executed and as such execution petition was dismissed on contest. 3. As against that the petitioners had come before this Court under section 115 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that the decree was a nullity and stated that the same could not be executed and as such execution petition was dismissed on contest. 3. As against that the petitioners had come before this Court under section 115 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is admitted on behalf of the petitioners that the compromise decree was not a nullity and the Court after perusing the compromise petition and on consideration of averments made in the plaint and the written statement passed the said compromise decree. The decree was not a nullity as the same was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and not by a Court which had no inherent power or jurisdiction to try, entertain or decree the suit. In support of this contention Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon several judgments of the Supreme Court. The argument of Mr. Bhattacharyya is that compromise decree shows that the defendant knew that he had no defence or that the defence was not tenable in a Court of law. So with his eyes open, he entered into compromise weighing all the pros and cons of his case. By the said compromise the defendant had bargained for himself a further period of 34 months to stay at the said premises. Counsel for the petitioner in support of his above contention relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1973 SC1311 at page 1323. Supreme Court has laid down as follows : “Of course a compromise can be valid only if it is in accordance with the Act ie only if the landlord has asked for possession of the building on one of the grounds laid down in the Act. For instance, a landlord merely on the ground that he is the owner of the building cannot come to the Rent Controller and ask for possession of the property and the Rent Controller cannot pass a valid order merely because the tenant submits to an order of eviction. Bahadur Singh's case (1969 (2) SCR 432) is an instance in point. In that case the landlord did not even apply for eviction. Bahadur Singh's case (1969 (2) SCR 432) is an instance in point. In that case the landlord did not even apply for eviction. But where the landlord specifically asks for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he is entitled to ask for possession under the provisions of the Act there will be no objection to the tenant either submitting to an order of eviction or entering into a compromise submitting to an order of eviction.” 4. In (1993) 2 SCC 458 at page 464 Supreme Court has laid down that “a decree is said to be a nullity if it is passed by a Court having no inherent jurisdiction merely because the Court erroneously passed a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultravires the powers of the Court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree.” In the said decision the Supreme Court has held that if there is a contest the Court can pass a decree for eviction only if the Court is satisfied about the existence of the grounds for eviction. But satisfaction can be inferred impliedly. On the second ground of eviction namely bonafide and personal requirement of the landlord the Supreme Court has stated that: “the very fact that the tenant asked for accommodation of time shows that the claim of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his bonafide personal requirement was impliedly admitted by the tenant. Again there was implied admission of comparative hardship......Order 23 of Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to the proceeding. Again there was implied admission of comparative hardship......Order 23 of Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to the proceeding. Rule 3 of Order 23 reads as follows : “Compromise of suit - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing or signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit. Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at the Court shall decide the question but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, under the Court for reasons to be recorded thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation - An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.” After quoting Order 23 Rule 3, the Supreme Court held as follows : “It is clear that whenever there is lawful agreement the Court is bound to record the agreement or compromise. There is no provision in the Act which made Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to proceeding contemplated by the Act. Nor there is any provision in the Act which prohibits parties entering into a compromise in the suit for eviction filed under the Act.” 5. Supreme Court in para 22 of the said judgment has referred and discussed the decision of Suleman Noormahamad vs. Umarbhai Juni Bhat reported in AIR 1978 SC 952 as follows : “22. Suleman Noormahamad vs. Umarbhai was again a case in which suit was brought on the ground of nonpayment of rent and bonafide personal necessity under the relevant provisions of the Act. Suleman Noormahamad vs. Umarbhai was again a case in which suit was brought on the ground of nonpayment of rent and bonafide personal necessity under the relevant provisions of the Act. The decree for possession was passed on the basis of compromise under the which the judgment debtor was to hand over possession by a future date. On his failure to do so execution application was filed and the judgment debtor challenged the validity of the decree. The order did not mention that the Court was satisfied about the grounds for eviction. The Court read pleadings and came to the conclusion that there was no serious dispute to be tried and is a decree for possession would have been passed in invitum the tenant would not have got three years time to vacate the premises that he therefore agreed to suffer a decree by consent and gained three years time under it. The Court also relied on the presumption that every compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be presumed to be lawful unless it is proved to the contrary. An , admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, expressedly or impliedly will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the Court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admission made hi a judicial proceeding are absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate decree cannot be called a nullity to enable the executing Court to go behind it. 23. It is clear from the terms of the compromise in the present case that there was an implied admission by the tenant of the grounds contained in section 12 (3) (a) as well as section 13 (1) (g) of the Act.” 6. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant draws my attention to the judgment reported in 1993 (1) GLJ124. In support of his contention that the compromise decree was a nullity and the same could not be executed and as such execution application was rightly dismissed. I have gone through the judgment carefully and I find that the said case have no application whatsoever in the facts of this case. In support of his contention that the compromise decree was a nullity and the same could not be executed and as such execution application was rightly dismissed. I have gone through the judgment carefully and I find that the said case have no application whatsoever in the facts of this case. The said judgment is relating to passing of an exparte decree without considering the existence of any of the ground mentioned in section 5 (1) (f) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. The Court was not dealing with the compromise decree where both the parties on consideration of their cause of action and the defence and knowing the strength or otherwise of the same have agreed to enter into a compromise decree in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. The said decision does not in any way help the defendant to wriggle out of his commitment in the compromise decree. The Advocate for the defendant relied upon on three decisions of the Supreme Court AIR 1973 SC 1311 , AIR 1975 SC 2130 and AIR 1970 SC 794 . On the basis of the said 3 decisions of the Supreme Court, the Advocate for the defendant urged that the compromise decree passed by the trial Court was a nullity and the same cannot be executed. The decision reported in AIR 1973 SC 1311 , AIR 1975 SC 2130 have been thoroughly discussed by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in (1993) 2 SCC 458 and in both the decisions the Supreme Court upheld the compromise decree and the applicability of Order 23 Rule 3 to the suit governed by rent restriction or Control Act. The observation made in two Supreme Court decisions are totally against the submission of the Advocate of the defendant. AIR 1970 SC 794 have been referred in AIR 1973 SC 1311 and ratio of the said decision has not been approved of in the subsequent decision. In paragraph 25 at page 1319 it is held that it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bonafide and adjudicated upon the same. 7. In paragraph 25 at page 1319 it is held that it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bonafide and adjudicated upon the same. 7. On careful consideration of the submission made by the Advocate for both the parties and considering the judgments stated above and applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions I hold that the compromise decree passed by the Court below was not a nullity and it was in compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. The Court passing the decree had jurisdiction in the matter and was competent to pass such a decree. Secondly the pleadings of the parties including the plaint and the written statement were before the Court, the Court considered the same and perused the compromise decree and after having satisfied itself that the grounds for eviction existed passed a decree in terms of the compromise between the parties. Thirdly to borrow the language of the Supreme Court the tenant was neither a minor nor an imbecile that he would not know as to what he was doing whether he would succeed in the suit or fail due to no defence or defence not tenable in law. The Supreme Court in (1993) 2 SCC 458 in paragraph 15 had stated that whenever there is any lawful agreement the Court is bound to record the agreement or compromise there is no provisions in the Act which made Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to proceeding contemplated by the Act nor there is any provisions in the Act which prohibits parties entering into a compromise in a suit for eviction filed under the Act. Further in addition to what Supreme Court has observed in my opinion, a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC cannot be made a shield for a dishonest and deceitful litigant who under legal advice or on his own takes advantage of certain terms of compromise decree but when his turn comes to follow other terms of the compromise, turns around and takes the plea that the decree was a nullity. In my opinion such a litigant is estopped from saying “ I have taken the advantage of the decree but now I shall not abide by the same.” The compromise decree is nonetheless a decree and it is to be fully complied with by the parties to the compromise. By the compromise decree the defendant impliedly admits the existence of grounds of eviction and the Court as such need not prove further into the matter. 8. For the aforesaid reason I find no justification for the executing Court to go behind the decree arid declare the decree arrived at by way of compromise a nullity and refusing to execute the same. In my opinion after taking advantage of the compromise decree for a period of 34 months and thereafter taking the plea of decree being a nullity was an act of malafide and gross abuse of the process of the Court. The defendant has entered into a compromise decree knowing fully well the strength or weakness of the defence and impliedly admitting to the allegations of the plaintiff, thereafter to resist the execution application on the ground of nullity was totally unjustified and not maintainable. In view of the same I allow this revision application and set aside and quash the order passed by the Assistant District Judge on 15.7.91 and hold that the compromise decree is executable and the executing Court will give the effect to the said decree forthwith without any delay. 9. The defendant is to pay a cost of Rs.7,500/- as cost of this petition to the petitioner through the Court below.