PALOK BASU, J. If the proverb "facts are sometimes stranger than fiction" ever requires proof, one might look to the facts in this bunch of litigation categorised as "registration-Clerks-Bunch-The fantastic truth is that almost all the persons who have filed writ petitions have obtained interim orders on the strength of which they continue to work in the Registration Department in various districts even though none of them was an "ad hoc" employee and none of them had worked even as casual-labour for two hundred and forty days continuously in any calendar year and most distressing being that several of them have not worked at all even a daily-wager. 2. In this Bunch there are four different matters which includes several writ petitions filed at Lucknow Bench of this Court which were summoned for being heard along with similar matters filed in this Court and all connected were directed to be listed for final disposal, it may be noted that the ex pression petitioners hereinafter includes petitioners in all the writ petitions even if they are appellants or respondents in the Special Appeals arising out of orders in those petitions and the expression state9 hereinafter includes the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Inspector General of Registration or the District Registrars (Registration) of the district, as the case may be. 3. The State was initially heard is some Special Appeals when it was pointed out that because of the interim or final orders in writ petitions passed by learned Single Judges, a piquant situation has been created inasmuch as managing the Registration offices has become difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, it was directed by a Division Bench that all the matters be bunched together as Registration Clerks Bunch and placed for final disposal and this is how four sets of matters have come up for hearing. 4. The first matter consists of various writ petitions which were filed for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to regularise their services as Registration Clerks, in some a writ of certiorari was also prayed for quashing the advertisement calling applications from the candidates for appointment as Registration Clerks while in some petitions, further prayer was that the respondents be commanded not to refuse allotment of work to the petitioners as Registration Clerks. 5. 5. The second matter consists of Special Appeals against final orders passed by learned Single Judges in some writ petitions with similar prayers as mentioned above. Since in those writ petitions affidavits had been exchanged between the parties, writ petitions have been placed and seen along with the Special Appeals. 6. The third matter consists of Special Appeal tiled by the State against final orders of learned Single Judge disposing of a writ petition with various directions to the Slaw as to what should and should not be done while selecting candidates for appointment as Registration Clerks. 7. The fourth matter consists of Special Appeal by petitioners against the orders of the Special Single Judge who has dismissed their petition sum marily by holding that the petitioners have no right to continue much less to be appointed as Registration Clerks. 8. Sri K. M. Dayal, Sri Murlidhar, Senior Advocates and Sarvasri K. M, Sinha, Dr. R. Padia, Pankaj Srivastava, Hari Narayan Singh, A. K. Singh, B. P. Singh, A. I. Naqvi, Mahendra Pratap, Ashok Khare, Bhagwati Prasad Singh; Ramendra Asthana, Rajesh Ji Verma, Ravi Kant, K. N. Tripathi, Govmd Krishna, V. K. Shukla, Bhagwati Prasad Srivastava, Madhur, Prakash, Ashok Bhushan, R. Bahadur, Shashi Kant, H. P. Pandey, Vinod Sinha, A. K. Gaur, Manoj Gupta, Arun Prakash, V. Sahai, H. S. N. Tri-pathi, S. P. Sharma, H. M, Srivastaya, Tarun Varma, M. C. Misra, R. B. Tripathi and Sri A. N. Srivastava have been heard on behalf of the petitioners at length while Sri S. N. Upadhyaya assisted by Sri Ramesh Upadhyaya has been heard on behalf of the State, Since the matters pending at Lucknow Bench were also bunched together, the learned Advocates who came from Lucknow and argued the matters were Sarvasri Satisli Chandra Misra, (Dr.) P. L. Mishra, R. K. Srivastava, A. P. Singh, A. K. Baijpai and several others, Sri Upadhyaya appeared for all the opposite parties in these cases also. It may be pointed out that during the course of arguments some counsel moved applications praying that the writ petitions were cognizable by Single Judges hence, (they may not be heard by Division Beach as the right of appeal of those individuals will be lost. Those applications have been rejected as being without force for several special appeals in like matters have also been heard together and all questions are identical. Those applications have been rejected as being without force for several special appeals in like matters have also been heard together and all questions are identical. Each and every document filed as Annexures to the various petitions and the affidavits have been thoroughly scrutinised, 9. It is desirable to take up the first matter, i. e. , the writ petitions at the outset as that would clearly indicate the claim of the petitioners and the objection qf the State. After dealing with the general legal propositions on the relevant facts, it would become easier to examine the correctness or otherwise of the interim or final or even modified orders of learned Single Judges which are under challenge in the second, third and fourth matters in the nature of Special Appeals. 10. The most important factor would be to determine the factual and legal basis for the petitioners claim of regularisation". The second im portant enquiry has to be directed towards the "advertisement" for Registra tion Clerks. The last exaction has to be regarding the legal effect after changes have been brought about by amending the laws and rules concerning appointments of Registration Clerks. Practically in all the writ petitions three opposite parties have been arrayed and the) are : State of U. P. through the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General Regis tration, U, P. ands District Registrar, Registration of the district concerned It may be mentioned here that rules regarding recruitment and conditions of service of Registration Clerks are to be found in U, P. Registration Depart ment (District Establishment ). Ministerial Services Rules, 1979, The peti tioners contend that there are 978 posts of Registration Clerks and 195 temporary posts of the said Clerks and before the rules were amended in 1991 Registration Clerks on daily wages basis were appointed in pursuance of Government Orders, dated 30-11-1989 and 2-3-1990. This assertion of fact has been specifically denied in the counter affidavit and the case of the State is that when increase of copying work was noticed periodical daily wage workers were engaged as and when necessary for a maximum period of 90 days in a financial year with the approval of the Collector of the District. It is wrong to say that those daily wage workers were engaged to discharge all the functions and responsibilities of regularly appointed Registration Clerks. It is wrong to say that those daily wage workers were engaged to discharge all the functions and responsibilities of regularly appointed Registration Clerks. It is specifically averred in Paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit with reference to the said 150 posts of temporary Registration Clerks, that regarding those, sanction was operative till 28-2- 1990 whereafter those posts were not sanctioned at all. Consequently those 150 temporary posts lapsed and ceased to exist after 28-2-1990. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner could not allege anything to indicate that the averments made in the counter affidavit are wrong or are against the record, 11. In order to lay claim to the posts of Registration Clerks the petitioners pleaded that for about six years those vacant posts of Registration Clerks were not filled in by the State therefore, a local Selection Committee was constituted. It consisted of the District Assistant Registrar, District Ins pector General, Registration and one co-opted member. It is said that even the daily wagers were appointed after getting selected through this Selection Committee. This has been strongly refuted in Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit. It is denied by the State that any such selec tion committee ever existed for making selection of daily wage workers. It has been reiterated that daily wage workers were engaged to clear off periodical accumulation of copying work. The averments made in the counter affidavit further say : "it is wrong and misleading to State that the duties discharged by a permanent Registration Clerk were got discharged by daily wage workers. It is also false to state that alleged arrangement of engaging daily wage Barkers was continuing in the District Allahabad for the last six years. " Nothing has been brought out in the rejoinder affidavit so as to deny this specific averment made on behalf of the State. 12. Another attempt on the part of the petitioners was to allege in Paragraph-9 of the writ petition that the Government had issued order contained in the body of the letter dated 18-12-1986 whereby the District Registrar with prior approval of the Inspector-General Registration was authorised to create posts of Registration Clerks and make appointments of persons on daily wage basis. Another attempt on the part of the petitioners was to allege in Paragraph-9 of the writ petition that the Government had issued order contained in the body of the letter dated 18-12-1986 whereby the District Registrar with prior approval of the Inspector-General Registration was authorised to create posts of Registration Clerks and make appointments of persons on daily wage basis. This fact has also been denied specifically in the counter affidavit with reiteration of the pleading of the State that even this Government Order dated 19-10-1986 had reference only to daily wage workers and did not authorise appointment of Registration Clerks. 13. Then comes an important averment in the writ petition saying that the petitioner was working as daily wager since January, 1988. It may be interesting to quote the averment. It is said "that the petitioner was appointed as Registration Clerk on daily wages basis in January, 1988 in Allahabad and he has been discharging his duties attached to the Office of the Registration Clerk from the date of his appointment until now without any interruption. That the work and performance of duties attached to the office of Registration Clerics which was being discharged by the petitioner particularly throughout have been satisfactory. " In the counter affidavit the State has specifically denied these averments in the writ petition. It has been sworn in Paras 10 and 11 that the petitioner was engaged on daily wages between 28-1-1988 and 15-3-1988 (i. e. 26 days) again between 4-12-1990 and 4-2-1991 (i. e. 44 days) and the allegations to the contrary claiming continuous discharging of duties as Registration Clerks was absolutely false and baseless. It may be relevant to quote here the specific assertion of the State which is to the effect that "assertions regarding-continuous discharging of duties as Registration Clerk made by the petitioner are raise and emphatically denied. There is no relationship of employer and employee existing between the respondents and the petitioner except the period herein-after mentioned, and he has been paid wages for the same period. It is wrong to State that the petitioner has been discharging his duties from the, date of his engagement until filing of this writ petition without any break or interruption. The petitioner has ceased to work after 4-2-1991 in any capacity. The petitioner has worked in a temporary construction of shamiana errected with the help of rope and bamboo. 14. It is wrong to State that the petitioner has been discharging his duties from the, date of his engagement until filing of this writ petition without any break or interruption. The petitioner has ceased to work after 4-2-1991 in any capacity. The petitioner has worked in a temporary construction of shamiana errected with the help of rope and bamboo. 14. In order to lend support to the otherwise baseless pleading on behalf of the petitioner that he had been continuously working as Registration Clerk, it was averred in Paragraph 11 of the petition that a Certificate denot ing satisfactory work by the petitioner as Registration Clerk was issued by the Authority concerned. However, this paragraph was wholly vague. The said allegation has also been denied in the counter affidavit and it is said that no certificate by any Authority whatsoever has ever been issued to the petitioner. 15. In Paragraph 14 of the writ petition it was averred that an order has been issued on 31-1-1991 whereby it was directed or as if a direction was issued that old Registration Clerks would be entitled to continue but the newly recruited Registration Clerks on daily wages shall be removed on completion of the accumulated Registration work. This averment was made obviously with the objective to impress upon the Court that the petitioner should derive some advantage from the contents of the said order dated 31-1-1991. The fact however remains that since the petitioner was appointed for only 26 days in the year 1988 and then for 44 days in the year 1991, no question of his being treated as an old Registration Clerk arose and therefore no benefit even under the alleged order, dated 31-1-1991 could accrue to the petitioner. It may be pointed out here that even the contents of the order dated 31-1- 1991 do not lend support to the claim of the petitioner as is sought to be made out. Petitioner then wanted to rely upon the list dated 16-1-1991 said to have been submitted by Sub-Registrar (Chail) indicating the Registra tion Clerks working under him. This is a list only of daily wage workers and does not include any ad hoc appointee m the clerical post. Therefore, nothing can be gained by the petitioner from the fact that his name was included in the list dated 16-1-1991 as a daily wage worker. This is a list only of daily wage workers and does not include any ad hoc appointee m the clerical post. Therefore, nothing can be gained by the petitioner from the fact that his name was included in the list dated 16-1-1991 as a daily wage worker. This will be for the reason that the petitioner in the second lap was appointed from 4-12-1990 to 4-2-1991. 16. Thus, for the petitioners averment relating to his factual and legal basis claiming regularisation, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) JT 1994 (3) (SC) 453- Moolraj Upadhaya, v. State of U. P. , (2) 1994 (5) SCC 304 , R. J. Pahda v. Steel Authority of India ; (3) 1994 UPLBEC 277, Society Madarasa Miza-hir Uloom Mubarak Shah, Saharanpur v. Muzaffar Hussain ; (4) 1990 UPLBEC 596, Suresh Kumar Tewari and others v. State of U. P. and others ; (5) AIR 1987 SC 2348 , K. S. Vora and others ; (6) 1992 (5) SCC 118, State of Haryana v. Piara Singh ; (7) AIR 1986 SC 183 ; (8) AIR 1988 SC 1531 . Industrial Establishments. Secondly, after the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in Piara Singh (supra) no scope of argument is left as to who and under what circumstances can claim regularisation of service, la none of the categories examined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as entitling regularisation, can the petitioners fall. The specific denial of the State in their counter affidavits is indicating conclusively that the petitioner was not employed, as an ad hoc Registration Clerk. The petitioner was a daily wager only for a few weeks or months and therefore by no rule or law could he lay claim for regularisation. 17. It may be mentioned here that in every one of these writ petitions none of the petitioners has worked even for more than a few weeks or at best for a few months in a year. Consequently the entire edifice of the claim of all the petitioners seeking regularisation is knocked out. 18. 17. It may be mentioned here that in every one of these writ petitions none of the petitioners has worked even for more than a few weeks or at best for a few months in a year. Consequently the entire edifice of the claim of all the petitioners seeking regularisation is knocked out. 18. The second question as to whether the advertisement dated 24-3-1991 issued by the State inviting applications for appointment to the post of Registration clerks confers any right on the petitioner has to be taken up along with the third point formulated above which related to the legal and factual effect of the amendments in the recruitment rules for appointing Registration Clerks. At the outset it may be stated here that the State has averred that by the amendment brought about in the then existing rules concerning appointments of Registration Clerks, it does not require any further appointment of such clerks. It has been averred that by the amended provision the persons seeking registration are required to supply mechanically processed copies of the documents sought to be registered in the Registration Offices and therefore there would not be any more, any need to have more Registration Clerks for copying out the documents in the registers maintained at the Registration office. 19. It has been admitted in the counter affidavit that the Inspector General, Registration, U. P. Allahabad issued a press notification on 24-3-1991 inviting applications for appointment to the posts of Registration Clerks. Nothing further happened thereafter except that several writ petitions were filed in this Court and as a result of different interim orders, no progress with regard to the said advertisements could take place and sinee in the meantime the aforesaid law was amended therefore the petitioners can claim nothing out of the said advertisement. 20. It may be stated here that law on the point is more than clear now that mere advertisements in a paper about some posts lying vacant does not confer any right whatsoever on those who may be seeking appointment in pursuance of the advertisements. The petitioners case |on the other hand it just contrary. 20. It may be stated here that law on the point is more than clear now that mere advertisements in a paper about some posts lying vacant does not confer any right whatsoever on those who may be seeking appointment in pursuance of the advertisements. The petitioners case |on the other hand it just contrary. They have pleaded that the aforesaid advertisement should indicate that there are posts vacant and therefore since they have been working is ad hoc Registration Clerks from much before the advertisements they may be regularised and no new appointment in pursuance of the advertisements should be made. As stated above since each and every one of the petitioner has failed to claim regularisation under any law or rule the aforesaid lone pleading on their behalf is wholly futile. In any case the Stats has speci fically come up with the case that they do not require any one to be appointed as Registration Clerks in pursuance of the said advertisement dated 24-3-1991, they are not proposing to process the said advertisement any further and which should for all practical purposes be treated as non-existent. Under the circumstances the changed laws and rules have drastically cut down the need for appointments of fresh Registration Clerks. For this reason also the aforesaid advertisements do not come to extend any helping hand to the otherwise hopeless case of the petitioners to seek regularisation as ad hoc Registration Clerks. None of the petitioners can come even within the category of ad-hoc employees and therefore the fact that some of them worked for few weeks or months in the span of one or a few years would not confer any right of regularisation because they have not succeeded in proving that they were ad hoc employees. Their tenure was and would remain that of a daily wager employed on contract for a limited period. It may be emphasised that none of the petitioners has filed any appointment letter to indicate on what terms and conditions the petitioners may have been appointed. The reason is obvious. There was infact no appointment letter ever issued to any one of them. None of the documents on which they have placed reliance, as discussed above, confer any right whatsoever on the petitioners to get selves declared as an ad hoc employee in a Registration Department. The reason is obvious. There was infact no appointment letter ever issued to any one of them. None of the documents on which they have placed reliance, as discussed above, confer any right whatsoever on the petitioners to get selves declared as an ad hoc employee in a Registration Department. It was perhaps for this reason that they went on making oral averments in the peti tion to foster their illegitimate claim. 21. One further argument needs mention here. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that a writ petition filed under similar circumstances in the Lucknow Bench was favourably decided by Honble S. H. A. Raza, J. and it was allowed and further that on S. L. P. against that order has been dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court. On the strength of these facts it was argued that the petitioners claim of similar relief be upheld and their petitions be allowed. 22. It is true that the averments made in that writ petition were similar. But nothing has been shown by learned counsel for petitioners as to on what basis any one of those petitioners could have been treated as regularly selected of ad hoc Registration Clerks. In the present bunch all the arguments have been noted above and it has been held that none of the petitioners can claim regularisation under any law or rule. Continuance of an employee on any post in pursuance of orders of this Court must have the backing of law. It is impossible to confer right to continue on a post only because of the fact that the petitioners may have obtained interim orders and on the strength of those orders they have been permitted to continue. There is no basis as to why those petitioners should have been directed to continue, With respect, the view of the learned single Judge is not acceptable for the various reasons noted above. The fact that the S. L. P. has been dismissed against that judgment cannot be a precedent for permitting the petitioners here to get benefit of interim orders which they were not entitled to. Benefit even under the industrial laws may extend to some workmen who may have worked continuously for two hundred and forty days in an year. Even so much is not true about any of the petitioners. The said judgment in Civil Misc. Benefit even under the industrial laws may extend to some workmen who may have worked continuously for two hundred and forty days in an year. Even so much is not true about any of the petitioners. The said judgment in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3721 of 1990 (Lucknow Bench) has no presidential value and is hereby overruled. The said argument has no force and is rejected. It may be added that "the mere rejection of the S. L. P. by the apex Court cannot be construed as the of the correctness of the decision" of the learned Single Judge. This legal position stands well explained by the Supreme Court in workman C. P. Trust, ;,air-1978 SC 1283/m/s. Rup Diamonds, AIR 1985 SC 674 and Nityanand Kar, 1991 Supp (2), SCG 516. 23. In this view of the matter all the petitioners have failed to make out any case for issue of a writ directing their regularisation. The writ petitions are therefore, liable to be dismissed. 24. Having thus examined first matter, i. e. the writ petitions, the rest of the three matters may be taken up together. In fact Miss Maya Guptas Writ Petition (No. 17634-A/31) along with several others; come up for disposal before Hon. Vijay Bahuguna, J. Before concluding the judgment, the learned single Judge has recorded the following finding :- "the petitioners have thus, on the facts of the case, not put in continuous and uninterrupted service for three years which could be taken into consideration by this Court for their regularisation. in fact the petitioners had not completed 240 days of service in any calendar year. The case of an ad hoc or daily wage employee for regularisation can be considered only if he has put in conti nuous service for at least a minimum period of three years and that will be dependent upon the nature of tae work and the availability of sanctioned post. In these cases the daily wage Registration Clerks are in excess of the sanctioned post and, after 1991 they have worked on the strength of the interim orders of this Court. The petitioners have failed to make out a case for regularisation and as such they are not entitled to the said relief. " 25. In these cases the daily wage Registration Clerks are in excess of the sanctioned post and, after 1991 they have worked on the strength of the interim orders of this Court. The petitioners have failed to make out a case for regularisation and as such they are not entitled to the said relief. " 25. Having held so, the learned single Judge has issued certain direc tions to the State which, according to the learned counsel for the State are wholly without jurisdiction. The directions are as under : (i) However, as the petitioners have now put in nearly two years of continuous service as daily wage Registration Clerks by virtue of the interim orders of this court, they have gained experience and if they fulfil educational qualifications and other conditions to be appointed on the post of Registration Clerks, then they should face regular selection and if they are selected they will have a right to continue. (ii) To balance the equities in favour of the petitioners and the Department it is just and fair that a weightage of 5% marks should be given to the daily wage Registration Clerks, who have worked for more than a year as daily wage Registration Clerks when the final selections are made in accordance with the Rules. (iii) The Inspector General of Registration shall determine the exact number of sanctioned posts and thereafter the petitioners and other daily wage Registration Clerks shall be allowed to continue in service against the sanctioned posts till regular selection are made. (iv) The daily wage Registration Clerks who are declared surplus shall not be given work, but they will be entitled to the weightage of 5% marks as directed above when they face regular selections. (v) As the petitioners have actually worked, the respondent shall not make any claim for the refund of the amount paid to them by way of salary. (vi) As the daily rated Registration Clerks are performing the same nature of work which is being performed by regular Registration Clerks, the petitioners working on daily wages shall henceforth be given the same salary which is being paid to the regular employees to bring a parity in salary. (vii) With the aforesaid directions given above, the writ petitions partly succeed and are allowed. 26. (vii) With the aforesaid directions given above, the writ petitions partly succeed and are allowed. 26. The learned counsel for the State has vehemently argued that not only the aforesaid direction are wholly without jurisdiction, they are contrary to the findings recorded by the learned single Judge. Those findings have also been therefore already quoted above. There is force in the argument that after having recorded the aforesaid finding the direction noted above should not have been issued nor could the writ petitions have been allowed. As noted above, while discussing the first matter, once the petitioners have failed to make out any case for regularisation and could never step into the posts of ad hoc Registration Clerks and have worked only as daily wage workers for few weeks of months, the aforesaid directions are wholly out of bounds of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. This necessitates further enquiry as to whether the petitioners can gain any advantage for having worked for nearly a year or two on the strength of the interim orders of this Court Those orders are quoted here inafter : "hon. M. L. Bhatt, J.- The learned Standing counsel is allowed one months time to file a C. A. List this case after one month. Until further orders from this Court, the petitioner shall be permitted to continue to work on the post of Registration Clerk and shall be paid his salary. However, the selection in terms of the advertisement notice dated 24-3-1991 may continue but one post shall not be filled up in pursuance of that advertisement notice," Hon. M. L. Bhat, J. passed similar type of orders in fifteen other writ petitions. "hon. Om Prakash, J.-Issue notice. Until further orders the selec tion pursuant to the advertisement will continue but so long as the post if any held by the petitioner is decided to be manned by daily wage earner by the respondents, the petitioner will be per mitted to continue if his work continues to be satisfactory and shall be paid his salary admissible to him regularly. " Honble Om Prakash, J passed similar type of orders in seventeen other writ petitions : "hon. R. R. K. Trivedi, J.-Learned Standing counsel prays for and is granted one months time to file a counter affidavit. Petitioners will have two weeks thereafter to file a rejoinder affidavit. " Honble Om Prakash, J passed similar type of orders in seventeen other writ petitions : "hon. R. R. K. Trivedi, J.-Learned Standing counsel prays for and is granted one months time to file a counter affidavit. Petitioners will have two weeks thereafter to file a rejoinder affidavit. List this petition for admission after the expiry of the aforesaid period. Meanwhile petitioners shall not be disturbed from working on the post of Registration Clerks until regularly selected candidate are available for appointment on the posts. " Hon. R. R. K. Trivedi, J. passed similar type of orders in four other writ petitions : "hon R. B. Mehrotra, J.-Standing counsel is allowed one month for filing center affidavit. List on 14-8- 1991. Until further orders, the operation of the order dated 27-5-1991 (Annexure "9" to the writ petition) shall remain stayed and the petitioner shall be allowed to continue on the post of Registration Clerk and will be permitted to draw his salary," Hon. R. B. Mehrotra, I. passed similar type of orders in six other writ petitions. Hon. B. M. Lal, J.-Issue notice. Until further orders of this Court, regular selection on the basis of advertisement dated 23-3-1991 may continue. However, appoint ment on the post on which the petitioner is working shall not be made and he will continue. It is further made clear that peti tioners claim will also be considered for being appointed on the posts. " Hon. B. M. Lal, J. passed similar type of orders in three other writ petitions : "hon. V. N. Khare, J.- Put up on the date of admission. Meanwhile, selection in pursuance of advertisement may take place. However, in the meantime if some person is required to be appointed in place of the petitioner in that case, the petitioner shall be given preference and such appointment shall continue till substantive selection is made. If it is not adhered to the respon dents shall give reasons for the same. " Hon. V. N. Khare, J. passed similar type of orders in one other writ petition. "hon, S. R. Singh, J.-List this petition for final disposal alongwith writ petition No. 8336 of 1991. If it is not adhered to the respon dents shall give reasons for the same. " Hon. V. N. Khare, J. passed similar type of orders in one other writ petition. "hon, S. R. Singh, J.-List this petition for final disposal alongwith writ petition No. 8336 of 1991. Meanwhile, the respondents are directed to consider the petitioner as well for appointment on the post in question in pursuance of the impugned advertisement and the selection if any made, would not be given effect to and the petitioner shall be allowed to continue on the post and paid his salary upto 31- 8,1991. " Hon. S. R. Singh, J. passed similar type of order in one other writ petition. "hon. N. L. Ganguly, J.-In the meanwhile the petitioner may be permitted to work as Registration Clerk on ad hoc basis as he had been working previously provided there is such a vacancy is available. In case be is allowed to work his emoluments will be regularly paid till further orders. " Hon. M. Katju, J.-Despite the orders of this Court dated 12-1-1993, no counter affidavit has been filed. In the circumstances, I direct that if the juniors to the petitioners have been retained in service, the petitioners will also be taken in service within a month of production of a certified copy of this order and shall be paid salary regularly. "hon. S. C. Verma, J.-Learned Standing Counsel prays for and is granted a months time to file counter affidavit. The petitioner will have thereafter two weeks time to file rejoinder affidavit. List this petition for admission thereafter. Meanwhile regular selection on the basis of advertisement published on 23-3-1991 may continue. However the appointment on the post on which the petitioner is working shall not be made, it is further made clear that the petitioners claim will also be considered for being appointed on the post. " Similarly, some other learned Judges here and in Lucknow Bench had passed interim orders more or less on the same terms as quoted above in the writ petitions. 28. It was lightly argued that the petitioners were duty bound to place correct facts before this Court and on wrong averments, the aforesaid interim orders were obtained by them. " Similarly, some other learned Judges here and in Lucknow Bench had passed interim orders more or less on the same terms as quoted above in the writ petitions. 28. It was lightly argued that the petitioners were duty bound to place correct facts before this Court and on wrong averments, the aforesaid interim orders were obtained by them. In view of what has been stated above while discussing the petitioners claim in the writ petitions, their false averments may have been responsible for persuading this Court to pass those interim orders. No body can gain or glamour for any advantage much less special benefits, on account of false averments made in the writ petitions. Had the petitioners not said that they were continuously and uninterruptedly working in the Registration Departments concerned, perhaps the learned Single Judge may not have been persuaded to pass those orders. 29. It is true that the learned single Judge in his final directions has taken due note of the fact that the petitioners have continued for about one or two years and therefore held that its benefit in the shape of weightage can be given to them when they should be called for selection. There is no right with the petitioners to claim the said weightage because the very averments on the basis of which they secured the interim orders were in correct and false. Likewise the directions to the effect that the petitioners should be allowed to continue in service against sanctioned posts till regular selections are made is also erroneous if not wholly illegal. It is therefore clear that the writ peti tions giving rise to the Special Appeals containing the aforesaid directions should have been dismissed. 30. However one word has to be said about one of the directions con tained in the order under challenge in these special Appeals. Learned Single Judge has directed that the petitioners shall not be asked to refund the amount paid to them by way of salary. In these hard days the petitioners may not be in a position to compensate the said amount they have drawn as salary in view of the interin orders. Taking into account all the surrounding facts and circumstances it is hereby directed that all the petitioners who have drawn salaries in whatever form from the State would not be called upon to refund the same. 31. Taking into account all the surrounding facts and circumstances it is hereby directed that all the petitioners who have drawn salaries in whatever form from the State would not be called upon to refund the same. 31. It may be pointed out that though none of the petitioners has quoted the relevant law permitting regularisation may be permissible under the U, P. Regulation of Ad Hoc appointments (on posts outside the Purview of the P. S. C.) Rules, 1979. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 thereof may be usefully quoted here :- "4. Regulation o/ad hoc appointments.- (1) Any person who- (i) was directly appointed on ad hoc basis before January 1, 1977 and is continuing in service, as such on the date of com mencement of these rules ; (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment ; and (iii) has completed on, as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accord ance with the relevant service rules or orders. " 32. Subsequent amendments have been made on the date January 1, 1977 in clause (i) making it October 1, 1986 but requirement of qualification and "three years continuous service envisaged by clauses (ii) and (iii) remain unchanged. 33. Likewise Section 6-N of the U. P Industrial Disputes Act also refers to "continuous service of 240 days" before benefits for regular appointment can be claimed. As stated above, there is no other law or Rule on the basis of which any of the petitioners could claim regularisation. Therefore, employ ment of all the petitioners shall have to cease with immediate effect as the interim orders would end with the dismissal of the writ petitions. 34. The third matter is the lone Special Appeal No. 406 of 1994 filed by the petitioners against order of Honble B. M. Lai, J. whereby the learned Single Judge has not granted any relief to them and has dismissed the writ petition summarily. This order has to be upheld. The said special Appeal has no force and has to be dismissed. 35. The fourth matter is Special Appeal by State. This order has to be upheld. The said special Appeal has no force and has to be dismissed. 35. The fourth matter is Special Appeal by State. This one Special Appeal No. 659 of 1994 is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge (Honble Vijay Bahuguna, J.) dated 5-2-1993 whereby petitioners who were not granted any interim orders as they had not filed writ petitions earlier, were permitted to be considered when regular selection was to be made. The relevant order may be quoted here for ready reference : "heard counsel for the parties. Respondent No. 2, Inspector General of Registration, U. P. Allahabad, issued an advertisement notice that selection will be made for the post of Registration Clerks. The advertisement was issued on 23rd March, 1991. The petitioners have stated that no regular selection has been made in pursuance of the advertisement notice. The petitioners were previously work ing on daily wages, but by the order of the Inspector General of Registration, U. P. Allahabad dated 27th May, 1991, the services of only such daily wages employees have been retained who have not interim order from the Honble High Court in their favour. As the petitioners did not have any interim orders in their favour from Court of law, they were not given the work. Till a regular selection is made by the respondent No. 2 for the post of registration clerks, it would be in the interest of justice that if work is available the petitioners be given work on daily wages as registration clerk. It is being made clear that the petitioner will be entitled to daily wages only for the period they have worked. There is no doubt that the petitioner will be considered when the regular selection will be made. With these directions, the writ petition is finally disposed of. A copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioners on payment of usual charges within a week. " 36. The same learned Single Judge then modified the aforesaid order by his subsequent order dated 25- 3-1993 which is also, for ready reference, quoted below : "time was granted to the standing counsel on 12th April, 1993 to file a counter affidavit, but no counter affidavit has been filed. " 36. The same learned Single Judge then modified the aforesaid order by his subsequent order dated 25- 3-1993 which is also, for ready reference, quoted below : "time was granted to the standing counsel on 12th April, 1993 to file a counter affidavit, but no counter affidavit has been filed. The order of this Court dated 5th February, 1993 is modified to the extent that as directed by the order of respondent No. 1 dated 29th July, 1992 (Annexure 3 to the affidavit filed in support of the application for modification) the petitioner will be absorbed any where in the State as directed by this Court. " 37. It was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the State that both the orders i. e. dated 5-2- 1993 as also the modified order dated 25-8-1993 are wholly without jurisdiction. Both the orders have to be quashed. 38. Before parting with these cases it may be mentioned that some learned counsel for the petitioners raised an objection regarding the appearance of Shri S. N. Upadhyay assisted by Shri Ramesh Upadhyay as counsel for the State in all these matters. The argument proceeded that since neither of them is a Standing Counsel they cannot hold brief of the State. Shri Upadhyay on the other hand stated that because of peculiar exigencies existing in these matters, the State has chosen to engage him as a State Counsel. Nothing could be brought to our notice which may prohibit him from arguing on behalf of the State in the matters where he may have been engaged as a special counsel. This objection therefore is rejected as baseless. 39. In view of the aforesaid discussions writ petition No. 30582/91 connected with CMWP Nos. 30581/91, 17921/91, 8322/91, 10410/91, 18767/91 26324/91, 23740/91, 26356/91, 26474/91, 20020/91, 22416/91, 21787/91, 17956/91, 10416/91, 80437/91, 27596/91, 27468/91, 26549/91, 30586/91, 30497/ 91, 28526/91, 1764/92, 31415/91, 30872/91, 1416/93, 17885/91, 19917/91, 24824/91, 28568/91, 23708/91, 30582/91,30563/91, 7571/24, 28469/91, 14122/ 91, 8336/92, 19960/91, 21579/91, 12369/91, 8351/91, 28560/91, 8767/91, 26171/91, 17637/91, 17636/91, 30587/91, 28560/91, 36367/91, 30806/91, 30805/91, 21910/91, 26473/91, 26472/91, 17884/91, 88502/91, 17836/91, 17837/91, 234s5/ 91,28508/91, 28503/91, 17883/91, 16522/91, 22917/92, 5738/93, 18623/93, 22868/93, 21854/91, 31227/91, 44513/92, 8332/91, 1449/91, 22197/91, 22220/91, 23515/91, 27184/91, 28201/91, 4800/92,14804/92. 30570/91, 37238/91, 37239/91, 7315/91 28524/91, 29081/91, 30495/91, 30661/91, 30841/91 31009/91, 31023/91, 36119/91, 36368/91, 37091/91, 37091/91, 37103^91, 37244/91, 10729/92, 14404/92, 14804/92, 14789/92, 14915/92, 15167/92, 15168/92, 4774/92, 7785/92, 14437/92, 14481/92, 4667/92, 20928/92, 30897/91, 36316/91, 20929/92, 229s9/ 92, 43380/92, 6700/93, 37101/92, 15754/93, 17135/91, 19773/93, 4874/91, 28226/91,27565/91,26162/91, 24735/91,28231/91, 24868/91, 14796/92, 4803/ 91, 10164/91, 10166/91, 11140/91, 121/91, 12230/91, 17776/91, 17974/91, 24722/91, 22199/91, 19871/91. 19976/91, 30801/91. LUCKNOW BENCH CASES : 815/95. (7656/92), 838/95 (7914/91), 849/95 (8030/90), 850/95 (672/93) 852/95 (2141/91), 854/95 (2509/91), 856/95 (2891/91), 362/95 (1309/91), 830/95 (7000/91), 867/95 (6957/91), 829/95 (3089/92) 841/95 (7334/91), 840/95 (7419/ 91), 880/95 (8206/91), 882/95 (695/93), 868/95 (6814/91), 883/95 7954/91) 870/95 (5467/91), 874/95 (5169/91), 810/95 (2488/93), 811/95 (6552/91) 812/95 (3106/93), 813/95 (3630/93), 814/95 (7465/92/), 817/95 (7919/93) 819 95 (6550/93), 820/95 (4235/93), 821/95 (4201/ 93), 822/95 (2165/92) 823/95 (2661/92), 824/95 (2295/92) 825/95 (2691/92), 826/95 (2690/92) 827 95 (3072/92), 831/95 (4395/92), 832/95 (2764/92), 834/95 (1907/93 835 95 (2589/93) 871/95 (5520/91), 863/95 (1548/91), 884/95 (6119/ 91) 836 95 (1556/93), 837/95 (1562/93), 839/95 (7437/91) 842/95 (3993/91) 4395 (3827/91), 844/95 (12968/90), 845/95 (3120/91), 346/95 (3789/91) 847/ 95 (4002/90), 851/95 (4346/91), 853/95 (2426/91), 857/95 (3095/91, 858/95 (3234/91), 859/95 (5349/91), 860/95 (407/91), 864/95 (1915/91), 866/95 (7318/ 91), 869/95 (6685/91) 872/95 (5613/91), 873/95 (6043/91) 875/93 4351/91, 876/95 (5466/91), 877/95 (5458/91), 878/95 (6195/91), 879/95 (8222/91), 881/95 (6813/93), 818/95 (7808/93), 2770/95 (2880/92), 2771/95 (477/93), 2772 95 (2937/93), 2773/95 (3660/93), 2774/95 (659393), 2775/95 (8955/93), 2776/95 (7471/93), 2777/95 (4956/92), 27/8/95 (557/91), 2779/95, (2214/91), 2780/95 (3522/91), 2781/95 (3523/91,, 2782/9j (6092/91), 2783/95 (6267/91,278495 (7011/91), 8785/95 (7630/91), 2786/95 (1794/94), 2787/95 (2369/94) 2788/95 (2371/94), 2789/95 ^3263/92), 2/90/95 (2946/92), are dismissed All the interim orders are vacated. The direction, issued by the learned single Judge are set aside except that the salary already drawn by the petitioners shall not be realised. 40, Special Appeal Nos. 646/94, 107/94, 585/94, 303/94, 302/94, 420/94 267/94, 266/94, 255/94 339/94, 715/94, 419/94, 666/94, 337/94, 338/94, 356 94 283/94, 587/94, 70/94, 216/94, 215/94, 439/94, 410/94, 396/94, 39//94, 541 94 271/94 295/94, 270/94, 340/94, 341/94, 304/94, 493/94. 665/94, 657/94 643/94 284/91, 285/94, 354/94, 322/94, 323/94, 22^/94 406/94, 825/93, 421 94 395 94 336/94, 645/94, 712/94, 711/94, 401/94, 429/94, 426/94, 431/94,709 94 438 94 736/94, 716/94, 710/94 and 713/91 are allowed. The judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 17th December, 1993 are set aside. All the directions contained in the judgment are also set aside except that the salary already drawn by the petitioners shall not be realised. 41. The judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 17th December, 1993 are set aside. All the directions contained in the judgment are also set aside except that the salary already drawn by the petitioners shall not be realised. 41. Special Appeal No. 406 01 1. 994-Harshenara Kumar v. I. G. Regis tration (Aligarh) is dismissed. 42. Special Appeal No. 659 of 1994-State of U. P. v. Harish Chandra Shukla (Deoria) is allowed. The judgment and order dated 5-2-1993 and 25-8-1993 in writ petition No. 41848 of 1992 passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. All the directions contained in the orders are set aside. 43. All the parties will bear their costs. Decreed accordingly. .