N. N. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application under Art. 226 of the constitution of India has been filed seeking directions to quash and set aside the order of the Election Officer, Amreli dated 11-1-1995 and further to declare that the correct date of birth of the petitioner is 31-12-1969 and as such he is entitled to contest the election for the membership of State Legislative Assembly of Gujarat on having completed 25 years of age. ( 2 ) THE say of the petitioner is that he filled in nomination form for contesting the election of Member of Legislative Assembly, State of Gujarat from seat No. 45, Amreli City. The nomination form was submitted on 9-1-1995. By mistake, the petitioner had shown the date of birth in the column of the nomination form as 30-12-1970. The Election Officer rejected the nomination of the petitioner on the ground that he has not completed 25 years of age and as such he falls short of age for contesting the election. This was communicated to him on 11-1-1995. He immediately approached the Election Officer and told him that the ground of rejection was not genuine, as in fact his date of birth is 31-12-1969 and by mistake he had shown the date of birth in the column of nomination form as 30-12-1970. It is stated that he had also produced relevant certificate showing the date of birth from Nagar Panchayat, Bhilkha, wherein the date of birth of the petitioner is shown as 31-12-1969. ( 3 ) I am not inclined to entertain this petition in view of the specific bar provided under Art. 329 (b) of the Constitution. Art. 329 (b) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner, as may be provided by or under any law made by the appropriate legislation. ( 4 ) MR R. K. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the bar provided under Art. 329 (b) will not operate in the present case, as something which has happened before the candidate is disclared elected is not the same thing as questioning the election. ( 4 ) MR R. K. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the bar provided under Art. 329 (b) will not operate in the present case, as something which has happened before the candidate is disclared elected is not the same thing as questioning the election. The argument advanced is that the respondent No. 2, election Officer has failed to discharge his duty cast upon him under the proviso to Sec. 36 (5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the act of 1951) to allow him to rebut the objection raised. Section 36 of the Act of 1951 provides for scrutiny of nomination. Sub-section (5) of Sec. 36 reads as under :"the returning officer shall hold scrutiny on the date appointed in his behalf under clause (b) of Sec. 30 and shall not allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when such proceedings are interrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control : provided that in case "an objection is raised by the returning officer or is made by any other person, the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the fixed date but one following the date fixed for scrutiny and the returning officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned. " ( 5 ) MR. S. I. Nanavati, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contends that challenge to any election including the election process which commences from the date of notification in the Offical Gazette cannot be brought up at an intermediate stage before any Court. The learned Counsel relies on the decision in the case of n. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, reported in AIR 1952 SC 64 . In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court was one of the persons who had filed nomination paper for election to one of the Constituencies of Madras legislative Assembly. His nomination was rejected on certain grounds. The appellant thereupon moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the returning officer rejecting his nomination paper and to direct the returning officer to include the name in the list of valid nomination to be published. His nomination was rejected on certain grounds. The appellant thereupon moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the returning officer rejecting his nomination paper and to direct the returning officer to include the name in the list of valid nomination to be published. The High Court dismissed the appellants application on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the returning officer by reasons of provisions of Art. 329 (b) of the Constitution. It was contended before the Supreme Court that rejection of the High Court was not affected by Art. 329 (b) of the Constitution and that he was entitled to a Writ of Certiorari in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court, after examining the various provisions of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 and the Scheme of Part XV of the constitution, held that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at an appropriate stage, in an appropriate manner before a Special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any Court. The Apex Court further ruled that having regard to the important functions which the Legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognised to be a matter of first importance that election should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections were over so that the election proceedings might not be unduly retarded or protracted. The Apex Court ruled that the word election embraces the whole procedure which consists of several stages and embraces many steps whereby an elected member is returned. It would be profitable to quote the relevant extracts from the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court :-"the law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a Special Tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any Court. Under the election law, the only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has, consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. Article 329 (b) was apparently enacted to prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground, and other grounds which may be raised under the law to call the election in question could be urged. It follows by necessary implications from the language of this provision that those grounds cannot be urged in any other manner, at any other stage and before any other Court. If the grounds on which an election can be called in question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors, if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a provision like Art. 329 (b) and in setting up a Special Tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the Article could lead to anomalies, which the Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them being that conflicting views may be expressed by the high Court at the pre-polling stage and by the Election Tribunal, which is to be an independent body, at the stage when the matter is brought up before it. " ( 6 ) THIS view has been re-affirmed by the Apex Court in Laxmicharan Singh v. Akm hassan Uzzaman, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1233 , Inderjit Baruva v. Election commission of India, reported in AIR 1984 SC 911 , Election Commission of India v. Shivaji, reported in AIR 1988 SC 61 . In Election Commission of India v. Shivaji (supra), dealing with the question of non-compliance of certain provisions of the act of 1951, the Court ruled that it is not the law that every non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or of the Constitution will vitiate an election. It is, only when it is shown that the result of the election was materially affected by such noncompliance the High Court would have jurisdiction to set aside an election in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 100 (1) (d) (iv) of the Act of 1951. It is, only when it is shown that the result of the election was materially affected by such noncompliance the High Court would have jurisdiction to set aside an election in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 100 (1) (d) (iv) of the Act of 1951. The Court further observed :"the High Court was in error in thinking that it alone had the exclusive power to protect the democracy. The success of democracy is dependent upon the cooperation of the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary, the Election Commission, the press, the political parties and above all the citizenry and each of them discharging the duties assigned to it. Every member of the body politic should play this legitimate role for the success of the democracy. Sometimes the success of democracy also depends upon the observance of restraint on the part of the constitutional functionaries. " ( 7 ) IN the present case, it is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents that it is not only that the petitioner gave out his date of birth as 30-12-1970 in the column of nomination form, but he also signed the proceedings at the time of scrutiny of the nomination. ( 8 ) I am not entering into this controversy, in view of the settled position of law as noticed above that the present petition cannot be entertained at an intermediate stage. Scrutiny of nomination form is part of the process of election of the legislative Assembly. ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this Special Civil application and the same is rejected as not entertained. Notice discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. .