Achankunju v. State of Kerala — 1995 DIGILAW 190 (KER)

JUDGMENT 1. Facts: The bus operation in the Thiruvananthapuram city was nationalised under the schemes notified on 16th October 1965, 26th June 1962 and 11th December 1975 whereby only K.S.R.T.C., i.e. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation', alone could conduct stage carriage service in the city and in the surrounding areas. During November, 1993, a section, of the employees of the Corporation went on strike putting the travelling public to hardship. Therefore, as a relief measure the Government issued temporary permits to private operators till the Corporation resumed services. Even after the strike was called off, the Government appears to have decided as a policy to continue private stage carriages in the city by issuing temporary permits. Government of India by notification S. O.954 (E), dated 15th December 1993 directed the State Government to limit the number of stage carriages operating in the city routes in Thiruvananthapuram city only. Government of Kerala considered it as expedient to issue the notification in G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. and T., dated 24th November 1994 limiting the number of stage carriages. In keeping with the line of the policy of the Government and in order to provide transport facilities the Government issued on the same day another notification modifying the then existing scheme in exercise of the power under sub-S.(2) of S.102 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whereby private buses may be allowed to ply within the city limits of Thiruvananthapuram Municipal Corporation, with the result that the total number of stage carriages to be operated within the city limits of Thiruvananthapuram was fixed at 510. Out of which 410 stage carriages are to be operated by the Corporation. The number of stage carriages operated by others is fixed at 100. Pursuant to these notifications applications were invited for the grant of 100 regular stage carriage permits during the period 8th December 1994 to 24th December 1994. About 423 applications were received and considered by the R.T.A., Thiruvananthapuram in its meeting held on 29th December 1994. After hearing the applicants the R.T.A. took a decision granting 100 permits distributed on 50 routes. About 423 applications were received and considered by the R.T.A., Thiruvananthapuram in its meeting held on 29th December 1994. After hearing the applicants the R.T.A. took a decision granting 100 permits distributed on 50 routes. O. P. No. 43 of 1995 was preferred before this Court challenging the notification G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. & T., dated 24th November 1994 and seeking to quash the said notification and also to stay the grant of regular permits that would be issued in pursuance to the said notification. The Original Petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge by a considered judgment dated 1st February 1995. Meanwhile the proceedings of the R.T.A., dated 29th December 1994 granting the permits were despatched on 9th February 1995 directing the grantees to produce the current records. Writ Appeal No. 172 of 1995 was filed against O. P. No. 43/1995 and an interim direction in C.M.P. No. 491 of 1995, dated 2nd March 1995 was ordered by the Division Bench of this Court holding that the appellants have not made out a case for staying the issuance of permits granted to the respondents. It is seen that most of the grantees have submitted their current records of the vehicle for the issue of the permits by the first week of March. However, the grantees were not issued the permits by the authorities. It was at this stage the Government issued the notification in G. O. (P) No. 15/95/ P.W. &T., dated 7th March 1995 rescinding the earlier notification in G.O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. and T., dated 24th November 1994. The explanatory note to the notification stated that since the percentage of reservation of stage carriages for , SC/ST has not been specifically mentioned and since the Government intends to issue a revised notification the earlier notification was decided to be cancelled. Thereafter the Government issued last notification, G.O. (P) No. 21/95/P.W. &T., dated 24th March 1995, whereby while fixing the limit of stage carriages operating on the city routes in Thiruvananthapuram city, reserved 10 per cent of the total number of stage carriages for SC/ST. The permissions granted in pursuance to the earlier notification were not cancelled and no applications so far had been called for in pursuance to the last notification, 2. There are two batches of writ petitions: (i) O.Ps. The permissions granted in pursuance to the earlier notification were not cancelled and no applications so far had been called for in pursuance to the last notification, 2. There are two batches of writ petitions: (i) O.Ps. challenging the first notification, dated 24th November 1994 and for further directions not to grant permits in pursuance of the decision taken by the R.T.A. dated 29th December 1994; (ii) O.Ps. filed by the grantees seeking for a mandamus to direct the Secretary to R.T.A. and the concerned officials to issue permits in pursuance to the grant and also challenging the notification; dated) 7th March 1995 rescinding the earlier notification besides challenging the subsequent notification dated 24th March 1995 which specifically prescribes 10 per cent reservation for SC/ST. 3. Contentions. The contentions of the petitioners challenging the notification dated 24th November 1994 who are also the appellants in the writ appeals since the learned Judges upheld the said notification are as follows: (a) The Government has not followed the mandatory provision of S.71(3) of the Act inasmuch as they have not prescribed the percentage of reservation for SC/ST. (b) The procedure prescribed under S.71(3)(d) read with R.145 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules', has not been followed while considering the grant of the permits by the R.T.A. (c) The proceedings of the R.T.A. in granting permits without there being separate reservation as contemplated under S.71 (3) (b), (c) and (d) of the Act are unconstitutional. (d) Since the total permits are 510, 10 per cent of the permits out of the total permits, viz., 51 permits should have been reserved for SC/ST. (e) By virtue of the notification under S.71 of the Act the Government cannot set apart stage carriages to be operated by the Corporation alone. All the permits must be made available and considered for the grant as per S.71(3)(d) of the Act. 4. The contentions raised on behalf of the grantees as well as the petitioners who have challenged the rescinding notification dated 7th March 1995 and the last notification dated 24th March 1995 are as follows: (a) The reservation contained in S.71(3)(b) and (c) of the Act have been strictly complied with and there is no particular mode prescribed as to the publication of the said reservation. In any event there is a substantial compliance of the requirement in this regard. In any event there is a substantial compliance of the requirement in this regard. (b) The statement of the Minister for Transport as published in Press dated 23rd December 1994 indicated the decision of the Government to reserve the 10 per cent for SC/ST. (c) The preamble to the decision of the R.T.A. dated 29th December 1994 clarifies the decision of the Government and R.T.A. to reserve the percentage for SC/ST as prescribed. (d) R.146 of the Rules has reserved 10 per cent of the vacancies available when the number of stage carriages are fixed under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of S.71 for SC/ST. The rule further states that the quota so reserved would be filled up by allotting one in every ten permits sanctioned. (e) The rescinding notification dated 7th March 1995 cannot take away their rights which have already accrued by virtue of grant of permits. (f) In the absence of notice to the grantees the cancellation of the earlier notification and the stand of the Government that by virtue of the illegality in the earlier notification the grant made is void, is in violation of the principles of natural justice. (g) Inasmuch as only the ministerial act of issuing the permits remains the matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Sharif Ahamd v. R.T.A., Meerut AIR 1978 SC 209 (h) The O.Ps. challenging the grants and the Writ Appeals are not maintainable since the affected parties are not impleaded. (i) The refusal to issue the permits and the grant of temporary permits to those who were not grantees are mala fide. 5. The submissions made by the learned Advocate General were on the lines supporting the first batch of O.Ps. which are as follows : The requirement of S.71 of the Act has not been strictly followed. Without reservation as contemplated under S.71(3)(b), the R.T.A. cannot proceed to consider the applications for the grant of permits. Reservation is a condition precedent for consideration. R.146 is only a general provision and without specific reservation the same cannot be invoked. Since the grants were illegal, nobody can take advantage of such illegal orders and seek permits on that basis. It was pointed out that a similar notification issued by the Government without reserving for SC/ST was quashed by this Court in O.P. No. 6575/92, dated 30th May 1992. 6. Since the grants were illegal, nobody can take advantage of such illegal orders and seek permits on that basis. It was pointed out that a similar notification issued by the Government without reserving for SC/ST was quashed by this Court in O.P. No. 6575/92, dated 30th May 1992. 6. Some of the decisions cited at the Bar which are relevant for the consideration of the issues are as follows: 7. In the decision Prabodh Verma v. State of U. P. AIR 1985 SC 167 . the Supreme Court held that a High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writ petition under Art.226 without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if the petitioners refuse to so join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary parties. 8. To the same effect is the decision in Udit Narain Singh v. Board of Revenue AIR 1963 SC 786 the Supreme Court held that the law as to who are necessary or proper parties to a proceeding is well settled. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. In a writ of certiorari not only the tribunal or authority whose order is Sought to be quashed but also parties in whose favour the said order is issued are necessary parties. The Supreme Court further held that the petition therein was incompetent without the necessary and proper parties being impleaded. 9. The contention of the petitioners in the Original Petitions challenging the rescinding notification and the subsequent notification is to the effect that the non-inclusion of the grantees in the O.Ps, challenging the first notification is fatal and therefore, both the O.Ps. and W.As. are incompetent and not maintainable by virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. 10. and W.As. are incompetent and not maintainable by virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. 10. In the decision in Commissioner of income Tax, U. P. v. M/s Shah Sadiq and Sons AIR 1987 SC 1217 , the Supreme Court held that the rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind S.6(c), General Clauses Act, 1977. The learned counsel submits that the rescinding notification and the subsequent notification have not taken away expressly the rights accrued to them as per the grants made in pursuance to the earlier notification. The said decision was followed in another decision reported in AIR 1989 SC 1614 (Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan) holding that the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred under the old law are not effaced. 11. In the decision State of Kerala v. Madhavan Pillai 1987 (1) KLT 141 the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held in that case that the Government did not have power or jurisdiction to revoke the sanction order and: that the cancellation violated the principles of natural justice. The said Division Bench judgment of this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in this decision and expressly the Supreme Court held that the exercise of the power of cancellation was vitiated by reason of non-observance of the principles of natural justice and the vice of extraneous factors. 12. The decision in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. ALR. 1983 SC 848 the Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of estoppel held that the principle of promissory estoppel would certainly estop the Corporation from backing out of its obligation arising from a solemn promise made by it to the respondent. The respondent acting upon the solemn promise made by the appellant incurred huge expenditure and if the appellant is held to its promise, the respondent would be put in a very disadvantageous position and therefore also the principle of promissory estoppel can be invoked: in this case. The contention of the grantees is that in pursuance to the order of grant and the directions issued by the Secretary, they have made the vehicles ready, remitted the tax amount and submitted the registration certificate and current records satisfying all the conditions prescribed for the grant. The contention of the grantees is that in pursuance to the order of grant and the directions issued by the Secretary, they have made the vehicles ready, remitted the tax amount and submitted the registration certificate and current records satisfying all the conditions prescribed for the grant. As per R.131 of the rules, the Secretary has to issue the permits to the petitioners as soon as they submit the current records and satisfy all the other requirements. The grantees are entitled to legitimately expect that on satisfaction of the requirements they would be granted the permits, The failure on the part of the respondent to carry out the duty is a clear violation of the principle of promissory estoppel and. legitimate expectation. 13. In the decision in Jndo-Marine Agencies v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay 1979 KLT 845 a learned Judge of this Court (as he then was) held as follows: "An order, although void in law, remains for many purposes effective and operative until it is challenged and its invalidity is declared by a competent body or court. It is not open to a person to ignore an order made against him by a competent authority in the purported exercise of its statutory power solely on the ground that the order is null and void and resist all consequences flowing from it. It is not correct to say that an order which is void is void in the sense that it has no effect at all. An order may be void ab initio, but it remains in effect and continues to operate until its invalidity is declared by the Court. Upon such declaration, the order goes out of existence as from the date on which it was made. But until then a void order is only voidable and it continues to operate against the person against whom it was made, and he is bound by the consequences flowing from the order." 14. Following the said decision the counsel for the grantees submitted that assuming the first notification is void, it is not open to the Secretary, R.T.A. who is performing the ministerial function of issuing the permit, to refuse the issue of permit on the alleged ground that the earlier notification is void, 15. The decision Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 872 while dealing with the question of mala fides held as follows. The decision Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 872 while dealing with the question of mala fides held as follows. "Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end design. There is a distinction between exercise of power in goods faith and misuse in bad faith. The former arises when an authority misuses its power in breach of law, say, by taking into account bona fide, and with best of intentions, some extraneous matters or by ignoring relevant matters. That would render the impugned act or order ultra vires, It would be a case of fraud on powers. The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an 'alien' purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred is mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power." 16. In the decision Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 , the Supreme Court held that the provision for reservation can also be made by the executive wing of the State and it can be made by an executive order. An executive order made in terms of Art.16(4) is effective and enforceable by itself. Enactment of the said "provision" into a law made by the appropriate legislature under Art.309 or incorporation into and issued! as a Rule by the President/Governor under the proviso to Art.309 is not necessary for it to become enforceable. In the same judgment it has been held that the reservation under Art.16 (4) should not exceed 50 per cent. 17. We have carefully considered the submissions. as a Rule by the President/Governor under the proviso to Art.309 is not necessary for it to become enforceable. In the same judgment it has been held that the reservation under Art.16 (4) should not exceed 50 per cent. 17. We have carefully considered the submissions. The main issue relates to the question whether in the absence of specific reservation in the notification in G.O. (P) No. 108/94/ P. W. &T., dated 24th November 1994 limiting the number of stage carriage permits, the further proceedings taken by the R.T.A. for the grant of permits are valid and enforceable, even though the R.T.A. while granting the permits has in effect reserved and granted 10 permits to SC/ST ? The contention is that inasmuch as the notification did not contain the specific reservation the said notification is ultra vires of S.71. Learned Single Judge who considered this question has held that there was a substantial compliance of the provisions of S.71 and upheld the notification and the action of the R.T.A. in granting the permits. 18. S.71 of the Act has prescribed the procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit. The power of the State Government under sub-section (3) of S.71 is limited to the extent to direct the State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage carriages in the city with the population not less than 5 lakhs, if so directed by the Central Government. The said order of the Government shall be issued in the form of a notification in the official gazette. The State Government shall reserve certain percentage of stage carriage permits for SC & ST in the same ratio as in the case of appointment made by direct recruitment to public services in the State. There is no discretion given to the Government as to the reservation and the percentage of reservation. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of S.71 does not state that such a reservation should form part of the notification issued in the official gazette. The State Government can issue orders even administratively as to the reservation and the ratio of reservation. The reservation need not necessarily be to form part of the notification in the official gazette in reference to the limiting of number of stage carriage permits. The State Government can issue orders even administratively as to the reservation and the ratio of reservation. The reservation need not necessarily be to form part of the notification in the official gazette in reference to the limiting of number of stage carriage permits. Even an executive order can be issued for reservation in favour of SC & ST and the same has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR. 1993 SC 477. 19. The statement of the Minister for Transport was published in the newspaper Kerala Kaumudi dated 23rd December 1994. The statement of the Minister reads as follows : "The private buses shall operate in the city limits and in some routes within l1/2 km. from the city limits. For that 100 private buses shall be given pucca permits. Out of that 10 buses are kept apart for Scheduled Castes/Tribes. Permits for those buses shall be given to bus owners or agencies in that community. The Minister said that in case applications are not received from those community, then it will not be allotted to others. Those permits will be kept as reserved till sufficient applications from those community are received." The statement of the Minister sets out the clear decision of the Government to the effect that reservation has been made for the grant of 100 permits. The said statement which was annexed along with the counter affidavit in O. P. No. 43/1995 has not been denied by the respondents. The preamble of the decision of the R.T.A., Thiruvananthapuram, dated 29th December 1994 sets out the criteria adopted by the R.T.A. for consideration of the grant. Clause (5) of the preamble reads as follows: "While screening the applications, the criteria of reservation of permits for the SC/ST applications, as prescribed in S.146 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, has been adopted. Accordingly, out of the total of 100 permits to be allotted, in keeping with the minimum statutory reservation of 10 per cent in respect of SC/ST candidates, it was decided to allot 10 permits to applicants belonging to SC/ST candidates. Such applications received from SC/ST were therefore considered on priority. Accordingly, out of the total of 100 permits to be allotted, in keeping with the minimum statutory reservation of 10 per cent in respect of SC/ST candidates, it was decided to allot 10 permits to applicants belonging to SC/ST candidates. Such applications received from SC/ST were therefore considered on priority. Where there has more than one SC/ST applicant for the same route, preference has been accorded to applications received from registered Scheduled Caste Cooperative Societies, subject, however to the general principle articulated in para 1." Thus, the R.T.A. has taken the decision under clause (c) of sub-section (3) of S.71 to reserve permits for SC&ST. 20. R.146 of the Rules enjoins the duty on the Government while fixing the number of stage carriages under clause fa) of sub-section (3) of S.71 of the Act to reserve 10 per cent of the vacancies available in favour of SC/ST and the Quota so reserved shall be filled up by allotting one in every ten permits sanctioned. Sub-section (3) also prescribes the percentage of reservation. The Government has limited the number of stage carriages to be operated by the private operators as 100. Under R.5 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service R.1958 direct recruitment should be resorted only to fill up substantive vacancies. R.14 of the said Rules deals with the reservation of appointments. Therefore, R.5 read with R.14 of K.S. & S.S.R. and R.146 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 makes it clear that 10 per cent reservation is applicable only to vacancies viz., 100 stage carriage permits that were ordered to be granted. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in the first batch of O.Ps. that the reservation should be 10 per cent of the total number of stage carriage permits viz., 500,. is not sustainable, 21. On analysis of these provisions on the decision taken by the Government and the orders issued by the R.T.A. we hold that the procedure as prescribed in clause (b) & (c) of sub-section (3) of S.71 has been fully complied with and there is no infirmity in the notification made in G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. & T., dated 24th November 1994. They are valid and binding. The objections raised by the petitioners and the learned Advocate General are rejected. 22. The chronology of events leading to the issue of rescinding notification dated 7th March 1995 is relevant. They are valid and binding. The objections raised by the petitioners and the learned Advocate General are rejected. 22. The chronology of events leading to the issue of rescinding notification dated 7th March 1995 is relevant. The R.T.A. meeting was concluded on 29th December 1994. O.P. No. 43/1995 was filed on 2nd January 1995 challenging the notification in G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. & T., dated 24th November 1994 on the ground, that there was no specific reservation for SC/ST. In the O. P. some of the grantees got impleaded themselves. The R.T.A. represented by its Chairman (District Collector) filed the counter. Strangely the other two members of the R.T.A. were also separately impleaded in the O. P. The member who cannot on his own represent the R.T.A. also filed a counter dated 28th January 1995 explaining his dissent note in effect questioning the validity of the notification dated 24th November 1994 itself. It raises serious doubts as to the bona fides of the officer as well the petitioner in the O. P. The O. P. was dismissed by order dated 1st February 1995. On appeal the Division Bench in C.M.P. No. 491/95 in W. A. No. 172/95 dated 2nd March 1995 held that the petitioners therein have not made out a case for staying the issuance of permits to respondents and other private operators in whose favour permits were granted. In the meantime in pursuance to the R.T.A. proceedings granting permits and directing the grantees to furnish current records relating to their vehicles, many of them after doing so started demanding the issue of permits. It was at this stage the notification G. O. (P) No. 15/95/P.W. & T., dated 7th March 1995 cancelling the first notification G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P.W. & T., dated 24th November 1994 came to be issued on the ground that there was no specific mention of the reservation in the G. O. The counter filed by the 1st respondent dated 15th March 1995 at the Writ Appeal stage (W. A. 172/95) states that the Advocate General has submitted before the Court that the notification is defective and has given instruction to Government to cancel the same and to issue a fresh and proper notification. We do not find defect in the notification. On the contrary the rescinding notification is bad and illegal. We do not find defect in the notification. On the contrary the rescinding notification is bad and illegal. The rights accrued to the grantees have been crystallised by the order of the grant of permit and therefore the same cannot be taken away by the issue of rescinding notification. In this connection the decision in AIR 1978 SC 209 squarely applies to the facts of the case. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court while holding that subsequent change in the policy notification cannot affect the grantees who are entitled to the issuance of permits stated in Para.10 and 11 of the said judgment as follows: "The High Court thought that since permits had not been issued, they could not be issued because of the notification dated September 24, 1975. Although not in form, in substance, the High Court thought that the effect of the order of the Appellate Tribunal was to remand the cases to the Regional Transport Authority for granting permits to the appellants on being satisfied that the vehicles put by them were road worthy and that their antecedents were not undesirable. In our judgment the High Court has fallen into an error in this regard. All the parties were agreed before us that clause (2) of the notification had not the effect of recalling, revoking or cancelling the permits which had been granted and issued pursuant to the notification dated 30th March 1972. It was also beyond any debate or doubt that if the applications for the grant of stage carriage permits were pending with any Transport Authority when the notification was issued it stood postponed until further directions were issued in this behalf by the State Government. But the scope for litigation and argument in these cases cropped up because they did not clearly and precisely fall in one line or the other. If on the special facts of these cases consideration of the applications could be taken to be pending with any Transport Authority, then they had to remain pending until further directions were issued. But the scope for litigation and argument in these cases cropped up because they did not clearly and precisely fall in one line or the other. If on the special facts of these cases consideration of the applications could be taken to be pending with any Transport Authority, then they had to remain pending until further directions were issued. But if, on the other hand, on a correct appreciation of the legal position the applications had been finally disposed of by the order of the Appellate Tribunal and they were not pending for any consideration then they did not stand postponed and permits had to be issued pursuant to the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The Regional Transport Authority had no discretion or power in the matter to dispose of the applications one way or the other. 11. To our mind the problem does not present much difficulty. The applications filed by the appellants for grant of permits to them were rejected by the Regional Transport Authority in October, 1971. They were finally disposed of and permits were granted to them by the order of the Appellate Tribunal made on 19th February 1975. The consideration of the applications for grant of permits was no longer pending after the said order. What remained pending was a mere ministerial act to be performed by the Regional Transport Authority or by any delegate of that authority in accordance with R.44A of the U P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940. According to the terms of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, nothing substantial or unsubstantial was to be decided by the Regional Transport Authority in connection with the grant of permits. The Regional Transport Authority could not say that it refused to grant the permit on one ground or the other. What was left to be done by it was only to find out whether a particular applicant had complied with the terms of the order and within the time granted by the Appellate Tribunal. If the terms were not complied with by the specified time the grant stood revoked not because the Regional Transport Authority could revoke it but because the Appellate Tribunal had specified it to be so. If the terms were not complied with by the specified time the grant stood revoked not because the Regional Transport Authority could revoke it but because the Appellate Tribunal had specified it to be so. As already stated, all the applicants had complied with the terms of the Appellate order within time, actual issuance of the permits could not be done because of the stay orders made by the High Court in the earlier writ petitions. In sum and substance, therefore, the appellants became entitled to the issuance of the permits in their favour by 31st March 1975. It is difficult to understand as to in what sense their applications remained pending after 31st March. 1975 and how did they remain pending even in the remotest sense of the term after the vacation of the stay order by the High Court and the dismissal of the writ petitions on the 10th of September 1975. When the notification dated September 24, 1975 was issued the position was absolutely clear that nothing in any sense was pending except that in the physical sense a paper containing the permit was not actually issued. Clause (2) of the said notification was not meant to cover nor did it cover a case of this kind. The Regional Transport Authority failed in its legal duty in not implementing the order of the Appellate Tribunal and issuing the permits as a result thereof. It was, therefore, just and proper to grant the writ of mandamus as asked for by the appellants." The said decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Attar Singh v. R. T. Authority, Agra AIR 1978 SC 1152 . The learned Advocate General also concedes the position that the decision squarely covers the issues but submits that since the earlier notification is illegal, the grantees cannot take advantage of the same. We are unable to countenance the argument of the learned Advocate General in this regard. Following the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court we hold that the applications for the permits had already been considered and decided and nothing; remains except the ministerial act of the issue of permits and therefore the rescinding notification would not have any application to the grants already made. 23. Following the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court we hold that the applications for the permits had already been considered and decided and nothing; remains except the ministerial act of the issue of permits and therefore the rescinding notification would not have any application to the grants already made. 23. In this context the learned counsel submitted that the rights that have been accrued cannot be taken away and the Government is estopped from going back on the order of grant. In support of their contentions they have relied on the following decisions: 1. 1989 (1) KLT 141; 2. 1986 SC 872; 3. 1989 SC 1614; 4. 1967 SC 40 and 5. 1993 (2) KLT 48 . Following these decisions we have no hesitation in holding that the grantees have acquired the right in seeking for the issuance of permits and the Government is estopped from going back on the permits already made by the R.T.A. inasmuch as the authorities have given effect to the reservation as per the order of the Government and the Rules before consideration of the grant, the rescinding notification stating that the reservation was not specified, is bad. The Government has to issue the permits without reference to the rescinding notification or the subsequent notification dated 24th March 1995. 24. The next point to be considered is whether the subsequent notification dated 24th March 1995 is valid or not. By virtue of our reasonings the first notification dated 24th November 1994 is valid and the last notification is redundant and unnecessary. Besides we also find that the said notification is obviously illegal inasmuch as it amounts to excessive reservation to the extent of 50 per cent of the available permits in favour of SC/ST. One of the contentions is that there should be reservation even in reference to the permits given under the scheme to the Corporation. But such a contention has only to be rejected for the. simple reason that Chapter VI of the Act dealt with special provisions relating to the State Transport undertaking has overriding effect. Therefore, the limitation of S.71 of the Act has to be subject to the permits granted under the scheme, and those permits cannot be subject to the reservation. But such a contention has only to be rejected for the. simple reason that Chapter VI of the Act dealt with special provisions relating to the State Transport undertaking has overriding effect. Therefore, the limitation of S.71 of the Act has to be subject to the permits granted under the scheme, and those permits cannot be subject to the reservation. If the wordings in the notification dated 24th March 1995 viz., 10 per cent of the total number of stage carriages as fixed above is taken literally, it will amount to reservation of 51 permits and in view of Chapter VI of the Act the reservation can only from the number of stage carriages operated by others, viz., from the 100 permits. In that case there will be a reservation of more than 50 per cent of the stage carriages which will be clearly violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel appearing for the Corporation submitted that the State Transport undertaking scheme continues and only a limited operation by private individuals are permitted. Hence reservation if any, could be only from the 100 permits made available to others. Learned counsel appearing for the grantees also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 at 563. Therefore, we hold that in any event the notification dated 24th March 1995 is illegal and ultra vires of the Act and Constitution of India. The Government and authorities have rightly proceeded on the basis of 10 per cent reservation as per the first notification as stated above and therefore the subsequent notifications are invalid. 25. The submission made on behalf of the petitioners challenging the first notification that the procedure prescribed under R.145 has not been followed and there was no proper application of the decision of 10 per cent reservation, has no substance. It is admitted by the parties that several regular appeals have been preferred by unsuccessful parties before the Appellate Tribunals challenging the original grant by the R.T.A. and are pending. These objections can very well be gone into by the Appellate Tribunal. As we are concerned with the validity of the notifications issued and the orders passed by the R.T.A. and implementation of the orders, the procedural infirmities if any, are matters that may be properly adjudicated before the Appellate Authority. 26. These objections can very well be gone into by the Appellate Tribunal. As we are concerned with the validity of the notifications issued and the orders passed by the R.T.A. and implementation of the orders, the procedural infirmities if any, are matters that may be properly adjudicated before the Appellate Authority. 26. Coming to the question of mala fides the allegations raised against the Minister for Transport personally in O. P. No. 4147/95 to the effect that non-issuance of the permit was due to the intervention of the Transport Minister and that the Secretary is interested in issuing permits according to the whims and fancies of the 3rd respondent have been specifically denied in the counter filed by the Minister. However, from the facts and circumstances of the case we find that there seems to be a deliberate attempt to derail the whole proceedings. As pointed out by the learned Advocate General that even in the year 1992 this Court in O. P. No. 6579/92 quashed a notification for the reason that there was no specific mention of reservation while limiting stage carriages under S.71(3) of the Act. However, in the first notification impugned herein there was no specific mention of the reservation. However, the Minister is reported to have announced that they have already decided to reserve 10 per cent of the permits in favour of SC/ST. The R.T.A. in its meeting decided to follow R.146 and reserve 10 per cent for SC/ST and thereafter considered the applications on 29th December 1994. A counter was filed by the Chairman, R.T.A. to that effect. But after the dismissal of the O. P. challenging the said notification and direction issued by the Division Bench holding that there is no case for the challenge of the notification and the permits can be issued subject to the result of the W. A. the rescinding notification came to be issued. Strangely even in the last notification dated 24th March 1995 we find the reservation of more than 50 per cent of the stage carriages in favour of SC/ST. It is difficult to believe that the Government was not aware of the obvious infirmities found in these notifications but still they proceeded to issue the same. The irresistible inference subsequent to the date of the R.T.A. meeting is that the authorities somehow wanted to set at naught the whole exercise for reasons known to themselves. It is difficult to believe that the Government was not aware of the obvious infirmities found in these notifications but still they proceeded to issue the same. The irresistible inference subsequent to the date of the R.T.A. meeting is that the authorities somehow wanted to set at naught the whole exercise for reasons known to themselves. Hence we are constrained to hold that this is a case of legal malice in law in issuing the successive notifications deliberately, appearing to be contrary to the specific provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Supreme Court in the decision Venkatraman v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 49 held as follows : "Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause." The statutory power is exercised for purpose foreign to those for which it is in law intended. It has been pointed out by the petitioner in O. P. No. 4147/95 that about 60 temporary permits were issued during the first week of March and many of them were granted at the instance of the Minister for Transport. Though the Minister impleaded in his personal capacity, denied the same, the fact that hundreds of applications for temporary permits were received and about 60 permits were issued is not denied. While the regular grantees were not issued with the permits in spite of direction issued by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench, temporary permits were issued to those who were unsuccessful and did not apply for the grant. Therefore, the rescinding notification dated 7th March 1995 and the last notification dated 24th March 1995 are liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides also. The first two notifications were issued in the general interest of travelling public. Therefore, the proceedings of the R.T.A. will be given effect to and implemented forthwith. 27. There were few impleading petitions both in the O.Ps. as well as in the Writ Appeals. It was contended before us that excepting one all the impleading applicants were unsuccessful applicants before the R.T.A. After having participated in the proceedings in pursuance of the first notification their applications to implead themselves in the O.Ps. to challenge those notifications itself, are not maintainable and are not bona fide. as well as in the Writ Appeals. It was contended before us that excepting one all the impleading applicants were unsuccessful applicants before the R.T.A. After having participated in the proceedings in pursuance of the first notification their applications to implead themselves in the O.Ps. to challenge those notifications itself, are not maintainable and are not bona fide. Besides the only contention raised by them that they have obtained temporary permits during the interval between the grant of R.T.A. order and the present proceedings and that they are eligible to apply for grant based on 24th March 1995 notification could not make them necessary or proper parties in the proceedings. We find no merit in the applications for impleading and accordingly all the impleading applications are dismissed. 28. For all these reasons we confirm the judgment of the learned Judge and dismiss the Writ Appeals. The Original Petitions filed by the grantees are allowed. 17. Consequently we order as follows: (1) The first notification in G. O. (P) No. 108/94/P. W. & T. dated 24th November 1994 is valid, binding and enforceable. (2) There will be a direction as prayed for in the Original Petition to direct the Secretary, State Transport Authority to issue the permits by virtue of the proceedings of the R.T.A. dated 29th December 1994 to all the grantees within a period of one week from the date of the production of a copy of this judgment. (3; The notification in G. O. (P) No. 15/95/P. W. & T., dated 7th March 1995 and the notification in G. O. (P) No. 21/95/P.W. & T. dated 24th March 1995 are illegal and ultra vires of the Act and the Constitution of India and are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to cost.