JUDGMENT : B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an Award of the Labour Court, Nasik, dated 30th January, 1989 made in Reference (IDA) No. 113 of 1982 under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. By the order dated 9th December, 1979, the petitioner was appointed as a temporary worker for the period 9th December 1980 to 15th March, 1980, due to the increase in work which was said to be of a temporary nature. On 16th March, 1980 the Petitioner was served with an order which stated that the period of his temporary employment was extended from 16th March 1980 to 15th June, 1980 since the work for which he had been appointed still existed. On 3rd June 1980 the Petitioner's service was terminated as no longer required on the ground that the temporary work for which he had been appointed came to an end and there was no other work which could be provided to him. On 10th March 1981 the Petitioner was again appointed on probation for a period of three months. There was no order either confirming the service of the petitioner of discharging the petitioner from service for unsatisfactory probationary employment. The record does not indicate as to how the petitioner's service came to an end at the end of the probationary service; but come to an end, it did. The petitioner was reappointed by a letter dated 30th June, 1981 again as a temporary worker with effect from 30th June, 1981 to 31st August, 1981 on account of increased temporary work load. His temporary service was extended from 1st September, 1981 to 15 December, 1981 under the letter dated 1st September, 1981, on the ground that the work for which he had been appointed continued to exist. On 29th December, 1981 the petitioner was served with a letter of appointment absorbing him in regular employment with effect from 17th December, 1981. The letter of appointment contained a probation clause of three months during which the services was liable to be terminated without notice or without assigning any reason therefor. On 29th December, 1981 the petitioner was served with a letter of appointment absorbing him in regular employment with effect from 17th December, 1981. The letter of appointment contained a probation clause of three months during which the services was liable to be terminated without notice or without assigning any reason therefor. On 18th March 1982 the Petitioner's service was terminated by a letter which did not indicate any reason for termination, except asking a reference to clause 3 of the letter of appointment under which the Second Respondent employer was empowered to terminate the service at any time without assigning any reason. It is not in dispute that on termination of his service by the letter dated 18th March, 1982, apart from being advised to collect his legal dues from the Accounts Department within two working days, the provisions of Section 25F were not complied with. 3. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute for reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages. The dispute was processed under the Act and resulted in Reference (IDA) No. 113 of 1982 being made to the Labour Court, Nasik. The Labour Court, Nasik, recorded evidence and raised the following issues and answered them as under: Issues Findings 1. Whether the workman Yes that unjust, proves that the termination of services of the workman by the employer is illegal and improper and unjust? 2. Whether the employer No proves that the appointment of the worker was for a fixed period and hence, his termination is just, legal and proper, 3. Whether the workman is No entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service? 4. Is the workman No entitled to full back wages? 5. What relief, if any, As per final order, is he entitled to? 6. What order? As per order below. 4. By the impugned Award dated 30th January, 1989 the Labour partly accepted the reference held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages, but directed the Second Respondent to pay 50% of wages and other monetary benefit to which the petitioner would have been entitled to for the period from the date of termination till 18th August, 1984 when Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, came into force. Being aggrieved by the impugned Award, the petitioner is before this Court. 5. Being aggrieved by the impugned Award, the petitioner is before this Court. 5. In view of the clear pronouncement in the judgments of two Division Benches of this Court in S.S. Sambre vs. Chief Regional Manger, State Bank of India Nagpur and Another, 1990 (2) CLR 793 (Per Deshpande and Ghodeshwar, JJ) and Nirmal Tejnath Dhar vs. Matru Sangh Mahal, Nagpur, 1993 (1) CLR 997 (Per Patel and Ghodeshwar, JJ.) holding that the provisions of clause (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inserted in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by amending Act 49 of 1984 was neither discriminatory in nature nor retrospective in operation. Mr. Naik, learned Advocate for Second Respondent, straightaway conceded that the impugned Award in so far as it holds that clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) was retrospective in operation and, therefore, applied to the case of termination of service of the petitioner, was erroneous and unsustainable. The Labour Court holds to the impugned Award that the termination of service of the petitioner would fall within the exception clause (bb) incorporated into section 2(oo) of the Act by the amending Act 4 of 1981 which came into force on 18th August, 1984 though the service of the petitioner was last terminated on 18th March, 1982. 6. Once the obvious confusion is removed, it is clear that the petitioner was a hapless victim of circumstances. Here was a poor workman repeatedly being engaged and discharged obviously with a view to disrupt his continuity of service. The systematic manner in which he was engaged and discharged at short intervals of time makes such an inference irresistible. In any event, there is no explanation as to why the Petitioner's service was not confirmed after his probationary service had ended on 5th June, 1981. Although the learned Judge of the Labour Court has adverted to Model Standing Order 4-A, which is reproduced in paragraph 9 of the impugned award, he does not seem to have paid the attention to the said Model Standing Order which it really deserved. Model Standing Order 4-A casts an obligation on the employer to make permanent a probationer in service after completion of a period of three months, uninterrupted service in the post. Model Standing Order 4-A casts an obligation on the employer to make permanent a probationer in service after completion of a period of three months, uninterrupted service in the post. The proviso to the said Standing Order provides that the Manger may terminate service of the probationer after his probationary period "if the service of the probationer are found to be unsatisfactory." There is nothing on record to show that the services of the petitioner was terminated on the ground indicated in the second proviso to Model Standing Order 4-A, on or after 9th June, 1981. The termination of his service, if any, (and it appears that his service was terminated, because there was a subsequent order of re-appointment given to him on 30th June, 1981) was wholly illegal and contrary to the provisions of Model Standing Order 4-A. On this ground alone, the Labour Court ought to have come to the conclusion that the Petitioner's service had been terminated illegally and improperly, in addition to unjustly, as held. As if this was not enough, the second respondent repeated history by again employing the petitioner on probation for three months by the last appointment letter dated 29th December, 1981 and that service was also terminated by a completely non-speaking order dated 18th March, 1982. Upon a perusal of the reason adduced in the last letter of termination of service dated 18th March, 1982, it is not possible to spell out that the termination of service was on account of unsatisfactory completion of probationary service, which the only ground on which Model Standing Order 4-A permits termination of service of a probationer after three months uninterrupted service in the same post. For this reason also, the order of termination was utterly indefensible as it was clearly illegal, improper and unjust. In the circumstances, the Labour Court had no option but to direct reinstatement of the petitioner in service with continuity and full back wages. The reasons given for refusing to grant such a relief, though purportedly founded on the discretionary power vested in it by section 11A of the Act make a mockery of it and render the power nugatory. Since the reason for refusing relief to the petitioner, who was obviously entitled to it, was incomprehensible to me, I requested the learned Counsel on either side to enlighten me on the same. Since the reason for refusing relief to the petitioner, who was obviously entitled to it, was incomprehensible to me, I requested the learned Counsel on either side to enlighten me on the same. Despite the collective efforts of myself and the two learned counsel on either side, I am unable to discern the real reasons which impelled the learned Judge of the Labour Court to refuse relief to the employee who was obviously entitled to it. 7. I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned Award is perverse and needs to be interfered with in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned Award dated 30th January, 1989 made by the First Respondent in Reference (IDA) No. 113 of 1982 is hereby quashed and set aside. It is declared that the order of termination of service of the petitioner was illegal and improper, in addition to being unjust. The petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages with effect from 18th March, 1982, not later than 2nd May 1995, failing which the back wages payable to the petitioner shall attract simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum in addition to other legal consequences which may follow for failure to carry out the directions of this Court. Rule is accordingly made absolute. Second Respondent to pay Rs. 500/- as quantified costs of this petition. 8. Issuance of certified copy of this judgment is expedited.