Arun Kumar ( 1 ) BY this petition, the petitioner landlady has challengedan order dated 22/09/1992 passed by the Additional Rent Controller,delhi granting leave to defend the eviction petition to the respondent tenant. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the petition are that the petictoner filed an evictionpetition under Section 14 D read with Sub-section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Controlact (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as act ) for eviction ofthe respondent on21. 3. 1990. Thecase of petitioner is that she is a widow. She is the owner landlady of the tenancypremises which is in occupation ofthe respondent. The said premises was let outby the petitioner s husband to the respondent for residential purpose only. Thepremises is required by the petitioner for her own residence as she has no otherresidential accommodation. The husband of the petitioner died in the year 1981leaving behind a Will bequething therein half of the property bearing No. B-12,west End, New Delhi in favour of the petitioner for life and half of the said propertywas bequethed in favour of the daughter Mrs. Usha N. P. Singh. As a result ofpartition between the petitioner and her daughter, the residential unit in occupation of the respondent fell to the share of the petitioner. The partition between thepetitioner and her daughter had also been recognised by the Delhi High Court. Therespondent has been exclusively dealing with the petitioner as the owner landladyofthe suit premises. The respondent has been all along paying rent to the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE respondent tenant filed an application for leave to defend supported byhis own affidavit under Section 25 B (4) of the Act on 5. 1. 1991. The impugned ordergranting leave to defend was passed on 22/09/1992. ( 3 ) BEFORE coming to the merits of the case, I may deal with a preliminaryobjection raised on behalf of the respondent. According to the learned Counsel forthe respondent, this revision petition is not maintainable since it is directed againstan interlocutory order granting leave to defend to the tenant. According to thelearned Counsel for the respondent, the proviso to Section 25 B (8) of the Act onlyenvisages a revision to the High Court against a final order of the Controllerallowing or rejecting eviction petition. According to thelearned Counsel for the respondent, the proviso to Section 25 B (8) of the Act onlyenvisages a revision to the High Court against a final order of the Controllerallowing or rejecting eviction petition. As per Sub-seciton (4) of Section 25 B, unlessthe tenant obtains leave to contest the eviction petition, the statements made by thelandlord in the eviction petition are deemed to be admitted by the tenant and aneviction order must follow. However, as per Sub-section (5), the Controller cangrant leave to contest to the tenant if he finds that the affidavit by the tenantdiscloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order forrecovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified in clause (e) of theproviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14. Sub-section (8) clearly bars any appeal orsecond appeal against an order for recovery of possession of any premises made bythe Controller. However, as per the proviso to the said sub-section, the High Courtmay for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller underthis Section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such orderin respect thereto as it thinks fit. It may be better to reproduce Sub-section (8):" (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery ofpossession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with theprocedure specified in this Section:provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that anorder made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call forthe records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. " ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has in this connection placedreliance on certain judgments of this Court wherein it has been held that revisiondoes not lie against an order granting leave to defend since it is an order which isinterlocutory in nature. The first decision is Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal, 1977 RLR566. It has been noted in the said judgment that prior to incorporation of Chapteriii-A in the Act, first appeal and second appeal were provided against orders of thecontroller. The said right was taken away by provisions of Chapter III-A and onlylimited right as contained in the proviso to Sub-section (8) quoted above has beengiven. It has been noted in the said judgment that prior to incorporation of Chapteriii-A in the Act, first appeal and second appeal were provided against orders of thecontroller. The said right was taken away by provisions of Chapter III-A and onlylimited right as contained in the proviso to Sub-section (8) quoted above has beengiven. The arguments in support of the contention that revision would lie in suchcases was that since the High Court was given power to call for the records of a casein order to satisfy itself that an order passed by the Controller was in accordancewith law, revision would lie against every order passed under Section 25-B and notnecessarily only against a final order allowing or rejecting an eviction petition. While negativing the contention regarding maintainability of the revision to thehigh Court, it heavily weighed with this Court that the object behind introductionof Chapter III-A by the legislature was expeditious disposal of the cases undersection 14 (l) (e) of the Act. Chapter III-A lays down a procedure for summary trialand curtails the rights of appeal altogether against the orders passed by Controllersin cases falling under Chapter III-A. It was observed. "no doubt the wordingpermits the High Court to call for the records of any order passed by the Controller. But the very setting of proviso suggests that revision would lie only against orderallowing or dismissing an application for eviction because it is well settled thatproviso is an explanation to main para, i. e. . Sub-section (8) which talks of finaldisposal of application for eviction. " The Court felt that if revisions were allowedagainst interlocutory orders like the one granting leave to defend, it will defeat thevery object of expeditious disposal. This reasoning was approved by another Singlejudge of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. 0m Prakash, 1979 RLR 26 . This wasfollowed by another judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Ram Labhaya v. Ram Prakash, 1982 RLR 35 . It was noticed in that judgment that the proviso to Subsection (8) REFERRED TO to "an order by the Controller under this Section" whichexpression was capable of being construed as any order passed by the Controllerwhile dealing with a case under the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. It was noticed in that judgment that the proviso to Subsection (8) REFERRED TO to "an order by the Controller under this Section" whichexpression was capable of being construed as any order passed by the Controllerwhile dealing with a case under the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. But it wasfelt that the proviso has to be read as a legislative measure carved out of the subsection to which it is appended and the order mentioned therein has to beregardedas an order of the type which the sub-section speaks of, i. e. , "an order for therecovery of possession of any premises made by Controller in accordance with theprocedure specified in this Section. " It was thus concluded that revision would lieunder Section 25-B (8) only against a final order either accepting or rejecting anapplication of the landlord for recovery of possession. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner landlady hasdrawn my attention to a recent judgment of this Court in KJ. Sarin v. Mis. Pigottchapman and Company (1992) 46 DLT 352 . In this case, this Court has held that arevision petition against an order for leave to defend is maintainable. The judgments relied upon by the Counsel for the respondent herein and REFERRED TO to abovewere also noticed by the Court. It was ultimately held that revision petition againstan order granting leave to defend is maintainable. ( 6 ) THE important distinction to be noticed is that the present is a case undersection 14-D of the Act and not a case under Section 14 (l) (e ). In K. K. Sarin (supra),the eviction petition was under Section 14 C of the Act. At the time when thedecisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent were handeddown, the provisions of Sections 14-B, C and D were not in existence. By theamended Act 57 of 1988, some more classes of landlords have been carved outunder Sections 14-B to 14-D. Section 14-B gives a right to recover immediatepossession of premises to certain members of armed forces. Section 14-C gives asimilar right to retired and retiring Central Government and Delhi Administrationemployees. Seciton 14 D gives a right to recover immediate possession of premisesto a widow. The present case is of a widow falling in Section 14 D. The entirecontext, therefore, has to be considered in view of the new legislative measure. Section 14-C gives asimilar right to retired and retiring Central Government and Delhi Administrationemployees. Seciton 14 D gives a right to recover immediate possession of premisesto a widow. The present case is of a widow falling in Section 14 D. The entirecontext, therefore, has to be considered in view of the new legislative measure. Thesections 14 B, 14 C and 14 D talk of right to recover immediate possession which isnotso in case of Section 14 (l) (e ). In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India and Another (1991) 2 SCC 87 , the Supreme Court has held that Section 14 (l) (e) on the one handand Sections 14 B, C and D on the other are two classes apart. The defences opento the tenant under Section 14 (l) (e) are not open to the tenant in petitions filedunder Sections 14 B, 14c or 14d of the Act. Otherwise, it will obliterate the purposeof object of fresh classification created by the legislation in favour of certaincategories of landlords specified in Section 14 B, 14c and 14d of the Act. ( 7 ) IT has to be noted that in view of the words "right to recover immediatepossession" used in Sections 14 B, 14c and 14 D, the approach to the issue cannotbe the same as was at the time of decisions in cases relied upon by the learnedcounsel for the respondent. The new legislative measure requires a fresh look. True, the object of expeditious disposal by way of summary trial as per Section 25b stays but the use of the word immediate has an accelerating effect and the Courtshave to ensure that the object of the legislature in introducing Sections 14 B, 14cand 14 D is not lost specially when these Sections use the word immediate . If thetenant raises frivolous pleas, specially pleas which are not germane for an inquiryunder provisions of Section 14 B, 14c and 14 D and still the Controller grants leaveto defend to the tenant, the landlord should not be left without any remedy. It is aknown fact that once leave to defend is granted, the cases linger before thecontrollers for years. What could be a better example of this than the present caseitself. I am informed that after leave to contest was granted on 22/09/1992, only the statement of the landlady has been recorded so far. It is aknown fact that once leave to defend is granted, the cases linger before thecontrollers for years. What could be a better example of this than the present caseitself. I am informed that after leave to contest was granted on 22/09/1992, only the statement of the landlady has been recorded so far. In order touphold the object of the legislation, the High Court should have the power toexamine the record of the case and interfere if it finds that there is no case made outfor grant of leave. It has been observed in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) that Section 14b and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and Subsection (5) of Section 25 B should be so construed as to implement the object andpurpose of Sections 14 B to 14 D. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to theintention of the legislature as expressed in these Sections. To quote: "though it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there,but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implicationwords which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting aconstruction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it ispermissible to supply the words". Having regard to the context in which aprovision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision isenacted the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make itmeaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevantprovisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. " ( 8 ) KEEPING this in mind, it has to be further noted that Chapter III A whichcontains Section 25 B was introduced in the Act with the object of alleviating thehardship faced by the landlords who required the accommodation in possession ofthe tenants for their personal needs and the needs of their family. The evictionpetitions used to linger on for years. By Section 25 B, a summary procedure wasintroduced for the trial of the cases falling under Proviso (e) to Sub-section (1) ofsection 14 of the Act. The right of appeal and second appeal which were hithertoin existence in Sections 38 and 39 were curtailed and it was provided that inpetitions falling under Proviso (e) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, there will be noright of appeal or second appeal. The right of appeal and second appeal which were hithertoin existence in Sections 38 and 39 were curtailed and it was provided that inpetitions falling under Proviso (e) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, there will be noright of appeal or second appeal. The only remedy left was a revision to the Highcourt to enable the High Court to satisfy itself that the order of the Rent Controlleris in accordance with law. To uphold the object of this newly introduced legislativemeasure, this Court took the view in the three cases relied upon by the Counsel forthe respondent and REFERRED TO to above that if revisions to this Court are allowed tobe entertained from interlocutory orders of the Controller, the object of speedydisposal of the cases will be lost. Inspite of the said legislative measure, it was againrealised that the object of speedy disposal of such cases was not being achieved. Itbecame a matter of common knowledge that once leave to defend was granted, thecases used to remain pending for years. The legislature had to again intervene forthe sake of certain categories of landlords who it was felt really needed furtherprotection inasmuch as they should be able to get immediate possession of theirpremises. Sections 14 B, 14 C and 14 D were introduced in the year 1988 to covercases of defence personnel, retired or retiring Government servants and widows. The vires of this measure was challenged but was ultimately upheld by the Courts. It was felt that the landlords covered under these new provisions could not affordto go through the procedure involved in a normal petition under Section 14 (l) (e) ofthe Act. For them, the legislature used the word immediate possession of premises . In this context, it is important to note that arevision against an order grantingleave to defend is really intended to expedite the disposal of the case. If the Highcourt comes to the conclusion that in the facts of the case leave to defend ought notto have been granted, that means end of the trial and end of the drudgery of thelandlord. In that sense, the revision if allowed to be entertained by the High Courtwill if finally accepted by the High Court will fulfil the object of the new legislativemeasure rather than defeat it in any manner. In that sense, the revision if allowed to be entertained by the High Courtwill if finally accepted by the High Court will fulfil the object of the new legislativemeasure rather than defeat it in any manner. For this reason also, I am of the viewthat in view of the changed scenario it must be held that a revision to the High Courtwill lie against an order of the Controller granting leave to defend. ( 9 ) WHEN the judgments REFERRED TO to above and relied upon by the learnedcounsel for the respondent were handed down. Chapter III A was a recentlyintroduced provision in the Act and the Court hoped that to uphold the object ofthe said provision, revisions against interlocutory orders should not be allowed. Today, the context has totally changed. Once leave to defend is granted, the caseslinger on for years and the very object of speedy disposal of the cases is lost. Thelearned Counsel for the respondent submitted that if I am not inclined to subscribeto the view expressed in the said decisions, the matter must be REFERRED TO to adivision Bench. I do not agree. For one thing behind this submission is the obliqueobject that in that process, the decision of the case will get postponed. Secondly,which in fact is the main reason, those decisions were given in proceedings undersection 14 (l) (e) of the Act whereas the present case arises in context of Section 14d which is a provision introduced on the statute much after those cases weredecided by this Court. Therefore, in view of the fact that I am dealing with a newlegislative measure, I do not feel it is a case where the matter must be REFERRED TO to thedivision Bench. Further, I have a recent decision of this Court in K. K. Sarin (supra)which is in the context of analogous statutory provision, i. e. , Section 14 C. I aminclined to agree with the view expressed in the said decision. ( 10 ) FOR all these reasons, the preliminary objection is overruled and it is heldthat the present revision petiton against an order granting leave to defend ismaintainable under Section 25 B (8) of the Act. ( 11 ) COMING to the merits of the case, briefly the facts are that the petitioner sson-in-law had taken a premises on rent at A-3/1, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi in theyear 1972. ( 11 ) COMING to the merits of the case, briefly the facts are that the petitioner sson-in-law had taken a premises on rent at A-3/1, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi in theyear 1972. In 1973 he was transferred out of Delhi. Thereafter, the petitioner and herhusband started residing with their daughter in the Vasant Vihar premises. Thelandlord of the said premises filed an eviction petition against the son-in-law of thepetitioner on the grounds of sub-letting and personal bona fide need. In the saidproceedings on the basis of an undertaking to vacate the premises, time to vacateupto 31. 12. 1990 was granted. After the said date, the petitioner would have noplace to reside in Delhi. This would render the petitioner shelterless. Therefore, thepresent eviction petition was filed by the petitioner under Section 14 D of the Act. ( 12 ) IN the affidavit filed on behalf of tenant for leave to defend the petition,various points were taken. The main points were: (1) Petitioner is not the owner of the premises. The premises are owned bypetitioner s daughter. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to file thepetition. (2) - Petitioner was residing in a property bearing no. A-3/1, Vasant Vihar,new Delhi where she had sufficient accommodation with her. Therefore, the premises was not required by the petitioner. The evictionorder with respect to that property passed against the son-in-law of thepetitioner who was the tenant in the said premises was said to becollusive. (3) The front portion of the property in suit consisting of five bed roomsetc. was let out in May 1990 to the German Embassy which showed thatthe petitioner did not require the premises in suit. (4) The petitioner wants to enhance rent and, therefore, the petition hasbeen filed with mala fide intentions. ( 13 ) IT is interesting to note here that the respondent conveniently kept quite onthe question that he had attorned to the petitioner after the death of her husbandso far as the tenancy premises is concerned. The respondent had been paying rentto the petitioner all along for the tenancy premises after the death of her husband. This fact had been specifically pleaded by the petitioner in the eviction petition inas much as she stated "the petitioner has been exclusively dealing as the owner andthe landlady with the respondent in respect of the premises in his tenancy andoccupation since the death of her husband". This fact had been specifically pleaded by the petitioner in the eviction petition inas much as she stated "the petitioner has been exclusively dealing as the owner andthe landlady with the respondent in respect of the premises in his tenancy andoccupation since the death of her husband". Inspite of this specific plea, the tenantchose to remain completely silent on this point in the affidavit filed for obtainingleave to defend the eviction petition. Further, so far as the question of ownershipis concerned. Section 14 D uses the word landlord and not owner as used inclause (e) to proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The respondent hasall along accepted the petitioner as the landlady qua the tenancy premises. He hasattorned to her as a tenant and it does not lie in his mouth to say that the petitioneris not the owner/landlord of the premises. The other plea of the tenant in this behalfis equally frivolous. He denies the partition of the property in suit between themother (petitioner) and her daughter. He submits that the daughter had claimed tobe owner of the entire property. The petitioner has REFERRED TO to a Will of her husbandin favour of herself and her daughter. According to the Will, she gets half share inthe property for her life. The petitioner s half share is the one which is in the tenancyof the respondent. The front half has fallen to the share of the daughter as per afamily arrangement between them which has got a seal of approval of this Court incollateral proceedings. The tenant says the partition is collusive because thepetitioner always stayed with her daughter from the time her husband was aliveand even after the death of her husband. Assuming that the partition is collusive,the fact remains that the petitioner and her daughter are heirs of deceased Col. Qadam Singh who was husband of petitioner. Even as a co-owner, the petitionercould be landlord of the premises and could file the present petition. ( 14 ) COMING to the next point that petitioner has sufficient accommodation inthe Vasant Vihar property, it has already been brought on record that the tenant ofthe said property, i. e. , petitioner s son-in-law had given an undertaking to Court tovacate the same by 31/12/1990. Therefore, the said premises would nolonger be available to the petitioner after the said date. The respondent calls the saiddecree as collusive. Therefore, the said premises would nolonger be available to the petitioner after the said date. The respondent calls the saiddecree as collusive. In the face of undertaking given to Court to vacate the premisesby 31/12/1990, the allegation that it is collusive decree is not open. Thetenant has in any case burnt his fingers and is not entitled to retain thepremisesafter the said date having given an undertaking to the Court to vacate it by theparticular date. Therefore, the Vasant Vihar accommodation cannot be said to beavailable to the petitioner and, therefore, cannot be taken into consideration at all. ( 15 ) THIS brings me to the point raised by the tenant that the front portion of theproperty was given on rent to the German Embassy in May 1990. The respondenthas conveniently omitted to mention while making the said averment as to who letout the portion of the property to the German Embassy. The fact is that the portionhas been let out by the daughter of the petitioner. The portion belongs to petitioner s daughter as per the partition between the petitioner and the daughter and,therefore, she is entitled to deal with her portion in any manner she likes. She hasbeen letting out this portion earlier also to various tenants as per informationplaced on record by the tenant in his affidavit in support of his application for leaveto defend. Therefore, this fact can have no bearing on the controversy in the presentcase. ( 16 ) THE plea regarding desire to enhance rent is a bald plea with no particulars. This is a usual plea taken by the tenants and does not deserve any discussion. It hasto be rejected out of hand. ( 17 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the approach of the learned Additional Rent Controller shewsconfusion which has resulted in the impugned order granting leave to defend to therespondent/tenant being passed. The learned Additional Rent Controller notes that it isadmitted that the premises was let out to the respondent by the husband of thepetitioner. The husband of the petitioner died in the year 1981. He bequethed theproperty through a Will in half and a half share to the petitioner and her daughter. The mother and daughter partitioned the property between themselves wherebythe portion in the tenancy of the respondent fell to the share of the petitioner. The husband of the petitioner died in the year 1981. He bequethed theproperty through a Will in half and a half share to the petitioner and her daughter. The mother and daughter partitioned the property between themselves wherebythe portion in the tenancy of the respondent fell to the share of the petitioner. Onthese facts, the learned Additional Rent Controller went on to observe "there appears tobe a collusion between the petitioner and her daughter as on the one hand daughterof the petitioner and son-in-law of the petitioner have not vacated the premisesunder their tenancy, where the petitioner is admittedly residing and on the otherhand have let out the portion which fallen vacant in the year 1989 and allegedly hascome to the share of the petitioner s daughter. In case the petitioner was notresiding with her daughter i. e. in the premises bearing No. A-3/1, Vasant Vihar,new Delhi, then position would have been different. . . " Even if there was collusionbetween the mother and the daughter regarding partition of the property, I do notsee how it makes any difference to the point in issue in the present case. Familyarrangements by mutual consent are well recognised in law. For partition badrelations or acrimony is not a must. What is most important in this behaif is that therespondent has already attorned to the petitioner qua the tenancy premises rightfrom the death of her husband and has been paying rent to her. Therefore, thepetitioner is the landlord of the premises so far as the respondent is concerned. Thepetitioner is not claiming any right qua the other portion of the property whichaccording to her has fallen to the share of her daughter. Therefore, whatever thedaughter may do towards her share in the property is not relevant for the presentcase. Similarly, the fact that petitioner was residing with her daughter in thetenancy premises at Vasant Vihar does not make any difference so far as the presentpetition is concerned. The premises admittedly was a tenancy premises and thepetitioner is not and was never a tenant therein. Therefore, whether that accommodation is available to the daughter of the petitioner or not is irrelevant. Thepetitioner never had any right to stay in that premises. The learned Additional Rentcontroller observes that if the petitioner was not residing with her daughter,position would be different. Therefore, whether that accommodation is available to the daughter of the petitioner or not is irrelevant. Thepetitioner never had any right to stay in that premises. The learned Additional Rentcontroller observes that if the petitioner was not residing with her daughter,position would be different. I do not see any relevance of petitioner s residencewith her daughter in the Vasant Vihar tenanted premises. ( 18 ) THE matter has to be viewed in the light of the facts on record and thestatutory provisions. The petitioner is landlord so far as the tenancy premises isconcerned. The tenant does not dispute that he attorned to the petitioner so far asthe tenancy premises is concerned and has been paying rent to her since the deathof her husband. The respondent, therefore, cannot dispute the petitioner s locusstandi/ right to file the present petition as a landlord under Section 14 D of the Act. It is not necessary that the petitioner must have disputes with her daughter andonly then she can maintain this petition under Section 14 D of the Act. For purposesof this petition, it is enough that the petitioner/landlady is a widow. The thirdrequirement is that the premises is required by the petitioner for her own residence. The petitioner says that she has no other place for her residence in Delhi. Regardingvasant Vihar property, she has already explained that she has no right to staytherein and in any case, the said property is no longer available in view of theundertakig to vacate the same, REFERRED TO to hereinbefore. The tenant has not allegedor shown that the petitioner has any other accommodation available to her forpurposes of her residence in Delhi. The petitioner has satisfied all the requirementsof Section 14 D of the Act and the respondent tenant has failed to raise any issuemuch less than any triable issue. The respondent is not entitled to leave to defendin the facts of the present case. The result of the above discussion is that theapplication for leave to defend filed by the respondent/tenant stands rejected. Thefurther consequence of this is an eviction order is passed in favour of the petitionerand against the respondent tenant qua the entire tenanted premises. The respondent is, however, granted two months time to vacate the premises. The petition is disposed of with no order as to costs.