JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners, who were Ex-Directors of Bhavnagar Vegetable Products Ltd. (in Short 'BVP Ltd.,'), have filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.PC to quash the proceedings against them in Cr Complaint Case No. 132/1983 pending before the learned A.C.J.M. No. 2, Udaipur under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred-to as, 'the Act'. 2. Briefly the relevant facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that on 30.7.73 the Food Inspector, Murad Khan, took a sample of vanaspati ghee from the retail shop of accused Laxmilal, now expired. The sample of vanaspati ghee was sent for chemical examination, which did not conform to the proscribed standard of ghee. The Municipal Council, Udaipur authorised the Food Inspector to file a complaint under the Act against fifteen accused persons including the present three petitioners and also accorded sanction to prosecute them. The Food Inspector filed a complaint on 9.11.73 in the court of the concerned Magistrate, which was later on transferred and is now pending in the court of ACJM No. 2, Udaipur. The only allegation against the petitioners in the complaint is that they were Directors of the BVP Ltd. at the relevant time. After recording pre-charge evidence, the Magistrate framed charge against the accused persons under Section 7 read with 16(1)(a) of the Act. On 25.2.75, the post charge evidence was recorded and the case was adjourned for recording the plea of the accused persons. However on 1.10.75, the A.P.P. moved an application praying that the BVP Ltd. also be made an accused under Section 20A of the Act. The learned Magistrate vide his order dated 17.11.75 allowed that application an ordered that BVP Ltd. be also impleaded as an accused under Section 20A of the Act. The learned Magistrate further ordered that because of the addition of the Company as an accused, the evidence will be recorded do novo. From November, 1975 to January, 1987, the proceedings and the trial did not substantially proceed because the BVP Ltd. had gone into liquidation and under the orders of the Gujrat High Court, a liquidator was appointed. Moreover, many Directors of the Company had also been reported to have died pending trial. On 2.7.76, the said Company put its appearance. From November, 1975 to January, 1987, the proceedings and the trial did not substantially proceed because the BVP Ltd. had gone into liquidation and under the orders of the Gujrat High Court, a liquidator was appointed. Moreover, many Directors of the Company had also been reported to have died pending trial. On 2.7.76, the said Company put its appearance. On 21.1.77, an application was moved by the said Company that since it had gone into Liquidation, therefore, permission be sought from the Gujrat High Court for appointing someone to represent and defend the accused Company BVP Ltd. On 16.12.81, the Liquidator appointed by the Gujrat High Court informed the learned ACJM that the Company BVP Ltd. had been taken over by the National Dairy Development Board in pursuance to the order passed by the Gujrat High Court. On 22.2.83, the learned ACJM summoned the liquidator appointed for the said company to appear and defend the said Company. However, it was submitted by the accused persons on 24.4.84 that the Gujrat High Court did not grant permission to the Liquidator to appear and defend the Company BVP Ltd. and, therefore, proceedings against the said Company could not go on. By 12.3.87, death of seven directors of the said Company pending trial, was reported to the court. On 27.6.90, it was also reported that co- accused Laxmilal, from whose shop the sample in question was taken, had expired. On 20.8.93, the trial Magistrate ordered that since the Gujrat High Court had not granted permission to the official liquidator to appear and defend the said Company, the order summoning the official liquidator be revoked. The effect of the said order was that the said Company ceased to be an accused. The learned Magistrate further ordered that the accused would appear on 4.10.93 for recording their statements treating the charge framed on 3.1.75 was still valid and the order passed on 25.2.75 summoning the accused for recording their statements would be still operative. 3. I have heard S/Shri Naga Ratnam and J.L. Purohit, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. H.R. Panwar, Learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. Bhim Arora, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. 4. Mr. Naga Ratnam has submitted a two fold argument. 3. I have heard S/Shri Naga Ratnam and J.L. Purohit, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. H.R. Panwar, Learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. Bhim Arora, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. 4. Mr. Naga Ratnam has submitted a two fold argument. Firstly, his submission is that in the complaint filed by the Food Inspector, the petitioners have only been impleaded as accused being the Directors of the Company BVP Ltd., which manufactured the vanaspati ghee in question. However, there is no assertion as to whether the petitioners were incharge of and responsible to the Company for conduct of its business and in what manner, they are liable for the conduct of its business so as to make them liable. He has claimed that there is not an iota of evidence to connect them with the offence and, as such, the charge framed against them, is ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction, which amounts to abuse of the process of the court, especially when the proceedings against the Company BVPL have already been dropped by the learned Magistrate. His another contention is that the trial in this case is going on for last more than twenty one years and for this, the petitioners are not at all responsible and, as such, their right to speedy trial u/Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been offended and that there is absolutely no chance for their conviction and in such circumstances, further proceedings against them tantamounts to abuse of the process of the court and, as such, the proceedings against them deserve to be quashed. 5. Mr. H.R. Panwar, learned Public Prosecutor, has submitted that since the trial is now at its fag end, the learned Magistrate be directed to expeditiously decide this case within a stipulated period. However, on merits, he had clearly conceded that from the pre-charge evidence recorded in this case, there is no substantial material even to frame the charge against the petitioners. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the. rival submissions. 7. However, on merits, he had clearly conceded that from the pre-charge evidence recorded in this case, there is no substantial material even to frame the charge against the petitioners. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the. rival submissions. 7. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veerappa Shivalingappa Konjalgi, AIR 1976 SC 1947 , it is no longer res integra that where the allegations made in the complaint taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, which is alleged against the accused, then the High Court in its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC should quash the criminal proceedings against such an accused. A similar view has been taken in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 . 8. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohiagi & Others AIR 1983 SC 67 , the Food Inspector Purchased a sample of "Morton Toffees", which on chemical analysis did not conform to the standard prescribed for toffees. The toffees were manufactured by M/s Upper Ganges Sugar Mills. The complaint was filed against respondent Ram Kishan Rohtagi, Manager of the Company and respondents No. 2 to 5, who were Directors of the Company and also against the said Company. The Magistrate summoned the respondents for being tried for the offence under Section 7/16 of the Act. In the complaint, so far as the Directors were concerned, there was not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence, nor anything to show apart from the presumption drawn by the complaint that there was any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that no case was made out ex-facie on the allegations made in the complaint against the Directors and affirmed the findings of the High Court quashing the proceedings against them. 9. In P.R Neelkantham & Others etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1986 CrLJ 1811 , the Food Inspector purchased tea from the Vend6r, which on chemical analysis was found to be adulterated. 9. In P.R Neelkantham & Others etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1986 CrLJ 1811 , the Food Inspector purchased tea from the Vend6r, which on chemical analysis was found to be adulterated. The vendor disclosed that he had purchased the tea from the agent of the M/s Brooke Bond India Ltd. The Food Inspector presented a complaint before the CJM against the said vendor M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. and its Directors. Relying on Ram Kishan Rohtagi's case (Supra) Court held that in the absence of any allegation in the complaint that the particular persons were incharge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, the deeming provision contained in Section 17(1) of the Act could not be attracted and such persons could not be prosecuted and punished in respect of offences under the Act. It was further held that they could not be deemed to be guilty of the offence alleged and that section 20A of the Act would not help the prosecution since the case had not reached the trial stage and the proceedings against the Directors were quashed and set aside. It was, however, directed that It would be open for the prosecution to proceed against M/s Brooke Bond India Ltd. 10. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has already dropped proceedings against the BVPL Company. There is not a shred of evidence even to prima facie show that petitioners Mohd. Hussain, Ahmed Hussain and Kirit Kumar, Ex-Directors of the said Company, which has already undergone into liquidation, were in any way incharge of an responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. In such circumstances, in this case, no reasonable or sufficient grounds exist to believe or presume that the aforementioned Directors of the Company have committed an offence punishable under Section 7/16 of the Act. Therefore, the Magistrate's order taking cognizance as well as the order for framing of charge for the offence under Section 7/16 against them are patently illegal and continuation of proceedings against them amounts to abuse of the process of the court and on this count alone, the proceedings against these petitioners deserve to be quashed by invoking the inherent power of this court under Section 482 Cr.PC. 11. 11. In this case, the sample was taken on 30.7.73 and the criminal complaint was filed on 9.11.73 and since then, the petitioners are facing under protracted trial. The delay has not been caused by any fault or dilatory tactics of the petitioners. 12. In Abdul Rehmon Antulay etc. v. R.S. Noydk and Others, AIR 1992 SC 1701 , the Apex Court has issued guidelines in regard to the speedy trial. It has been reiterated that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily that the right to speedy trial is the right of the accused and that the fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves that social interest does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It has been further held that the right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. It has been emphasised that worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal and that undue delay my well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-ability of witnesses or otherwise. It has also been observed by the Apex Court that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have infringed the first question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for the delay; that inordinate long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice that the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors, 'Balancing test" or 'balancing process', - and determine whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. However, the nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. However, the nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time. 13. In the case on hand, practically, there is no evidence against the petitioners and chances of their conviction are almost nil. The main accused Laxmilal Pujari, Vendor, has expired long back. Proceedings against the company, which is alleged to have manufactured the vegetable Ghee in dispute, have already been dropped. The inordinate delay in the protracted trial of this case cannot be attributed to any fault or dilatory tactics of the petitioners. Therefore, in such circumstances, the petitioners' right to have speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been vigorously offended and they cannot be exposed to further mental torture, physical harassment and financial burden in continuing the trial of this case, which is almost a dead case. 14. Hence for the reasons mentioned above, this petition is allowed and the charge framed against the petitioners for the offence under Section 7/16 (1)(a) of the Act as also the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 132/83 "State v. Laxmilal and Others " pending in the court of ACJM No. 2 Udaipur, qua petitioners (1) Mohd. Hussain Abdul Hussain, (2) Ahmed Hussain Abdul Hussain and (3) Kirit Kumar Gandhi, are hereby quashed. The learned Magistrate is directed to expeditiously dispose off this case against other accused persons in accordance with law. The record of the trial court be immediately sent back.Petition allowed. *******