D. S. SINHA, J. Heard Sri Kailash Nath Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, hereinafter called the Code, is directed against the decree and judgment of the IV Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Varanasi dated 14th April, 1980, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 410 of 1978, whereby the decree and judgment dated 30th September, 1978 passed by the III Civil Judge, Varanasi dismissing the Original Suit No. 267 of 1976, instituted by the plaintiff respondent against the defendant-appellant for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 5th February, 1976 for a consideration of Rs. 10,000 in respect of 7/16th share of the defendant-appellant in House No. 51/57 situate in Mohalla Mohammad Shaheed, Varanasi, has been reversed and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent has been decreed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned decree and judgment of the lower appellate court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent cannot be sustained on the ground that there was total non-com pliance of the provisions of clause (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, hereinafter called the Act, and of Rule 3 of Order VI read with Form 47 contained in Appendix-A of the Code. 4. Elaborating his contention, learned counsel submits that the plaintiff respondent had failed to over and prove that he had always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract of sales which were to be performed by him and Section 16 of the Act prohibits enforcement of specific performance of the contract in such a situation; that Rule 3 of Order VI of the Code mandates that the forms in Appendix a when applicable, and where they are not applicable forms of the like character, as nearly as may be, shall be used for all pleadings, and the form of pleadings in plaint in respect of suits of specific performance is contained in Form No. 47 of Appendix a and paragraph 3 thereof requires the plaintiff to plead that he has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice, but the plaintiff-respondent had failed to comply this requirement rendering his suit liable to be dismissed. 5. 5. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, sub mits that the question sought to be raised and canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is not covered by any of the substantial questions of law, namely, No. (i), (ii) and (iii) for consideration whereof the appeal was admitted by the court, and as such it cannot be permitted to be urged and canvassed to attack the impugned decree and judgment of the lower appellate court. He places reliance upon the provisions contained in Section 100 of the Code, generally, and upon sub-sections (4) and (5) thereof in particular. Reliance is also placed by him on sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XLI read with Rule 1 of Order XLI1 of the Code. 6. The substantial questions of law No. (i), (ii) and (iii) for considera tion whereof appeal was admitted are reproduced below: " (i) Whether the proceedings for declaration of the alleged share of Late Habibunnisa, the sister of the defendant appellant by the Custodian of Enemy Property was binding upon the defendant appellant who has not been served with any notice about the said proceeding by the Custodian of Enemy Property? (ii) Whether the Custodian of Enemy Property could decide the alleged share of late Habibunnissa, the sister of the appellant as enemy property without hearing the appellant who was the owner of the 7/16th portion of the disputed house including the share of her sister Late Habibunnissa? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to adjust the sale price of Rs. 800 of the alleged share of Late Habibunnissa, sister of the defendant appellant, paid to the Custodian of Enemy property in the sale consideration in spite of the admission in the partition deed that Late Habibunnissa had orally gifted her share to the appellant and also delivered possession to him?" 7. Upon a bare reading of the substantial questions of law quoted above, it Is apparent that the question of law sought to be raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant is not covered by any of the aforesaid substantial questions of law. Then, foremost question that arises for consideration of the court is whether the defendant-appellant should be permitted to raise the question of law sought to be canvassed for impugning the decree under appeal? 8. Then, foremost question that arises for consideration of the court is whether the defendant-appellant should be permitted to raise the question of law sought to be canvassed for impugning the decree under appeal? 8. Sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the Code enjoins upon the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal substantial questions of law involved in the appeal. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 provides that where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 envisages that the appeal shall be heard by the High Court on the question formulated by it. Rule 2 of Order XLII interdicts the appellant from urging any other ground in appeal without leave of the High Court, given in accordance with the provisions of Section 100. 9. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XLI of the Code requires the memo randum of appeal to set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from. Rule 2 of Order XLI provides that the appellant shall not, except by leave of the court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. A simple reading provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 100, Rule 2 of Order XLII, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XLI of the Code leaves no room for doubt that the appellant cannot, as a matter of right, be heard on any substantial question of law not formula ted by the court or in support of any ground of objection to the decree appealed from not set forth in the memorandum of appeal, either in second appeal under Section 100 or in first appeal under Section 96 of the Code, except by leave of the court. 10. The power of the High Court to hear the appellant in second appeal under Section 100 upon a substantial question of law not formulated by it is preserved in proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code but such a power has to be exercised for reasons to be recorded. The reasons to be recorded as envisaged by the proviso have to be substantial and cogent. The reasons to be recorded as envisaged by the proviso have to be substantial and cogent. Likewise, leave for urging any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal under Section 96 of the Code cannot be granted unless some substantial and cogent reasons are demonstrated to exist therefor. In the instant case, it has not been demonstrated before the court that there exists any reason muchless substantial and cogent reason justifying exercise of power to grant leave under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code. 11. However, at the instance of the learned counsel for the parties, and in the quest for substantial justice between the parties, the court has looked the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence produced by them notwith standing the rigour of law. The pleadings contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the plaint and relief a therein, read conjointly with paragraph 3 of the unchallenged statement of the plaintiff-respondent made in his examination-in-chief, runs counter to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The court is clearly of the opinion that the requirement of the provisions of the Act and the Code, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, are substantially complied with, and the impugned decree and judgment is not liable to be set aside on that ground. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .