JUDGMENT : 1. The short question that arises for our consideration is for the arrears which have accrued in favour of the original land-lord, is it open to a successor land-lord to seek eviction under Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956? 2. In this case the husband of Smt. Sati Rani Nath filed a suit for eviction. On his death his wife Smt. Sati Rani Nath was brought on record. Pending suit she sold the property in favour of the second plaintiff - Smt. Seema Adhikari. The sale deed stated as follows: "It is mentioned here that you are entitled and assigned to continue the case brought by me against Amiyo Banerjee being T.S. No. 509 of 1976 in the Court of Second Munsif, Scaldah, West Bengal, being added as a party to the proceeding." (This is a rough translation of the original deed in Bengali) 3. The suit for eviction ended in a decree which was affirmed by the court of first appeal and further affirmed by the High Court. In attacking these judgments Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned senior counsel for the appellant would urge on the basis of Ram Tahal Modi v. Ratan Lal, 1989 (1) RCR 178 that there was a cause of action for the original land-lord to sue for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent accrued in his favour, when the property was sold pendente lite he ceased to be the land-lord thereafter unless and until there are arrears of rent the vendee, the second plaintiff, again cannot find a valid cause under Section 13 (1) of the Act for eviction, hence the decree for eviction is liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents effectively meets this submission by referring to a ruling of this Court reported only in R.C.R., namely, Ramchander Narsey & Co. v. Wamanrao Shenoy, 1969 RCR 398. According to him what is to be looked at is that on the date of eviction was there a valid cause. If the answer is in the affirmative, did that cause continue or did any event happen to snap that cause. Tested in that light if the deed of conveyance mentions that the successor in interest could prosecute the suit, it would amount to the decree itself being assigned and, therefore, that cause continued. If the answer is in the affirmative, did that cause continue or did any event happen to snap that cause. Tested in that light if the deed of conveyance mentions that the successor in interest could prosecute the suit, it would amount to the decree itself being assigned and, therefore, that cause continued. This was the reasoning of the ruling cited on behalf of the respondents. The facts being identical, it must apply on all fours. 5. In reply Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned senior counsel would urge the Supreme Court ruling relied on by the respondents arose under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Therefore, it must be confined to Section, 5(3) of the Act which contained the definition of land-lord. In any event in the ruling cited there was a assignment, but here what is sought to be assigned is a future right and that is not a valid assignment within the. meaning of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. We have carefully considered the above submissions. We feel the judgment cited by Mr.'P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel, for the respondents, namely, Ramchander Narsey's case (supra) 1969 RCR 398 fully covers the case on hand. We may now extract the relevant portion of that ruling: "...Herein admittedly, on the date suit was instituted, there was a valid cause of action for evicting the appellant. What the court has to consider in every case is whether the suit was validly instituted. If a suit is validly instituted. a decree must necessarily follow, unless the law prescribes otherwise. Undoubtedly the present suit is based on a valid cause of action. Therefore all that we have see is whether any subsequent. event has happened necessitating the denial of the relief asked for. Paying or tendering the money under section 12 (3)(b) is merely a concession granted to the tenant. He may avail of that concession. or he may not avail of it. If he avails of that concession then the relief of ejectment asked for will not be granted though the landlord will ordinarily be entitled to the costs of the suit. There, is no denying the fact that at the time the suit was instituted, the 1st respondent was the "landlord" as defined in the Act and at the time the decree came to be made, the 2nd plaintiff was the "landlord". There, is no denying the fact that at the time the suit was instituted, the 1st respondent was the "landlord" as defined in the Act and at the time the decree came to be made, the 2nd plaintiff was the "landlord". The deed of assignment has not been printed. Therefore, we do not its terms. We have to proceed on the basis that the 1st respondent had assigned all his rights, title and interest in the suit premises to the 2nd plaintiff. We must assume that in particular he had also assigned his right in the decree that may be passed in suit. Learned Counsel for the respondent referred to us in this connection the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kante M. Mullick v. Jyotish Chanda Mukherjee. Undoubtedly that decision supports the contention of the respondent but it is not necessary for us to rest our decision on the basis of rule laid down in that case." In the present case also, as to what was the nature of assignment under the deed of conveyance, we have extracted. Therefore, whether along with the conveyance of the property the right to prosecute the suit is assigned, that would be enough because the test adopted in the citation was "we must assume that in particular he had also assigned his right in the decree that may be passed in the suit. (Emphasis supplied) This affords a complete answer to the arguments of Mr. A.K. Ganguli. The ruling of the Patna High Court is clearly distinguishable because in 6 paragraph 14 what was observed was as under: "Admittedly, according to the original as well as the added plaintiffs, the alleged default in payment of rent was committed by the tenants long before the suit properties were transferred by the original plaintiffs to the added plaintiffs. In none of the sale deeds, the rent which was in arrear was assigned or transferred to the added plaintiffs." "In terms of Section 109 of the T.P. Act, the transferees-plaintiffs came to possess all the rights of the transferors- lessors with regard the suit properties. Under the general law the transferees in all these cases, the tenants being tenants month to month, could have immediately after the purchase, terminated the tenancy and filed suit for eviction. Under the general law the transferees in all these cases, the tenants being tenants month to month, could have immediately after the purchase, terminated the tenancy and filed suit for eviction. Under the general law again, they as owners of the properties could have prosecuted suit filed by the transferor on the basis of title. But in these cases, the transferees can obtain decree for eviction of the tenants only if at least one of the grounds mentioned in Section 11(1) of the Rent Act is proved." " Could the transferees obtain decree for eviction? The answer could have been in the affirmative had they been suits to which the Rent Act was not attracted. The Rent Act has put impediment on the right of landlord to evict a tenant from a building. For obtaining decree for eviction, against it must be proved (1) that the plaintiff is landlord within the meaning of the Rent Act, and (2) must also prove any of the grounds enumerated in Section 11(1) which are as many as six in number. From the perusal of the grounds, there is no difficulty in holding that some cause of action or occasion for filing suit are not available to a transferee - pendente lite, for instance eviction on the ground of personal necessity, i.e., Section 11(1)(c). Again there is no difficulty in holding that some cause of action may be said to be continuing, for instance, breach of condition of tenancy, or subletting without the consent of the landlord or where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste or negligence or default of the tenant or on the expiry of period of lease, i.e., Cis. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. The transferee- pendente lite may prosecute the suit if these grounds are available. But can such transferee take advantage of default in payment of rent by tenant, ground stated in Section 11(1)(d)?" Therefore, that was not a case of assignment. 7. Again the attempt to say that the ruling of the Supreme Court cited above must be confined to Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 does not appeal to us. Equally the nature of assignment would make a distinction is also not a tenable argument in view of what we have observed above. Again the attempt to say that the ruling of the Supreme Court cited above must be confined to Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 does not appeal to us. Equally the nature of assignment would make a distinction is also not a tenable argument in view of what we have observed above. In the result the appeal is dismissed. No costs.