JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. :---Constitutional validity of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and Rule 31(1) of the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 amended vide Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment, Amendment Rules, 1977 are the principal common questions involved in this group of six writ petitions and, therefore, all these writ petitions have been heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. To appreciate the contentions raised in these writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions, facts of Writ Petition No. 15 of 1989, which are in narrow compass, may be adverted to first. Smt. Fulwantabai w/o Ishwardas Meshram (for short, the worker) in the said writ petition filed an appeal under section 31(2) of the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (for short, the Beedi Workers Act, 1966) before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Gondia on 24-10-1986. It was inter alia averred in the said appeal by her that she was beedi roller and working as such for the last 4-5 years for M/s Vidarbha Tobacco Products (P.) Limited, Ekodi (for short, the petitioner-employers) through Shri Chand Khan Mohammed Sheikh and Shri Khalil, the respondents 3 and 4 (for short, contractors). According to the worker, the petitioner-employer and the contractor did not provide log book/card to the worker and her correct name was not recorded in the register and for that an enquiry was made on spot by the Government Labour Officer on 25-9-1986. Due to this enquiry, the contractor terminated the services of the worker with effect from 26-9-1986 after receiving her beedis and despite repeated requests, the contractor did not give tobacco and leaves to her. On the basis of these facts, the worker prayed before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour that she should be reinstated with back wages from the date of her termination. The contractor as well as petitioner-employer contested the appeal before the Assistant Labour Commissioner by filing the reply on 26-3-1987. Though the reply was common by them, the contractor and employer set up the plea that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the worker had been in service with the contractor at any time. It was admitted by them that the Government Labour Officer, Gondia visited the site on 25-9-1986. Though the reply was common by them, the contractor and employer set up the plea that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the worker had been in service with the contractor at any time. It was admitted by them that the Government Labour Officer, Gondia visited the site on 25-9-1986. However, in para 4 of the reply, the employment of worker was denied and it was for that reason that no requisite notice was required to be served upon her. Worker examined herself as well as one Devdas Ganpat Bawane. On the other hand, the petitioner-employer and the contractor examined Shri Chandkhan Sheikh. The Assistant Labour Commissioner after holding the enquiry and hearing the parties, held that the termination of the worker was bad in law and accordingly by the said judgment dated 6-6-1988, set aside the termination of the workman and directed the employer and the contractor to reinstate the worker with immediate effect. The worker was held entitled to guaranteed wages of 50 per cent till her reinstatement. Dissatisfied with the judgment passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner allowing the appeal of worker, setting aside her termination and directing the petitioner-employer to reinstate her with 50 per cent of guaranteed wages till reinstatement, has given rise to Writ Petition No. 15 of 1989 and similar other five writ petitions relating to different workers by different employers. 3. Challenge to the constitutional validity of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 and Rule 32 of the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968 as amended by the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1977 would not have been required to be gone into by applying the doctrine of de-facto as laid down by the Apex Court in (Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P.)1, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1473 and other decisions including the judgment of this Court in (M/s. Haji Latif Gani v. Union of India and others)2, Writ Petition No. 2790 of 1990 decided on 29th April, 1991, with connected matters dealing with these very questions, but for the insistance by all the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties to decide the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions on merit since these are being raised time and again. In Gokaraju Rangarajus case (supra), the Apex Court held as under :--- "The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party, but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the Judge except as a judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to being in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise, as soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for adeclaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judges titled to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence, the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question a judges appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course, such a collateral attack." 4. In Writ Petition No. 2790 of 1990 and other connected matters (supra) decided by this Court on 29th April, 1991, challenging the order passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in the appeal under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 and the Rules framed thereunder, the constitutional validity of section 31(2)(a) and the aforesaid rules were questioned and applying the doctrine of de-facto, this Court held that the writ petitions which are basically under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the collateral challenge to the authority in competance of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour exercising the power under section 31(2)(a) cannot be allowed to be raised and this Court held as under :--- "9) The learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that section 31 read with section 44(n) of the Act provides for excessive delegation to the Executive Powers under these provisions also are without any guideline and have resulted in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Another limb of the submission is that the function of the appellate authority under section 31 of the Act is judicial. However, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour who has been notified as appellate authority is not equipped with either with such quality or character. As such, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour is not competent to exercise jurisdiction under section 31 of the Act. The impugned orders thus passed have incurred a disability of being void ab-initio. However, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour who has been notified as appellate authority is not equipped with either with such quality or character. As such, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour is not competent to exercise jurisdiction under section 31 of the Act. The impugned orders thus passed have incurred a disability of being void ab-initio. Tenability of this ground was objected. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners cannot avail this ground in these proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution since they are collateral for the purposes of ground as raised. Reliance is placed on a decision in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1473. It is held therein that--- The learned Counsel for the petitioners made a submission that no such plea was raised in the Return. They pointed out that the challenge as posed was incorporated in the petition by way of amendment. Even in reply, the question of entitlement of such ground was not pleaded. As such, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, respondents now cannot object to the tenability of the ground. Any plea of tenability of the challenge in particular proceedings relates to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is obligatory on the part of the petitioners to satisfy as regards tenability of the ground which they propose to raise. Not raising the plea of tenability of a ground by adversary does not permit the petitioners to assume entitlement of raising such ground and the Court cannot usurp jurisdiction for adjudication of such ground. It is then contended on behalf of the petitioners that in the instant proceedings, no material is even for the purpose of the ground. They submitted that the petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. No doubt, the petitions have been styled as under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution but the petitioners have approached to this Court after adjudication and decision in appeal on merits. The petitioner on facts are not justified to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. They are virtually and in fact are under Article 227 of the Constitution wherein this Court can ascertain whether the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction acted within and in accordance with the limits of law. The petitioner on facts are not justified to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. They are virtually and in fact are under Article 227 of the Constitution wherein this Court can ascertain whether the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction acted within and in accordance with the limits of law. The petitioners while assailing the orders of Assistant Commissioner of Labour in exercise of power under section 31 of the Act, cannot now challenge his authority or competence, for the purposes of the ground as raised. These proceedings which are basically under Article 227 of the Constitution are collateral. As such, the challenge is not available. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be permitted to question the authority or competence of the Assistant Labour Commissioner". 5. However, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that to settle controversy once for all about the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 and Rule 32 as amended in the year 1977 under the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968 on merits with reference to the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer, may be examined. 6. Mr. Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer first of all has challenged the vires of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966. Mr. Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer contended that the said section 31(2)(a) of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it confers unguided and uncontrolled powers on the State Government to appoint any person or anybody as an appellate authority for hearing the appeal filed by the employee challenging his/her discharge, dismissal or retrenchment. According to Mr. Qazi, in the absence of any guidelines provided in the said section, as a result of uncontrolled and unbriddled power given to the executive, the State Government has conferred such power of hearing appeals under section 31(2)(a) to the Assistant Commissioners of Labour who, though discharge judicial functions while hearing such appeals, but are not competent to discharge such judicial functions. The contention of Mr. The contention of Mr. Qazi is that in the absence of any guidelines in section 31(2)(a) and unbriddled and uncontrolled power having been conferred on the State Government, the State Government has misused such power by conferring the powers of hearing the appeals under section 31(2)(a) upon the Assistant Labour Commissioners and such misuse of power by the State Government would also make the provisions contained in section 31(2)(a) unconstitutional and ultra-vires. 6-A. Beedi Workers Act, 1966 was enacted to provide for the welfare of workers in Beedi and Cigar Establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and the matters connected therewith. Constitutionality of the entire Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in (Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India and others)3, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1832. The Supreme Court after examining the historical background leading to the enactment of this Act, observed that the Beedi Industry was an unorganised and scattered and it called for radical reforms. It was further observed that the service conditions of the workers as well as the conditions of working place were bad. The workers which included much force of women and children, were not provided basic amenities and the service conditions obtaining in the industry were far from being satisfactory. The Apex Court considered the various systems adopted in the manufacture of beedis. These systems prevalent in the manufacture of beedis are known as, factory system, contract system of employment and out-workers system. In factory system, the manufacturer is an owner of the factory. Workers gather and work under his supervision as his employees. In the contract system, the proprietor gives to the middlemen quantities of beedi leaves and tobacco and the contractor on receiving the materials manufactures beedis (i) by employing directly labourers and manufacturing beedis or (ii) by distributing the materials amongst the home workers, as they are called, most women who manufacture beedis in their own homes with the assistance of other members of their family including children and in the third system of outworkers, the workers roll beedis out of the tobacco and beedi leaves supplied by the proprietor himself without the agency of middlemen. The Supreme Court then referred to various committees appointed from time to time in this connection and observed that the Act came into existence in the background of these reports wherein the employment of women and children, wage structure in the industry were considered and solution of unhealthy working conditions under the miserable employment, long working hours, unregulated employment and deduction from wages were recommended. The Supreme Court, thus, observed :--- "17. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 is an Act to provide for the welfare of the workers in Beedi and Cigar Establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for matters connected therewith. The special feature of the industry was the manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling house, where the workers took raw materials given by employers of contractors. The relationship between employees and employees was not well defined. The application of the Factories Act met with difficulties. The labour in the industry was unorganised and was not able to look after its own interests. The industry was highly mobile. The attempt of some of the State to legislate in this behalf was not successful. The necessity for central legislation was felt. A bill was mooted to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread over, rest periods, over-time, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials etc. The anxiety was expressed by several Committees to introduce some regulation in the employer-employee relationship and to obtain certain benefits to the employees which were denied to them". "26. The scheme of the Act relates to provisions regarding health and welfare, conditions of employment, leave with wages, extension of benefits by applying other Acts to Labour. To illustrate, section 28 of the Act extends benefits of the Payment of Wages Act to industrial premises, section 31 of the Act provides for security of service, section 37 of the Act extends the benefit of Industrial Standing Orders Act, 1946 again. Section 37(3) of the Act makes provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act applicable to every establishment, section 38(1) of the Act applies the safety provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Factories Act to industrial premises. Section 37(3) of the Act makes provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act applicable to every establishment, section 38(1) of the Act applies the safety provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Factories Act to industrial premises. Section 39(1) of the Act makes the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applicable to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. Section 39(2) of the Act provides that disputes between an employee and an employer in relation issue of raw materials, rejection of beedis and cigars, payment of wages for the beedis and cigars rejected by the employer, shall be settled by such authority as the State Government may specify. An appeal is provided to the appellate authority whose decision is final. Section 39(1) of the Act applies to industrial premises. Section 39(2) of the Act applies to every establishment." "28. The pith and substance of this Act is regulation of conditions of employment in the beedi and cigar industry. The Act deals with particular subject matter as regards the establishments and industrial premises. These matters are regulation of conditions of employment in the industry and the industrial relations between the employer and the employee. Entries 22 and 24 in List III are wide enough to cover this piece of labour welfare measure. Entry 22 deals with labour welfare. Entry 23 deals with social security, employment and unemployment. Entry 24 deals with welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers liability, workmens compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. The Act is valid and falls within Entries 22, 23 and 24 of List III." 7. Challenge to section 31 of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 was negatived in the aforesaid case and the Supreme Court, upholding the said provision, held as under :--- "69. It has been contended that section 31 of the Act which provides one months notice in lieu of notice of dismissal was an unreasonable restriction. The reason advanced was that the Act has not defined the word "wages" and, therefore it is not possible to calculate wages. Section 27 of the Act prescribed the rate for calculating wages during the period of leave. Section 39(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies to matters in respect of every industrial premises. Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines wages. Section 27 of the Act prescribed the rate for calculating wages during the period of leave. Section 39(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies to matters in respect of every industrial premises. Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines wages. The definition of wages in the Industrial Disputes Act applies to workers in industrial premises contemplated by the Act. Home workers are not included in industrial premises because they work in private dwelling houses which are establishments. The definition of wages in the Industrial Disputes Act will apply to workers who are paid on monthly basis. Section 28(1) of the Act empowers the State Government to direct that the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 shall apply to employees in establishments to which the Act applies. Section 2(6) of the Payment of Wages Act defines "wages" to include inter-alia any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of any leave period. Some aid may be had from the definition of wages in the Payment of Wages Act, viz. wages include leave wages. Therefore, the word "wages" in section 31 of the Act will mean wages which are calculated under section 27 of the Act. This can be calculated in both in the cases of workers in industrial premises and home workers in establishments. Therefore, the provisions contained in section 31 of the Act cannot be said to be unreasonable restrictions." 8. Despite the fact that the entire Beedi Workers Act, 1966 has been held to be constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court in the Mangalore Beedi Works case (supra), Mr. Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer contended that the Supreme Court did not examine the constitutionality of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 from the point of view that it did not provide any guidelines and rather confers unbriddled and uncontrolled powers on the State Government and therefore the said provisions being unconstitutional should be struck down. 9. Section 31 of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 reads as under :---- "31. 9. Section 31 of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 reads as under :---- "31. (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of six months or more, except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employee at least one months notice or wages in lieu of such notice : Provided that such notice shall not be necessary if the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held by the employer for the purpose. (2) (a) The employee discharged, dismissed or retrenched may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his service or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer or on the ground that such punishment of discharge or dismissal was severe. (b) The appellate authority may, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the employer and the employee, dismiss the appeal or direct the reinstatement of the employee with or without wages for the period during which he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without reinstatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. 2-A The appellate authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matter, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; and (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects". (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such time as may be specified in the order of the appellate authority". 10. (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such time as may be specified in the order of the appellate authority". 10. The words "employee" and "employer" are defined under section 2(f) and 2(g) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 which read as under :--- "2(f) "employee" means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment or go-down to do any work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, and includes---- (i) any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home (hereinafter referred to in this Act as "home worker"), and, (ii) any person not employed by any employer or a contractor but working with the permission of, or under agreement with the employer or contractor or both". "(g) "employer" means --- (a) in relation to contract labour, the principal employer, and (b) in relation to other labour, the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name." 11. Scheme of section 31 of the aforesaid Act is that an employee who has been in employment of the employer for a period of six months or more, his services should not be dispensed with except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee one months notice or wages in lieu of such notice. However, such notice would not be required if the services of such employee are dispensed with on the charge of misconduct and such charge of misconduct has been enquired into by holding enquiry and there was satisfactory evidence recorded during the course of enquiry proving the charge of misconduct. Section 31(2)(a) provides that such employee whose services have been discharged, dismissed or retrenched, may challenge such order of dismissal, discharge or retrenchment by filing an appeal within the prescribed time and before such authority where such appeal lay. Section 31(2)(a) provides that such employee whose services have been discharged, dismissed or retrenched, may challenge such order of dismissal, discharge or retrenchment by filing an appeal within the prescribed time and before such authority where such appeal lay. The order of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment may be challenged by the employee either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services on or the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held in the enquiry by the employer or that punishment of discharge or dismissal was disproportionate or excessive or severe looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Appellate Authority under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 31 is required to follow the principles of natural justice and hear and decide the appeal after giving notice to the employer and employee. While hearing the appeal under sub-section (2) of section 31, the Appellate Authority enjoys the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and compelling the production of documents and material objects. After giving the notice to employer and employee of appeal, the Appellate Authority may dismiss the appeal or direct reinstatement of the employee with or without the wages of the period during which such employee was out of employment or direct payment of compensation without reinstatement or grant any such relief which is just and proper and which the Appellate Authority deems fit in the circumstances of the case. The decision of the Appellate Authority is final and binding on the employer and employee and is required to be given effect to within the time prescribed by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966. 12. For carrying out the purposes of the Act, power to make rules is provided in section 44 of the aforesaid Act and section 44, as far as relevant, reads as under :--- "44(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :--- (a) ..... to (m)..... (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :--- (a) ..... to (m)..... (n) the authority to which and the time within which an appeal may be filed by a dismissed, discharged or retrenched employee; (o) ..... to (x) ....." (3) All rules made under this Act shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be subject to the condition of previous publication; and the dates to be specified under Clause (3) of section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall not be less than three months from the date on which draft of the proposed rules was published. (4) ......" 13. It is, thus, clear that the State Government has been empowered to specify the authority to whom and the time within which an appeal may be filed under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act by an employee who is aggrieved by the order of dismissal, discharge or retrenchment. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and Clauses (a) to (x) of sub-section (2) of section 44 and all other powers vested in the State Government in that behalf, the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 (for short, the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968) were made. At the time of making of the said rules, Rule 32 which provided for forum and limitation of appeal under section 31 of the aforesaid Act relating to discharge, dismissal and retrenchment of an employee read as under :--- "32. Appeals under section 31(1). The Appellate Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of section 31 shall be the person for the time being presiding over the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Presiding Authority"). Appeals under section 31(1). The Appellate Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of section 31 shall be the person for the time being presiding over the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Presiding Authority"). He shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals under this Rule in respect of industrial premises to areas for which he has jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947...." (2) An employee who is discharged, dismissed or retrenched may prefer an appeal under sub-section (2) of section 31, to the appellate authority specified under sub-rule (1) within a period of thirty days from the date of communication of the order of such discharge, dismissal or retrenchment : Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the said period of thirty days, if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period. (3) The notice to be given by the appellate authority under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 31 shall --- (a) in the case of a notice to an employer be in Form VIII; and (b) in the case of a notice to an employee, be in Form XI; and every such notice shall be sent to the party concerned by registered post acknowledgment due." Rule 33 of the Beedi Workers Rules, 1966 initially read as under :--- "Procedure to be followed by Labour Courts in deciding appeals.---The Presiding Authority in deciding appeals under sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Act may follow the procedure of judicial inquiry and cover the spot inspection, examination of documents, witnesses and other evidences produced by the parties. For this purpose, the Presiding Authority shall have the same powers as are vested in the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in so far as they are applicable in deciding such appeals". 14. These rules were amended by the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 and accordingly Rules 32 and 33 were amended in the following manner :--- "32. 14. These rules were amended by the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 and accordingly Rules 32 and 33 were amended in the following manner :--- "32. (A) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), the appellate authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of section 31 shall be the Assistant Commissioner of Labour; and he shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals (including appeals pending disposal on the date of the coming into force of the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 in such areas as the State Government, may by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the appeals which were partly heard by the authorities which were competent to hear them immediately before the coming into force of the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 shall be disposed of by those authorities as if the said rules had not been made". "33. Procedure to be followed by appellate authority in deciding appeals---The appellate authority in deciding appeals under sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Act may follow the procedure of judicial inquiry and cover the spot inspection, examination of documents, witnesses and other evidences produced by the parties. For this purpose, the appellate authority shall have the same powers as are vested in the appellate authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in so far as they are applicable in deciding such appeals." 15. The question is, on the face of the provisions contained in section 31, particularly sub-section (2)(a) thereof, can it be said that the provisions contained therein are unconstitutional because of the lack of guidelines about the appointment of the authority for hearing appeals. Plain answer would be in the negative. Merely because the authority to whom an appeal under section 31(2)(a) challenging the dismissal, discharge or retrenchment by an employee, would lie has not been specified, it cannot be said that the said provision conferred unbriddled and uncontrolled power for appointment of such authority hearing appeals. Plain answer would be in the negative. Merely because the authority to whom an appeal under section 31(2)(a) challenging the dismissal, discharge or retrenchment by an employee, would lie has not been specified, it cannot be said that the said provision conferred unbriddled and uncontrolled power for appointment of such authority hearing appeals. True it is that by not specifying the authority who would hear the appeal under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, discretion has been given, but that discretion under section 44 of the said Act has been given to the State Government which provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out purposes of this Act and Clause (n) of sub-section (2) thereof empowers the State Government to make rule providing for the authority to whom and the time within which an appeal may be filed by a dismissed, discharged or retrenched employee. Discretion, therefore, has been given to the State Government and that by itself is a sufficient check and it cannot be said that unbriddled and uncontrolled power has been conferred without any guidelines. The discretionary power conferred on the State Government to specify the authority for hearing the appeals under section 31(2)(a) filed by the dismissed, retrenched or discharged employee by itself does not invalidate section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 nor can it be said that it suffers from vice of unbriddled, uncontrolled and unguided power. The fact that the discretion is exercised by the State Government and it is only the State Government who is invested with power to exercise such discretion under section 44, I am of the clear view that the said provision contained in section 31(2)(a) is constitutional and cannot be invalidated on the ground of contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Apex Court in (Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and others v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another)4, (1992)3 S.C.C. 336 . In that case while challenging the constitutionality of section 25(N) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1977, one of the contentions before the Apex Court was that section 25-N of the said Act does not give any indication about the status and qualifications of the officer who would be entrusted with the power to grant or refuse permission for retrenchment of workman. The contention was that without specifying the authority which may exercise the power under sub-section (2), discretion has been conferred on the appropriate Government and the said discretion being unfettered and uncontrolled, section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Repelling the said argument, the Supreme Court observed thus :--- "40. As regards the second part of the contention relating to the discretion to specify the authority which may exercise the power under sub-section (2), it may be stated that the said discretion given to the Government itself and not to a subordinate officer. In Virendra v. State of Punjab, this Court was dealing with section 2(1)(a) of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, which uses the expression, "the State Government or any authority so specified in this behalf". The validity of the said provision was assailed on the ground that it gave unfettered and uncontrolled discretion to the State Government or to the officer authorised by it and reliance was placed on the earlier decision of this Court in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P. Rejecting the said contention this Court held :--- "In the first place, the discretion is given in the first instance to the State Government itself and not to a very sub-ordinate officer like the licensing officer as was done in Dwarka Prasad, case. It is true that the State Government may delegate the power to any officer or person but the fact that the power of delegation is to be exercised by the State Government itself is some safeguard against the abuse of this power of delegation". "41. It has, however, been submitted that in Virendra case this Court struck down section 3(1) of the said Act which also used the same expression, viz. "the State Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf". But on a perusal of the judgment, we find that section 3(1) was not struck down on the ground that the power could be delegated by the State Government to any authority. "the State Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf". But on a perusal of the judgment, we find that section 3(1) was not struck down on the ground that the power could be delegated by the State Government to any authority. It was held to be bad on the ground that there was no time-limit for operation of the order made under section 3(1) and no provision was made for any representation being made to the State Government and in this regard the provisions contained in section 3 were contrasted with those contained in section 2(1)(a) wherein a time-limit of two months had been prescribed for Government had also been conferred. Keeping in view the fact that the power to specify the authority which can exercise the power conferred under sub-section (2) of section 25-N has been conferred on the appropriate Government, we are unable to hold that the delegation of the power to the appropriate Government to specify the authority renders the provisions of section 25-N as arbitrary or unreasonable. The first contention is, therefore, rejected". 17. In section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966, it has been provided that the appeal against the order of dismissal, discharge and retrenchment may be filed by an employee within time and such authority as may be prescribed and section 44 of the said Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out purposes of the Act and Clause (n) of sub-section (2) of section 44 empowers the State Government to make rules providing for the authority to whom and the time within which the appeal may be filed by the dismissed, discharged or retrenched employee and, therefore, the power having been given to the State Government itself under the Act, it cannot be said that the said power suffers from the vice of uncontrolled and unfettered discretion given to the State Government. Looking to the policy, scheme, letter and the spirit of section 31, the State Government is to appoint the authority for hearing the appeals under section 31 to decide the nature of controversy relating to dismissal, discharge or retrenchment of an employee on the grounds mentioned therein by following the procedure as contemplated under section 31 itself and rules framed thereunder and, therefore, the provision of section 31(2)(a) even without specifying the authority before whom the appeal would lie under the said section is constitutionally valid and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As aforesaid. section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 is, thus, neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 18. Whether the rule, conferring jurisdiction to hear appeals under sub-section (2)(a) of section 31 to the Assistant Commissioners of Labour by appointing them as Appellate Authority is constitutionally valid or not, shall be examined later on, but even otherwise, misuse or abuse of discretionary power or that the possibility that the discretionary power conferred under section 31(2)(a) read with section 44 of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 may be abused or misused, is not and would not be a ground for invalidating section 31(2)(a) and, therefore, the submissions made by Mr Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer that the grounds on which he was assailing validity of the rule appointing Assistant Commissioners of Labour as appellate authority to hear appeals under section 31(2)(a) would itself invalidate section 31(2)(a) is misplaced and misconceived and is held to be void of any merits. As observed above, the entire Beedi Workers Act, 1966 has been held to be constitutionally valid including section 31 by the Apex Court in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works case (cited supra), though specific challenge to sub-section (2)(a) of section 31 was not made and challenge was confined to section 31 to the extent it provided one months notice in lieu of notice of dismissal. Once the enactment has been held to be constitutional by the Apex Court, merely because certain aspects were not specifically raised or certain provisions were not specifically challenged, those provisions cannot be allowed to be reopened by raising different pleas at different times. Once the enactment has been held to be constitutional by the Apex Court, merely because certain aspects were not specifically raised or certain provisions were not specifically challenged, those provisions cannot be allowed to be reopened by raising different pleas at different times. The constitutional validity of the entire Beedi Workers Act, 1966 having been upheld by the Apex Court, the constitutionality of section 31(2)(a) would also be presumed to have been upheld by the Apex Court even if the arguments advanced on behalf of the present petitioner-employer relating to section 31(2)(a) were not raised before the Apex Court in the manner the same are being raised in these writ petitions. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner-employer that section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966 is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Besides that, I have already held that the said provisions contained in section 31(2)(a) even otherwise does not suffer from any vice of unfettered and uncontrolled discretion conferred on the State Government and is constitutionally valid under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. Challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 32 of the Beedi Workers Rules as amended by the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1977 conferring the jurisdiction to hear appeals under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act to the Assistant Commissioners of Labour, Mr. Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer contended that it is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 50 of the Constitution of India and section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966. Qazi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer contended that it is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 50 of the Constitution of India and section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act, 1966. It has been contended by the learned Counsel that initially Rule 32(1) of the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968 conferred appellate powers under section 31(2)(a) of the Act upon the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but this rule has been substituted by the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Amendment Rules, 1977 effective from 1-1-1977 whereby the jurisdiction to hear appeals under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act has been conferred upon the Assistant Commissioners of Labour and since the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority is the procedure of judicial enquiry and the appellate authority virtually discharges the powers of the courts in adjudicating the civil dispute of dismissal, discharge and retrenchment and the said judicial powers having been conferred on non-judicial persons or authorities like the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, is unconstitutional and unreasonable. According to the learned Counsel, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour acts as an Administrative Officer or Executive Authority and discharges various administrative or executive functions under various Labour Laws, conferment of judicial powers under section 31(2)(a) to such authority having no judicial training or experience, is also unreasonable and unsustainable. Mr. Qazi contended that the appellate authority contemplated under section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act is a judicial authority and such power having been given to the Assistant Labour Commissioners who are only Administrative Officers in the Labour Department discharging administrative and executive functions by the Amendment Rules of 1977, is violative of section 31(2)(a) of the Beedi Workers Act besides being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The appointment of Assistant Commissioners of Labour under the Amendment Rules of 1977 as an appellate authority under section 31(2)(a), contended Mr Qazi, is arbitrary and imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on their business. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer referred to various provisions under the Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Wages Act, Payment of Gratuity Act, Payment of Bonus Act, The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act etc. and submitted that under the said Acts, the Government Labour Officers are also appointed as Inspectors. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer referred to various provisions under the Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Wages Act, Payment of Gratuity Act, Payment of Bonus Act, The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act etc. and submitted that under the said Acts, the Government Labour Officers are also appointed as Inspectors. Inspectors under the said Acts who are Government Labour Officers also have multi-ferious duties to perform under various Labour Laws. They are required to negotiate and settle industrial matters between employees and employees and they are vested with the powers to prosecute employers under the different Labour Laws. These Inspectors are mostly subordinate to Assistant Commissioners of Labour in the District and, therefore, develop bias with the employers. Mr. Qazi contended that similarly, Assistant Commissioners of Labour are also required to perform different functions under Labour Laws including that of Conciliation Officer in the industrial disputes and, therefore, they often come in contact with the employers in labour matters and form their opinions in respect of individual employers and develop their likings and dislikings, prejudices and bias against various employers and these very Assistant Commissioners of Labour having been conferred with power to hear the appeals under section 31(2)(a) challenging dismissal, discharge and retrenchment of the employees, such Assistant Commissioners ofLabour develop bias and the employers cannot expect justice from them. In this background also, Mr Qazi contended that Amending Rule 32 of the Beedi Workers Rules and conferring jurisdiction on the Assistant Commissioners of Labour to hear appeal under section 32(2)(a) is unreasonable. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that the notification dated 1-1-1977 amending Rule 32 of the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968 by the Maharashtra Beedis and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1977 be invalidated and declared unconstitutional. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that the notification dated 1-1-1977 amending Rule 32 of the Beedi Workers Rules, 1968 by the Maharashtra Beedis and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1977 be invalidated and declared unconstitutional. In this connection, Mr Qazi relied on (Chandramohan v. State of U.P. others)5, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1987, (Statesman (P.) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb and others; Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder and others; Krishna Chandra Sharma v. Sindh Hyderabad National Collegiate Board; S.P. Sampatkumar v. Union of India and others)6, A.I.R. 1987 S.C.386, (J.C. Patel and another v. ESIC)7, 1987 Mh.L.J. 280; (Rajni Parekh College and another v. Mahendra Ambalal Shah)8, (1986)II S.C.C. 560; (S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra)9, (1981)I S.C.C. 436; (Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and others)10, (1992)III S.C. 666; (Kartarsingh v. State of Punjab)11, (1994)III S.C. 569; (All India Judges Association v. Union of India and others)12, 1993 S.C.C. 288 (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. and others v. Union of India and others)13, (1993)IV S.C.C. 441 and (Unnikrishnan and others v. State of A.P. and others)14, (1993)I S.C.C. 445.