JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– This application for contempt has been filed for wilful disobedience of an order dated 22.1.1993 passed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J., the operative portion whereof reads thus :–– "Accordingly, after bearing Mr. Chakraborty for the petitioners and considering the facts stated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition, wherein the observations of the Supreme Court, as aforesaid, were quoted in verbatim, this Court proposes to dispose of this writ petition by directing the Secretary, Department of Finance, to consider the question of re-fixation of the pension of the petitioners and their retirement benefits at par with post 1986 pensioners and in accordance with the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment. The Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of West Bengal is directed to dispose of the same within a period of 3 months from communication of this order, and is expected to pass a 'reasoned order', in disposing of the same. The Secretary, Department of Finance, is also directed to give opportunity to Nirmalya Chatterjee, General Secretary, Government Pensioners' Association, West Bengal, petitioner No. 2 herein, to represent the said Association, before him." 2. Pursuant to the said direction the respondent by an order dated 30.4.1993 rejected the contention of the petitioners. 3. Mr. Chakraborty the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from the impugned order it would appear that the contemner/respondent has committed an illegality. In so far as he failed to take into consideration the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in (1) D. S. Nakara v. Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 , as was directed by this Court in the aforementioned order. The learned Counsel submitted that the State in its affidavit-in-opposition filed in the main writ application had admitted that these employees who had retired prior to 1.1.1986 had been getting lessor amount of pension than those who have retired after 1.1.1986; although the difference was not substantial. The learned Counsel further submits that from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the contemner/respondent, it would appear that deponent thereof allegedly took into consideration a decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Union of India v. P. N. Menon & Ors. since reported in AIR 1994 SC 2221 which is evidently wrong inasmuch as the said decision was rendered one year after the impugned order was passed. since reported in AIR 1994 SC 2221 which is evidently wrong inasmuch as the said decision was rendered one year after the impugned order was passed. The learned Counsel contends that keeping in view the chart as stated in the affidavit-in-reply to the said affidavit-in-opposition, it would appear that the members of the petitioner-association would not get the same amount of pension which the employees retiring after 1.1.1986 would receive. 4. Mr. Jaidip Kar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contemner/respondent, however, submitted that Nakara's case (supra) has been distinguished by the Supreme Court in various decisions, namely, (3) Indian Ex-Service League & Ors. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 1182 : 1991 (2) SCC 104 and (4) Action Committee, South Eastern Railway Pensioners & Anr v. Union of India reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 544. The learned Counsel submits that the contemner/respondent cannot be said to have committed any contempt of this Court inasmuch as he has passed the impugned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to Sri Nirmalya Chatterjee, Secretary, Government Pensioners' Association within the stipulated time. The learned Counsel submits that in view of the definition of Civil contempt as contained in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, the contemner/respondent cannot be said to have violated this Court's order inasmuch as there is no wilful disobedience therein. Relying on a decision of this Court in (5) S. K. Saha & Another v. Gokul Chandra Dhara reported in 1987(1) CHN 446 the learned Counsel contends that a bona fide order which although may not be legally sustainable would not amount to an act of contempt. 5. The only question which thus arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent is liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of this order dated 22.1.1993 or not. 6. The contention of the petitioner in the writ application was that a uniform rule of calculation of pension of pre-1986 pensioners was required to be framed by treating them at par with post 1986 pensioners in the light of a judgment of Nakara's case (supra). It was urged that calculation of amount of pension payable to the members of petitioners' association was vioiative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. It was urged that calculation of amount of pension payable to the members of petitioners' association was vioiative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. upon considering the submissions of the respective parties disposed of the matter in the manner as laid down hereinbefore. It also appears that B. P Banerjee, J. by his judgment dated 6th May, 1985, passed in C. O. No 6931(W)/84 (Government Pensioners' Association v. Government of West Bengal) passed a similar order. 8. In a contempt application, this Court is not concerned with the merit of the order. It is only to be seen as to whether the contemner/respondent violated the order dated 22.1.93 by Paritosh Kr. Mukherjee, J. or not. It is not disputed that the said order was communicated to the Finance Secretary in the first week of 1993. It is also not disputed that a personal hearing was given to Sri Nirmalya Chatterjee on 26th February, 1993 by the Contemner/respondent in relation whereto a notice dated 19th February, 1993 had been served on him. It is further not disputed that pursuant to the direction of this Court, the Finance Secretary has passed an order rejecting the claim of the petitioner by an order dated 30th April, 1993. The contemner/respondent has passed a speaking order. He upon taking into consideration the relevant rules recorded that the slab system has been abolished, and with effect from 1st January, 1986 the amount of pension is being calculated on the basis of 50% of the pay last drawn by the incumbent which principle has also been extended to pre-1986 pensioners. The revised scale of pay as par the recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission of Central Government was introduced with effect from 1.1.1986. He, therefore, held that those who are retired prior to that date could not have availed the benefit of fixation of the revised pay scales and thus their pension was calculated no the basis of un-revised pay. However, to protect their interest, the 4th Central Pay Commission evolved a formula to bring them on the same footing in terms whereof the revised pay scales were fixed on the basis of 608 point of the Consumer Price Index, that is to say, all Dearness elements sanctioned upto 608 point C. P. I. were merged with the unrevised pay. However, to protect their interest, the 4th Central Pay Commission evolved a formula to bring them on the same footing in terms whereof the revised pay scales were fixed on the basis of 608 point of the Consumer Price Index, that is to say, all Dearness elements sanctioned upto 608 point C. P. I. were merged with the unrevised pay. The State Government adopted the policy decision of the Central Government for pre-1.8.86 pensioners bringing their pension at 608 point C. P. I., pursuant whereto the Government order No. 7532-F, dated 6.7.88 was issued. It has further been noticed that the State Government also adopted a similar mode of fixation and followed the same principle in the matter of determination of pension in relation to both pre and post 1.1.86 and followed the same principle as adopted by the Central Government. He, therefore, opined that the Government has taken suitable steps to remove disparity and discrimination among all classes of pensioners irrespective of the date of their retirement. He further noticed that the State Government has always followed the Central Government's decision regarding the extension of retirement benefit from time to time. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that the contemner/respondent has complied with the order of this Court fully and effectively. The petitioner may feel aggrieved by the said order but the same, in my opinion, does not give rise to a cause of action for initiation of any proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act. 9. 'Contempt of Court' to speak generally may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and the administration of the law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants, their witnesses during the litigation. Before a person can be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, it has to be established that the violation of an order passed by any competent Court of law was wilful and deliberate. 10. It is now well settled that the Court has to exercise caution while invoking its jurisdiction under the said Act. 11. The very definition of Civil Contempt postulates wilful disobedience of any judgment. 12. An error, if any, on the part of the contemner in his action pursuant to the judgment will not amount to civil contempt unless such disobedience is wilful. 13. 11. The very definition of Civil Contempt postulates wilful disobedience of any judgment. 12. An error, if any, on the part of the contemner in his action pursuant to the judgment will not amount to civil contempt unless such disobedience is wilful. 13. In S. K. Saha & Another v. Gokul Chandra Dhara reported in 1987(1) CHN 446 it has been held:–– The explanation offered by the appellants in this regard was that such payment was made to him to comply with the extent rules. The explanation of the appellants may not also be corrected but then in the final analysis the question of bona fides about the interpretation given by the appellants comes in. It is of course true that in given case a recalcitrant person may try to circumvent an order or the Court by giving it a patently wrong and untenable interpretation and taking a plea of mistaken interpretation in a proceeding for contempt. But the acceptability of such a plea as a bona fide one would depend on the facts of a particular case. 14. Nakara's case (supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Chakraborty was rendered in absolutely a different fact situation. In that case, on May 25, 1979, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, issued an office memorandum whereby the formula for computation of pension was liberalised but it was made applicable to Government servant who were in service on March 31, 1979 and retired from Service on or after that date. In other words, the said liberalised scheme was brought about in the existing 1972 Rules and the employees covered thereunder but the effect thereof was given from a specified date as a result whereof, a class of employees were exempted from the said liberalisation formula introduced to the 1972 Rules. As a result of introduction of the said new scheme, the earlier measure of pension being average emolument of 36 months' service just preceding the date of retirement. This was coupled with a slab system for computation. The Supreme Court struck down the date with effect from which the said formula was made applicable and held that the liberalisation formula introduced to the 1972 Rules should be made applicable to all the employees who come under the said Rules. This was coupled with a slab system for computation. The Supreme Court struck down the date with effect from which the said formula was made applicable and held that the liberalisation formula introduced to the 1972 Rules should be made applicable to all the employees who come under the said Rules. This was done since as a result of introduction of the liberalised formula, a section of employees whose average emolument of last 10 months of their service was been taken would have received a higher pension than those in whose case the formula of 36 months' average emolument was being calculated. The Supreme Court while discussing the case pointed out that it was violative of Article 14 introducing discrimination amongst the retired employees. 15. The Supreme Court itself has distinguished the said decision on a number of occasions. 16. In The Indian Ex-Services League & Ors. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 1182 , the Apex Court held that the decision in Nakara's case has to be read as one of limited application and its ambit cannot be enlarged to cover all claims made by the pension retirees. The Supreme Court in that case dismissed the claim of the petitioners of "one-rank-one pension" for all retirees. 17. In Action Committee, South Eastern Railway Pensioners &, Anr. v. Union of India reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 544 the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in (6) Krishna Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1990(4) SCC 207 wherein Nakara's case wall distinguished in the following terms:–– "Thus the Court treated the pension retirees only as a homogeneous class. The P. F. retirees were not in mind. The Court also clearly observed that while so reading down it was not dealing with any fund and here was no question of the same sake being divided amongst larger number of the pensioners than would have been under the notification with respect to the specified date. All the pensioners governed by the 1972 Rules were treated as a class because payment of pension was a continuing obligation on the part of the State till the death of each of the pensioners and, unlike the case of Contributory Provident Fund, there was no question of a fund in liberalising pension. The argument of Mr. All the pensioners governed by the 1972 Rules were treated as a class because payment of pension was a continuing obligation on the part of the State till the death of each of the pensioners and, unlike the case of Contributory Provident Fund, there was no question of a fund in liberalising pension. The argument of Mr. Shanti Bhusan is that the State's obligation towards pension retirees is the same as that towards P. F. retirees. That may be morally so. But that was not the ratio decidendi of Nakara's case. Legislation has not said so. To say so legally would amount to legislation by enlarging the circumference of the obligation and converting a moral obligation". 18. In that case, the petitioner had been contending that the pensioners who had retired before 31st March, 1985 were entitled to merger of dearness allowance with dearness pay on the ground that other pensioners who retired prior to 31st March, 1985 and are getting D. A. in addition to their pension on account of Price Index level going high. The Supreme Court categorically held that the petitioners thereof formed a different class from whose who were continuing in service on or after 31st March, 1985. 19. In (7) State of U. P v. U. P. University Colleges Pensioners' Association reported in AIR 1994 SC 2311 , the Apex Court observed :–– "In so far as his submission relating to the basis of computation of pension, we would observe that in principle we do not find any objection in computing the pension on the basis of last pay drawn at the age of 58 years. This is for the reason that demand of the Association being basically grounded on the better pensionary benefit available to Government teachers, the State was amply justified, while considering the question of liberalising the pension qua the aided teachers to peg the computation of pension with reference to the pay at the age of 58 years, which is the retirement age of Government teachers. This apart, as to how much of liberalisation should have been concerned is a matter of policy and if the Government decided to go as far as visualized by the G.O. of 28.4.80, it is not open to any Court to interfere with the same, as the policy contained in the G.O. cannot be said to be either unreasonable or against public interest, which are the only two grounds available to a Court to interfere with a policy matter while reviewing the same judicially." 20. In (8) Mafatlal Group Staff Association & Ors. v. Regional Commissioner, Provident Fund & Ors reported in AIR 1994 SC 2271 the Supreme Court distinguished Nakara's case (supra) saying :–– "Be that as it may, we find no substance in the said attack. Here is a Scheme newly being introduced. Those who come after the introduction of the Scheme do become members of the Provident Fund are free to become members of the Pension fund or not. This is not an uncommon feature. Both of them represent two distinct categories. The reliance on the decision of this Court in D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 is misplaced. That was a case where a class of retired employees was sought to be deprived of the benefit of liberalised Pension Rules on the only ground that they had retired prior to a particular date. Here, in this case, no one is being deprived of the benefit of the new Scheme. All that the option means is that if any employee who is already a member of the Provident Fund Scheme that, having regard the number of years of service put in by him and/or for other reasons, it is not beneficial for him to join the Family Pension Scheme, he can stay out. While judging the validity of such Scheme one should not pick out an individual instance––not representing the generality of the situation––and make it the basis. One has to take an overall view, i.e., whether it is beneficial to the class concerned as a whole or not." 21. In Union of India v. P. N. Menon & Ors. While judging the validity of such Scheme one should not pick out an individual instance––not representing the generality of the situation––and make it the basis. One has to take an overall view, i.e., whether it is beneficial to the class concerned as a whole or not." 21. In Union of India v. P. N. Menon & Ors. reported in AIR 1994 SC 2221 a copy whereof has been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the contemner/respondent, the Supreme Court was concerned with a Government Memorandum dated 25th May, 1979 treating a portion of the dearness allowance, as pay for the purpose of retirement benefits in respect of Government servants who retired on or after the 30th September, 1977. The writ petitioners who retired from service before 30th September, 1977 contended that the said benefits should have been extended to all retired Government servants, irrespective of their date of superannuation. The Supreme Court upon considering its earlier decisions observed :–– "According to us, for the reasons disclosed on behalf of the appellant-Union of India for fixing 30th September, 1977 as the cut off date, which date was fixed when the price index level was 272, cannot be held to be arbitrary. The decision to merge a part of the dearness allowance with pay, when the price index level was at 272, appears to have been taken on basis of the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission. As such it cannot be held that the cut off date has been selected in an arbitrary manner. Not only in matters of revising the pensionary benefits, but even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut off date on some rational or reasonable basis, has to be fixed for extending the benefits. This can be illustrated. The Government decides to revise the pay-scale of its employees and fixes the 1st day of January of the next year for implementing the same or the 1st day of January of the last year. In either case, a big section or its employees are bound to miss the said revision of the scale of pay, having superannuated before that date. An employee, who has retired on 31st December of the year in question will miss that pay-scale only by a day, which may affect his pensionary benefits throughout his life. In either case, a big section or its employees are bound to miss the said revision of the scale of pay, having superannuated before that date. An employee, who has retired on 31st December of the year in question will miss that pay-scale only by a day, which may affect his pensionary benefits throughout his life. No scheme can be held to be fullproof, so as to cover and keep in view all persons who were at one time in active service. As such the concern of the Court should only be, while examining any such grievance, to see, as to whether a particular date for extending a particular benefit or scheme, has been fixed, on objective and rational considerations." 22. The said decision applies in all fours to the fact of the present case. It is true that the said decision has been rendered on 17.3.1994 i.e. after the impugned order was passed but in a supplementary affidavit the deponent has clearly stated that the statements made in paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-opposition with regard to the said decision was clearly erroneous. 23. Yet again in (9) State of West Bengal v. Ratan Behari Dey reported in 1994(1) Cal. LT (SC) 9, the Apex Court distinguished Nakara's case (supra) and followed, inter alia, its judgment in (10) Susma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1985(3) SCR 243 and Krishna Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1990(4) SCC 207 . In that case, the writ petitioners claimed application of a regulation known as Corporation of Calcutta Employees (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit Regulations, 1982 which carne into force from 1st April, 1977 to all those employees who retired prior to 1st April, 1977. This High Court relying on the decision in Nakara's case (supra) granted the said reliefs. The aforementioned decision of this Court was reversed by the Supreme Court holding :–– "As rightly pointed out in Krishna Kumar, Nakara was a case where an artificial date was specified classifying the retirees, governed by the same Rules and similarly situated, into two different classes, depriving one such class of the benefit of liberalised Pension Rules. It was found in that case that the specification of the date from which the liberalised Rules were to come into force) was arbitrary. It was found in that case that the specification of the date from which the liberalised Rules were to come into force) was arbitrary. Whereas in this case, the employees retiring prior to April 1, 1977 and those retiring thereafter were governed by different sets of Rules. The argument to the contrary may mean that the Government can never change the conditions of service relating to retiral benefits with effect from a particular date. No such absolute proposition can be stated that while effecting any such change, no date from which such change will come into force can be specified. As stated above, a date can be prescribed but such date should not be drawn in such a manner as to bring about discrimination between persons situated similarly i.e., in a manner violative of Article 14". 24. Yet recently in (11) Union of India v. B. Rama Murthy reported in JT 1995(2) SC 539, the Supreme Court held :–– "The benefit of the O. M. is to facilitate calculation of 10 months' average pay for the purpose of pension. Earlier, only 3/10th of the 10 months average pay was computed for pension. Under the impugned order in para 3(iii) of the O. M. dated May 25, 1979, the computation would be 5/10th i.e. half of the dearness pay for the purpose of computation of pension. In other words, the O. M. is more beneficial for the pensioner rather than earlier computation. Whether the notification is justified and valid in law, was considered by a Bench of this Court in (12) State of Rajasthan v. Seva Nivatra Karamchari Hitkari Samiti, 1995(1) SCALE 40 wherein it was held that the ratio in Nakara's case has no bearing in this matter and the introduction of the rule is not arbitrary or capricious. It is permissible to introduce different retiral benefit schemes for Government servants as indicated in the decisions held by this Court in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, 1994(4) SCC 207 , Indian Ex-service League v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1182 , and (13) State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Pensioner Samaj, AIR 1991 SC 1743 ". 25. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that D. S. Nakara's case is applicable where a date has been fixed arbitrarily. 25. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that D. S. Nakara's case is applicable where a date has been fixed arbitrarily. In this case the cut off date 1.1.86 is based upon the date of coming into force of the revised scale of pay. Those who have retired after 1.1.86 cannot get the benefit of the revised scale of pay. They form a distinct class. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, no discrimination has been meeted out to the petitioners. 26. In any view of the matter the contemner cannot be said to have wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court. This application is, therefore, dismissed and the Rule issued as against the petitioner is discharged. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.