R. K. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision at the instance of the informant, Buli Dei, in G. R. Case No. 651 of 1989 has been preferred against the judgment of the learned Magistrate First Class, Khurda, acquitting accused persons from the offences U/ss. 294/354/34 IPC. ( 2 ) SHORN of unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that on 12-9-1989 evening when the informant was shouting regarding theft of three yokes from her house, accused Krushna Mohan Pahadsingh being followed by his brother Braja Mohan Pahadsingh, the other accused, came from their house and abused her in filthy language. To this when the informant protested, accused Krushna Mohan having undressed himself dragged her cloth, as a result, she becomes naked. This incident, according to the informant had been witnessed by Purnachandra Samantray and Gajendra Baliarsingh. Against such illegal act of the accused, she lodged a written report to the police, whereupon, investigation was taken up and on conclusion thereof, chargesheet was placed against both the accused to stand their trial under Sections 294/354/34, IPC. ( 3 ) PLEA of the accused is one of denial and false implication due to previous enmity. ( 4 ) TO bring home the charge to accused, the prosecution examined four witnesses and the learned Magistrate on appraisal of the evidence came to hold that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and having held thus acquitted the accused persons, and it is against that order of acquittal, the informant has come up before this Court in the present revision. ( 5 ) SINCE the case was instituted on police report and the State having not chosen to prefer appeal, the informant has filed the revision assailing the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial court. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of revisional power under Section 401, Cr. P. C. against an order of acquittal can interfere in extraordinary circumstance where there is glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice. On several occasions, it has been decided by the Supreme Court as to the scope and jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of power of revision under Section 401, Cr. P. C. (Section 439 of the Old Code ). On several occasions, it has been decided by the Supreme Court as to the scope and jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of power of revision under Section 401, Cr. P. C. (Section 439 of the Old Code ). In this connection, it is desirable to refer to the decision in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla. AIR 1951 SC 196 : 52 Cri LJ 510 where it was observed that :"the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complaint against an under of acquittal against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. The jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. " ( 6 ) FURTHER reference may be made to the case of Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas AIR 1951 SC 316 : 52 Cri LJ 1248 : 1951 All LJ 603 where it was held :"though Sub-Section (1) of Section 439 authorises the High Court to exercise, in its discretion, any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by Section 423, Sub-Section (4) specifically excludes the power to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court could in the absence of any error on a point of law re-appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stopped short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him. By merely characterising the judgment of the trial court as 'perverse and lacking in perspective' the High Court cannot reverse pure findings of fact based on the trial court's appreciation of the evidence in the case. By merely characterising the judgment of the trial court as 'perverse and lacking in perspective' the High Court cannot reverse pure findings of fact based on the trial court's appreciation of the evidence in the case. " ( 7 ) IN K. Chinaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963 Cri LJ 8) the Apex Court proceeded to define the limits of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while setting aside an order of acquittal and held that :". . . . . THIS jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases when there is some glaring defect in the procedure and there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. . . . It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional case which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some case of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be : where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. " ( 8 ) ALL the above decisions were followed in the case of Khetran Basi Semal v. State of Orissa etc. , AIR 1970 SC 272 : 1970 Cri LJ 309. In that case, two proceedings for the self-same incident were initiated; one by the police and other by way of private plaint. Both the cases were clubbed together and, after a protracted trial, the accused persons being not found guilty were acquitted. Against that order of acquittal, complainant filed appeal to the High Court. Upon hearing, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal of seven accused persons and held them guilty and consequently sentenced them to undergo imprisonment ranging from three to six months. Against that order of acquittal, complainant filed appeal to the High Court. Upon hearing, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal of seven accused persons and held them guilty and consequently sentenced them to undergo imprisonment ranging from three to six months. Against that order of the High Court, the convicted accused persons approached the Supreme Court. The evidence of three witnesses, which the learned Magistrate on scrutiny refused to rely upon to support the prosecution case, was accepted by the High Court, as a result, order of acquittal was set aside. The procedure of reappraisal of evidence in an appeal against the acquittal was not approved by the Supreme Court since it is impermissible under law. ( 9 ) KEEPING in view the settled principles of law as discussed above, it is to be seen in the present case whether the learned Magistrate overlooked any material evidence resulting in unmerited acquittal of the accused persons. It may be stated that the prosecution, in all, examined four witnesses. Of them, informant, P. W. 2 in cross-examination admitted that her son Rabi married the daughter of accused's sister-in-law in spite of her protest and that after marriage Rabi has been residing separately. In view of such strained relationship, trial court was not inclined to put reliance on her testimony without there being any independent corroboration. The prosecution examined two other witnesses, namely, P. Ws. 1 and 3 who no other than informant's labourer and son respectively. P. W. 1 can be termed as a chance witness since because his house is situate about 50 cubits away from the place of incident. It is the prosecution case that the incident occurred in front of informant's house and so it was expected of the neighbours to witness the same. So, any of the neighbours ought to have been examined by the prosecution to prove its case. But instead, it chose to examine P. W. 1, on whose evidence the trial court refused to put implicit reliance. Further the learned Magistrate while assessing the evidence of P. W. s also doubted the prosecution case, since no motive was ascribed for the accused to commit the alleged crime. Added to it, he also noticed discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses and so was not inclined to accept the same on its face value. Further the learned Magistrate while assessing the evidence of P. W. s also doubted the prosecution case, since no motive was ascribed for the accused to commit the alleged crime. Added to it, he also noticed discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses and so was not inclined to accept the same on its face value. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the trial court being based on appreciation of the evidence. I am not inclined to interfere with the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. ( 10 ) IN view of my discussions made above, the revision having no merit is dismissed. Revision dismissed.