JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an Award of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, dated September 25, 1986, made in Reference (IT) No. 216 of 1983 under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. The Petitioner joined the erstwhile Burmah-Shell Company, on August 13, 1947 as a fitter and worked as such upto December 31, 1982. He was doing the job of maintenance in Burmah-Shell Co, in the areas from Dadar to Sion, in Greater Bombay. The erstwhile Burmah-Shell Company was taken over by Bharat Refineries Limited and its name was changed to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and the Petitioner continued in service as an employee of First Respondent. On the basis of the records maintained, the First Respondent retired the Petitioner from service on December, 31, 1982 on the ground that he had attained 58 years of age, which was the age of superannuation. Some time in March 1982 itself, the petitioner has been given an advance notice that he would retire at the end of 1982. As soon as he got the notice, the Petitioner made a number of representations to the First Respondent alleging that the record of his date of birth maintained by the First Respondent was erroneous. He had also filed Writ Petition 2751 of 1982 in this Court to restrain the First Respondent, a Government Company from retiring him with effect from December 31, 1982, but the Petitioner's Writ Petition was summarily dismissed on the ground that alternate remedies were available to him. The first Respondent did not accept the Petitioner's representation that his correct date of birth was December 27, 1926 and that he should be allowed upto December 27, 1984. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute regarding the date of birth and that dispute was processed under the Industrial Disputes Act, and resulted in Reference (IT) No. 216 of 1983. 3. The parties appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, filed their respective pleadings and led voluminous documentary and oral evidence. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute regarding the date of birth and that dispute was processed under the Industrial Disputes Act, and resulted in Reference (IT) No. 216 of 1983. 3. The parties appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, filed their respective pleadings and led voluminous documentary and oral evidence. Upon assessment of all the material on record, the Industrial Tribunal, by the impugned Award, took the view that the First Respondent could not be directed to accept the date of birth shown on the E.S.I. Identity Card issued by the E.S.I. Authority as the authentic record for the purpose of determining the age of superannuation of the Petitioner or for correcting the age of superannuation as on record. In this view of the matter, the Industrial Tribunal refused relief to the Petitioner and rejected the reference. Hence this writ petition. 4. Mr. Joglekar, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, contends that the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in law in not accepting the E.S.I.S. Card as determinative record maintained by the First Respondent as it clearly showed that the date of birth of the Petitioner was December 27, 1926 and that the Petitioner ought to have been continued in service upto December 27, 1984. He contended that under settlement dated December 19, 1979 between the First Respondent and the Bharat Petroleum Workmen's Union it was provided that the age of superannuation of the workmen shall be determined by reference to the Provident Fund and / or other records of the Company which shall be considered as authoritative and final for the purpose, but the First Respondent had chosen to rely only on the Provident Fund record maintained by the Company in which the year of birth was given as 1924' while the E.S.I.S. Identity Card supplied to the Petitioner clearly mentioned the date of birth as 'December 27, 1926', which was also the date mentioned in the Baptism Certificate maintained by him. In these circumstances, he strongly criticised the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as perverse. 5. In my view, the issue before the Industrial Tribunal was very simple. On the material placed before it, the Industrial Tribunal had to decide whether the petitioner had been able to prove that his date of birth was December 27, 1926. In these circumstances, he strongly criticised the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as perverse. 5. In my view, the issue before the Industrial Tribunal was very simple. On the material placed before it, the Industrial Tribunal had to decide whether the petitioner had been able to prove that his date of birth was December 27, 1926. Though the Petitioner produced a School Leaving Certificate, it was challenged and as the Petitioner did not care to prove the said document, the Industrial Court placed no reliance on it. The Petitioner produced his Baptism Certificate, which did show the date of birth as December 27, 1926. The Industrial Tribunal held the said Baptism certificate to be a fabricated document and has given elaborate reasons for refusing to rely on the said document, The Tribunal also castigated the Petitioner as unreliable witness, who made reckless statements on oath without any regard to truth. The Baptism Certificate was of no avail. The only other document produced by the Petitioner was the E.S.I.S. Identity Card, the evidentiary value of which needs to be scrutinised. 6. Under Regulation 17 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations 1950 the appropriate Office shall arrange to have an Identity Card prepared in Form 4, for each person in respect of whom an Insurance number is allotted and shall send all such Identity Cards to the employer. The employer shall, if and when the employee has been in his service for 13 weeks, obtain the signature or thumb-impression of the concerned employee on the Identity Card and shall, after making relevant entries thereon, deliver the Identity Card to him. The employer shall obtain a receipt from the employee for the Identity Card. The Identity Card in respect of an employee, who has left employment before 13 weeks shall not be given to him, but shall be returned to the appropriate Office as soon as possible. A Card shall not be transferable. A perusal of Regulation 17 and Form 4 does not indicate that the Identity Card issued under Regulations 17 is treated as the Employer's record. Prima facie it is the record of the E.S.I.S. Corporation, albeit, that it is authenticated by the Employer so as to indicate the connection of the Employer with the concerned Employee. A perusal of Regulation 17 and Form 4 does not indicate that the Identity Card issued under Regulations 17 is treated as the Employer's record. Prima facie it is the record of the E.S.I.S. Corporation, albeit, that it is authenticated by the Employer so as to indicate the connection of the Employer with the concerned Employee. There is no evidence placed on record by the Petitioner to indicate as to by whom, under what circumstances and on the basis of which document, his date of birth came to be entered as December 27, 1926 in the Identity Card issued by the E.S.I. Corporation. 7. As against the said doubtful document, the First Respondent placed reliance on a Form of Declaration dated March 22, 1948 taken from the Petitioner when he became a member of the Labour Provident Fund of the Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited. The said document is in the hand of the petitioner and signed by him in which, against the column "Date of Birth", the Petitioner in his own hand writing had written the figures "1924". Though the words "about" have been inserted therein by some one, the evidence on record does not indicate as to who wrote the said word. What is surprising is that the Petitioner, a Christian by religion, who can write English and seems to possess sufficient common sense to understand the difference between the year of birth and the date of birth, did not write his exact date of birth in the Provident Fund declaration Form, even though he knew his date of birth when he sent the declaration form on March 22, 1948. Apart from the said document, the First Respondent also relied on the service card of the Petitioner in which all particulars of the employee are entered. Here also the year of birth is indicated as 1924. Apart from the said document, the First Respondent also relied on the service card of the Petitioner in which all particulars of the employee are entered. Here also the year of birth is indicated as 1924. In view of the provisions contained in the settlement dated December 19, 1979, which clearly provides that the age of superannuation of the workmen "shall be determined by reference to the provident fund and/or other records of the company which shall be considered as authoritative and final for the purpose, and that the procedure as regards retirement shall be the same as set out in the settlement dated May 28, 1959 between the parties", the Industrial Tribunal had no difficulty in holding that the First Respondent was justified in treating 1982 as the year of retirement of the Petitioner. Desperate attempts made by the Petitioner by relying on the Baptism Certificate, which the Industrial Tribunal held to be a fabricated document, and his oral evidence, which the Industrial Tribunal suggests is nothing short of false, was all the evidence produced by the Petitioner in his own support. In these circumstances, if the Industrial Tribunal chose to believe the First Respondent's version arid returned a finding that the year of Petitioner's birth was 1924, I find it difficult to fault the Tribunal 's reasoning. Once it was held that the year of birth of the Petitioner is 1924, then there was no difficulty for the First Respondent to retire the Petitioner from service in the year 1982, after he had completed the age of 58 years. No fault could be found in the action of the First Respondent in this regard. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Joglekar, learned Advocate for the Petitioner, that the Industrial Tribunal should have gone by the solitary entry in the E.S.I.S. Identity Card and ignored the rest of the evidence. Clause (3) of the Settlement dated December 19, 1979 primarily refers to the Provident Fund record and then to other records maintained by the Company. In my judgment, what the First Respondent did was perfectly justified in law and there was no ground to interfere with its action. The Industrial Tribunal was justified in its finding in favour of the First Respondent and rejecting totally the case sought to be made out by the Petitioner. 8. In my judgment, what the First Respondent did was perfectly justified in law and there was no ground to interfere with its action. The Industrial Tribunal was justified in its finding in favour of the First Respondent and rejecting totally the case sought to be made out by the Petitioner. 8. I see no merit in the petition which deserves to be dismissed. Petition dismissed and rule discharged with no order as to costs.